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We are proud to say that this third volume of Specula-tions needs very little support 
from our editorial introduction. We have done our best to 
collect, in the pages that follow, outstanding contributions 
covering a wide range of topics (from the philosophy of 
religion to psychoanalysis, from the philosophy of science 
to gender studies), formats (articles, interviews, position 
pieces, translations and review essays) and authors (from 
well-published authors to the best among a new generation 
of philosophers).
We would like to thank all the contributors and the peer 
reviewers for their patient collaboration during the editorial 
phase. We are also very grateful to the Atelier de métaphy-
sique et d’ontologie contemporaines at the École Normale 
Supérieure, and their group of English translators (Mark 
Ohm, Leah Orth, Jon Cogburn and Emily Beck) for allowing 
us to publish the translation of one of their publications.
Finally, we like to think that, with each new issue, Specula-
tions grows and develops its own peculiar identity as more 
than just another academic journal: a space for the appraisal 
of, and critical reflection upon, the contemporary and ever-
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developing philosophical scene. It is an ambitious aim, but 
there can be no speculations without a modicum of audac-
ity. We hope you’ll enjoy reading this new materialization 
of the Speculations project with as much excitement as we 
experienced while we were assembling it.
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Re-asking the Question                            
of the Gendered Subject after 
Non-Philosophy1
Benjamin Norris
The New School for Social Research, New York
Is a science of (non-)gender Identity constitution possible? What would be the object and proper 
method of this science? And, most importantly, what new 
spaces of (non-)philosophical investigation can be opened 
in light of such an analysis? 
At some point in time during its perpetual production 
and proliferation of problems, philosophy stumbled across a 
problem it called “the subject.” As time passed and philosophy 
1 Three people in particular made this paper possible in its present form. I 
would first like to thank Professor Alan Bass, as much of the reading of Freud 
contained herein is largely influenced by his work and lectures. Although he 
is only directly cited once, his work on Freud and Derrida is responsible for 
my focus on the primacy of time and disavowal in Freud’s thought. I would 
secondly like to thank Anthony Paul Smith for his criticisms and comments 
on the first two drafts of this paper. It is hard to come by informed and in-
sightful feedback on Laruelle, especially in America (even in “continental” 
circles), and my understanding of Laruelle and hopefully the engagement 
with his work contained herein has been exponentially increased and aided 
by way of Anthony’s help. Finally, I would like to thanks Professor Richard J. 
Bernstein for encouraging me to pursue my diverse interests in philosophy, 
including my work with Laruelle. He’s says he’ll “make a pragmatist out of 
me one day” and I in turn hope to convince him that non-philosophy is in 
spirit not that far from the work of thinkers like Peirce and Dewey.
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roared on, the question of the subject has taken many differ-
ent forms, been approached with many different methods 
and has yielded incredibly diverse and distinct answers.We 
have now come to a point where we no longer need to ask 
philosophically “what is the subject?” and “how is the subject’s 
individuality constituted?” but instead ask non-philosophically 
“how has philosophy produced its hypotheses, conditioned 
its methods and pre-determined its conclusions regarding 
the subject?” 
In the following, I will show that a non-philosophical analysis, 
as a form of rigorous and scientific analysis of philosophical 
problems, can point toward a science that investigates the 
fractal nature of the temporal (non-)interaction between 
the transcendental and the empirical selves. By bypassing 
the “empirico-transcendental” philosophical deadlock one 
can produce new and expansive (explosive even) methods 
of theorizing gender identity as always at once a playful, gen-
erative experiment and a unique unity that can provided an 
immediate site of resistance toward external (and internal) 
negative determinations. Non-philosophy affords us the seem-
ingly contradictory ability to fall to neither a transcendent 
universalizing of gender by way of static categories that are 
then applied to individuals and distinct subjects, nor to a 
destruction of a unitary self that never persists in the wake of 
the flux and contingency of experience and thus marks the 
opportunity for the much needed expansion of the discourses 
driving theoretical feminisms, queer theories and, more gen-
erally, theories of subjective individuation and constitution.
I proceed in four parts. Part I is a non-genealogy, influenced 
by the non-philosophical method, of the philosophical per-
mutations of the question of the subject. Part II explicitly 
introduces François Laruelle into the discussion and attempts 
to begin articulating the new spaces of study non-philosophy 
opens in the discourse of the subject. Part III builds on the 
opening developed in Part II in order to argue that a science 
of (non-)gender Identity constitution must psychoana-
lytically interpret the productive nature of an unconscious 
structured by a fractalized temporal inner sense. Part IV will 
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then compare and contrast the account provided in Part III 
to a more “traditional” non-philosophical understanding 
of the unilateral relationship between a temporally driven 
unconscious, Identity and the Real.
Part I The (non-)Genealogy
In his extensive study of philosophies of difference, Laruelle 
warns the reader that “we do not pursue here the absurd 
project [...], of showing that Derrida ‘amounts to the same 
thing’ as Nietzsche or even Heidegger.”2 Here I will follow a 
similar method circling around the question of the subject 
instead of the question of difference. Although I will point 
out structural similarities between the seven thinkers dis-
cussed, it will be shown that these similarities are a result 
of the philosophical decision itself and not the result of a 
direct influence between the thinkers. “In general” Laru-
elle writes, “a philosophical decision is a cut—repeated or 
relaunched—with regard to an empirical singular, or more 
generally, some given and, at the same time, an identification 
with an idealizing law of this given, itself supposed as real, a 
transcendence towards a veritable real.”3 The philosophical 
decision, in an attempt to achieve the “philosophizable-all” 
(the “telos” of the principle of sufficient philosophy) is driven 
time and time again to universalize contingent givens and 
attribute to them a privileged access to the real and the true. 
The singular example is subsumed under the universal law, 
creating a dueling relationship of co-determination and 
auto-legitimation. What sets non-philosophy apart from 
this vicious philosophical circle that auto-affirms itself is 
its ability to isolate and then separate the empirical and the 
ideal, or the given and the idealizing law of the given, by way 
of an acceptance of the radically foreclosed nature of the Real. 
The non-philosopher is relieved of her passion for the real 
2 François Laruelle, Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-




by thinking alongside the Real, (of) the Real and not of the 
Real. Laruelle writes that “The hiatus between the empirical 
and the ideal, which we have posited the possibility of lifting 
(in the form of an a priori relation, before then lifting it re-
ally through the passage to transcendental essence), is now 
definitively re-opened and lets a new kind of gap be glimpsed 
that is no longer that of the empirical and the ideal, or of 
empiricism and rationalism.”4
The non-decisional genealogy of the question of the subject 
in its various philosophical permutations can allow us to both 
identify and subsequently break philosophy’s self-created 
empirico-transcendental deadlock regarding the question 
of the subject, and more particularly the gendered subject. 
This will be a non-genealogy in the sense that it will posit 
the equivalence of all the individual philosophical decisions 
discussed. The history of the question of the subject to be 
traced can be tentatively characterized as a continuing battle 
between the transcendent and the immanent in which the two 
categories oscillate, re-define and subordinate one another. By 
immanent I mean any theory that defines identity in terms 
of a flux of empirical and/or virtual elements that are self-
organized by way of repetition and cannot be reduced to a 
universal, unexperienced category. By transcendent I mean 
any theory of identity that appeals to a universal, external and 
never experienced, “true” self. I will introduce the extremes 
of the immanent/transcendent stories of the subject to be 
traced later on by beginning with a contrasting of Descartes’ 
individually discovered and purely transcendent cogito with 
Hume’s decentralized and purely immanent self. I will then 
move to Kant and his attempt to preserve both Descartes’ 
cogito as well as acknowledge Hume’s theory regarding the 
flux of the immanent self. Here Kant presents himself with 
a problem: how can one reconcile the chaotic empirical self 
with the universal and transcendental self? We will see that 
introduction of time as a productive inner sense and “me-
diator” between the seemingly irreconcilable Cartesian and 
4 Laruelle, Philosophies of Difference, 198 [emphasis added, B.N.].
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Humean selves was an invention of Kant’s that opens a strange, 
and incredibly relevant, “third space.” Next, in Husserl and 
Sartre, we will witness how the transcendental ego is lost in 
light of Sartre’s analysis of Husserl in The Transcendence of 
the Ego. This loss of the transcendental ego in Sartre’s early 
existentialism provides the space for all following theories of 
the de-centered, fragmented and/or “deconstructed” subject. 
Here the immanent seems to re-establishes primacy over 
the transcendent. The primacy of immanence, postulated by 
Hume and re-vitalized by Sartre retains its influence in the 
contemporary continental discourse on gender and identity. 
To exemplify this, I will briefly discuss the way Jacques Lacan 
and Judith Butler inherit and re-iterate this discourse and 
the limitations they inherit with it. This history will exem-
plify the role the “empirico-transcendental” philosophical 
deadlock has continuously played in discussions of subjective 
constitution and gender identity by extension.
In each analysis, we will not seek to argue for the validity or 
lack thereof in each account. We will instead seek to identify 
the “idealized law” or philosophically hallucinated tran-
scendental concept and the contingent “empirical singular” 
in each theory as well as point toward the new kind of gap 
opened by a non-philosophical analysis of the philosophical 
decision as it pertains to the question of the subject.
I Descartes
Some credit Descartes with the honor of being the father of 
the question of the subject. This original account is often 
seen, rightly in my view, as a radically one sided answer to 
this question. Quite simply, for Descartes “I am, then, in the 
strict sense only a thing that thinks, that is, I am a mind, or 
intelligence, or intellect, or reason [...] But for all that I am 
a thing which is real and truly exists. But what kind of a 
thing? As I have just said—a thinking thing.”5 By privileging 
5 Rene Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy” in Descartes selected 
Philosophical Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 27.
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the thinking self as the core of the subject, Descartes is infa-
mously lead to completely dismiss the body (“I am not that 
structure of limbs which is called a human body”6) and the 
empirical because it cannot live up to the same universality 
and indubitability as the transcendent and unchanging cogito. 
The body and its senses are fallible, for Descartes, and can thus 
not ground any certain theory of the subject. The question 
of the subject is here, at its origins, answered firmly in favor 
of the transcendent over the immanent. The thinking self is 
posited as the idealized and universal law and the body and 
senses are merely contingent manifestations subordinated 
to the self as a universal thinking thing.
II Hume
Hume’s theory of subjective constitution flattens all identity 
into a flux of empirical perceptions and passions and thus 
exemplifies the absolute opposite of a Cartesian thinking and 
unified self. Hume’s strict empiricism leads him to conclude 
that any idea of an identity or self that pre-exists and persists 
throughout all experience is simply a constructed fiction, 
based only in habit (repetition), custom and belief. There is 
no transcendent ground for the subject’s identity. The mind 
infers or ascribes an identity to an object when it observes 
only a gradual change in it. No impression of “Identity” is 
found in the object itself. It is instead only a product of the 
imagination relating different impressions to each other. The 
same thing holds true for personal identity. Beyond the im-
manent, there is no transcendent self: “the mind, in following 
the successive changes of the body, feels an easy passage from 
the surveying its condition in one moment to the viewing 
of another, and so at no time perceives any interruption in 
its actions. From which continu’d perception, it ascribes a 
continu’d existence and identity to the object.”7 We can only 
6 Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy,” 27.
7 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 1967), 256.
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infer and ascribe identity through artificial ideas that are not 
based on any simple impression found in experience.
Because there is no impression that corresponds to the 
idea of the self as universal and unchanging, Hume argues 
that the self is ultimately nothing more than a tumultuous 
collection of shifting passions and sensations; “I may ven-
ture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing 
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which 
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are 
in perpetual flux and movement.”8 We should recall that for 
Hume the very notion of an identity must be something 
fixed and unchanging throughout time. If the self is indeed 
nothing more than a changing flux of perceptions, then no 
such transcendent stability can be found. The point Hume is 
making is that when we ascribe to ourselves an Identity that 
depends on a concept of stability and universality, we lapse 
into a fictitious account. But if we are to instead consider the 
self as something that is the product, and not the producer, of 
changes in ideas, passions and perceptions over time, then 
we can speak of a self without contradiction.
What is important to draw out of Hume’s work on the self 
is that he attempts to completely dismiss any sort of tran-
scendent ground for a permanent self. For Hume, this self, 
as a fixed, stable and eternally self-identifying unity, cannot 
be found in the world and must therefore not exist at all. Any 
account of “self” as unified Identity is simply a fiction con-
structed by culture and produced by habituation. There are 
no secret or transcendent criteria that identity is measured 
against. Instead, experience internally produces customs and 
habits that constitute, in a largely contingent fashion, our 
conception of “self.” This means that gender could never be 
universally and permanently constitutive. Individuation, on 
this account, is an empirical contingency, following a flow of 
passions that is only categorized by contingent socio-cultural 
categories established and re-established through the habitual 
repetitions of belief and customs. Here the immanent flux 
8 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 252.
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of perceptions is the idealized law of the self and the plastic 
formation of habits and beliefs by way of repetition is the 
empirical contingent.9
III Kant
In an attempt to both grant to Hume that causality, space and 
time do not appear directly in experience but also hold that 
space and time are necessary conditions for experience Kant 
invents a transcendental idealism to deduce that space, time, 
cause and effect are still necessary in order for there to be 
any experience even if they are never present/presented in 
experience, as Hume’s copy-principle (ideas derived from 
impressions) would necessitate. Kant effectively bridges 
the two extremes of Descartes and Hume through the claim 
that the cogito is a necessary product of the transcendental 
imagination’s temporal structure. Kant claims that:
For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different repre-
sentations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of 
the subject. […] Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of 
given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to 
represent myself to the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. through-
out] these representations10
Here Kant identifies two aspects of consciousness. There is 
9 Hume gives us, in my opinion, the first true account of what will later 
come to be known as a philosophy of difference. His account of the influence 
of repetition on the contingency of beliefs and habits can in a way, unlike 
Descartes, account for both the iteration of the “illusion” (belief, habit) of 
the self as permanent identity based on alteration (the self as common 
wealth: “In this respect I cannot but compare the soul more properly to 
anything than to a republic or a common wealth, […] as the same republic 
may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in 
a like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as 
well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity” [Hume, Ibid., 
261]) accounting for the flux of the manifestation the “self” of individuals.
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 
2003), b 133.
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the diverse flux of empirical consciousness and the unify-
ing identity that is exposed not in experience but in the very 
fact that we can have unified representations of experience. 
The former can evade the later but is incomprehensible 
without it. In this characterization we are presented with 
a strict binary between empirical (lived experience) and 
transcendental (reflective and determinative abstraction). 
Kant retains from Hume the idea that our experience of 
ourselves is always diverse and variable. But Kant does add 
another “level” of consciousness that is necessary for there 
to be any account of experience at all. By creating the binary 
between transcendental and empirical consciousness Kant 
is left with the trouble of explaining how the transcendental 
consciousness can have any relation at all to the empirical 
consciousness. In order to bridge this gap, Kant turns to time, 
the inner sense. Kant claims that:
I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of 
combination; but in respect to the manifold which it has to combine 
I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, 
that this combination can be made intuitable only according to the 
relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of the under-
standing, strictly regulated.11
Any relation of my empirical self to my transcendental self 
is both guided by and limited by the inner sense of time. 
For Kant, the I that accompanies all experience yet is never 
presented in any particular experience is only generated 
and reveled through the combination of manifolds into 
representations in the unity of apperception. This process 
of combination is necessarily regulated by a time that is an 
a priori form of intuition that can never be captured as a 
concept of the understanding. Hence, time, as the produc-
tive connecter between the empirical and the transcendental 
consciousness, is both necessary for and inaccessible to the 
understanding. Time is a bridge between the un-bridgeable 
11 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, b 159.
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that can never be reduced to that which it bridges. As a pure 
form of intuition it never subordinates the transcendental to 
the empirical or vice versa. Time is here what will be called 
below a fractalized free-play of the “between-two.”
Several key aspects of the interplay between temporality 
and consciousness in Kant must be emphasized as they will 
become relevant in Part III of this paper. First, Kant preserves 
an element of Hume’s thought by emphasizing the diverse 
and variable nature of the empirical consciousness that is 
“without relation to the identity of the subject.” Secondly, 
identity is an accomplishment of the unification of a manifold 
through time as the inner sense, so Kant also retains a form 
of the necessary, universal yet never experienced self-created 
through a unique temporal synthesis. Third, although time as 
inner sense is the only source of our awareness of our tran-
scendental consciousness and the only form of interaction 
between the empirical and transcendental consciousness, 
this inner sense is an a priori form of intuition which is itself 
both beyond conceptualization by the understanding and 
never encountered in experience. And finally, this temporal 
synthesis must be understood as a very particular form of 
synthesis that, when reinterpreted in light of Laruelle’s work, 
can barely be called a synthesis. In a strange way, Kant allows 
for both a flux of the empirical self as well as a universal and 
unified “I” that accompanies all experiences yet is never in 
these experiences without subordinating one to the other 
automatically. The invention of time as an inner sense is, in 
my reading, the first glimpse of the gap non-philosophical 
analysis later opens. 
IV Husserl-Sartre
At this point I want to continue the non-genealogy and move 
on to the distinct shift that takes place in the discourse of 
the subject manifested in the existentialist innovation. The 
transition from Husserl to Sartre chronicles a return to a 
more Humean understanding of the self. Instead of arguing 
for a unified I that structures all experience while remaining 
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outside of experience, Sartre argues that it is experience itself 
that produces the ego. We once again return to a privileging 
of immanent or empirical criteria of personal constitution. 
The empirical no longer needs to be compared to or referred 
back to some category that is not experienced, in this case Hus-
serl’s transcendental ego. The discourse of the subject is at this 
point thrown in to the depth of the empirico-transcendental 
philosophical deadlock where it remains. 
The ego, in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, is transcendental 
and always outside of the world. Even though it is outside of 
the world, it shows itself through its various intentional acts 
toward objects. The ego then, through its decisions, shows 
itself in a style that presents or expresses a unified identity 
or personal character. The transcendental ego itself is per-
sonalized, in the sense that there is always an I that acts as 
a condition of possibility for experience, but there is also a 
personal character expressed in the world through the deci-
sions of the transcendental I that lives through the multiplicity 
of decisions. This ego is always my ego. It is me before I am 
myself in the world. Personality is what is shown through 
my decisions, valuations, etc. during my interactions with 
the world but it is never in the world. 
Sartre reverses Husserl’s account of the ego and posits that 
experience precedes and produces the idea of a transcendental 
ego. Because experience creates the ego, the transcendental 
ego is rendered superfluous. Hence consciousness is first 
and foremost a pure spontaneity and freedom, and it must 
remain spontaneous and free at each moment. States, actions, 
and qualities are reflectively shown/created after the fact but 
are never determining factors at the start that emanate out 
of a transcendental ego pole.12 
With existentialism, we find a return to a purely immanent 
I that reflectively and retrospectively produces a transcendent 
ego that it is not in turn dependent on or reducible to. The self 
is once again fragmented and has no dependence upon any 
12 Jean-PaulSartre, The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of 
Consciousness (Hill and Wang: New York, 1991), 71.
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external criteria. It has gained a new freedom of expression, 
but it has, as a consequence, lost any form of pre-empirical 
unity. The history of thinkers surveyed, for the most part (Kant 
being our exception), exemplify not the irreconcilability of the 
question of the subject itself but instead the un-decidability 
of the oscillating battle between the privileging of either the 
permanent and un-experienced Cartesian self, or the chaotic 
flux of the Humean, immanent “self.” The question of the 
subject has been answered in the form of either privileging 
the immanent flux and turning becoming into the ideal 
law and reducing universal categories to mere contingent 
illusions (Hume, Sartre) or by turning the transcendent 
unified self into the ideal law and subordinating the fluxes 
immanent self into an irrelevant or largely insignificant 
factor (Descartes, Husserl). This is and has been a problem 
for quite a while, but it becomes further complicated with 
the advent of the question of the gendered subject, especially 
the question of the gendered subject after queer theories. 
Thinkers now search for a way to completely decentralize and 
dismiss any binary category defining gender identity from 
the outside. If difference is privileged in theories of subjec-
tive gender constitution, fragmentation becomes the law, but, 
just as problematically, if the universal self is made the law, 
individual differences cannot be theoretically accounted for 
and practically respected.
V Butler-Lacan
Feminist theory, in a certain sense, was born through a 
critique of the applicability of universal determinations of 
“man” and “woman” to distinct individuals. Lived gender was 
found to be inaccurately described by and irreducible to the 
universal givens handed down, both pre-determined and un-
justly determining. Thinkers began looking more closely at 
the existential conditions under which one became either a 
man or a woman (the Sartrean resonance should be stressed 
here). In some ways we return to a Humean theorizing of the 
self as an empirically contingent bundle of perceptions. As 
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Hume claims “I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, 
that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceiv-
able rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.”13 The 
self is a flux; it is an ever changing and shifting bundle of 
perceptions. In a like fashion, Sartre emphasizes that, “the 
ego maintains its qualities through a genuine, continuous 
creation. Nevertheless, we do not finally apprehend the ego 
as a pure creative source apart from its qualities.”14 The ego, 
for Sartre, is also a creative product of ever-changing inter-
actions with the world. The self by no means stays stable. It 
is instead, just as Hume suggested, a collection of changing 
experiences and perceptions placing the self in a state of 
“perpetual flux and movement.” In both cases, the self shifts 
according to its experiences within the world. It is always a 
product and not a producer of these different experiences.
The existential account of gender constitution was then 
challenged by the advent of queer theories and their crucial 
critique of the heteronormative essence of even these more 
existential accounts. In order to expand our understanding 
of gender constitution in a way that can positively account 
for a multiplicity of gender identities, most of which cannot 
be simply reduced to “heterosexual man” or “heterosexual 
woman,” fragmentation and flux seem to become the law. 
In this situation, the emphasis of the importance of lived 
difference is pushed to its most extreme limit but also en-
counters a very serious problem. The gendered identity is 
always an identity founded upon an experience of complete 
fragmentation and aggressive alienation from any form of 
unified identity in the wake of the chaos of their empirical 
and individual gendered experience. For Hume, the original 
thinker of the self as perpetual flux, there was no transcen-
dent and universal criteria whatsoever to determine the self 
and there was thus no conflict between empirical reality and 
transcendent illusion. What comes to characterize a large 
13 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 252.
14 Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, 78.
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number of prevalent contemporary theories of subjective 
constitution is that they are actually driven by an inherent 
tension between the empirical flux and the transcendent 
illusion. Thus the current discussions of gender identity 
are characterized by what Laruelle would call a duel relation-
ship between the transcendent illusion of the unified I and 
the empirical flexuous self. Furthermore, what we will see 
is that this duel is not simply a consequence of individual 
shortcomings in the theories presented that can be remedied 
philosophically. Laruelle argues that this is simply a conse-
quence of the philosophical decision regarding the primacy 
of difference “Difference affirms the superiority if their [the 
law and the given] combat.”15 To exemplify this duel, let us 
turn to Lacan and Butler.
For Lacan, the I (as “Je”) is the product of a necessary and 
fundamental mis-recognition/identification of oneself (as 
“moi”) and one’s specular image (as “ideal-I”) during his in-
famous “mirror stage.” This mis-recognition and the desire 
to remedy this fundamental fragmentation between the 
experienced body and the ideal imago of the body serves as 
the condition of possibility for both the subject’s aggression 
and desire as well as the subject’s entry into the symbolic 
register. This conflict is ultimately a battle between the ir-
reconcilability of space and time. Space, in Lacan’s account, 
includes the “imaginary space” of the universal, ideal and 
static imagos acquired in early infant experience and most 
dramatically in the mirror stage. The universal and timeless 
imagos stand in direct conflict with the temporal experience of 
the imperfect, fragile and dependent body. As a consequence, 
“man’s ego is never reducible to his lived experience.”16 The 
temporal, dependent and vulnerable individual desires an 
ideal-I that can never be attained but only asymptotically 
approached.17 The subject, now fragmented through a desire 
15 Laruelle, Philosophies of Difference, 8.
16 Jacques Lacan, “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” Écrits (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2006), 114.
17 See Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed 
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for the transcendent universal, enters into the symbolic 
realm and attempts to complete herself through the desire 
of the other. The constitution of gender identity is now actu-
ally driven by an active and irreconcilable conflict between 
transcendent lack and immanent fragmentation. Fragmenta-
tion and conflict are now at the core of the development of 
the individual’s gender identity. Differentiation and, more 
importantly, conflict become the law.
The most dominate theoretical continuation of this Laca-
nian perspective and its potential for providing an account 
of gender identity in its true state of diversity (non-hetero-
normative) is articulated by Judith Butler.18 Here I want to 
briefly draw out the way Butler’s 1988 essay “Preformative 
acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology 
and Feminist Theory” exemplifies Butler’s inheritance of the 
empirico-transcendental philosophical deadlock showing 
us that ultimately even philosophies of gender constitution 
founded in difference are equally susceptible to the non-
philosophical critique. Butler begins her account with a 
reference to the founding figure of feminist existentialism: 
When Simone de Beauvoir claims, “one is not born, but, rather, becomes 
a woman,” she is appropriating and reinterpreting this doctrine of 
constituting acts from the phenomenological tradition. In this sense, 
gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which 
various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted 
in time—an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts.19
Hume and Sartre speak powerfully in this claim. The self, as 
immanent flux, is privileged above all else. Constitution of 
in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in Écrits, 94.
18 I want to acknowledge here that this account of Butler’s work is by no means 
extensive and is not meant to be a critique. Butler’s work makes important 
advancements after her 1988 essay discussed here, distancing herself from 
Lacan, but due to space, these advancements cannot be discussed here.
19 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay 




gender is a repetition of stylized acts of expression. Gender 
is not pre-determined by some transcendent essence but is 
instead created continuously by the spontaneity of the im-
manent self.
If the ground of gender identity is the stylized repetition of acts through 
time, and not a seemingly seamless identity, then the possibilities 
of gender transformation are to be found in the arbitrary relation 
between such acts, in the possibility of a different sort of repeating, in 
the breaking or subversive repetition of that style.20
The gender constituting act is an empirical expression and 
the very fragmentation of the self is what provides a site for 
“subversive repetition of that style.”
In an attempt to account for the largest possible plurality 
of gendered expression, Butler decides in favor of differ-
ence and flux, standing in opposition to transcendence and 
binary universal categories. Yet the loss of the transcendent 
or transcendental ego does not completely rid discussions 
of subjective gender constitution of the duel-isms that have 
plagued it at least since Descartes nor of the oppositional 
structure inherent in the philosophical decision. Butler and 
Lacan both follow Hume and Sartre by turning the flux of 
the individual into the law but they, in addition to this, posit 
an inherent tension between the universal “ideal” and the 
fragmented self (taken in this decision to be the law of the 
Real) and seem to actually elevate conflict itself to the status of 
the ideal law governing subjective constitution. The purely 
transcendent I of Descartes is fundamentally unable to account 
for the diversity of the empirical expression of individual 
selves. On the other hand, the purely chaotic or fragmented 
self of Sartre, Lacan or Butler cannot account for or maintain 
any form of unity and ultimately becomes characterized only 
by opposition, lack or aporia. Through its decision, philoso-
phy can only think either unity or difference and through 
its desire for sufficiency, the philosophical resolution of the 
20 Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” 520.
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either/or always determines and thus hallucinates the Real.
In the next Part, I will show how Laruelle’s non-relational 
mode of thinking is able to remove us from the duel-istic 
deadlock between transcendental subject and the empirical 
subject, without privileging either one. This method pro-
vides a clue to why antimony, conflict, tautology, aporia and 
deadlock might not be the necessary consequence of any 
investigation into subjective gender constitution, even if they 
are a necessary consequence of any philosophical investiga-
tion into the matter. What comes to the fore in light of this is 
that the battle against dichotomous and oppositional gender 
logic can only come in the form of a redefinition of time and 
temporal experience itself and not either the collapsing of 
the transcendent into the immanent or in privileging the 
immanent over the transcendent. We must stop giving law 
to the Real in order to truly subvert the philosophical deci-
sion’s deadlock.
Part II Non-Philosophy, Non-Photography                              
and (non-)Gender Identity
Laruelle’s The Concept of Non-Photography is nothing short 
than an accessible and insightful masterpiece of disguise 
and subtlety. In this text, Laruelle isolates and analyzes the 
way the philosophical decision has constrained philosophi-
cal discourse and interpretation of photography into an 
antinomical battle over the privileging, re-positing and 
re-privileging of binary relationships. The philosophical 
decision has an invariant effect upon any subject matter 
philosophy approaches. Therefore, the non-photography 
developed in this text can be easily and legitimately trans-
lated into a science of (non-)gender Identity constitution. 
In this section I will demonstrate and develop this claim 
in order to show how the non-philosophical de-coupling of 
the “empirico-transcendental doublet”, which is actually the 
“empirico-transcendental deadlock,” can make the space for 
a consideration of the purely temporal element of gender 
constitution that can bypass the deadlock philosophy still 
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harbors in its core. What is unique about the opening Laruelle 
provides for our analysis is that it points to a “third” term 
in gender constitution yet does not require us to replace the 
law or given of the earlier theories of subjective constitution. 
Laruelle’s position on the (non-)relationship of the transcen-
dental and empirical self can be summarized by the following 
claim made in The Concept of Non-Photography:
The cause […] no longer corresponds to the “transcendental subject,” 
nor do the conditions of existence correspond to an “empirical” 
conditioning in the sense in which the philosopher understands it. 
Photography [non-philosophy] along with symbolic modes of thought, 
radical phenomenologies, non-Euclidian generalizations and, in gen-
eral in the spirit of “Abstraction,” has contributed to identifying the 
transcendental and the empirical as functions of a specific process, and 
to the distinguishing of this usages from their philosophical putting-
into-correlation, the “empirico-transcendental doublet.”21
The non-philosophical gendered subject would be one that is 
immediately experienced apart from any empirical or tran-
scendental philosophical determination. It would resemble 
what Laruelle terms the “identity photo” or “photographic 
identity.” The proper photographic identity can only be 
“discovered” by way of a non-philosophical science because 
“science eliminates from itself the philosophical correlation 
between fact and principle, between the rational faktum and 
its possibility; it describes and manifests simultaneously the 
being-photo (of) the photo, photographic identity as such, such 
as it is deployed from its real cause to its effective conditions 
of existence and fills in this ‘between-two.’”22 The science of 
non-photography does not reduce the identity of the photo 
to either its transcendental conditions (the camera and other 
technological apparatuses of photographic production) or to 
the empirical content of the photo (the scene it “represents” 
21 François Laruelle, The Concept of Non-Photography, (Urbanomic/Sequence 
Press: New York. 2010), 42.
22 Ibid., 42.
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expresses etc.).The identity of the photo, and correlatively of 
the (non-)gendered Identity, is something that is not reduc-
ible to either the immanent (philosophically understood) or 
the transcendent. The photographic identity is more properly 
the “space between” the proposed doublet/deadlock.
Using The Concept of Non-Photography let us further develop 
a concept of (non-)gender Identity. For Laruelle, the photo 
(properly understood) is “an absolute reflection, without 
mirror, unique each time but capable of an infinite power 
ceaselessly to secrete multiple identities.”23 The photo is always 
immediate and unique, yet it retains the power of multiple 
and ceaseless iteration. It is never reducible to either the 
technology it is produced with (the “ideal law” of the photo) 
or the scene which it “represents” (the contingent empirical 
given). The surface of the photo, in its immediate experience, 
is always an infinite fractal surface, and its fractal nature 
provides the infinite surface without depth upon which the 
photographic experience is placed. Yet, “The fractalized wall 
carries no signification.”24 The fractal nature of the surface 
resists all signification not because it is “un-signifiable” but 
because it is “omni-significant,” and the fractal nature of 
this omni-significance is what allows for the photo’s ability 
to “secrete multiple identities” at any point in time while 
retaining a unique, unitary and inexhaustible identity. 
In his analysis of the photo and theories of photography 
Laruelle attempts to show how the introduction of a fractal 
surface of the photo can provide us with a “synthesis of the 
modern and the postmodern”25 How can this be possible and 
how is this claim in anyway different from previous attempt 
to reconcile empirical with transcendent consciousness? 
Laruelle writes that:
If the ontological destination of Abstraction were the void as either 
Being, fractality realizes the synthesis of the most undifferentiated 





void and of the most differentiated concreteness [...] Neither the em-
pirical and transcendent content, nor the purified void, the purism 
of the abstract but a synthesis that reconciles the opposites without 
summarily hybridizing them.26
The fractal surface is the “plane” of synthesis that renders 
synthesis itself incomprehensible. It in no way reproduces 
hybridizations of the empirico-transcendental philosophical 
deadlock. It instead discards the never-ending co-production 
of subordination in order to discover an immediate unity, 
capable of infinite and never determinative or exhaustive 
differentiation.
Gender can now be understood as an immediately expe-
rienced unity that is never reducible to either its immanent 
expression or the transcendent category it is measured 
against. It is never stable yet never fragmented. It is a constant 
experiment, limited only by itself. Gender is no longer an 
oppositionally defined splitting into male or female, queer 
or straight, etc. Yet at the same time, the gendered subject is 
not simply a fragmented body of meaningless contingencies 
piled upon contingencies. We no longer need to define the 
gendered body in terms reducible to either the immanent 
or the transcendent, a method that has inevitable resulted 
in antinomical and auto-justifying philosophical deadlocks. 
We can instead turn to the fractal nature of temporality as 
the “between-two” to ground an experience of gender that 
is infinitely free, unitary and productive, always affirma-
tive and self-realizing. Gender becomes a pure reflection 
without the funhouse mirror of custom, habit, transcendent 
gender categories, capitalist fabrication or other distorting 
effects. Gender is an expression of a fractal temporality that 
is always-already beyond, and more importantly indifferent 
to and before, any form of binary dicotomization. 
But here I am presented with a problem. I claim that the 
object of a rigorous science of (non-)gender Identity constitu-
tion would be a fractal temporality. How can time and gender 
26 Laruelle, The Concept of Non-Photography, 139.
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be connected at all, and can this be done in a way that does 
not fall prey to the philosophical deadlock I have attempted 
to exit from above? It is at this point when I must take a he-
retical turn. Although I do believe that non-philosophy can 
help us diagnose philosophy’s constant stumbling block in 
the discourse of the subject as well as point toward a space 
for new considerations that might surpass and bypass the 
philosophical deadlock, Freudian psychoanalysis is needed 
to provide us with a working conceptual framework by 
with which to show how gender and time come together. It 
is here where we must turn to psychoanalysis in order to 
concretely lay out what a non-decisional investigation of 
the time (of) gender would look like. Ray Brassier argues 
that non-philosophy’s “conceptual import can and should 
be philosophically interpreted.”27 I, on the other hand, will 
suggest that the import of non-philosophy, if it is going to 
open up a new discussion of the gendered subject, must be 
psychoanalytically interpreted.
Part III Temporality, Psychoanalysis and (non-)Gender 
Identity Constitution
How can an account that relies on the assumption of a pro-
ductive unconscious that is temporally structured provide 
us with a theory of subjective gender constitution that can 
bypass the empirico-transcendental deadlock we used Laru-
elle’s work to identify in the above non-genealogy? 
In order to begin bringing time and gender together, let 
us here draw the work of Julia Kriseva into our discussion. 
Kriseva’s 1981 article “Women’s Time” is an investigation 
into a confrontation between two distinct temporal dimen-
sions as they relate to gender identity. Kristeva writes that, 
“with sociocultural ensembles of the European type, we are 
constantly faced with a double problematic: that of their 
identity constituted by historical sedimentation, and that of 
27 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 119.
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their loss of identity which is produced by this connection 
of memories which escape from history only to encounter 
anthropology.”28 European ensembles, understood as histori-
cal products, present us with two distinct and oppositional 
trends: the constitution of identity and the dissolution of 
identity. How is this double process possible? To understand 
how the movement of identity formation and loss of identity 
are simultaneously possible in historical development, we 
must distinguish between two different temporal registers or 
dimensions: “we confront two temporal dimensions: the time 
of linear history or cursive time (as Nietzsche called it) and 
the time of another history, thus another time, monumental 
time (again according to Nietzsche), which englobes these 
supranational, sociocultural ensembles within even larger 
entities.”29 One time, the time that constitutes universal 
identity, is logical and linear. The other time, which dissolves 
identity into fragmented multiplicity, is a monumental 
movement, irreducible to a linear interpretation that seeks 
to bind and create larger entities through the dissolution of 
individual identities.
In addition to the cursive and linear generations of temporal 
experience, which both entail a conflict between transcendent 
universals and immanent flux, Kristeva posits the possibility 
of a third generation. This third generation is also defined by 
a distinct experience of temporality, but this is a time that is 
neither foreign to women, as linear time is, nor a rejection 
of the historical time exemplified by the second generation’s 
post ’68 rejection of universal categories. Instead, “it can be 
argued that as of now a third attitude is possible, thus a third 
generation, which does not exclude [...] the parallel existence 
of all three in the same historical time, or even that they be 
interwoven one with the other.”30 This third generation offers 
the promise of both the previous generations without the 
exclusion or subordination of either temporal dimension. 
28 Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time” Signs, Vol. 7. No. 1. (Autumn,1981), pp. 13-35. 14.
29 Ibid., 14.
30 Ibid., 33.
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For Kristeva, the temporality of the third generation, can 
signal to an outside of the traditional metaphysics of gender: 
In this third attitude, which I strongly advocate [...] the very dichotomy 
man/woman as an opposition between two rival entities may be un-
derstood as belonging to metaphysics. What can “identity,” even “sexual 
identity,” mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very 
notion of identity is challenged?31
A synthesis (a complete synthesis beyond opposition, nega-
tion, reconciliation, hybridization, etc.) can yield an experi-
ence of temporality that dissolves the very notion of identity 
itself into something that can be both linear and cyclical. We 
achieve Nietzsche’s dream of an affirmation of values based 
on the monumental repetitions that occur within the time 
of history. One could theoretically experience a time beyond 
binary constitution that does not just sublate the history 
of these binaries, but renders the entire binary theoretical 
construction obsolete.  
At this point, I want to draw together three threads in the 
above paper. The first thread is the discussion of time in 
Kristeva and Kant and the role it can play in the interrelation 
between a historically experienced empirical, contingent self 
and an ahistorical and necessary self. The second thread is the 
deadlock produced by a long history of constitutional theories 
(exemplified by the series Descartes-Hume-Husserl-Sartre-
Lacan-Butler) that rely solely on the privileging of either 
the ahistorical, transcendent self or the historical empirical 
self. The final thread, and the most speculative one, is the 
non-philosophical method’s ability to return to a focus on 
temporal synthesis that is not reducible to either a historical, 
contingent account or a transcendent ahistorical account (in 
short, an account that gives no hallucinatory law to the Real). 
We will ultimately see how gender constitution is not simply 
structured by temporal experience, but our very desire for 
gender differentiation itself is a result of a dynamic and im-
31 Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” 33-34.
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mediate experience of a temporal synthesis that renders all 
synthesis incomprehensible. I have suggested that Laruelle 
can assist us in separating completely the empirical and 
transcendental aspects of theories of subjective constitu-
tion in order to avoid having to subordinate and determine 
one by the other. We saw that Laruelle accomplishes this 
separation by referring us to the fractal “between-two” of 
the photographic identity, now converted in to the fractal 
“between-two” of (non-)gender Identity. I now will argue that 
a particular reading of Freudian psychoanalysis can provide 
a legitimately non-philosophical method for studying the 
constitution of the individual’s (non-)gender Identity without 
giving a philosophically understood law to the Real.
Let us here turn to one of the most puzzling yet important 
remarks Freud makes on temporality in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. Freud pauses for a moment in section IV, one of 
the most (in)famous speculations in the psychoanalytic 
tradition, and writes:
At this point I shall venture to touch for a moment upon a subject 
which would merit the most exhaustive treatment. As a result of certain 
psycho-analytic discoveries, we are to-day in a position to embark on a 
discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are “necessary 
forms of thought.” We have learnt that unconscious mental processes 
are in themselves “timeless.” This means in the first place that they are 
not themselves ordered temporally, that time does not change them in 
any way and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them. These are 
the negative characteristics which can only be clearly understood if a 
comparison is made with conscious mental processes. On the other hand, 
our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method 
of working of the system Pcpt-Cs. and corresponds to a perception on 
its own part of that method of working. This mode of functioning may 
perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli. 
I know the remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself 
to these hints.32
32 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” The Standard Edition of 
the Complete works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press: London, 1974) Volume. 
XVIII, 27.
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Freud is here suggesting that the conscious experience of 
time as linear (what Kriesteva called cursive or historical 
time) is in fact a defense against another form of unknown 
yet always experienced unconscious time. The Kantian inner 
sense of time as a pure form of immediate a priori intuition is 
something that must necessarily be guarded against because 
of its dynamic implications. The battle between the insistent 
and dynamic inner sense of unconscious time and the Pcpt-
Cs.’s protective linear time represents the original (non-)
dialectic in the sense that it is interminable and never fully 
constitutive. This dialectic can never decide for it is lost in 
its own fractalization in peaceful fascination.33
Linear time, in the Freudian account, is not the starting 
point for psychic experience as a whole. It is instead a form 
of protection and defense against a primary dynamic experi-
ence of time as other than linear. This original experience of 
time is at the same time never surpassed, it is only repressed. 
This would mean that Kristeva’s third generation is no longer 
some future category to be obtained or achieved. It is instead 
fundamental and generative of the desire to create linear, logi-
cal definitions of gendered identity and gendered experience. 
The fractal nature of temporality as the “between-two” is both 
the always present yet never presented source of salvation, 
re-iteration and radical recreation. The third generation 
33 Linear conscious temporality can be read in this light as similar to Sartre’s 
reading of Husserl’s epoché. For Sartre, the phenomenological reduction 
that Husserl uses to find the transcendental ego is no longer a method of 
bracketing the world in order to gain apodictic certainty; it is instead a 
therapeutic technique for buffering the inherent spontaneity of conscious-
ness itself from itself. The epoché is, “no longer a miracle, an intellectual 
method, an erudite procedure: it is an anxiety which is imposed on us and 
which we cannot avoid”(Sartre, Trancendence of the Ego, 103). The immediate 
experience of consciousness is literally too much to bear. Personality, created 
through reflective reduction, is a guardian against the radical spontaneity 
of consciousness and not a necessary, pre-personalized transcendental ego. 
The ego, for Sartre, is not a uniting operation but instead a buffer against the 
nothingness that allows for the pure spontaneity of consciousness. In my 
account, the linear construction of narrative gender identity is not a uni-
versal necessity but instead a continent response to an original experience 
of individual constitution as a matter of fractal, unconscious temporality.
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precedes the first two necessarily. The third generation does 
not need to be achieved; it instead needs to be remembered. 
Recall that, for Kristeva, in the third generation’s temporal 
experience “the very dichotomy man/woman as an opposi-
tion between two rival entities may be understood as belong-
ing to metaphysics What can ‘identity,’ even ‘sexual identity,’ 
mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very 
notion of identity is challenged?”34 The unique experience 
of temporality as fractal is itself enough to dissolve the very 
notion of identity as it is conceived metaphysically and more 
importantly, philosophically as well. Now in order to fully grasp 
how a new experience of collapsed and dynamic unconscious, 
fractal temporality can explode the idea of gender constitution 
we must link the third generation’s temporality to a fractal 
experience of temporality that lies in the “between-two” of 
the empirical-transcendental deadlock. Time itself must be 
fractalized in order to understand how any innovation in a 
theory of gender constitution could exit the dogmas it repeat-
edly inherits in the form of (seemingly) irreducible binaries.
Freud’s 1915 paper “The Unconscious” states that:
The processes of the system Ucs. [Unconscious] are timeless; I.e they are 
not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they 
have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once 
again, with the work of the system Cs. [Consciousness]. […] To sum 
up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary processes (mobility of 
cathexis), timelessness and replacement of external by psychic reality—these 
are the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes be-
longing to the system Ucs.35
Timelessness is a central characteristic of the unconscious 
and the expression of unconscious processes. Yet, as Derrida 
notes in “Freud and the Scene of Writing,”
34 Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” 33-34.
35 Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press: London, 1974) Volume. XIV, 15.
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The Timelessness of the unconscious is no doubt determined only in 
opposition to a common concept of time, a traditional concept, the 
metaphysical concept: the time of mechanics or the time of conscious-
ness. […] the unconscious is no doubt timeless only from the stand 
point of a certain vulgar conception of time.36
This “vulgar time” has been recognized and discussed in the 
subsequent literature on the time of the unconscious, but it has, 
for the most part, remained vulgar, but only in the sense that 
it has remained philosophical. An example of this comes from 
Adrian Johnston’s Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting 
of the Drive in which he argues in a philosophical manner for 
the primacy of temporality in the productive unconscious and 
the drives themselves. Johnston claims that “Temporality—as 
the irreducible tension between timelessness (the atemporal 
subjectivity of unconscious enunciation) and time (the phe-
nomenal subjectivity of diachronic utterances)—is the gap 
constitutive of the Kantian-Lacanian subject.”37 Temporality, 
in Johnson’s account, remains constituted by an oppositional 
battle between two irreconcilable contraries: iteration and 
alteration or the monumental and the linear. “The temporality 
of the Kanitan-Lacanian subject is prefigured by the meta-
psychological condition of the (possible) emergence of all 
subjects, namely, drive.”38 Johnston’s analysis here contributes 
important aspects to the discussion of the temporal nature 
of the drive, yet he still posits alterable, linear and cursive 
time in opposition to the monumental, repetitions, iterable 
“timelessness” of the noumenal unconscious. Johnston thus 
once again raises the conflict between two irreconcilables 
to the status of the “ideal law” of the psyche’s temporal pro-
ductivity. Fragmentation and conflict remain the law and the 
limit, and the philosophical decision lives on. 
36 Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Writing and Difference 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 215.
37 Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive. 




Can the idea of a fractal and not a fractured experience 
of temporality as the dynamic source of libidinal invest-
ment bypass the still clear philosophical threat? If we ac-
cept that drive, and by extension the constitution of (non-)
gender Identity, and temporality are deeply connected but 
characterize the time of the unconscious not as timeless but 
instead as fractal then we can account for both the infinite 
alteration of the expression of gender as well as incorporate 
the monumental iteration of the flux of the drive itself. The 
fractal, like the unconscious, like the Real, is radically inex-
haustible. It collapses any difference and repetition, iteration 
and alteration, cursive and monumental into a single, unified 
yet inexhaustible surface of creative play and possibility. The 
productive unconscious is, in this account, not characterized 
by lack, opposition or fragmentation. It is instead produc-
tive and “unique each time but capable of an infinite power 
ceaselessly to secrete multiple identities.” In Kristeva’s par-
lance, yet modified in light of our investigation, the time of 
the third generation must be akin to an inexhaustible fractal 
time such as described above.
To concisely summarize the dynamic, temporally structured 
unconscious that I am here proposing as the proper object 
of the psychoanalytic and scientific study of (non-)gender 
Identity constitution:
1: Like Kant, the temporality of our unconscious is the syn-
thetic faculty “which lies entirely outside of the concepts 
of the understanding, strictly regulated”: time is not the 
content of thought and the unconscious more generally, it 
is instead the subtle and dynamic form.
2: Like Kristeva’s third generation, fractal temporality shows 
that “the very dichotomy man/woman as an opposition 
between two rival entities belonging to metaphysics;” ex-
tended in our analysis to the entirety of philosophy and 
universally amongst the plurality of philosophical deci-
sions on the matter thus dissolving any determinative/
determining relationship between dichotomy and gender 
identity e.g. male/female, gay/straight, Sadist/masochist etc.
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3: Like Johsnton’s drive theory, the drives themselves are 
temporally driven and this temporality supplies the drives 
with both their unity and their infinite diversity of vicis-
situdes. But unlike Johnston, our temporal unconscious 
is driven not due to an irreconcilable division between 
the experience of time and the transcendent timelessness 
of the noumenal unconscious, elevating conflict and dif-
ference to the status of an ideal law. The drive is instead 
driven, yet only in-the-last-instance, by the fractal nature 
(of) unconscious time itself.
4: Like the fractal surface of the identity photo, the fractal 
temporality of the unconscious is “an absolute reflection, 
without mirror, unique each time but capable of an infinite 
power ceaselessly to secrete multiple identities;” it is like 
the fractalized wall that “carries no signification;” it “real-
izes the synthesis of the most undifferentiated void and 
of the most differentiated concreteness [...] Neither the 
empirical and transcendent content, nor the purified void, 
the purism of the abstract but a synthesis that reconciles 
opposites without summarily hybridizing them.” 
Yes, a science of (non-)gender Identity constitution is possible. 
The object of this science would be the fractal “between-two” 
experience of temporality understood and analyzed in a rigor-
ous psychoanalytic sense. Finally what new spaces of (non-)
philosophical investigation can be opened in light of such 
an analysis? I have attempted to show that the shift in focus 
from either immanent or transcendent theories of gender 
constitution to the fractal experience of irreducible and inex-
haustible unconscious temporality can lead us outside of the 
traditional binary philosophical deadlock and point toward 
a “third way” of temporal experience that is always-already 
upon us and not deferred à venir into an aporetic future. By 
collapsing the temporality of gender onto a flat, yet infinitely 
complex fractal surface we can explode the possibilities of 
gender expression as well as solidify a unitary core from 
which gendered resistance can proceed. We allow for cease-
less differentiation without turning either fragmentation 
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or opposition into the law by way of a philosophical cut or 
decision and, in fact, attempt to apply no determinative final 
law to the dynamism of the temporal unconscious at all. We 
continue to study gender as only determined-in-the-last-
instance by the vicissitudes (of) the fractal unconscious while 
at the same time respecting its inexhaustibility. 
Part IV Possible Non-Philosophical Objections
The Analysis of a Heresy
I have argued that psychoanalysis provides a way to pragmati-
cally apply the findings and principles of non-philosophy 
concretely to theories of gender constitution. How faithful 
is this positive account of gender constitution based on a 
fractal temporality to Laruelle’s own accounts of the uncon-
scious, temporality and Identity? Why can a psychoanalytic 
reinterpretation of the Kantian/Freudian notion of time as a 
constitutive inner sense in light of the findings of Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy provide a better solution for the exiting of 
the empirico-transcendental philosophical deadlock the 
question of the subject finds itself in than a more strictly 
non-philosophical understanding of temporality and psy-
choanalysis more generally? Where is my heresy and what 
advantages, if any, does it give my account? In order to ad-
dress this question I will have to briefly pit psychoanalysis 
against non-philosophy and ask if Freud is in fact making a 
philosophical decision, enforcing a “principle of sufficient 
psychoanalysis,” and consequently hallucinating the un-
conscious as the Real, or more problematically for Laruelle, 
positing time and temporality itself as the ideal law of the 
Real. If the unconscious, and more specifically the temporal 
unconscious, is simply another philosophical hallucination 
then it could never constitute-in-the-last-instance a (non-)
gender Identity, rendering a psychoanalytic science of (non-)
gender Identity impossible. I simply mean here to show that 
Freudian psychoanalysis and Laruellean non-philosophy are 
not contrary but complimentary.
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The first point of tension between a psychoanalytic account 
and a more traditionally non-philosophical interpretation of 
gender Identity revolves around a different understanding of 
the relationship between Identity, the unconscious, repres-
sion and time. The Freudian unconscious, strictly understood, 
does not truly capture the radical (non-philosophical) im-
manence of Laruelle’s One. I have argued that an account of 
(non-)gender Identity constitution must be founded in the 
study of the way the fractal temporality of the unconscious 
both constitutes the desire for gender identification as an im-
mediate unity of Identity as well as creates the possibility of 
productive and creative individual contingencies resulting in 
the expression of desire and the constitution of the gendered 
subject. It would seem at first as if an analysis of this type would 
depend on the operation of a Freudian notion of repression, 
memory and time that Laruelle attempts to radically distance 
himself from.39 For Freud, and the psychoanalytic account I 
have argued for more generally, there must be some form of 
interaction between the past, memory and the constitution 
of sexual identity. The unconscious must in some fashion 
express itself through the individual’s object choices and 
psychic hallucinations/duplications of the chosen objects in 
order for sexuality to be constituted.40 This stands in strict 
39 Laruelle has more generally attempted to distance non-philosophy from 
psychoanalysis. He is for the most part effective in this attempt but concen-
trates on distancing himself from a Lacanian iteration of psychoanalysis. 
See Laruelle Théorie des Etrangers (Paris: Kimé, 1995). For a more extended 
secondary discussion of Laruelle and Lacan in english see Katerina Kolozova 
(in The Real and ‘I’: On the Limit and the Self (Skopje: Euro-Balkan Press, 2006) 
chapter 3) and John Mullarky (Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline (New 
York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006) chapter 4). This 
focus on Lacan leads Laruelle to overlook certain affinities between non-
philosophy and a more Freudian iteration of psychoanalysis. I will briefly 
expand on this at the end of the paper.
40 See Freud’s “Three Essays on Sexuality” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press: London, 1974) Volume VII 
(1901-1905): A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality and Other Works, 
123-246. Object choice, and the experience of libidinal satisfaction by exten-
sion, is determined (in-the-last-instance) by the contingent interaction of 
Speculations III
38
contrast to Laruelle’s “Past foreclosed to memory” and thus 
seems to stand at odds with non-philosophy, sinking back 
into a philosophical desire for the Real, unjustly exhausting 
the un-exhaustible immanence of the One. Laruelle claims 
that, from a philosophical perspective “memory has just been 
considered as an anthropological faculty or instance, the past 
and memory in general as functions of a worldly time or even 
reduced and immanent to consciousness, always philosophizable 
or sufficient.”41 A non-philosophical consideration of memory, 
and symptomatology in general, would have to acknowledge 
the necessity yet radical insufficiency and foreclosure of the 
past and memory. The Identity could only be determined-
in-the-last-instance by the past foreclosed to memory. This 
critique could be leveled against a form of psychoanalytic 
understanding centering on the primacy of repression as a 
mechanism of psychic defense. The One cannot be repressed 
and thus Identity, in a non-philosophical sense, cannot be 
captured by the traditional form of the Freudian “return of 
the repressed.”
Laruelle wants to envision memory as a radically foreclosed, 
necessary yet also radically insufficient past or memory. If 
non-philosophical past or memory are to be consistent with 
the non-philosophical project they must respect the radi-
cally immanent and foreclosed nature (of) the One. In non-
philosophy “The One cannot be forgotten or repressed by 
occidental memory but hallucinated, giving rise to a special 
form of symptom.”42 The non-philosophical unconscious is 
similarly foreclosed.
the individual infant unconscious and the contingent material/historical 
events of its early childhood. (It is at this point where Freud and Marx meet). 
Psychic reality requires necessarily an external (and ultimately internal [see. 
Freud’s “The Project for a Scientific Psychology” The Standard Edition of the 
Complete works of Sigmund Freud (Hogarth Press: London, 1974) Volume I, 
281-391]) material reality independent of the individual psyche.
41 Laruelle, François, Future Christ (New York: Continuum, 2011), 75.
42 Ibid., 89.
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Non-psychoanalysis extricates a radical transcendental unconscious 
from the result of the Real (the One). The unconscious is the syntactic 
side of jouissance, which is itself, in non-psychoanalysis, a concept 
on the same level as the Stranger. But, in opposition to the restrained 
unconscious or the unconscious determined by the signifier, logic, or 
the combinatory, the non-psychoanalytic unconscious has nothing to 
do with the transcendence of “the autonomy of the symbolic”: it is the 
identity of jouissance and a unilateral duality43 
This is clearly an attack on Lacan’s unconscious. The non-
philosophical unconscious, in contrast to the Lacanian 
unconscious, is characterized by a unilateral casual relation 
between jouissance, desire, and its expression in the Stranger-
subject. Here I will speculate that the fractal temporality of the 
unconscious provides a picture of the necessary yet radically 
insufficient, foreclosed core of gender constitution due to its 
unity and it radical differentiation-without-fragmentation 
or exhaustion.
The account I have given runs into even deeper contradic-
tion with Laruelle’s direct consideration of temporality in 
The Dictionary of Non-Philosophy: “non-philosophy renounces 
to make of time (or history or even becoming) the essence 
of the Real, to desubstantialize the latter by the former.”44 In 
order to not turn time or temporality into the idealized and 
hallucinated law or essence of the Real Laruelle develops a 
concept of time in line with his concept of memory; radically 
immanent, foreclosed, necessary yet insufficient. For non-
philosophy “Time as Given or Past-without-temporalization, 
as seen-in-One or ‘in time,’ etc” are all:
first names of time [that] symbolize not a past time but a past which 
simultaneously possesses a primacy over synchrony and diachrony 
and determines these transcendent dimensions themselves at least as 





comprising the object of philosophical interpretations. The radical past 
is uni-versal immanent time, of which one could say that it is-without-
existing or even that it is a non-temporal time. It is less a question of a 
memory capable of forgetting and anamnesis than of a past which can-
not be forgotten and which, precisely for this reason, is foreclosed to memory 
which itself, in its sufficiency, believes to be able to forget and repeat 
by anamnesis. This One-time, even effectuated as future, remains in 
its necessary sterility and in no way participates in the present-world 
such as non-philosophy conceives it and no longer—this is what dis-
tinguishes it from the Levinasian Other, and from the “trace”—in the 
ontological present or the “Same.”45
 
For time to be consistent with the One, it must possess a radi-
cal primacy to both synchrony and diachrony. I have argued 
that if the fractal nature of the temporality of the unconscious 
plays the constitutive role in the constitution of (non-)gender 
Identity in a way that turns neither empirical contingency, 
difference or fracture nor the timeless, universal and static 
into an ideal law of Identity constitution, hence respecting 
the an-archic nature of the One. Just as the fractal can never 
be exhausted, the time of the unconscious determines yet 
can never in turn be determined or exhausted. 
Laruelle’s characterizes the non-psychoanalytic Uncon-
scious in a way that falls in line with the above discussions 
of “Past-without-temporalization” and “Past foreclosed to 
memory.” As a consequence, the common or “vulgar” philo-
sophical language of “repression,” “temporality” and most 
importantly “unconscious” cannot adequately maintain 
non-philosophical rigor. But, I think we can find what seems 
at first to be a crucial oversight in Laruelle’s understanding 
of the Freudian Unconscious. Laruelle claims that:
Psychoanalysis treats under the name of the unconscious not only one 
of the local proprieties of the psychic apparatus—the product of repres-
sion constituted from the representation of things (Freud, Klein)—but 
also the dimension of the imaginary (Jung) or symbolic (Lacan) Other, 
45 Laruelle, The Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, 76.
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nevertheless generally endowed with a “subject” that Lacan estimates 
as being “nothing but the Cartesian subject.”46
What Laruelle seems to be missing here are some very im-
portant comments in Freud’s later work on the inexhaustible 
and un-decidable nature of the unconscious47 and ultimately 
Freud’s final suggestions that repression may not be the pri-
mary form of psychic defense and begins to emphasize the 
mechanisms of disavowal, first articulated in his work with 
fetishism.48
Certain concepts borrowed from psychoanalysis can and 
should be rigorously re-worked by way of a non-philosophical 
analysis in order to truly show the expanded potential of both 
psychoanalysis and non-philosophy in their relation to queer 
theories and other theories of the constitution of individuality. 
Here I have argued that the key step in preforming this task 
46 Laruelle, The Dictionary of Non-Philosophy 79-80.
47 “Everything that is repressed must remain unconscious; but let us state 
at the very outset that the repressed does not cover everything that is 
unconscious. The unconscious has the wider compass; the repressed is a 
part of the unconscious” Freud, “The Unconscious,” 166. The unconscious, 
contra Laruelle’s suggestion, is not simply a topographical psychic stores 
house for repressed contents. There is some “thing” else there “in” or (of) 
the unconscious, but it seems as if the philosophical question of “what is x” 
has nearly exhausted itself attempting to exhausted this “thing.”
48 More importantly, by the end of Freud’s thinking, disavowal, as the 
simultaneous, undecidable registration and repudiation of trauma takes on 
a more central role in the construction of all psychic defenses (repression 
included). As Alan Bass puts it “let me emphasize Freud’s words: ‘whatever 
the ego does in its efforts of defense...’ In other words, the disavowal and ego 
splitting first elaborated in order to understand fetishism have now become 
the basis of a changed understanding of psychopathology in general” Alan Bass, 
Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros, (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2000). We must be cautious here, due to the Derridian resonances, in 
a reading of the importance of disavowal as a mechanism of defense. We 
must analyze this phenomenon in a “non-deconstructive” manner. This 
would involve, from my point of view a re-reading of Derrida’s reading of 
Hegel and Antigone in Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) 
alongside Laruelle’s engagement with Derrida in chapter 5 of Philosophies of 
Difference. With caution, and more space than I have here, one could expand 
the implications of disavowal and non-philosophy.
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involves re-thinking the time(lessness) of the Unconscious 
as something radically other (but not in the Judeic [still 
philosophical] sense) than a lack that generates and sustains 
oppositional, fragmented and ultimately “false” identities, 
or as simply a determined stasis, defining individuals “once 
and for all” at the outset regardless of empirical and material 
factors. The non-vulgar time of the unconscious turns out 
to be a strange form of non-philosophical and fractal time. 
Productive in-the-last-instance yet never in turn produced, 
unified yet inexhaustible, “unique each time but capable of 
an infinite power ceaselessly to secrete multiple identities” 
yet a “wall carries no signification,” etc…
43
Thing Called Love




Into what, precisely, do we plum-met when we fall into love? What, exactly, is produced when we make 
it? When we are hungry for love, what stomach is nourished 
by that strange food? Colloquialisms are littered with a lan-
guage that objectifies love, that turns it into a thing—not just 
something we can feel, but something we can touch, some-
thing that hits us, changes us, throws us, consumes us, drives 
us. Popular parlance makes the love relation into something 
almost tangible, concrete, autonomous: love is some thing 
we fall into, love is a master key, love is a war, love is a bite of 
heaven, love is a virus. Such language begins to suggest that 
the “love object” is not, exactly, the person for whom you pine. 
Instead, it begins to look as though the “love object” is the 
relation, itself. Love takes on thing-like contours, becomes 
its own sort of creature. It does its own little cosmic dance.
Such formulations are, you might say, fundamentally ide-
alist in nature. This is not to say that they are unrealistic, or 
anti-realistic. Rather, as Iain Hamilton Grant, Jeremy Dunham, 
and Sean Watson suggest—in their history of idealism—this 
language might be idealist in the sense that it attempts to 
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be realistic about the idea, itself.1 Love, the idea of love, is 
taken seriously as an entity. This raises the possibility that a 
love is something real in the world—more than merely the 
emotive outcome of a human psychological engagement. A 
love with such a degree of autonomy, presents itself as mind-
independent. This kind of a love—a love that is somehow real 
in the world—allows us to speculate in strange new directions. 
Could it have been, for instance, love that was made as the leaf 
was reaching for the sun?
Never mind the obvious absurdities of such a statement. 
That we tend not to think of love in this particular manner, 
I realize, should be obvious. I offer it as a thought exercise 
because—much as I recognize that the prospect of such a 
“love object” invites skepticism—this idealistic method of 
investigating love also commends certain practices and ap-
proaches. That is to say, an idealistic understanding of love 
(one that attempts to approach the idea itself realistically, to 
understand the idea of love as something real in the world) 
can also understand that this entity—like other creatures 
who move, act, or grow—is something fragile and vulner-
able. It is something that demands recognition and requires 
nurture. This is as true for the loves that appear between 
human individuals as it is for the loves that act as bonds be-
tween tiny earthlings and the creaky old planet that birthed 
them, that sustains them. Love that is real in the world may 
not be something we can prolong through the cultivation of 
psychological states. Rather, this sticky bonding relation that 
connects bodies has certain tissues and fibers of its own (tis-
sues that come into contact with, yet are not reduced to, the 
folds and fibers of our human brains and bodies) This love 
1 Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant & Sean Watson, Idealism: The His-
tory of a Philosophy (Montreal, Kingston & Ithaca: McGill University Press, 
2011), 7. They clarify, further, that with regard to ideas, an idealism means 
“having a theory of what they are.” In this sense, perhaps, my parallel falls 
apart. If colloquial language sounds idealist in nature (because it reflects the 
extent to which we take ideas seriously as things in themselves) it probably 
lacks a theory of what exactly these ideas are. Nonetheless, I do think that 
such language reflects a kind of stubborn underlying realism with respect 
to the idea of love.
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needs room to breathe, nourishment, attention, recognition.
Such a pronouncement might seem religious, in the James-
ian sense: a drive to make real (and live in accord with) the 
unseen. “Were one asked to categorize the life of religion 
in the broadest and most general terms possible,” William 
James writes, “one might say that it consists of the belief that 
there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in 
harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.”2 James intimates 
that the building blocks of religion3 are abstractions with 
their own lives. “The more concrete objects of most men’s 
[sic] religion, the deities whom they worship, are known only 
to them in idea.”4 And yet, “strangely enough” in the sincer-
ity of our fervor, these abstractions come to “have a definite 
meaning for our practice. We can act as if there were a God; 
feel as if we were free; consider Nature as if she were full of 
special designs; lay plans as if we were immortal; and we find 
then that these words do make a genuine difference in our 
moral life.”5 He suggests that religion is the sphere of life, in 
other words, where the reality of the unseen—the actuality of 
abstractions—is sanctioned, preserved, and protected. 
In the Christian tradition, of course, love has long been 
one of those great abstractions. Love, in fact, has been ef-
fectively collapsed into the figure of the divine itself: love 
has been divinized. The biblical assertion that “God is love” 
(1 John 4:8) has driven attempts not only to divinize the love 
relation but more, to assert its independence from human 
emotions and psychology. If love is, itself, divine (following 
a rather standard and orthodox line of Christian theologic) 
it must indeed be mind-independent. It cannot be a human 
2 William James, “Lecture 3: The Reality of the Unseen” in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (London & New York: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 
1961, 1973), 59.
3 “The building blocks of religion”: a phrase that I am playfully cribbing from 
Ann Taves. See: Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block 
Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton, New Jersey 





construct, or a psychological, emotive aftershock. It must be 
real in the cosmic sense. It must be something with the agen-
tial power to bear responsibility, to shape worlds. This may 
be, perhaps, the very reason that the theologian Augustine 
of Hippo gave thing-like contours to love—turning it into a 
“substance.”6 Such a theoretical move suggestively points to 
a need for the most abstract of entities to become the most 
real, the most concrete.
Consider this essay a contemplative exercise in relational 
ontology—a speculative excursion. In what follows I endeavor 
to take the idea of love seriously—to make the relation real. 
Given his claim that “Anything real can be regarded as an 
object”7 (even, crucially, a relation) I will have cause to ex-
plore the extent to which the substantive nature of love that 
emerges with Augustine can be illuminated or elaborated 
within Graham Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology. I will 
explore, in other words, whether there isn’t something about 
the love relation that emerges more clearly when we risk a 
light objectification of its contours.
The Love Relation as Divine Substance
Christian theologians have traditionally been, of course, ex-
tremely cautious to uphold orthodox distinctions between 
things worldly (creaturely, material) and things divine. This 
is no less true for Augustine, who declares that God is not 
only “invisible and unchangeable” but fully immortal and 
beyond all human comprehension (available only in fits and 
starts to our quasi-divine intellectual faculties).8 God is said 
to be locked fully into the transcendent. 
6 I will acknowledge, further along in the essay, the complications inherent 
in using the phrase “thing-like” to describe divine substance. Suffice it to 
say, for the time being, that Augustine himself verges in this direction in 
De Trinitatae.
7 Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of 
Things (Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2005), 76.
8 Saint Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), Book 2.15. 
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Augustine’s interpretive skills are stretched and challenged, 
however, when he attempts to account for how the triune God 
(immortal, immutable, invisible) could also be the Son—that 
fleshy humanoid figure who walked on earth—without sacri-
ficing his transcendently divine qualities. How, in other words, 
could the divinity of the fleshy incarnation be accounted 
for? It was important, of course, that Augustine figure out a 
way to do so, for to claim that Christ incarnate (the Son) was 
basically just a special sort of creature, or an actual earth-
ling, would have been tantamount to heresy. It would have 
been improper to let Christ’s divinity lapse. The negation of 
Christ’s full unity with the divine was the Modalist mistake 
(Sabellianism), which claimed that the triune God was three 
distinct modes, rather than one unity. The mono-God has to 
be one, and all the unique facets of this divinity must play 
the same game of identity. Augustine’s task in De Trinitatae is 
to convince his reader that God can indeed be three unique 
persons, while still remaining (somehow) unitary. The special 
challenge presented by Christ’s (clearly not divine) creature 
carnality is chalked up to habit. 
First, Augustine argues that creatures are made or produced 
by the creating divine. Christ, on the other hand, was “begot-
ten not made.”9 His special creation means that, “he is not 
a creature.” He may have walked like a creature and talked 
like a creature, but in his nature, he is no creature. If he is 
not a creature, what else could he be but God himself (given 
that everything which is not God can rightly be considered 
creaturely)? That is to say, “if He is not a creature, then He is 
of the same substance with the Father, since every substance 
which is not God is a creature, and that which is not a creature 
is God.”10 This is the important qualification that Augustine 
will hammer away at, chapter by chapter, in De Trinitatae: the 
triune God is one unified substance. Within this substance, 
there are three persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit). But they 
9 Here Augustine makes reference to the Nicene Creed, and the interpreta-
tion of 1 John 1.14.
10 Augustine, The Trinity, Book 1.6.
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all remain relationally connected in the unitary, univocal, 
divine substance. 
How does he then explain the Son’s apparent creatureliness 
(when he takes on the form of an earthling—a humanoid)? 
Augustine determines that the Son has the habit11 of taking 
on creaturely form (or, as Augustine more frequently phrases 
it, the form of a “slave.”) The Latin term habitus is, of course, 
derived from the verb habere: to have, to hold, to own, to pos-
sess. The habitus might also be translated as a “condition,” an 
“appearance,” or a “state.” The Son, in other words, might have 
the appearance of a creature, or might reside temporarily within 
the state of a creature. To speak of a creaturely condition, or a 
creaturely state, might make a more ready parallel to Pierre 
Bordieu’s use of the term habitus: a “system of dispositions”12 
that governs and structures practices, perpetuating the past 
into the present. But the advantage of the term habit is the 
easy parallel to the language of a garment: a new nature is 
put on, like a garment, and taken off. The language of habit, I 
think, puts the ease and superficiality of this transition into 
sharper relief.
We might say that the Son, then, has a penchant for putting 
on the veil of creaturely materiality. This should be understood 
merely as a personality trait of the divine person—something 
he has the capacity to do, but that does not transform his na-
ture. The Son is “equal to God the Father by nature, but less 
than he by habit.”13 The Son, we might say, has his own habits. 
And it is by virtue of such habits that the mechanism of in-
carnation is set in motion. Habit is the “mediator” between 
God and human.14 It is, then, this habit that brings divine 
substance into the world in a form that humans can sense 
11 The Latin term is habitus, and the translation of this term in to the English 
“habit” can certainly be contested as inappropriate. I am exploiting, here, the 
language used in the 1963 translation by Stephen McKenna.
12 Pierre Bordieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1990) 54.
13 Augustine, The Trinity, Book 1.7.
14 Ibid., Book 1.8.
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and comprehend. Divine substance can—in exceptional 
circumstances—become habituated to a creaturely form. The 
invisible, eternal, and immutable divine substance becomes 
comprehensible and sensible as a habit. Christ takes on the 
habit—he wears the veil of the creaturely world.
Christ, however, remains substantially divine. His habit 
may be creaturely, but his substance is divine. Augustine 
recognizes that the language of substance is tricky, risky. God 
must be a substance because God is certainly not an accident. 
Moreover, “we can in no way rightly say that anything is 
known while its substance is unknown.”15 We cannot claim 
to know God, in other words, if we do not know something 
about the divine substance. So it would seem that the language 
of substance can be appropriately applied to the divine. Or 
can it? “God is without a doubt a substance,” Augustine pro-
nounces, then muses more tentatively, “or perhaps essence 
would be a better term, which the Greeks call ousia.”16 Better 
for what reason? Because an essence is more clearly ethereal? 
More presciently spiritual? Augustine then begins to confuse 
himself further over other possible cognates for this slippery 
term. “They indeed also call it hypostasis,” he ponders, “but 
I do not know what different meaning they wish to give to 
ousia and hypostasis.”17 
His confusion over the proper description of this divine 
substance signals that Augustine may be anxious about the 
possible consequences of substantializing the deity.
What interests me most, however, is that in the end Augustine 
does not fear—at least in brief flashes—objectifying the divine, 
giving it thing-like contours. What remains important, for 
Augustine, is that this divine object be wholly uncreaturely. 
It cannot be a thing in the same manner that a creature is a 
thing. It is (or should be) another sort of thing, entirely. The 
divine object, the divine thing, must be invisible, eternal, 
and immutable. “For the nature itself, or the substance, or 





the essence” he writes almost on the verge of confusion, “or 
whatever name the thing itself that God is, whatever it should 
be called, cannot be seen corporeally.”18 I am interested in 
the fact that, in the end, the divine substance (or whatever 
it’s most rightly named) is indeed a kind of thing. There is 
something thing-like about God. Is this part of what (for 
Augustine) “proves” the deity’s reality, or actuality?
The incarnation, then, is not ultimately a roadblock in 
Augustine’s path to discern divine substance. The language of 
substance becomes, however, even more risky when we begin 
to speak of high-ranking spiritual creatures such as angels, or 
the soul. These creatures, hovering around us or filling us up 
from the inside, might seem (in their very substance) as im-
mutable, eternal, and invisible as the divine itself. They are, 
similarly, beyond the senses—they nag at the senses from 
some other realm. But Augustine works to cleverly distinguish 
these substances from God. 
The human soul was, for Augustine, an extremely special 
cosmic substance—one that occupied a top rung in the hier-
archical ladder of creation. The soul, for Augustine, was made 
in the image of God. The deity created the human “out of the 
dust of the earth” (not so special), but gave it “a soul of such 
a kind that because of it he surpassed all living creatures, on 
earth, in the sea, and in the sky in virtue of reason and intel-
ligence; for no other creature had a mind like that.”19 The 
soul, then, was responsible for bringing the human closer 
to the angels, closer to God. But Augustine was also careful 
to distinguish that—when it comes to evaluating the human 
person—the soul of the human should not be considered 
in isolation from the body. Even if the soul was an awesome 
spiritual substance, it should not be divorced from the body. 
This is precisely why he disliked the Platonic doctrine of the 
soul—because it made the flesh abject, responsible for the 
evils of the world.20 The emotions (which were acts of the 
18 Augustine, The Trinity, Book 2.18. Emphasis mine.
19 Saint Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 2003), Book 12.24.
20 Ibid., Book 14.5.
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abstract will) were responsible for the perversions that drove 
the human to do evil.21 This is also why Augustine contested 
Origen’s claim that the soul was housed in the body, as if it 
were a prison.22 Thus, the body could not be blamed for all 
perversion. The soul and the body could never be entirely 
separate. Certainly, in death the soul abandoned the body. So 
a moment of severance was inevitable. But, in Augustine’s 
cosmology, the body and soul were reunited in the afterlife. 
We would get our actual bodies back (merged with our soul). 
Interestingly, however, they would be super-bodies, living 
in a state of superlative health, as “words cannot express 
the immense difference between what we call health in our 
present condition and the immortality which is to be ours 
in the future.”23 As human creatures, Augustine considered 
us a kind of soul/body package.
The fact that the soul is eternally related to the body gives 
some nuance to the claim that, for Augustine, the soul was 
a creature (and not a shard, or slice, of the creator). But it is 
important to note that the creatureliness of the soul held, even 
when the spiritual substance of the soul was contemplated 
in abstraction from the body. This is, Philip Cary argues, the 
crucial distinction between Plotinus’ Neo-Platonism and 
Augustine. While Augustine agreed with the Plotinian claim 
that we must look inward to find the divine, what we find in 
the deep recesses of the human interior is not God, properly 
speaking. God starts to become intelligible when we look 
inward—the “eye of the soul” starts to get a glimpse of the 
divine. But there is not a collapse of distinction between the 
soul and God. One can indeed “look inside the self to find 
what is not self.”24 But to confess the soul’s creatureliness is 
to repudiate its divinity. The soul, for instance, is a spiritual 
creature that can suffer a mortal death. The soul, Augustine 
21 Augustine, City of God, Book 14.6.
22 Ibid., Book 11.23.
23 Ibid., Book 13.18.
24 Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian 
Platonist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 114.
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clarifies, “is said to die, not because it is changed, or turned 
into a body or into any other substance, but because…[it] is 
found to be mortal inasmuch as that which it was has ceased to 
be.”25 The nature of the soul in its entirety, its basic substance, 
does not change. But something is altered in the mode of the 
soul—the soul’s modality. Augustine suggests, in City of God 
that “the death of the soul results when God abandons it.”26 
That which it was (blessed) has ceased to be. The soul dies 
when its blessedness dies.
Discerning divine substance is a messy business. And, re-
alistically, to speak of divine substance is to make reference 
to an extremely long-lived and complicated series of debates 
in Christian theology. To contemplate the possible contours 
of divine substance would extend this essay far beyond the 
bounds of any reasonable limit. I have not even treated the 
subject exhaustively, in Augustine’s own corpus. What I hope 
to have shown is merely that the thing-like contours of God, 
for Augustine, were thing-like in a way that does not seem 
concrete. Even the soul—a spiritual substance whose creaturely 
form is so abstract that it’s commonly thought not to exist at 
all—is alleged to be thing-like in a more concrete sense than 
the deity. When it comes to the matter of divine substance, 
we have seen Augustine wrangling with Christ’s creature 
carnality, searching for a way to determinately distinguish 
it from divine substance. We have seen him struggling with 
the strange substance of spiritual creatures—attempting to 
ensure that their insensible invisibility is not mistaken for 
some variant of divine substance. But it is love, I think, that 
presents Augustine with the most difficult challenge of all. For 
Augustine must give credence to the biblical injunction that 
“God is love” (he points, especially, to 1 John 4:8), while also 
recognizing the fact that there is nothing quite so creaturely, 
quite so carnal, quite so worldly and earth-bound as love itself. 
To charge that love is thing-like, but only thing-like in a divine 
way, was to set for himself a difficult metaphysical challenge.
25 Augustine, The Trinity, Book 2.9. 
26 Augustine, City of God, Book 13.2.
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What does Augustine talk about, when he talks about love? 
This, even for Augustine, is a perplexing question. For, when 
he loves love, he must love God. Yet what can it mean to love 
love, to love a relation? Passages in Augustine’s work seem to 
reflect his own bewilderment over what it would mean to 
turn a relation into something metaphysically actual. “But 
what is it that I love in loving you?” he asks his god.27 He 
loves a certain manner of thing. But he cannot, quite, discern 
what that thing might be. It is “not manna and honey, not the 
limbs embraced in physical love” that he loves, when he loves 
love. And yet neither is this thing that he loves, when he loves 
love, entirely without some sensual thingness itself. “I love a 
certain kind of light and sound and fragrance and food and 
embrace in loving my god.”28 Augustine stresses that love is 
certainly not nothing, it is not made of nothingness. It must, 
in some sense, be a thing that exists. “If love is nothing, how 
can it be said ‘God is love?’ If it is not a substance, how is God 
a substance?”29 Augustine is careful to note that whatever this 
God stuff is, it must be more spirit than body.30 Yet Augustine 
recognizes how odd it seems to call love a thing—namely, 
because it seems impossible to love love. That is to say, one 
cannot fall in love with love. “For I do not love love, except I 
love a lover, for there is no love where nothing is loved.”31 To 
repeat: Augustine discovers, I think, the strangeness of mak-
ing a relation into something metaphysically actual.
Love must be something (because it cannot be nothing). Love 
must be a substance (according to the metaphysical rules he’s 
set out for himself). Love must have some sort of thingness 
about it. And, yet, given that love is a relation, neither can 
he deny that this thingness is ever truly isolated, solitary, or 
wholly independent. Whatever thingness the love relation 
27 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Albert C. Outler & Mark Vessey (New 







has is tenuous and fragile—dependent, for its existence, on 
what it relates. Divine substance is not creaturely. And yet, 
it does take on a strange creaturely cast, glare, or contour: it 
begins to look (and perhaps smell) sensual, it begins to look 
dependent. Much as Augustine seeks to uphold the orthodox, 
rigid, distinction between the creaturely and the creatorly, 
the fleshy, dependent nature of the love relation seems to 
rope him into confounding these boundaries. It is necessary, 
here, to navigate through a resulting bifurcation that occurs 
in Augustine’s development of love.
Eric Gregory argues that, for Augustine, love “like choles-
terol, can be healthy or deadly.”32 He is making reference, of 
course, to Augustine’s description of love as either cupiditas 
(desire) or caritas (charity, true love, good love). By this logic, 
it would seem, love is either good or bad: immanent, fleshy 
(and of this world), or heavenly, disembodied, and transcendent. 
This would split love into two variants, or strains. Thomas 
Carlson, for example, points to the “extraworldly tendency 
of love in Augustine and his heirs.”33 To speak of a “love of 
the world” was, says Carlson, to speak of “our human way of 
being with others.”34 Augustine, by this analysis, validates a 
love that is out of this world. For this reason, Carlson calls for 
a way of thinking love that reconnects the polarities, to think 
love “within the world, by making it a condition of the world.”35 
Hannah Arendt explored this distinction between caritas 
and cupiditas at great length in her doctoral dissertation, Love 
and Saint Augustine. As Arendt reads Augustine, there is a gap 
between lover and loved that begs to be filled. When I use the 
term “gap,” I will be making reference to her analysis. But I 
think it clarifies something useful. Lover and loved need a 
connector. Cupiditas, she says, fills the gap between creatures 
32 Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Demo-
cratic Citizenship (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 35.
33 Thomas A. Carlson, Indiscrete Image: Infinitude and the Creation of the Hu-
man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 214.
34 Ibid., 215.
35 Ibid., 215.
Beatrice Marovich – Thing Called Love
55
while caritas fills the gap between creature and creator.36 What 
I would especially like to underscore in Arendt’s analysis is that 
both caritas and cupiditas “are distinguished by their objects, 
but they are not different kinds of emotion.”37 In other words, 
they belong to the same phenomenon. They are, in the last 
instance, the same thing. Love as caritas, Arendt clarifies, is a 
kind of ceaseless craving passion that turns whatever it craves 
into something to either ravish or consume. “The object of 
craving can only be a thing I can possess and enjoy, and it is 
therefore quite characteristic that in this context Augustine 
can even speak of God as an ‘object of enjoyment.’”38 Arendt 
thus underscores the importance, for Augustine, that when 
we (as human creatures) love, we must be careful to cast our 
love in the proper direction. We must be wary of where we cast 
our love. Cupiditas is a love of things in this world, it’s a love of 
carnality and in carnality. Caritas aims outside of the world. It 
is directed toward the eternal God. One who loves the world 
via caritas will filter their love for the world through this 
caritas and will be able to love the world properly. 
What I think we can get from this analysis is simply the 
complexity of this thing called love. Arendt claims that love 
is one form of “emotion” that is complicated in its direction-
ality. This is, of course, an atheistic reading—one that reads 
love as purely emotive, rather than (in some sense) divine. 
For Augustine, I suggest, love is a form of divine substance that 
can be complicated in its directionality—pulled and tugged 
in various directions. I would stress that it is important to 
recognize the ambivalence inherent in Augustine’s under-
standing of love, without understanding Augustine’s love as 
something that is bifurcated all the way down—something 
that is eternally split between spheres (the temporal and the 
eternal). There are not kinds, variants, or strains of love. There 
36 Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, Edited by Joanna Vecchiarelli 






are distinct deployments of love, ways of directing it. It seems 
more accurate to me to say that love, for Augustine, is love. It 
is one thing. Thus, by this reading, to say that the God (who is 
one) is love (which is one) is to make a one-to-one correla-
tion. The variations that create the illusion of different kinds 
of love are simply incremental distinctions in intensity. I am 
arguing that Augustine sees love deployed along a spectrum, 
or a continuum. Perhaps it is helpful, then, to imagine caritas 
and cupiditas as distinct points on a parabolic line of love.
Edward Morgan argues that caritas and cupiditas are at 
“intersecting but opposing points in an Augustinian ethical 
spectrum.”39 Morgan argues that the two are involved in a 
“transformative dialogue”40 that happens through language—via 
the word. His claim, in other words, is that Augustine’s caritas 
is “re-formed by engagement with scripture’s prescriptive 
norm of caritas.”41 The medium of the text serves as the point 
of intersection. The text is what consolidates and reveals the 
continuity between cupiditas and caritas—the continuity that 
binds them within the more singular force of love. In their 
recent collaborative commentary on Augustine’s Confessions 
Virginia Burrus, Mark Jordan, and Karmen MacKendrick 
also allude to the transformations that occur, for Augustine, 
through the medium of text. The “beauty of the text,” they 
suggest, allows Augustine to slip “between flesh and words, 
words not always even about the flesh, though always, in sub-
lime disregard of his own anti-rhetorical stance, words with 
a potent sensory appeal.” The text is a point of intersection 
between flesh and abstraction. They claim that although “the 
Confessions seems—though, in real ways, it is—a text startlingly 
without a body, especially without a divine body” there is 
still a sense in which, “it is also a text in which every word is 
drawn toward the body.”42 Bodies burst into the text, and the 
39 Edward Morgan, Incarnation of the Word: The Theology of Language of Au-
gustine of Hippo (New York & London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 73.
40 Ibid., 74.
41 Ibid., 75.
42 Virginia Burrus, Mark D. Jordan, and Karmen Mackendrick, Seducing 
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text injects itself into bodies. We might see such slippage in, 
for example, Augustine’s description of God’s busty incarna-
tions. Speaking of the breast milk that nourished him as a 
child, Augustine writes, “neither my mother nor my nurses 
filled their own breasts but you, through them.”43 God does 
not have a body, yet is present in the most intimate recesses 
of bodies. God may not have a distinct body, but does not 
leave bodies behind. There is, in the Confessions, a “mutual 
seduction of bodies and words.”44 
Augustine may claim to turn away from the flesh (from the 
world), when he turns toward God. But his own texts reveal 
the mutual transformation, the dialogue, between caritas and 
cupiditas. If scriptures are able to serve (as Morgan suggests) 
as a corrective to transform cupiditas, bodies (and images 
of bodies) also attach themselves to words and bring caritas 
back into the world, into the flesh. The text is the medium 
that reveals that caritas and cupiditas are not bifurcated into 
different kinds of love, but remain bound. As Augustine re-
ports (textually) in his Confessions, he is seduced by his God, 
he burns for his God—divine love offers the most superla-
tive erotic prospects. As MacKendrick has elsewhere argued, 
“Only God holds—or, as I suspect is—the promise of burning 
that hot.”45 The text reveals the entanglements of caritas and 
cupiditas. In this sense, there is a complex crossing of signals 
between caritas and cupiditas as different signals light up, on 
the spectrum of love.
If love moves back and forth, intensely and anxiously, be-
tween cupiditas and caritas on the parabola of love, does this 
mean that cupiditas is merely the side of the love spectrum 
most detached from the divine pinnacle of love? Would 
Augustine: Bodies, Desires, Confesions (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2010), 125.
43 Augustine, Confessions, Book 1.6.7.
44 Burrus, Jordan, and Mackendrick, Seducing Augustine, 125.
45 Karmen MacKendrick, “Carthage Didn’t Burn Hot Enough: Saint Augus-
tine’s Divine Seduction,” in Towards a Theology of Eros: Transfiguring Passion 
at the Limits of Discipline, ed. Virginia Burrs and Catherine Keller (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2006), 217.
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cupiditas be a point on the end of the line, while the deity is 
located on the equidistant opposing point? It is not toward 
cupiditas, I submit, that we need to look if we seek the antith-
esis of love but, instead, to the love of nothing. That is to say, 
there is an end of the line—when it comes to love. Love (as 
God) may live eternally. But there is still a point when love 
becomes something else—when it undergoes a change of 
identity, when it stops being love. This happens when love 
loves nothing—when love is nullified.
In Book Two of the Confessions, Augustine gives a rather 
dramatic account of his youthful folly: the theft of some 
pears from a neighbor’s tree. This narrative is a paradigmatic 
reflection on his sense of sin. In the end, it is not the act of 
stealing that appears most abhorrent to Augustine. Rather, 
what is most vile is that it revealed the nature and direction 
of his love: the nihilism of his love.46 Given that there was no 
good, none at all, in the simple act of theft, Augustine claims 
that, “the theft itself was nothing.”47 Given that the act lacked 
any ontological good, it was evil (for Augustine, an ontological 
nothingness that is the antithesis of the profundity of cre-
ation). When he loved the theft, he was in love with nothing. 
He confesses that he had no love, whatsoever, for the pears 
that he stole. He took no pleasure at all in their juicy, fleshy, 
pear bodies. This was, in the end, a shame as it revealed to 
him that, “I did not desire to enjoy what I stole, but only the 
theft and the sin itself.”48 What this intimates, it seems, is that 
the love might have been less vile had it been mediated by 
something else. The theft might have been slightly less vile, 
had the love of the theft been interrupted or complicated by 
the love for a juicy, fleshy pear body. 
Here, in this situation where Augustine loves nothing—by 
loving the sin of theft itself—it is the lack of mediation that I 
46 I have been aided in my analysis of this passage by: Kim Paffenroth, “Bad 
Habits and Bad Company: Education and Evil in the Confessions,” in Augus-
tine and Liberal Education, ed. Kim Paffenroth and Kevin L. Hughes (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2008), 5.
47 Augustine, Confessions, Book 2.8.16.
48 Ibid., Book 2.3.8.
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would like to highlight as central. As Arendt has articulated: 
the conundrum of love is that it exists to fill a gap between 
lover and loved. This is what makes love a trinity, by Augus-
tine’s account. “There are, therefore, three: the lover, the be-
loved, and the love.”49 It is the Trinitarian nature of love that 
allows him to draw an easy, and suggestive, parallel between 
love and God. When we love, we participate in a trinity. The 
substance of love can be like the divine substance because 
both are Trinitarian. What this means is that love exists, as 
a third. The death of love is when this third—this mediating 
element—is left out of the equation, or collapses. If the love of 
a thing in itself (in the very worst case, perhaps, a sin) is not 
interrupted or complicated by a mediating element, love is 
nullified. As James Wetzel puts it, sin is a void, “it is the lack 
in love,”50 what becomes the lack of love. What the love of 
nothing lacks, says Wetzel, is “measure.” God is “the beloved 
beyond measure.”51 In a love of nothing there is nothing to fill 
the gap between lover and loved. Nothingness is what fills 
the gap between lover and loved—rather than a love relation. 
To steal a pear in order to love the juicy, fleshy pear body 
wouldn’t have been a holy act. But it would have mediated, 
or complicated, the love of theft with the love OF something 
good. For Augustine, the holiest sort of creature-to-creature 
connection is to love creaturely things with a love of God as 
the measure between them—to love things in God, to love 
microcosmic creatures within the macrocosm of God-love. 
This serves as a mediator, or complicator, in connections. 
We might imagine this holiest form of love as the vertex in 
the parabola of love, where the point of caritas crosses with 
that of cupiditas.
Love is a relation that binds. But, as the sort of relation I 
have been illuminating here, love is always and already a love 
49 Augustine, The Trinity, Book 9.2.
50 James Wetzel, “Snares of Truth: Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” 
in Augustine and His Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London 
& new York: Routledge, 2000, 2005), 132.
51 Wetzel, Augustine and His Critics, 135.
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OF. That is to say (for example), when two humans love one 
another, the love that binds them is a relation. But this rela-
tion is not a simple knot between them, or a blob, or a plug. 
Rather, it is its own life and dynamic. The love that connects 
is, itself, already related (in a cosmic sense). In other words, 
love is something like a macrocosmic relation—a framework. 
To be in love is to be microscopically connected within the 
macrocosm of a connection: to be points on the parabolic line 
of love. The love of God becomes a framework for microcosmic 
loves between creatures. To love within the umbrage of this 
macrocosmic framework is what, I’m suggesting, it means to 
love in God. At the other extreme, the love of nothing is also a 
macrocosmic framework. But the love of nothing cuts love off 
from itself. Love is nullified as it’s isolated from its connec-
tivity. This is the negation of love, a putting-to-death of love, 
or nullification of love. Therefore, to love in the umbrage of 
this love of nothing is actually to pop or squash the fragile life 
of the relational connection. Connection is pursued without 
the mediator. We might imagine this, for example, as the 
quest to traverse a ravine without constructing a bridge, or 
finding a footpath. This might require, simply, convincing 
oneself that the ravine does not exist, which would be noth-
ing more than a delusion.
Love’s Ontological Dilemma: Object or Relation?
In the end, I am less interested in Augustine’s metaphysics of 
love for its potential holiness. The function that it serves for 
me, here, is as a relational ontology that doggedly seeks to give 
reality, actuality, to the abstract figure of a relation. A relational 
ontology, like that of Bruno Latour, would deny Augustine’s 
claim that a divine thing—like love—is a substance. Latour 
insists that the divinities (who he deems concrete and actual 
enough to dub creatures52) are “not substances.” Instead, “they 
52 This is, of course, resonant with Alfred North Whitehead’s process on-
tology where he follows up on William James’ decoupling of the divine 
and the absolute (that emerges in his tirade against the British Hegelians 
in A Pluralistic Universe). God, says Whitehead, is the “primordial creature” 
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are all action.”53 Divinities are not substances but events that 
he calls “modus operandi.”54 This is, in fact, why he insists 
on calling them “divinities” rather than gods—because the 
gods, it is said, save through their very presence, they claim 
a kind of presence that only an ontology of substance might 
give them.
In his own analysis, however, Latour fails to “give a seat in 
existence” to the divinity I’ve been discussing: this divine 
relation, this divine thing called love. I’m simply suggesting 
that its agency and actuality is not sufficiently accounted for. 
Latour underscores the fact that love, in some crucial way, 
explains the function of religion—the way it works. Love, and 
specifically what he calls “love talk” (language exchanged 
between lovers) illustrates the critical distinction that La-
tour draws between religion and science. Both religion and 
science, he argues (echoing the passage from William James, 
cited earlier), are “regimes of invisibility.” Neither of them 
(contrary, perhaps, to established belief) are much interested 
in the visible world. But the assumption, Latour argues, that 
religion is primarily preoccupied with the transcendent, the 
distant—that which is most far away—is erroneous. Instead, 
he suggests, “the long mediated chains of science” are what 
lead toward “the distant and the absent” while religion is ac-
tually preoccupied with “the representation of the close and 
the present.”55 Science seeks to get into the furthest reaches 
of the universe, while religion is concerned with bringing it 
close. Love talk, as he sees it, is exemplary of this process, this 
religious bringing-close-and-present. The words that lovers 
use are, in themselves, rather banal. There is nothing much 
thrilling in the confession: “I love you.” What is significant 
about it, says Latour, is “the transformation it generates in 
who is “transcended by the creativity which it qualifies.” See: Alfred North 
Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Free 
Press, 1978), 31, 88.
53 Bruno Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (Durham, NC: Duke 





the listener, as well as the speaker.” Love talk possesses an 
incredible agency—the power to bring bodies close, the power 
to intimate. The power of religion, of religious talk, is not 
dissimilar. Religion “aims at jumping, dancing toward the 
present and the close: to redirect attention away from indif-
ference and habituation, to prepare oneself to be seized again 
by this presence that breaks the usual, habituated passage of 
time.”56 Religion is about transforming the spaces between 
us and around us. Religion works to bring something (the 
divinities?) close and present. 
What is interesting to note, however, is the role that Latour 
suggests love plays in religion. Love, in this discussion, is not 
a relation with any particular pride of place. Love is not a site 
where anything religiously significant is happening. Love talk 
exemplifies a form of transmission, a mode of relation. But this 
transmission, itself, is not concrete. Love talk is like a sign, or 
an icon, of the transmission that occurs. But the love, itself, is 
not a thing. Nor is love religiously meaningful (as anything 
more than an analogue). Latour avoids what he calls “freeze-
framing” the love relation. Freeze-framing, he writes, takes 
an image (let us say, in this instance, the image of a love) and 
“interrupts the movement of the image” by “isolating it out 
of its flows of renewed images, in order to believe it has a 
meaning by itself.”57 Both religion and science, he states, are 
constituted by a “flowing character.” And so he interprets the 
cardinal sin as nothing else but freeze-framing. Idolatary is 
not about the making of images, but the freeze-framing of 
them. “God did not ask us not to make images (what else 
do we have to produce objectivity, to generate piety?) but he 
told us not to freeze-frame, that is, not to isolate an image 
out of the flows that only produce them with their real—their 
constantly re-realized, re-represented meaning.”58 It may be, 
perhaps, that even a light objectification of love—such as 
that we witnessed in Augustine—is at risk of freeze-framing.
56 Latour, On the Modern Cult, 122.
57 Ibid., 121.
58 Ibid., 123.
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Yet there is something about the quality, or character, of 
love that both popular sentiment, as well as Augustine’s 
metaphysical confessions, capture. Love talk points to a kind 
of transformation that happens across a gap (between lovers). 
But when a love becomes real (when two actors have “fallen 
into” the real thing in this gap between them) something 
happens in the world, something is born, something is made. 
There exists, between the lovers, an actual bond, a tie. The 
world itself readjusts to accommodate its presence. I would 
argue that this calls for a light objectification of the love 
relation—a sort of gentle freeze-framing, a willingness to 
see it as some real thing, with a presence: a real creature, an 
enduring thing, who calls out for recognition.
The metaphysical conflict between objects and relations 
has been explored at great length by Object Oriented On-
tologist Graham Harman. Making the interesting move to 
read Latour (the Actor-Network theorist) as a metaphysician, 
Harman believes that Latour is object oriented in some senses, 
but not in others. While Latour does, indeed, account for the 
agency of non-human actors (such as, for example, divinities) 
the point of greatest difference between Latour and Object 
Oriented Ontology appears to be that Latour risks “reducing” 
real objects to the sum total of their relations—real objects 
are subsumed in his relationalism. Rather than fall error to 
Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”59 Harman 
seems to suggest that Latour commits another sort of fal-
lacy—of misplaced indeterminateness, perhaps. For Latour, 
Harman emphasizes, a thing is “nothing more than its sum 
total of perturbations of other entities. There is no mysteri-
ous residue in the things hiding behind their relations with 
other things.”60 This is what Harman calls the “weakest” form 
of relationalism—neither a “lump universe” that sees the 
entire cosmos as one connected relation, or a correlationism. 
59 “This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved 
when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain 
categories of thought.” See: Whitehead, Process and Reality, 7.
60 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Mel-
bourne: re.press, 2009), 158.
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Latour’s relationalism is, more, a kind of “theory of internal 
relations.”61 
Harman, on the other hand, has sought to underscore what 
he believes is a kind of “non-relational actuality” somewhere 
at the heart of things, their ability to “be actual without being 
registered by other things, or at least without being registered 
fully by them.”62 His sense is that reducing all objects to noth-
ing more than their relations “does an injustice to the object 
in question.”63 There is a sense in which the actuality of a thing 
is exhausted by its connections. You are your connections, and 
nothing more: any entity is nothing other than a point in a 
network. This has given rise to Harman’s somewhat polemi-
cal position—that the object is always more than its relations. 
The object is “a real thing apart from all foreign relations with 
the world, and apart from all domestic relations with its own 
pieces.”64 This holds not only for objects that we can touch (a 
rock, a hammer) but for relations as well. Relations, in other 
words, are themselves objects that are independent of (and 
more than) their own relations. Once a relation emerges into 
existence, it takes on the properties of what Harman calls an 
object. This may risk sounding nonsensical, but the emphasis 
falls on the fact that relations illustrate characteristics of an 
object and maintain a kind of non-relational core.
What is important to note, however, is that Harman wants 
to soften the sharp distinction between objects and relations 
(rather than deny the reality of relations). He argues that, 
“no simple distinction can be made between relational and 
nonrelational entities, since every entity is both of these.”65 
Relations as objects (which I will simply refer to as “relational 
objects”) play the cosmic role of acting as “the very carpentry 




65 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, 
Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2002), 284.
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of things, the joints and glue that hold the world together.”66 
Relations are the objects that are created when two other ob-
jects come into contact. “When two objects come into genuine 
relation, even if they do not permanently fuse together, they 
generate a reality that has all of the features we require of an 
object.”67 This gives rise to what sounds like a rather halluci-
nogenic (and, perhaps, harmonious) interchange of objects 
and relations—what Harman calls the “wheel of substance 
and relation.” “Substances are filled with relations; relations 
become substances. The wheel of substance and relation throws 
everything in the cosmos sometimes into one of these roles, 
sometimes into the other.” More, “an object always plays both 
roles simultaneously, and it is only our reflection on them 
that places it more emphatically in one light or another.”68 It 
is only our ontological framework, in other words, that stops 
the wheel of substance and relation from spinning.
Up to this point, the object-oriented frame seems to provide a 
hospitable environment for the reality of a substantive relation 
like love. More intriguing parallels develop, however, when 
we ponder the connections between Augustine’s substantive 
love relation and Harman’s theory of “vicarious causation.” 
The claim that all objects (even relations) withdraw into an 
autonomous and non-related core presents us with an onto-
logical situation in which, “relations never directly encounter 
the autonomous reality of their components.”69 Objects hide 
from one another “endlessly, and inflict their mutual blows 
only through some vicar or intermediary.”70 This leads to the 
necessity of a mediator. This happens through the process of 
vicarious causation where “entities influence one another 
only by meeting on the interior of a third, where they exist 
side-by-side until something happens that allows them to 
66 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 20.
67 Ibid., 85.
68 Ibid.
69 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse, Vol II: Speculative 




interact.”71 The relation, as a third object, is born out of a kind 
of causal necessity: two objects are driven to connect, and so 
a relation is born. The site where the connections occur is 
not between the two objects’ deep non-relational core, but 
along their sensual plane. “Something must happen on the 
sensual plane to allow them to make contact.”72 The sensual 
plane of objects gives birth to the relational object.
The vicarious causation that gives rise to a new relational 
object unfolds into a rather Trinitarian dynamic: one object 
can only touch another object by the creation of a third. In 
this sense, it resembles Augustine’s substantive love relation: 
the gap between lovers is filled by the mediating relational 
substance of divine love. Even Harman’s choice of language 
is interestingly relevant for the example at hand: the love 
object is created through the sensual point of contact between 
objects (by sensual objects). We might think, then, of the love 
object as read out of Augustine’s metaphysics (which is also, 
coincidentally, God) as a third object that is borne from the 
gap between the lover objects. This also allows for an inter-
esting explanation of how it is that love (which is a relation) 
can happen in God, as Augustine declares it to. Love can occur 
within an entity, because the entity is (itself) a relation. The 
ability to consider love more objectively opens new possibili-
ties for (perhaps heretically) unpacking this orthodox claim.
All of this (the ability to contemplate love as both object and 
relation, the theory of vicarious causation that explains the 
birth of the new, thing-like, relation) would suggest that OOO 
offers a theoretical environment where the reality of love can 
be discerned at its most robust. And yet I am skeptical that, in 
the last instance, an object-oriented framework can accurately 
discern the reality of love—that substantive relation. The 
reason, I submit, is that Harman halts the wheel of substance 
and relation—forcing relations into the ontological position 
of objects. What this means is that, because entities are always 
objects, they are each “sealed away in a vacuum devoid of all 
71 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 190.
72 Ibid., 197.
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relation.” These vacuums are “noncommunicating vacuous 
zones, ontological bubbles, none of them able to transmit 
energy or influence to the others.”73 Harman has described 
this withdrawal as “the single basic tenet” of an object-oriented 
philosophy.74 The issue of withdrawal has been a subject of 
hot debate, on the blogosphere, between process-relational 
and object-oriented thinkers. I make, here, no claim about 
the possibility of withdrawal as a localized phenomenon. I 
merely question its universalizability.
What I mean to suggest is, merely, that withdrawal would 
nullify the reality (the very existence) of the substantive 
relation that I have illuminated in the preceding pages. To 
force the substantive relation into a purely objective status 
would be to take an anti-realist ontological approach to its 
actuality. For Augustine, the substantive love relation hovers 
in a paradoxical and anxious tension between object and 
relation. Indeed, I think it’s appropriate to understand it as 
caught up within the wheel of substance and relation. But if 
the substantive relation that is love were to be located (at its 
most real) within a state of withdrawal, this would make the 
love relation something noncommunicating, cut off, existent 
within its own private vacuum. In Harman’s ontology, it would 
seem entirely possible for a relation like love to exist, in its 
full reality, as a Platonically unconnected form. Particular 
loves would then be sensual instantiations of this great form. 
But for the substantive relation of love that I have explored, 
to be shut into a private vacuum (where it is disconnected 
and nonrelational) would essentially put an end to the love 
relation. It would be, in essence, a love of nothing. This was 
for Augustine, as we have seen, the end of love, the nullifica-
tion of love. Love is born into existence (and remains real) 
to the extent that it is a love of something—in the best case (by 
Augustine’s account) of the deity. The substance and essence 
of love is that it is a relation: a love of. When it is cut off from 
its relational status and loves nothing, the love relation col-
73 Harman, Tool Being, 295.
74 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 20.
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lapses and leaves nothing between lovers. It is in its love of 
something that a love relation becomes substantive enough 
to fill the gap between lovers. 
This is, perhaps, the result of considering the love relation 
within a metaphysical frame that is purely objective. Harman 
suggests that ontology should be defined as “a description 
of the basic structural features” whereas metaphysics treats 
“fundamental traits.”75 To say that a given entity (like love) 
bears the structural features of an object does not preclude us 
from looking at those structural features from another angle 
(that of a relation). But to claim that the fundamental traits 
of an entity reveal the metaphysics of an object does seem 
to push its relational features aside. What I find compelling 
about Augustine’s account is that he tenuously flirts with 
the notion that love (i.e. God) is an object, thing-like, actual. 
But he does not over-commit to this solidity. He allows love 
(because it also a relation) to remain just a bit more indeter-
minate, a bit more mysterious. I do not read this as a sign of 
analytical weakness. Rather, I see the suggestive contours of 
a more supple metaphysic.
75 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 204.
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I. Religion as a Social Structure
Reading the work of Christo-pher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Daniel Dennett, one gets the 
impression that questions of religion and theology revolve 
around whether or not these beliefs are accurate represen-
tations of the world.1 However, as Levi-Strauss shows in The 
Savage Mind, the difference between mythological thought 
and scientific thought is not to be understood in terms of 
whether it is an accurate representation of the world, but 
rather both are variations of a common structural order. As 
Levi-Strauss understands it, both myth and scientific thought 
are characterized by identical mental operations, but are 
merely applied to different materials.2 While not wishing to 
1 Cf. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2006); Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell:  Religion as a Natural 
Phenomenon, (New York:  Penguin Books:  2006); Christopher Hitchens, 
God is Not Great:  How Religion Poisons Everything, (New York:  Twelve Books: 
Hachette Book Group, 2007).
2 “If our interpretation is correct, we are led toward a completely different 
view—namely, that the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as 
that of modern science, and that the difference lies, not in the quality of 
the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied. 
This is well in agreement with the situation known to prevail in the field 
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follow Levi-Strauss all the way in arguing that structures are 
ahistorical invariants of the human mind, in this paper I do 
wish to argue—drawing heavily on Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory—that religion is a particular structure of thought and 
human social formations. From this I will draw some struc-
tural or systemic consequences that follow from this structural 
organization. In particular, I wish to identify some structural 
features characteristic of a particular type of religious thought 
and social organization pertaining to monotheism in terms 
of the subject’s precarious relationship to language, masculine 
sexuation, and the role that objet a plays in our economy of 
desire. I will argue that these features are not accidental by-
products of unique historical conditions, but rather properties 
of a particular structural organization. While these structures 
might themselves be products of particular socio-historical 
conditions, these features will be seen to be part and parcel 
of these particular forms of structural organization, such 
that where these structural organizations are present, these 
features will be present as well in much the same way that 
the hypotenuse of a right-triangle is a ratio of its relation to 
the other two sides.
At the outset, it is important to note that it is extremely 
difficult to make generalizations about religion. As any theo-
logian or philosopher of religion will tell you, “religion” is a 
polythetic concept, having characteristics of what Wittgen-
stein referred to as a set of family resemblances without an 
overarching essence. While we may anachronistically refer 
to the beliefs of the Aztec and the beliefs of the Christian as 
religions, we would be hard-put to find a common essence 
characteristic of both. In the course of this essay, I will be re-
ferring to collective formations that posit the transcendence 
of technology: What makes a steel ax superior to a stone ax is not that the 
first one is better made than the second. They are equally well made, but 
steel is quite different from stone. In the same way we may be able to show 
that the same logical processes operate in myth as in science, and that man 
has always been thinking equally well; but the improvement lies not in an 
alleged progress of man’s mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which 
it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers.” Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Structural Anthropology, (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 230.
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of the One. Moreover, following Russell McCutcheon, I here 
propose to treat these religious structures not as private, first 
person experiences, but rather as social formations.3 This 
thesis necessarily follows from any Lacanian approach to 
religion, for as Lacan argues in Seminar 10, Anxiety, “…the 
subject is constituted in the locus of the Other. He constitutes 
himself from his mark in relationship to the signifier.”4 If 
this is indeed the case—and I won’t rehearse the arguments 
here—then there can be no question of a private subject, or 
a subject characterized by immediate interiority and inde-
pendence from the social field. If my thesis that religion is a 
structure of particular collective formations rather than a body 
of ontological claims and private experiences is correct, then 
it follows that certain social formations can be characterized 
as religious, regardless of whether they are secular or what we 
more commonly refer to as the religious. That is, questions 
of whether there is explanation of phenomena through the 
supernatural will be secondary to the nature of these struc-
tures, such that a strictly secular system could nonetheless 
exemplify these characteristics. As Manfred Frank puts it,
…Structure [is] in the first place only insofar as it is a finite context of 
assignments and references among a finite number of oppositive values. 
What can be changed in a structure are, at the most, the contentual and 
significational attributions, not the order of values itself.5
3 Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study 
of Religion, (New York: suny, 2001).
4 Jacques Lacan, Seminar 10: L’Angoisse, 1962 - 1963 trans. Cormac Gallagher, 
unpublished seminar, Seminar of 28 November 1962. Lacan develops his 
account of subject formation in terms of alienation and separation between 
seminars 9 and 14. Unfortunately I will be unable to develop this account 
here, but for excellent discussions of the Lacanian subject cf. Mladen Dolar, 
“The Cogito as Subject of the Unconscious” in Slavoj Zizek ed., Cogito and the 
Unconscious, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 11-40; Paul Verhaeghe, 
“Causation and Destitution of a Pre-Ontological Non-entity: On the Lacanian 
Subject,” in Dany Nobus ed., Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, (New 
York: Other Press, 1998), 164-189; and Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Be-
tween Language and Jouissance, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
5 Manfred Frank, What is Neostructuralism?, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), 65.
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The terms that might fill a particular position in a structure 
might change—being supernatural in one instance and secular 
in another—but the value of the relations remains the same. 
But prior to this we need to pass through the discussion of a 
number of issues, ranging from linguistics to set theory, that 
will initially seem far removed from questions of religion 
and theology. This will provide the resources for discerning 
how this theological structure is a response to the problem 
of the Real. What I wish to understand is why there is a pre-
dominance of violence among social formations organized 
around the primacy of the One. The joke of this paper will 
be that this is the result of a set-theoretical paradox.
II. The Problem of Language
During the final phase of his work extending from roughly 
1964 to the end of his life, Lacan came to focus increasingly 
on the role of the Real in the triad composing the Symbolic, 
Imaginary, and Real. This entailed understanding the forma-
tions of the unconscious—roughly symptoms—as attempts 
to recreate a harmony with the Real. As Lacan puts it,
Whenever we speak of cause…there is always something anti-conceptual, 
something indefinite. The phases of the moon are the cause of tides—we 
know this from experience, we know that the word cause is correctly 
used here. Or again, miasmas are the cause of fever—that doesn’t mean 
anything either, there is a hole, and something that oscillates in the 
interval. In short, there is a cause only in something that doesn’t work. 
Well! It is at this point that I am trying to make you see by approxima-
tion that the Freudian unconscious is situated at that point, where, 
between cause and that which it affects, there is always something 
wrong. The important thing is not that the unconscious determines 
neurosis—of that one Freud can quite happily, like Pontius Pilot, wash 
his hands…For what the unconscious does is show us the gap through 
which neurosis recreates a harmony with a real—a real that may well 
not be determined.6
6 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1998), 22. 
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Importantly, Levi-Strauss makes an analogous claim in Struc-
tural Anthropology: “…since the purpose of myth is to provide 
a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction (an 
impossible achievement if, as it happens, the contradiction is 
real), a theoretically infinite number of slates will be generated, 
each one slightly different from the others.”7 In short, it is a 
gap or Real in the social system or symbolic order that will 
generate mythic productions, just as it is a gap or Real in the 
unconscious that will generate symptoms, slips of the tongue, 
jokes, bungled actions, acts of forgetting, dreams, etc. The 
product of this attempt to re-create a harmony between the 
symbolic and the real is, of course, the symptom. A symptom 
can be anything from the dramatic compulsion to repeatedly 
wash one’s hands to a simple slip of the tongue or a dream. 
What is important is that the symptom is a response to a gap, 
lack, or absence which is characterized as Real.
Lacan gives two key formulations in characterizing the 
specific difference of the Real: on the one hand, Lacan claims 
that the Real is that which always returns to its place. In 
the middle Lacan, something qualifies as Real if it has this 
quality of always returning to its place. Here, then, we might 
think of the movement of the planets. We can see how this 
characterization of the Real evolves over the course of his 
thought insofar as the symptom comes to increasingly be 
conceived as that which always returns to its place in the 
psychic economy of the subject. The symptom might occur in 
a variety of manifestations—a phobia of a weasel might turn 
into a phobia of planes—but these various manifestations 
will share a structural identity. In fact, we might even think 
of that final moment of analysis, which involves identifica-
tion with the symptom, as consisting in the eternal return of 
the symptom. While it is certainly true that the movement 
of the symptom produces an endless variety of symptomatic 
formations, the lack or absence around which these forma-
tions occur is always the same. A good deal of analysis thus 
consists in the mapping of this lack in its sheer nonsensical 
7 Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 229.
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being (the movement from symptoms imbued with meaning 
to the sinthome as pure process without meaning). Part of 
traversing the fantasy consists in coming to stand before this 
fundamental void borne of castration covered over by fantasy.
On the other hand, Lacan characterizes the Real as the im-
possible. It is with this formulation of the Real that we truly 
enter Lacan’s mature thought. Here the claim that the Real is 
the impossible should not be equated with idiotic common 
sense platitudes to the effect that pigs will never fly or pigs 
and donkeys cannot mate. As Lacan argues, impossibility is 
not to be understood as related to possibility, but necessity. 
Moreover, we ought not understand impossibility as being 
defined in terms of what people or a given culture believes 
is possible or impossible. Rather, the sort of impossibility 
Lacan has in mind are formal impossibilities like the sort 
that arise in logic or mathematics. Most often these formal 
impossibilities have to do with sets that do not include them-
selves, like the set of all sets that do not include themselves. 
Such entities generate irresolvable paradoxes. Thus there is a 
special relationship between paradox and impossibility as it 
pertains to the Lacanian Real. The Real is not reality—the lat-
ter, Lacan claims, is only ever approached through the frame 
of fantasy8—but rather is an impasse of formalization.9 This 
impasse of formalization or the Real, Lacan will argue, does 
not cease writing itself;10 which is to say, it does not cease 
producing symptoms in an attempt to recreate a harmony 
between the symbolic and the real. The graphs of sexuation, 
8 “To the right is the scant reality on which the pleasure principle is based, 
which is such that everything we are allowed to approach by way of reality 
remains rooted in fantasy.” Jacques Lacan, Seminar 20: Encore, (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 94-95.
9 “This is where the real distinguishes itself. The real can only be inscribed 
on the basis of an impasse of formalization” (Ibid., 93). 
10 “The necessary—what I propose to accentuate for you with this mode—is 
that which doesn’t stop what?—being written…‘What doesn’t stop being 
written’ is a modal category, and its not the one you might have expected 
to be opposed to the necessary, which would have been the contingent. Can 
you imagine? The necessary is linked to the impossible, and this ‘doesn’t 
stop not being written’ is the articulation whereof” (Ibid., 59).
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along with the stances of hysteria (“am I a man or a woman?”) 
and obsession (“am I alive or am I dead?”) can be seen as 
variations on these set theoretical paradoxes.11
Thus, for instance, the problem with the set of all sets that 
do not include themselves is that if the set of all sets that do 
not include themselves includes itself, then it simultane-
ously must belong to itself and exclude itself. If it belongs 
to itself then it has violated the property defining member-
ship to itself: Namely, it is no longer the set of all sets are not 
members of themselves. Likewise, if it is not a member of itself, 
then there is at least one signifier that does not belong to the 
set of all sets that are not members of themselves, thereby 
undermining the totality of this set. The set of all sets that 
are not members of themselves is consequently a paradoxical 
notion. The symbolic thus generates impasses of formaliza-
tions, these impasses express formal impossibilities, and 
these formal impossibilities are what characterize the Real. 
Moreover these impossibilities are intriguing in that they 
always return to their place. They always occur in the same 
place and thus mark a certain invariance in the symbolic 
which otherwise does not exist. Although I cannot develop 
this claim in detail here, Lacan will define three formal 
impasses that fundamental fantasy strives to surmount: the 
non-existence of the sexual relation, questions of our origin 
as subjects, and the non-existence of Woman.12
Now, having briefly unfolded Lacan’s conception of the 
Real, it is worth noting that his conception of the signifier 
perfectly exemplifies Russell’s paradox or the paradox of the 
set of all sets that do not include themselves. Lacan gives his 
most striking formulation of this feature of the signifier in 
Seminar 14, The Logic of Fantasy, when he remarks that, “…it is 
of the nature of each and every signifier not to be able in any 
11 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Seminar III: The Psychoses, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1993), 178 - 179.
12 On the primary questions underlying fundamental fantasy, cf. Paul Ver-
haeghe, Does the Woman Exist? From Freud’s Hysteric to Lacan’s Feminine, (New 
York: Other Press, 1999), 159 - 177.
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case to signify itself.”13 To say that a signifier cannot signify 
itself is to say that no signifier is a member of itself. Rather, as 
Lacan’s discourse of the master illustrates, the signifier must 
always refer to another signifier. Lacan immediately follows 
this up with reference to how this generates Russell’s paradox 
or the paradox of the set of all sets that are not members of 
themselves.
It is too late for me to impose on you, in a hurry, the writing of this in-
augural point for the whole of set theory, which implies that this theory 
can only function starting from an axiom described as specification. 
Namely, that the only interest in making a set function is when there 
exists another set which can be defined by the definition of certain x’s 
in the first as freely satisfying a certain proposition. “Freely” means: 
independently of any quantification: small number or all. The result 
of this…is that by positing any set whatsoever, by defining in it the 
proposition that I indicated as specifying x’s in it, as being simply 
that x is not a member of itself—that which, as regards what interests 
us, namely, for the following, which is necessarily once one wishes to 
introduce the myth of a reduced language: that there is a language 
which is not one, namely, which constitutes, for example the totality 
of signifiers. What is proper to the totality of signifiers, I will show 
it to you in detail, involves the following as necessary—if we simply 
admit that the signifier cannot signify itself—involves the following 
as necessary: that there is something that does not belong to this set. 
It is not possible to reduce language, simply because of the fact that 
language cannot constitute a closed set; in other words: that there is 
no Universe of discourse.14
The consequences of this simple observation are profound. 
It will be recalled that at the outset I pointed out that the 
subject is constituted in the field of the Other or the field of 
language. Lacan develops his account of subject formation in 
seminars 10-14 in his account of alienation and separation. 
13 Jacques Lacan, Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy, 1966 - 1967, trans. Cormac 
Gallagher, unpublished seminar, Seminar of 16 November 1966.
14 Ibid.
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On the one hand, this will entail that the subject can never 
find a signifier for itself within the symbolic order that would 
adequately name it or fix its identity. Why? Simply because 
another signifier will always be required to engender the 
sense of any signifier. As Manfred Frank puts it speaking in 
the context of the Derridean notion of play,
We are already familiar with the other object Derrida puts forward 
against the idea of a principle or a closure of structure. It is of a sys-
tematic nature and maintains that even the signification of a structural 
principle—in the semantic sense of the word “signification”—cannot 
escape the law of determination by means of opposition and thus can 
constitute itself only within the referential play of signifiers of structure. 
As a result, one has to give up the idea that the blueprint of structure, 
its transcendental principle, commandeers structure and keeps it in 
order from outside. One has to concede, on the contrary, that we are, as 
Derrida says, entangled in structures and have no possibility of getting 
beyond our Being-inside-structures.15
Although Frank is here referring to Derrida’s critique of 
Lévi-Strauss’s thesis of unchanging synchronic structures 
functioning as an infrastructure for the various myths we 
find about us, these claims equally characterize Lacan’s 
understanding of the signifier. When Frank here refers to 
“determination,” he is referring to the necessity of distinction 
in terms of what something is not for something to become 
determinate. As Hegel quotes Spinoza as saying, omnis deter-
minatio est negatio. Lacan had begun developing these claims 
in 1961, in Seminar IX: Identification, nearly ten years before 
Derrida published Speech and Phenomena or Writing and Dif-
ference. Indeed, in Seminar 9, given between 1961-1962, one 
will even find a sophisticated discussion of writing and the 
trace. Questions of precedence aside, the upshot of this thesis 
is that the subject, insofar as it is constituted in the field of 
the Other, will experience its identity as precarious as it will 
be unable to fix on one signifier to ground or support that 
15 Frank, What is Neostructuralism?, 61-62.
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identity. One more will always be needed. In certain respects, 
this is the hysterical core of neurotic subjectivity. The hysteric 
is perpetually asking the Other “what am I?,” “tell me who I 
am?,” but never finds a satisfactory answer.
However, matters are far worse than identities rendered 
precarious by virtue of every signifier requiring determina-
tion by another signifier; for if it is the case that the signifier 
is an example of a set characterized by not belonging to itself, 
then it follows that there cannot be a set of all signifiers or 
a totality of signifiers. As Lacan so forcefully puts it, “there 
is no Universe of discourse.” This point will be expressed 
throughout Lacan’s teaching in a variety of ways: Lacan will 
express it in the aphorism that “the Other does not exist,” i.e., 
that it does not form a closed and consistent totality. Likewise, 
Lacan will claim that “there is no Other of the Other.” The 
upshot of this, as we will see, is that not only is the subject, 
like Joseph K. in Kafka’s Trial and Castle, unable to discover a 
stable name or identity for itself, it also discovers that there is 
no support for its very being. It is precisely here, I will argue, 
that the site of religion emerges.
III. Masculine Sexuation and Onto-Theology
As we have seen, there are thus two inter-related poles between 
which language is problematic. On the one hand, at the pole 
of the subject, there is no stable signifier that would anchor or 
fix the subject’s identity. On the other hand, at the pole of the 
symbolic or the Other, language is unable to form a fixed or 
closed totality without falling into an impasse of formaliza-
tion. As Lacan puts it, “the Other does not exist,” which is to 
say, it does not form a closed totality. In a closely related vein, 
Lacan will also claim that “there is no Other of the Other,” or 
signifier standing outside this play of the signifier (S1), secur-
ing a foundation and stability for the endless sliding of the 
signifiers (S2). As Lacan puts it in “Subversion of the Subject,”
Let us begin with the conception of the Other as the locus of the sig-
nifier. No authoritative statement has any other guarantee here than 
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its very enunciation, since it would be pointless for the statement to 
seek it in another signifier, which could in no way appear outside that 
locus. I formulate this by saying that there is no metalanguage that can 
be spoken, or, more aphoristically, that there is no Other of the Other. 
And when the Legislator (he who claims to lay down the Law) comes 
forward to make up for this, he does so as an imposter.16
To say that there is no Other of the Other is to say that there 
is no signifier that would complete the set of all signifiers, 
establishing a totality and system of all possible relations, 
thereby guaranteeing speech. It is precisely this that Lacan 
illustrates in the discourse of the master:
Discourse of the Master
Impossibility
Impotence
In the upper left-hand portion of the discourse we have the 
master-signifier (S1), while to the left we have the battery 
of signifiers (S2). The master-signifier here functions as an 
“Other of the Other,” totalizing and completing that battery 
in a finite and consistent whole. In terms of the passage we 
just saw from “Subversion of the Subject,” this would be the 
so-called Legislator laying down the law. However, we note 
that in the position of the product we find the objet a. Despite 
this attempted totalization, a remainder is produced that 
fails to be integrated in the symbolic totality. The master-
signifier proposes itself as outside the play of the signifier 
and therefore capable of forming a totality, yet it inevitably 
fails in this vocation. Why? Because no signifier, including the 
master-signifier, can signify itself. As Derrida so nicely puts it,
16 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English trans. Bruce Fink, 






The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based 
on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a funda-
mental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond 
the reach of play. And on the basis of this certitude, anxiety can be 
master, for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of being 
implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were 
at stake in the game from the outset…This is why one perhaps could 
say that the movement of any archaeology, like that of any eschatology, 
is an accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and 
always attempts to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence 
which is beyond play.17
Derrida is here extremely close to Lacan. The upshot of the 
differential nature of the signifier is that any attempt to total-
ize the system of signifiers necessarily fails, leaving behind a 
remainder, that cannot be integrated in the system. It is for 
this reason that the barred subject (S) appears in the position 
of truth in this discourse, or as that which is unconscious or 
which must be excluded while animating the discourse. On 
the one hand, this discourse perpetually strives to surmount 
its division or lack produced in and through language (S), 
presenting itself in the semblance of completeness and totality 
(S1). On the other hand, this discourse perpetually finds this 
gap or division returning in the form of the loss or remain-
der (a) produced by this discourse when the master-signifier 
intervenes in the battery of signifiers (S2). For this reason, the 
upper level of the discourse is characterized by impossibility 
insofar as the master-signifier is never sufficient to produce 
the totality it aims at; while the lower level of the discourse 
is characterized by impotence insofar as the divided subject 
(S) is forever separated from the lost object or remainder (a) 
thereby failing to attain completeness. Consequently, this 
discourse endlessly repeats in an infinite variety of ways, for-
ever striving to recoup what it loses through language. This 
point, the function of the remainder, will become extremely 
important in a moment.
17 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, (Chicago: The University of Chi-
cago Press, 1978), 279.
Levi R. Bryant – The Other Face of God
81
Having outlined the impasse of formalization characteristic 
of language, I would now like to situate theological structure 
in terms of the masculine side of Lacan’s graphs of sexuation. 
For Lacan, the graphs of sexuation do not refer to biological 
sex, nor do they refer to socially constructed gender. It is im-
portant to note that subjects that are biologically female can 
occupy a masculine structure of sexuation, just as subjects 
that are biologically male can be sexuated female. Rather than 
being an issue of biology, the structures of sexuation are two 
ways in which subjects relate to this impasse of formalization 
or the Real. As Žižek puts it, for Lacan,
…sex, sexual positions, [are] not something simply discursively con-
structed. But for all that, Lacan, of course, does not return to a naïve 
position of sex as something substantially pre-discursively given. Sex is 
not a symbolic discursive construction. What is it? It emerges precisely 
where symbolization fails. That’s Lacan’s point. That, in other words, 
we are sexed beings precisely because symbolization necessarily fails. 
And sexuality means two versions of this failure.18
My thesis is that mono-theistic structure can be comprehended 
in terms of the masculine side of the graph of sexuation. As 
a reminder, I understand mono-theistic structure to be any 
social formation organized around the primacy of the One 
or the master-signifier as a technology for totalizing language. 
From this mapping, we should be able to draw attention to 
some salient features of this type of formation.
The issue of sexuation is not about biological sex, but about 
the sort of jouissance one is able to obtain.19 Lacan’s concept 
of jouissance is highly polysemous, and can refer to a variety 
of different types of jouissance—phallic jouissance, surplus-
jouissance, Other-jouissance—but the term cannot strictly be 
translated as “pleasure.” Where pleasure is produced through 
a decrease in tension, according to Freud, jouissance can be 
thought as an increase in tension that is often experienced 
18 Slavoj Žižek, Interrogating the Real, (London: Continuum Books, 2005), 81.
19 Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Ecrits Closely, (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2004), 158.
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as painful. Translating the term as “enjoyment” can thus be 
misleading, as the term is also sometimes used to refer to 
any sort of affect, such as anxiety, sadness, depression, joy, etc.
Lacan presents his graph of sexuation as a formalization 
of two formal impasses or deadlocks in the subject’s attempt 
to attain jouissance. The upper and lower levels of the top 
portion of the graphs of sexuation are to be read together 
such that the upper level indicates a structure of fantasy and 
the lower level indicates how the subject relates to jouissance. 
The lower portion of the graph of sexuation represents the 
manner in which the subject strives to surmount this real or 
formal impasse. The left-hand portion of the graph represents 
the masculine structure of sexuation, while the right-hand 
side represents the feminine structure of sexuation.
The upper portion of the masculine side of the graph of sexu-
ation can be read as “there is a form of jouissance that is not 
subject to castration.”20 “Castration,” here, should be taken to 
refer to submission to the symbolic order. In Freud’s myth of the 
primal father in Totem and Taboo, the primal father exemplifies 
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this proposition as he has no limits to his sexual enjoyment. 
That is, not only can the primal father enjoy all women in 
the tribe, he can enjoy his own mother and daughters as well. 
There are no limitations to his enjoyment. Whenever we say 
that God is omnipotent we are also saying that God exempli-
fies this proposition, as omnipotence implies no restriction to 
power and enjoyment. Similarly, some think of the extremely 
wealthy, rock stars, or porn stars as exemplifying this state. 
Roughly, whenever we imagine that there’s someone who is 
completely satisfied, without any impediments or limitations, 
we’re in the domain of the first line. 
The lower line of the masculine side of the graph of sexua-
tion can be read as saying “All of a man’s jouissance is phallic 
jouissance. Every single one of his satisfactions may come 
up short.”21 The idea here is that all jouissance is mediated in 
the symbolic such that it is experienced as coming up short 
or lacking in some way. This is a consequence, once again, of 
the principle that the signifier cannot signify itself. Because 
the signifier is differential, no term will be immediate or 
complete, but will rather always embody absence or a refer-
ence to other signifiers. Every time I get a bit of recognition, 
every time I get a new honor, every time I get an article or a 
book published, every time I get a new car, buy a new book, 
etc., I experience this satisfaction as less than expected or as 
coming up short. The jouissance I actually obtain is less than 
the jouissance I expected. As Fink writes,
There is no barrier between my desire for something as formulated 
or articulated in signifiers (S) and what can satisfy me. Thus the sat-
isfaction I take in realizing my desire is always disappointing. This 
satisfaction, subject to the bar between the signifier and the signified, 
fails to fulfill me—it always leaves something more to be desired. That 
is phallic jouissance. Just as one cannot take the lack out of Lacan, one 
cannot take the failure out of the phallus.22




Fink’s point here evokes Hegel’s old joke about how you can-
not buy “fruit.” There’s no such thing as “fruit,” only oranges, 
apples, grapes, etc. Fruit is a signifier that cannot be had. 
The abstractness of the signifier—if that’s an adequate way 
of putting it—is always in conflict with the concreteness of 
jouissance, such that each bit of jouissance we obtain is expe-
rienced as not being “it.” More fundamentally, I experience 
myself as limited or lacking, as constitutively incomplete. This 
structural disappointment in the masculine side of the graph 
of sexuation is represented by the arrow running from the 
barred subject (S) to objet a, where the subject is perpetually 
pursuing this elusive remainder without being able to catch 
it. It is notworthy that this is simply another schematization 
of Lacan’s discourse of the master, where we saw that the 
totalization of the symbolic field always leaves a remainder.
Now here is the key point: The upper level and lower level of 
the masculine graph of sexuation must be read together to signify 
a particular deadlock or antinomy within the masculine way of 
relating to jouissance. Let the upper portion of the graph be a 
specifically masculine fantasy of complete or total jouissance. 
It is because a man believes either that a) total jouissance is 
possible through some action or object or social position, 
or b) that some other person or being has total jouissance, 
that he comes to find all the jouissance that is available in 
his day to day life insufficient. Take the following passage 
from Descartes’ third meditation as an exemplification of 
this structure:
[I]…should…[not]…think that I do not perceive the infinite by means 
of a true idea, but only through a negation of the finite, just as I per-
ceive rest and darkness by means of a negation of motion and light. 
On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an 
infinite substance than there is in a finite one. Thus the perception 
of the infinite is somehow prior in me to the perception of the finite, 
that is, my perception of God is prior to my perception of myself. For 
how would I understand that I doubt and that I desire, that is, that I 
lack something that I am not wholly perfect, unless there were some 
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idea in me of a more perfect being, by comparison with which I might 
recognize my defects?23
Descartes is here arguing that we cannot arrive at the idea of 
the infinite or perfect simply by negating the finite. Indeed, 
his whole point is that my very ability to see myself and enti-
ties in the world as imperfect and lacking is because I already 
have the idea of perfection. But since this idea of perfection 
is a necessary condition for seeing things as imperfect, I 
could not have learned this idea from experience. Therefore, 
says Descartes, only a perfect being could have put this idea 
in me. Descartes’ point, then, is that the idea of God, of an 
uncastrated being, is the very condition of my desire insofar 
as I desire to move from a less perfect to a more perfect state. 
This passage exemplifies the structure of masculine sexual-
ity perfectly. On the upper portion of the graph we have God, 
while on the lower portion of the graph we have the subject 
that desires to know. In between, there is always a remainder 
that falls away. Lacan, of course, will argue that this structure 
results not from God, but from our alienation in the signifier.
III. Theology and Dirt
What consequences follow from this elaboration of the theo-
logical structure of masculine sexuation? What does it allow 
us to discern? In order to draw these consequences, we must 
focus on the role that objet a plays in these structures. Philo-
sophically it is difficult to know how to situate Nietzsche’s 
proclamation that God is dead. It would be a mistake to 
suggest that this is an ontological thesis or a philosophical 
argument against the existence of God, for Nietzsche does 
not demonstrate to us, as an atheist might, that there is no 
God. Rather, Nietzsche claims that a fundamental mutation 
or shift has occurred in how we understand the world and 
23 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy 
trans. Cress, (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1998), 76.
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the nature of being. That is, Nietzsche gives us a version of 
the failure of symbolic efficiency. I will not here enter into a 
long discussion of Nietzsche’s narrative as to how we came to 
kill God. This is not a joyous proclamation—though it may 
have joyous consequences—but a lament. As Lacan argues, 
traversing the phantasy lies not so much in coming to see 
how we are castrated, fissured, or non-identical, but rather 
coming to see how the big Other through which we organized 
our desire and identity does not itself exist. That is, the very 
co-ordinates of our world, desire, and identity collapse when 
we come to discern the non-existence of the big Other. This 
comes out most clearly in Descartes’ third meditation, where 
we are shown how God is not simply the guarantor of the truth 
of clear and distinct ideas, but of our very being or existence. 
In this precise Lacanian sense, then, both atheist and theist 
can still think prior to the death of God, insofar as both rely 
on a guarantee of truth.
What strikes me as crucial to Nietzsche’s declaration of the 
death of God, is the accompanying claim that we have wiped 
away the horizon, that we now move without direction, that 
we are suspended in an infinite void and cold, empty space. 
All of this returns us to the set theoretical paradoxes sur-
rounding the nature of the signifier. The death of God seems 
to signify a world that has lost its coordinates and that the 
ground has disappeared beneath us. I take it that the term 
“God” is a generic term for any sort of transcendental signi-
fier (the upper portion of the masculine graph of sexuation) 
that would fix meaning and identity. It would be a mistake to 
assume that “God” simply refers to the God of monotheistic 
religion. Rather, God is a generic term referring to a particular 
operator, to anything on the order of a form, essence, tran-
scendence, identity, substance, permanence, ideal, wholeness, 
totality, and so on. Similar sentiments could be expressed, for 
instance, following the collapse of a nation or empire, where 
the name of the nation or empire serves this God-operation 
for its subjects.
While the death of God is not an ontological claim, it does 
present an ontological opening or challenge. This logic is 
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deeply attached to that of identity and generates a particular 
sort of antagonism. In De Ordine, Augustine writes that,
The soul therefore, holding fast to this order, and now devoted to phi-
losophy, at first introspects itself; and—as soon as that mode of learn-
ing has persuaded it that reason either is the soul itself or belong to it, 
and that there is in reason nothing more excellent or dominant than 
numbers, or that reason is nothing else than number—soliloquizes 
thus: “By some kind of inner and hidden activity of mine, I am able 
to analyze and synthesize the things that ought to be learned; and this 
faculty of mine is called reason.”…Therefore, both in analyzing and in 
synthesizing, it is oneness that I see, it is oneness that I love. But when 
I analyze, I seek a homogenous unit; and when I synthesize, I look for 
an integral unit. In the former case, the foreign elements are avoided; 
in the latter, proper elements are conjoined to form something united 
and perfect. In order that a stone be a stone, all its parts and its entire 
nature have been consolidated into one. What about a tree? Is it not true 
that it would not be a tree if it were not one? What about the members 
and entrails of any animate being, or any of its component parts? Of 
a certainty, if they undergo a severance of unity, it will no longer be an 
animal. And what else do friends strive for, but to be one? And the more 
they are one, so much the more they are friends. A population forms 
a city, and dissension is full of danger for it: to dissent—what is that, 
but to think diversely? An army is made up of many soldiers. And is 
not any multitude so much the less easily defeated in proportion as it 
is the more closely united? In fact, the joining is itself called a coin, a 
co-union, as it were. What about every kind of love? Does it not wish to 
become one with what it is loving? And if it reaches its object, does it 
not become one with it? Carnal pleasure affords ardent delight for no 
other reason than because the bodies of lovers are brought into union. 
Why is sorrow distressful? Because it tries to rend what used to be one.24
A central onto-theological assumption is not so much that of 
God—the God-function, as Descartes argues, is only a guaran-
tor of truth and order, which cannot be guaranteed by our 
24 Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, eds., Philosophies of Art & Beauty: 
Selected Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1964), 182-183.
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senses or appearances alone—but rather the assumption of 
the One. Whether the One be substance remaining identical 
throughout change such as Descartes’ wax, or the one of the 
transcendent form immune to the distortions of images, ap-
pearances, and sophists, or whether it be the one of personal 
identity, the nation, our kind of people, or a subject that is 
the same despite all its ever changing thoughts, or the one of 
a holistic universe where everything is interconnected and 
harmonious, or the one of a State, the one is always the avatar 
of theological thought. As such, the death of God signifies 
first and most fundamentally the end of the primacy of the 
One in whatever form it might take. To announce the death 
of the God is, as both Deleuze and Badiou have declared, 
to simultaneously declare that the One, the identical, the 
same, is only a product, a result, a term-become rather than 
a foundation or first.
Philosophically those ontologies premised on identity or 
the One as their first principle produce irresolvable set-theo-
retical problems. Ethically and politically such philosophies 
are premised on the predominance of the Imaginary, the 
yearning for totality, completeness and wholeness, as can be 
seen in Augustine’s example of the army and the city, where 
dissension and the stranger are seen as threats. The problem 
is that such organizations are inherently conflictual. As Plo-
tinus, another thinker of the One will write when describing 
beauty and purity,
If a man has been immersed in filth or daubed with mud, his native 
comeliness disappears and all that is seen is the foul stuff besmearing 
him: his ugly condition is due to the alien matter that has encrusted 
him, and if he is to win back his grace it must be his business to scour 
and purify himself and make himself what he was.25
In the same passage, Plotinus draws comparisons to the be-
smeared man covered in mud, and the stained soul, impure 
gold, and the way in which the One, the Good, and the Beautiful 
25 Hofstadter and Kuhns, Philosophies of Art & Beauty, 146.
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are contaminated by matter itself. In the case of both Plotinus 
and Augustine, there seems to be a close correlation between 
the primacy of the One and contamination which threatens 
the One. Every desire for the One—whether in the form of 
identity, collective unity, the holism of the universe, etc.—is 
always accompanied by this “foul stuff that besmears” it or 
the alien matter that must be eradicated or defended against. 
IV. The One and the Extimacy of Contamination
However, while we here see a close correlation between asser-
tions of the One and concern about the foreign, what we have 
not yet established is that this dialectic is internal to identity 
and the One itself. That is, it could yet be that there is the One 
and something comes from the outside, contaminating the 
One from without. The immigrant, as it were, invades our land. 
What needs to be shown is that this contamination is always 
already internal to the One itself. Put otherwise, it must be 
shown that the contamination of the One is not something 
that comes from the outside, sullying what would otherwise 
be a pure identity, but rather that organizations premised on 
the supremacy of the One must, by virtue of their own neces-
sity, produce an outside that simultaneously marks and veils 
the impossibility of the One. The is, the signifier subtracted 
from the chain of differentiality must be veiled in its truth 
that it too is diacritical or differential, while simultaneously 
marking the place of its failure or the remainder that it pro-
duces. It is precisely this that Lacan’s account of masculine 
sexuation, the Real, and the discourse of the master allows 
us to thematize.
Language is always constitutively incomplete. This is not 
simply a contingent accident such that we could finally 
rectify it by adding one more (encore!) signifier, but is an 
essential feature of any system or the mark of systematicity 
as such. From a psychoanalytic perspective, this logic is seen 
most clearly in Totem and Taboo and Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of Ego. The consistency of the social system is only 
made through the subtraction or addition of a particular ele-
ment, a supplement—that is always provisional in its support 
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at best—such that this element has the paradoxical status of 
simultaneously being a part of the system and outside the 
system. It is this supplementary signifier that I have referred 
to as the “God-function.” Thus, when Lacan claims that there 
is no metalanguage, he is essentially claiming that there is 
no point of view one can adopt on language that would allow 
one to survey the whole from the outside. 
If there is no metalanguage, then this is by virtue of the 
fact that language is, as we have seen, diacritical such that 
every “element” of language takes on its identity by virtue of 
its difference to the other elements. Insofar as each element 
only takes on its identity with respect to the other elements, 
no element is ever simply present, but each element is always 
already dispersed or “contaminated” by the other elements. 
Thus we encounter the formal impossibility, impasse, or Real 
characterizing the impossibility of ever arriving at simple 
identity with oneself. As many post-structuralist thinkers 
have observed, identity is always already contaminated by 
difference by virtue of the diacritical play of language. This is 
just another way of saying S1/S in the discourse of the master.
Žižek gives a terrific example of this principle in his mag-
num opus, For They Know Not What They Do. As Žižek remarks 
in the context of a discussion of Hegel’s distinction between 
boundary and limit,
National identification is an exemplary case of how an external border 
is reflected into an internal limit. Of course, the first step towards the 
identity of the nation is defined through differences from other na-
tions, via an external border: if I identify myself as an Englishman, I 
distinguish myself from the French, Germans, Scots, Irish, and so on. 
However, in the next stage, the question is raised of who among the 
English are “the real English,” the paradigm of Englishness; who are the 
Englishmen who correspond in full to the notion of English…However, 
the final answer is of course that nobody is full English, that every em-
pirical Englishman contains something “non-English”—Englishness 
thus becomes an “internal limit,” an unattainable point which prevents 
empirical Englishmen from achieving full identity-with-themselves.26
26 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, 
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National identity here corresponds to the master-signifier 
(S1) in the discourse of the master or the upper portion of the 
masculine graph of sexuation. The diacritical nature of identity 
is the lower portion of the masculine graph of sexuation or 
our inability to embody “Englishness.” Žižek’s point is that 
insofar as a nation is defined by a boundary, it’s identity can 
only be established in its difference from other nations. We 
can readily observe this phenomenon at work in personal 
identity as well; for as Lacan shows in the second cell of the 
graph of desire, my identity is only arrived at differentially 
in relation to others.
What we have here is thus the real of identity or the way in 
which identity, properly speaking, is impossible. Neither a 
nation nor a person is able to ever arrive at identity with itself 
insofar as it is differentially structured with respect to other 
nations and identities. Thus when Žižek claims that social 
antagonisms are always structured around an impossible 
Real, one way of understanding him would be to point to this 
formal impossibility of achieving identity. This impossible 
Real is not without consequences; for as a traumatic impos-
sibility it turns the accomplishment of identity into an insistent 
demand. Despite the fact that identity is formally impossible 
insofar as it is always-already contaminated by difference, 
identity or respite from the play of diacritics is nonetheless 
demanded. Just as the Real of castration produces desire in 
the subject, the Real of impossible identity produces a sort of 
collective desire or fantasy. Identity must be accomplished 
even if impossible. Or rather, we might say, it does not cease 
to write itself.
In this respect, identity is not established through a total-
ization of the system in question, but is instead produced 
by having some contingent entity stand for the totality of 
entities, allowing a totality to provisionally produce itself. 
For instance, some particular type of Englishman—perhaps 
the working man—comes to stand for all Englishmen. This 
addition to the system is simultaneously a part of the system 
(London: Verso Books, 1991), 110.
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and outside it, and functions in such a way as to grant the 
system a semblance of identity with itself. It is notable that 
the unconscious functions in exactly this way. The function 
of the symptom is in fact that crazy addition that allows the 
otherwise untotalizable unconscious to hang together as a 
consistent whole. The symptom is always a +1 that stands in 
the place of the absence lying at the center of the unconscious 
structured like a language. It is therefore a S(A) or a signifier 
of the barred Other. Yet in functioning in this manner it 
simultaneously reveals and conceals the fact that the Other 
is barred.
In this respect, the symptom recreates a harmony with what 
would otherwise be infinite deferral. This is why the symp-
tom can also be understood as a metaphor. By contrast, the 
operation of addition by which an untotalizable system takes 
on the semblance of totality is itself subject to the diacritical 
movement which effaces identity and is therefore in danger 
of collapsing. For this reason, the addition of one element is 
never enough. In addition to this +1 there must be a -1 which 
accounts for the failure of totalization in advance. It is here 
that the logic of contamination emerges in connection to 
those fantasies of collective wholeness. For, as we saw in the 
case of Plotinus and Augustine, in every semblance of totality 
there is always a contamination or cries of a virus corrupting 
the identity of the system. This contaminant is the remain-
der or objet a. This contamination is a strict corollary of the 
crazy identity established through the addition of that one 
extra signifier, and functions to account for the failure of this 
master-signifier or the manner in which the signifier is itself 
effaced by the diacritical play of difference. Just as Lacan, in 
Seminar 22, says that there is no subject without a symptom, 
it could be said that there is no social organization without a 
symptom. The symptom here marks the failure of the social 
symptom while simultaneously treating it as something 
external to the system that could be overcome.
The subtracted signifier or contaminant is always the im-
migrant, the ethnic other, women, liberals, the infidel, the 
terrorist, etc. However, the point not to be missed is that this 
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subtracted term is not these entities themselves, in their sub-
stantial being, but a refracted view of the system itself as it 
strives to repress its own impossibility. As Žižek sometimes 
says, the Jew targeted by the Anti-Semite has nothing to do 
with real Jews, but is itself a symptom of the German social 
system under national socialism. It is for this reason that those 
discourses most characterized by the call for identity and the 
primacy of the One (nationalistic discourses, individualistic 
discourses premised on the ego, certain religious discourses, 
etc) are always most characterized by discussions of their Oth-
ers or those supposed invaders contaminating the identity of 
the discourse. In fact, what the discourse encounters in these 
Others is its own disguised Real or the manner in which it is 
always already differs from itself. In short, these Others are 
the objets a that the identity has had to sacrifice in order to 
constitute itself in the semblance of a complete totality. For 
that which is repressed always returns. The question then is 
whether it is possible to conceive a metaphysic, ethic, and 
form of social organization not premised on the primacy of 
the One…A society, as it were, of the Real.
V. Epilogue
An amusing thing happened in the pre-publication stages 
of this article. One of the outside reviewers critiqued the 
article on the grounds that it seemed unfamiliar with the 
work of Levi Bryant and, in particular, the work of Bryant 
on sexuation and onticology27 (my term for my variant of 
materialist object-oriented ontology). This is quite right. “The 
Other Face of God” was written in 2007 on the occasion of 
the Psychoanalysis and Belief Symposium hosted by the English 
and Rhetoric department at University of Texas at Arlington. 
At this point I had not yet made my realist turn, nor did I yet 
know anything about object-oriented ontology or speculative 
realism. At any rate, I can scarcely imagine a more delightful 
27 For a discussion of my current views on Lacanian sexuation cf. Levi R. 
Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2012), 
chapter 6, section 1.
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example of withdrawal and the manner in which objects are 
even withdrawn from themselves. 
Nonetheless, if I saw fit to attempt to publish this article 
despite its dated nature, then this is because the meditations 
on sexuation and theology I develop here are at the heart of 
the ethico-politico project of my onticology. These medita-
tions would later become the groundwork of my flat ontol-
ogy and critique of ontotheology in The Democracy of Objects. 
Drawn from the work of Manuel DeLanda, flat ontology is 
the thesis that all beings equally exist, even where they do 
not exist equally. While flat ontology recognizes that entities 
exist at different levels of scale ranging from the smallest 
quark to the largest galaxy, it refuses that gesture that would 
treat any of these entities as more ontologically real than oth-
ers. For example, flat ontology recognizes that institutions 
cannot exist without people, but simultaneously argues that 
institutions are real entities in their own right with unique 
powers that cannot be reduced to the parts upon which the 
institution depends.
However, flat ontology above all rejects the existence of 
sovereign entities that condition all other entities without 
themselves being conditioned. Examples of sovereign en-
tities in the philosophical tradition would be the God of 
theistic traditions, the Kantian and certain forms of the 
phenomenological subject, Platonic forms, and so on. In 
each of these cases, one entity conditions and organizes all 
of the other entities without itself being significantly condi-
tioned by these entities. For example, Leibniz will argue that 
God selects each and every entity to exist thus and so in his 
creation of the universe. In the case of Kant’s transcendental 
subject, while it is true that it is affected by the world apart 
from it in intuitions, the categories of the understanding and 
the forms of intuition nonetheless condition and structure 
all these elements given in sensibility. In the case of vertical 
ontologies, there is an entity that conditions, legislates, and 
organizes everything else without itself being conditioned. 
As in the case of Plato’s Demiurge in the Timeaus, it is said 
that there is a sovereign author of all other beings. This De-
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miurge can take the form of the “big Demiurge” (God, force, 
the will to power, etc) or the form of a “little Demiurge” (the 
correlationist subject that organizes all being).
Initially these issues might appear to be very remote 
from Lacan’s account of sexuation; however, if one thinks 
in structural terms, it will be noticed that the philosophical 
orientation of vertical ontologies share one and the same in-
variable structure and that this structure is that of masculine 
sexuation. What, then, does it mean to think in structural 
terms? We think structurally when we bracket the content of 
a position or artifact, instead attending to how elements are 
related as empty placeholders within a formation. Think here 
of Pythagoras’s famous theorem. What Pythagoras’s theorem 
outlines is the structure of right triangles. It doesn’t articulate 
any particular right triangle, but instead presents us with the 
formal structure of a set of relationships and what follows 
from these relationships. In this regard, two right triangles 
might be quite distinct at the level of their specific content 
while still being structurally identical. They possess the same 
pattern. Thus, for example, the blueprints of a house and a 
house itself are structurally identical, and two actual houses 
can be structurally identical despite having different colored 
walls, different flooring, and one being composed of bricks 
while the other is composed of stone or wood. We can plug 
whatever content we like into the structural positions while 
the pattern remains the same.
The thesis of “The Other Face of God” is that ontotheology 
and theistic religion is structurally that of masculine sexuation. 
In other words, it is not the content that determines whether 
a position is theological—i.e., whether one believes in the 
existence of God or the supernatural—but rather the structure. 
In this regard, whether we’re speaking of the God of theistic 
religions, the sovereign king of monarchial governments, the 
father of patriarchal family structures, dictators in atheistic 
governments, the nation of nationalisms, the sovereign subject 
that conditions all material of sensation in Kant, the structure 
of correlationism, certain ways in which academics relate to 
“master-figures” such as Lacan, Deleuze, Derrida, Heidegger, 
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etc., and so on, these formations all have one and the same 
Oedipal structural pattern that is structurally identical to 
that of masculine sexuation. Vertical ontologies all share this 
same structure where one entity is posited as “uncastrated” 
and as capable of totalizing the heteroverse of being and all 
the other entities are “castrated” or subordinate to this entity.
However, this is not all. As I try to show in “The Other 
Face of God,” it is not simply that all of these formations are 
structurally identical. Rather, the important point is that these 
structures necessarily and ineluctably generate a persecu-
tory and paranoid structure because, due to set theoretical 
paradoxes internal to all attempts of totalization—Russell’s 
paradox and Cantor’s paradox—these structures necessarily 
generate a return of the repressed in the form of the objet a, 
the remainder that cannot be integrated into the totality, that 
these structures simultaneously attempt to both destroy and 
recoup. Ontotheology, masculine sexuation, is necessarily a 
will to mastery that requires an accursed other to rationalize 
the failure of its totalization (the immigrant, women, the 
queer, the heretic, Goldstein, Satan, terrorists, etc)—i.e., this 
remainder is misidentified as what is preventing successful 
harmony and totalization—and that generates the fantasy 
that jouissance can be captured and domesticated through a 
formation of successful totalization if this accursed share is 
just destroyed. Masculine sexuation or ontotheology is not 
simply a structure, it is a dangerous and destructive structure.
In my most recent work I have referred to this structure as 
“phallusophy,” for phallic economies of desire are 1) premised 
on the fantasy that totalization is possible, 2) strive for identity 
and integration of all things in the heteroverse, and 3) strive 
to eradicate the remainder or whatever does not fit. In Laca-
nian psychoanalysis, phallic economies of desire are those 
economies that strive to totalize being and master it. Again 
and again we see phallusophy in what should be philosophy 
in the form of those idealist and correlationist positions that 
would capture the entire heteroverse in ideas or signifiers, 
that would master the world through the sovereign synthetic 
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power of a subject, or that would postulate god or an author 
as the origin of all things and meaning.
It was “The Other Face of God” that first led me to recognize 
this structure of traditional ontological thought and that led 
me to begin wondering whether or not another ontological 
thinking—a differential ontological thinking that preserves 
the queer or alterity—not premised on mastery or the iden-
tification of being and thinking, might not be possible. This 
trajectory of thought was not completed until The Democracy of 
Objects. There I would argue that the masculine and feminine 
structures of sexuation mark two fundamentally different 
ways of thinking being and responding to the withdrawal of 
objects. The masculine side of sexuation premised on mas-
tery and domination, seeks to treat the withdrawn nature 
of objects (castration) as an accidental aberration, a fault, in 
knowledge that can be surmounted for God or a sovereign 
subject that comes to recognize the identity of being and 
thinking. “Violence” is therefore inscribed in the heart of such 
ontological thinking as everything is to be denuded, brought 
into visibility, brought into mastery and control under the 
signifier without remainder. This is the logic of identity and 
identification, and it is structured around the pornographic 
as that which strives to master and render everything visible 
to the concept.
By contrast, I argue, the feminine side of the graph of sexua-
tion begin from the premise that “there does not exist a being 
that is not withdrawn (castrated), but that not-all of beings are 
withdrawn (they manifest themselves a bit).” The feminine 
side of the graph of sexuation begins from the constitutively 
withdrawn and differential nature of entities characterized 
by an abyssally withdrawn core that cannot ultimately be 
mastered. Within this ontological thinking assemblages can 
be formed among entities, but they will always be assemblages 
of the heterogeneous where the elements of the assemblage 
remain heterogeneous, lively, and surprising. Here relation is 
a pathos of difference where entities appreciate their alterity 
and create on the basis of that alterity from across chasms in 
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relating to one another. Where the masculine side strives for 
categorization and identification, the feminine side begins 
from the premise of difference. Where the masculine side 
proposes an ethics and politics of the same and identical, the 
feminine side proposes an ethics and politics appreciative 
of difference and generous towards difference. Where the 
masculine side proposes a totalitarianism of the identical, 
a patri-archy of obedience, the feminine side proposes a 
community of the different, an an-archy, a queer politics of 
collaboration and invention.
But, above all, reversing the traditional psychoanalytic char-
acterization of masculinity and femininity, I argue that the 
masculine side represents the side of ontological semblance, 
while the feminine side is the side of ontological truth. If 
the masculine side of the graph of sexuation is the side of 
semblance, then this is because it obfuscates and attempts 
to cover over the formal deadlocks of the Real that always 
return to their place through the positing of a transcendent 
supplement whether in the form of God, Platonic forms, a 
sovereign, or a masculine subject. The masculine side recoils 
from the alterity of beings. If the feminine side of the graph 
of sexuation is the side of ontological truth, then it is because 
it inscribes these formal deadlocks at the very heart of being, 
facing them head on, and abjuring fantasies of completeness 
and totalization. Such a shift invites an ethics and politics 
that appreciates difference, that is generous, and that rejects 
the drive to master and control.
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Improper Names for God
Religious Language and the “Spinoza-Effect”
Daniel Whistler
University of Liverpool
“Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy 
to answer.” —First words of Frege’s “On Sense and Meaning”1
This paper practises a Naturphi-losophie of language. I treat texts as rocks to examine the linguistic 
forces that constitute them. In other words, this paper is born 
out of a hyper-realist attitude to sense that asserts: what goes 
on in texts should be subject to a “linguistic physics.”2 In 
order to bring out this linguistic physics as fully as possible, 
what follows is devoted to the logic of sense (or, even better, 
the physics of sense3) in monist philosophies. As I shall argue, 
monism forces the philosopher to treat words as one more 
class of body colliding on a surface. This is because the mo-
nist assertion that there is ultimately one thing in existence 
ultimately leads to the materialisation of language (at the 
same time as the linguistification of matter). A lacuna from 
the opening to Badiou’s Logic of Worlds clarifies this point:
1 Gottlieb Frege, “On Sense and Meaning” in Collected Papers on Mathematics, 
Logic and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 157.
2 François Zourabichvili, Spinoza: Une physique de la pensée (Paris: puf, 2002), 240.
3 See Joshua Ramey and Daniel Whistler, “The Physics of Sense: Bruno, 
Schelling, Deleuze” in Alain Beaulieu, Edward Kazarian and Julia Sushy-




Today, natural belief [or democratic materialism] is condensed in a 
single statement: There are only bodies and languages. This statement 
is the axiom of contemporary conviction…It is then legitimate to 
counter [it] with a materialist dialectic, if by “materialist dialectic” we 
understand the following statement…There are only bodies and languages, 
except that there are truths.4
There is of course a third option: “there are only bodies.”5 
According to such “monist materialism,” the linguistic is 
reduced to the corporeal; yet, this is a radical materialism 
that Badiou seems loath to mention. In this paper, however, 
I explore the implications of such a corporeal reduction of 
language by focusing on two monisms—Spinoza’s Ethics and 
Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie.
Such a naturphilosophische approach to monism emerges 
out of previous work in which I began to think through the 
consequences of the speculative turn for the study of lan-
guage and concluded that a physics of divine names may 
well be a helpful way forward.6 That is, my contention is that 
the speculative turn that has recently engulfed continental 
philosophy needs to be thought through in the realm of 
philosophy of language. For while this speculative turn is 
also an anti-linguistic turn,7 it does not thereby foreclose 
philosophical investigation of language altogether. Rather, 
4 Alain Badiou, The Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Con-
tinuum, 2010), 2-4.
5 As well as the variant: “there is only language.” However, as we shall discover 
by the end of the paper, “there are only bodies” and “there is only language” 
turn out to be synonymous.
6 Daniel Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature” in Anthony Paul 
Smith and Daniel Whistler (eds.), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: New 
Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 
2010), 335-59.
7 Harman speaks of “this ghetto of human discourse and language and 
power” to which philosophy has confined itself “for the past two hundred 
and twenty years” (in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism,” Collapse III [2007], 
381) and Meillassoux is likewise concerned with the aporia to which language 
leads (After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier [London: Continuum, 2008], 6); see 
further, Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature,” 336-9.
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language must pass through the speculative epoché to be 
transformed from a medium that problematizes the very pos-
sibility of philosophy to a regional object of inquiry.8 The task 
is to examine language not as it exists for us, but as it exists in 
itself. The route I take in the present paper—thinking through 
the consequences of monism for a logic of sense—is one way 
of attaining this end. In particular, I delineate a monist logic 
of sense as a means of intervening in debates over religious 
language. Religious language has become a paradigmatic site 
for anxiety over the slippage of signs. Much ink has been spilt 
over theorising the complex ways in which language fails to 
refer in religious discourse: obsessions with the metaphorical, 
analogic and apophatic character of such language merely 
name this anxiety. The present paper pursues an alternative 
path, teasing out a speculative philosophy of religious lan-
guage by means of an analysis of the fate of names for God 
in monist logics of sense.9
My construction of a Naturphilosophie of monist language 
is organised as follows. I begin by considering precedents 
in the critical literature for such an enterprise in the work 
of Warren Montag and François Zourabichvili. Turning to 
Spinoza’s Ethics, in the second section, I approach the lin-
guistic physics it exhibits through, what I dub, the problem 
of improper names. That is, in dialogue with Daniel Barber’s 
recent work on Spinoza, immanence and religion, I argue that 
linguistic practice in the Ethics is illustrated by the identifica-
tion of the names “God,” “substance” and “Nature.” In order 
to make sense of this process of identification, in the third 
section, I take a detour through F.W.J. Schelling’s philoso-
phy of language as presented in his Identitätssystem, before 
returning to Spinoza once again to apply my Schellingian 
results. Spinoza’s identification of names for God is, I sug-
gest, a “Spinoza-effect” to rival the “Carroll-effect” Deleuze 
identifies in The Logic of Sense.
8 See Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature,” 344-5.
9 And to this extent this paper is, very literally, a working out of the project 
for a physics of divine names.
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Part One: Spinoza’s Linguistic Physics
One need not look far in either Spinoza’s works or those of 
his circle in Amsterdam to find evidence of sustained interest 
in language. Balling begins The Light Upon the Candlestick with 
the following remark, “Things are not for words, but words 
for things”10 and goes on to present a damning critique of 
language as impeding knowledge and so plunging mankind 
into “a sea of confusion.”11 Indeed, he remarks, “If we would 
better express things unto another by words and speeches, 
we had need find new words and consequently a whole new 
language: but that would be toil and labour indeed.”12 In the 
end, though, no such replacement language could ever be 
satisfactory, since language is by nature epistemically deficient. 
Spinoza shares this critical attitude. He writes, for example, 
“Words…can be the cause of many and great errors, unless 
we are wary of them…They are only signs of things as they 
are in the imagination, but not as they are in the intellect.”13 
This is why in the ttP Spinoza is so critical of “superstitious 
veneration of the letter…adoring images and pictures, i.e. 
paper and ink, as the word of God.”14 Words, insofar as they 
attempt to designate truths, fall short.
 However, this is not the aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy 
of language on which I concentrate in this paper. My focus is 
not on language insofar as it represents or makes reference 
to truths, but language considered in itself—as an object exist-
ing in its own right with its representative function brack-
eted. This is one of the implications of a Naturphilosophie of 
10 Peter Balling, The Light upon the Candlestick; English translation in W. Sewel, 
The History of the Rise, Increase and Progress of the Christian People called Quak-
ers, vol. 2, 4th ed. (London, 1800), 626.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Benedict Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect in Collected 
Works vol. 1, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 38.
14 Benedict Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ed. and trans. Jonathan Israel 
and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 164.
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language: words are considered as objects. In the Scholastic 
terminology that Spinoza appropriates, I am here honing in 
on the formal, not objective, reality of language.
That Spinoza himself makes this distinction between the 
formal and objective reality of language is clear from a remark 
he makes to Jarig Jelles: 
If I see a book containing excellent thoughts and beautifully written 
in the hands of a common man and I ask him whence he has such a 
book, and he replies that he has copied it from another book belong-
ing to another common man who could also write beautifully, and so 
on to infinity, he does not satisfy me. For I am asking him not only 
about the form and arrangement of the letters with which alone his 
answer is concerned, but also the thoughts and meaning expressed in 
their arrangement.15
The point is that language exists both as a vehicle which 
expresses “thoughts and meanings,” but also as an object of 
study in its own right in terms of its “form and arrangement.” 
The former constitutes the objective existence of language 
(language as reference); the latter the formal existence of 
language (its materiality).16 Each of these types of existence 
have their own causal chain: hence, “the common man” is 
perfectly correct to identify the cause of the book in terms of 
its material production; however, there is also a causal chain 
of intentions, according to which the author tries to refer to 
concepts or perceptions. Language exists both formally and 
objectively and there is a separate science (a separate causal 
account) for each aspect.
It could be argued that Spinoza’s deployment of the image 
of “the common man” here is polemical: the science of the 
formal existence of language is trivial and hence not worth 
pursuing. Moreover, Spinoza’s works do give the impression 
15 Benedict Spinoza, “Letter 40” in Collected Works, trans. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 865-6.
16 The editors in the Shirley edition flag up the difference between “the 
objective reality of a representation” and “its formal reality” in explaining 
the above remark. (Ibid., 866)
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that he never pursues the science of the formal reality of 
language either in an explicit or sustained manner. However, 
two recent commentators (Warren Montag and François 
Zourabichvili) have argued that this impression is mislead-
ing and that Spinoza does indeed engage in the science of 
the formal reality of language or “linguistic physics,” as 
Zourabichvili dubs it.
Montag’s reading of the ttP in Bodies, Masses, Power involves 
Spinoza in precisely such an endeavour. As he insists, for Spi-
noza texts are part of nature: “Scriptura, sive Natura.”17 In other 
words, writing is a physical body and needs to be treated as 
such. Scriptura, sive Natura illustrates “what makes Spinoza… 
the first philosopher explicitly to consider Scripture, that is, 
writing, as a part of nature in its materiality.”18 It is primarily 
for this reason, according to Montag, that Spinoza intervenes 
in the debate over the interpretation of Scripture in the ttP: 
to persuade readers that texts are not merely vehicles for 
conceptual referents, but should be read as entities in their 
own right. Spinoza “rejects the quest for the supertextual”19 
or, as Montag puts it more fully, “Writing, whether sacred or 
not, is fundamentally corporeal…Writing is part of nature, a 
body among other bodies, and, if it is effective, ‘moves’ other 
bodies to act or to refrain from action.”20 In short, the ttP 
examines the formal reality of Scripture, ignoring for the 
most part its objective reality. It contributes to the Spinozist 
science of the formal reality of language.
Zourabichvili’s Spinoza: Une physique de la pensée explicitly 
takes up the distinction between formal and objective reality 
as the guiding thread to Spinoza’s philosophy. In particular, 
17 Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries (Lon-
don: Verso, 1999), 5. It is important to note that Montag conceives such sive 
statements as a form of dialectical identity, where the first term gives way to 
the second. I offer an alternative, non-dialectical reading below (ibid., 4-5).
18 Ibid., 5.
19 Ibid., 6.
20 Ibid., 21. Montag defines superstition as sole concern for the objective 
reality of language: “The superstitious person forsakes the surface (of nature, 
of Scripture) in favour of the depth.” (Ibid., 8)
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Zourabichvili attempts to reconstruct a physics of ideas (the 
laws and structures of thought running parallel to a physics 
of bodies). His book therefore revolves around “the question 
of the formal being of ideas.”21 Indeed, such a “physics cogita-
tive” is noticeably absent in the Ethics itself: the precedence 
Spinoza gives to the attribute of extension in Part II ensures 
that knowledge is discussed only in its objective existence—
insofar as ideas relate to bodies. Curley, for example, takes 
this as a symptom of Spinoza’s Hobbesian temptation to 
reductive materialism.22 Ideas seem to exist to the extent 
that they represent bodies—and Spinoza neglects to sketch 
in any detail how ideas relate to each other: “The Spinozan 
physics of thought is absent.”23 This is the lack Zourabichvili 
addresses. He asks, “What would it be to consider the idea in 
its formal being and thus to relate it to an autonomous field 
of production analogous to that of physics, what would it be 
to conceive a physics cogitative with its own laws (not ones 
merely transposed from the physics of bodies)?”24
For our purposes, the most significant part of his answer to 
this question concerns the incomplete Hebrew Grammar. For 
Zourabichvili, the very idea of a grammar is a transposition of 
this quest for a physics of thought onto the linguistic plane: 
“‘Grammar’ is the name of a linguistic physics, for there is no 
reason not to treat a text as a natural object obeying certain 
laws.”25 The Hebrew Grammar consists in a science of the 
formal reality of language. It is the linguistic complement 
of a physics of thought. Hence, just as in a physics of exten-
sion bodies are formed and in a physics of thought ideas are 
formed, in grammar a text is treated as “an individual formed 
itself from multiple individuals.”26
21 Zourabichvili, Spinoza, 115.
22 Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method (Princeton: Princeton Uni-







Montag and Zourabichvili’s work provide, then, two pre-
cursors to my argument in this paper. For them as for me, 
Spinoza does indeed engage in a science of the formal real-
ity of language, a linguistic physics or (in my anachronistic 
expression) a Naturphilosophie of language. In what follows, 
I want to pursue this idea in the Ethics itself. That is, I argue 
that the logic underlying much of Spinoza’s rhetoric in the 
Ethics can be formulated in terms of just such a linguistic 
physics. Taking Montag and Zourabichvili’s research as my 
jumping off point, I attempt to fill out in more details just 
what such a physics would look like in detail. In particular, 
it is the deployment of the terms “God,” “substance” and 
“Nature” which orients my attempt to formulate a Spino-
zan “grammar.” As I indicated in my introduction, such an 
enterprise has significant consequences for philosophy of 
religion (as well as for philosophy of language); hence, I begin 
by considering a powerful interpretation of Spinoza’s use of 
these three terms from within contemporary, continental 
philosophy of religion.
Part Two: Naming Immanence with Barber
What follows revolves around two concepts: improper name 
and proper name. Spinoza defines a proper name as follows: 
“By means of a proper substantive noun it is possible to indi-
cate only a single individual, for each and every individual 
has a proper noun for himself only.”27 It is a noun that is suf-
ficient for successfully naming one concept and that concept 
alone (in certain contexts). An improper name can therefore 
be defined as one name that is insufficient for successfully 
naming one concept and that concept alone (in any context). 
These definitions are significant because Spinoza deploys 
more than one name for God; he speaks of “God,” “substance” 
and “Nature” indifferently, giving none priority. If the name 
“God” were a proper name, this rhetorical practice would 
be redundant: there would be little reason to provide more 
27 Spinoza, Hebrew Grammar in Complete Works, 600.
Daniel Whistler – Improper Names for God
107
than one name. Therefore, “God” seems to be employed as an 
improper name: on its own, “God” is insufficient; it stands 
in need of supplementation. Prima facie, this is odd: “God” 
seems to be precisely one of the only names that successfully 
pick out a unique concept. My task therefore is to determine 
how and why “God” can be thought of as an improper name, 
despite all indications to the contrary.
Daniel Barber’s recent essay, “Secularism, Immanence and 
the Philosophy of Religion,” makes use of the impropriety 
of the Spinozan name “God” in order to reinterpret the no-
tion of the secular. The secular has, of course, come under 
criticism in the last decade owing to the imperialist nature 
of its historical manifestations: everything particular in 
religious traditions has been forced, the argument goes, to 
be translated or mediated through the universal language of 
secularity. The secular is a transcendent plane that is imposed 
on the specificity of religions. Therefore, Barber echoes the 
call made by all postsecular thinkers:
What must be expelled is what has been installed [by imperial secular-
ity]: a transcendent, universal plane…The capacity to think without 
a transcendent plane must be pursued. It is in this sense, and in this 
sense alone, that philosophy of religion must become secular.28
Yet, there is an obvious difference that emerges here between 
Barber and postsecular thinking: while the latter calls for 
the elimination of the secular tout court, Barber demands a 
reinterpretation of the secular as an immanent, and not tran-
scendent, plane.29 And he achieves this end of articulating an 
28 Daniel Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion” 
in Smith and Whistler (eds.), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern, 161-2. 
A fuller statement of Barber’s arguments can be found in On Diaspora: 
Christianity, Religion and Secularity (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011). Here, his 
affirmation of the secular is less fulsome.
29 That such a reinterpretation is possible and that postsecular thinkers have 
therefore foreclosed this alternative by moving too quickly is the wager of 
Barber’s essay: “I will argue for a secularity that is intrinsic to immanence. 
Only the rigour of immanence provides the possibility of a secularity that 
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immanent secular via Spinoza. Barber argues that there are 
a number of “paradoxes” in Spinoza’s thought which shed 
light on how immanent secularity would function: they are 
“paradoxes that harbour the potentiality for the sort of im-
manent secularity and immanent affirmation of religion I 
am proposing.”30 The first paradox takes up Spinoza’s claim: 
“Deus sive Natura.” In complete opposition to the philosophical 
tradition as well as common sense, Spinoza identifies God 
and nature—these two names refer henceforth to the same 
thing. In Barber’s words,
[God or Nature] is, of course, a notoriously enigmatic statement. Is it 
that these two terms are reversible, where they name the same thing 
but from different vantages? Is the distinction between these terms 
meant to preserve a real difference in signification, or is the distinc-
tion primarily strategic, in which only one terms designates the real 
(the other then being strategically preserved yet remaining ultimately 
derivative or epiphenomenal with respect to the real)?31
The problem is merely compounded when one adds “substance” 
to the mix, since substance is another name Spinoza employs 
synonymously with God and nature. Spinoza therefore has 
three names which each seem perfectly appropriate ways of 
referring to one thing (i.e. that thing which is referred to by 
the names “God,” “nature” or “substance;” I will henceforth 
call it, following Barber, immanence). Immanence has three 
equally good names; this, then, is Barber’s formulation of the 
problem of improper names.
2.1 The Second Solution
In the above quotation, Barber gives two unsuccessful solu-
has nothing to do with a transcendent plane. I will argue, furthermore, that 
an immanent secularity provides a new way of thinking about religion” 
(Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion,” 162).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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tions for justifying the impropriety of Spinozan names. These 
alternatives exhaust most traditional responses to the problem; 
however, as Barber rightly asserts, both of them ultimately fail. 
According to the second alternative, only one of the names 
is really adequate to immanence or “designates the real” (in 
Barber’s words). The other two names are inadequate, and 
employed merely for strategic reasons. For example, “God” 
might be taken as a merely strategic name which Spinoza 
thinks is inadequate to refer to immanence, but that is still 
used in the Ethics as a cover for his atheism. In short, Spinoza 
could think that only one of “substance” or “Nature” is an 
adequate name for immanence; if this is so, the problem of 
improper names would be dissolved, because actually Spinoza 
would be committed to the claim that esoterically “substance” 
(for example) is the proper name for immanence.
However, the problem is that there is no sufficient warrant 
for choosing any one of the three names: Spinoza never makes 
clear which name he prefers. There is no evidence nor even 
any criterion on which to make the choice; hence, any choice 
would ultimately be arbitrary—deciding the undecidable, 
even. For example, to write off “God” as a strategic cover for 
Spinoza’s genuine thought seems implausible considering 
Spinoza’s strident defence of his theism in his letters.32 At no 
point does Spinoza ever let his guard down to reveal himself 
an atheist; to call him one, then, is mere guesswork. Indeed, 
despite Leo Strauss’ fame for jettisoning the linguistic surface 
of Spinoza’s text in the name of a hidden meaning, even he 
is suspicious of writing off “God” in the Ethics as a strategic 
cover or “appeasive term.”33 There is no way of discriminat-
ing between “God,” “Nature and “substance” as names for 
immanence. Hence, Barber speaks of “the inadequacy of a 
reductive interpretation of Spinoza’s act of naming.”34
32 See, for example, Spinoza, “Letter 43” in Complete Works, 879-81.
33 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), 188-90. He insists that prior to any judgment on this matter, 
“one has to see whether there are not anywhere in Spinoza’s writings indica-
tions, however subtle, of a strictly atheist beginning or approach” (ibid., 189).
34 Barber, On Diaspora, 3. He continues, “If God is ‘really’ meant to signify 
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2.2 The First Solution
There is another option considered in the above quotation. 
On this alternative, each name refers to immanence, but the 
different connotations (or Fregean “senses”) of each name 
means that they all add something to our idea of immanence. 
“Substance,” “God” and “Nature,” that is, all give a different 
perspective or “vantage” on what immanence is, and so cu-
mulatively such perspectives define it completely. On this 
view, each name refers successfully but incompletely (or in-
adequately)—and this is why they require supplementation 
by each other. This is a version of the claim that each name 
expresses an attribute of God—an argument that Spinoza 
himself employs when it comes to human names (specifically, 
“Jacob” and “Israel”).35
Barber concludes that this alternative cannot be correct 
either. This is because, for Barber, no name can success-
fully refer to immanence, because ultimately immanence 
is “nameless immanence;” it is that which forever eludes 
signification. If “substance,” “God” and “Nature” fail to refer 
to immanence (which is inevitable, according to Barber), 
then they are unlikely to successfully connote aspects of it, 
however incompletely. Barber’s argument thus makes use of 
a central concept in his essay—nameless immanence. 
Another way of problematizing this supposed solution is to 
be found in Spinoza’s definition of adequacy in Part II of the 
Ethics: “By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar 
as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has 
all the properties or intrinsic denominations of a true idea. 
I say intrinsic to exclude what is extrinsic, namely, the agree-
Nature, what does it mean that God is nonetheless invoked as sign?” (ibid., 4).
35 “You want me to explain by example—though it is not at all necessary—
how one and the same thing can be signified by two names…By ‘Israel’ I 
mean the third patriarch; by ‘Jacob’ I mean that same person, the latter name 
being given to him because he seized his brother’s heel.” Spinoza, “Letter 
9” in Complete Works, 783. On the relation of God’s attributes to names, see 
Gillian Howie, Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expressionism (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), 29-36.
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ment of the idea with its object.”36 An adequate idea, Spinoza 
insists, has nothing to do with the success or failure of its 
reference;37 rather, adequacy is the intrinsic aspect of truth—
and this intrinsic aspect is synonymous with completeness.38 
An adequate idea is “absolute.”39 This distinction between 
intrinsic and true maps precisely onto the distinction al-
ready made between formal and objective reality: “adequacy” 
therefore indicates an excellence of formal reality.40 Two 
further premises are required for this argument to function. 
First, Spinoza’s presentation of his philosophy in the Ethics 
is adequate. This remains a controversial point considering 
Spinoza’s sometimes negative views on language (discussed 
earlier). For example, Savan argues, “Spinoza’s views on words 
and language make it impossible for him to hold that his 
writings (or anyone else’s) can be a direct or literal exposi-
tion of philosophical truth.” He continues, “So sharply does 
Spinoza separate words from adequate ideas that it is difficult 
to make out for language any useful philosophical function 
at all.”41 Nevertheless, I contend the above claim must be true 
to some extent for Spinoza to claim to be communicating the 
truth, and so for present purposes I will assume that Spinoza 
did think his philosophical writings (somehow) expressed 
the truth adequately. Second, a complete idea would contain 
every connotation or “sense” pertaining to its referent—that 
is, a complete or adequate idea would include every possible 
perspective on its subject-matter. From these three premises, it 
follows that each adequate name for immanence is complete 
36 Spinoza, Ethics in Collected Works, IId4.
37 Instead, a “true” idea “must agree with its object.” (Ibid., Ia6)
38 This is the presupposition behind the doctrine of common notions: concepts 
which are legitimately universal and all-encompassing. See ibid., IIp40s1.
39 Ibid., IIp34.
40 Hence, in what follows, I use “adequacy” to denote the formal excellence of 
names and “success” to denote the objective excellence of names, i.e. names 
insofar as they do refer to a concept or percept are successful.
41 David Savan, “Spinoza and Language” in S.P. Kashap (ed), Studies in Spinoza 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 239.
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and there is no necessity for it to be further supplemented 
by the addition of further names. And to the extent that any 
one of the names used in the Ethics is adequate, additions 
are redundant: each name is absolute in itself. Therefore, the 
problem of improper names—the problem of the seeming 
redundancy of Spinoza’s proliferation of names for imma-
nence—remains intact.
2.3 Barber’s Answer
Barber himself claims that all three names—“God,” “sub-
stance” and “Nature”—must be improper, because what 
they attempt to name (immanence) is ultimately unname-
able. This unnameability does not, however, lead to mystic 
silence, but an endless proliferation of new but necessarily 
unsuccessful names.
At the heart of his argument stands the claim that immanence 
is nameless;42 in fact, it is unnameable. The reason for this is 
to be found in how Barber characterises the naming process 
itself: to name something is always necessarily to install a 
transcendent plane. Barber writes, if “God” or “Nature” are 
considered proper names, “in each case immanence has been 
subjected to a transcendent plane—but immanence remains 
irreducible to such subjection.”43 To subject immanence to a 
transcendent plane is to falsify it; therefore, immanence—if 
it is to remain immanence—cannot be named.44 Or, to be 
42 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence,” 164.
43 Ibid..
44 What is Philosophy? is of course the source of this claim. Deleuze and Guat-
tari write, “The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like 
a sieve…Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. 
The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the 
infinite into which thought plunges” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
What is Philosophy? trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson [London: 
Verso, 1994], 42). In other words, there are three types of thought: chaotic 
thought which is infinite but inconsistent, immanent thought which is 
both infinite and consistent and transcendent thought which is consistent 
but finite. To name immanence is to make it finite; it is to determine it and 
fix it in certain respects—converting an infinite plenitude into something 
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more precise, it cannot be named outside of a fictive register 
in which naming acknowledges its own inadequacy.
Yet, Barber is no less insistent that, even though it is name-
less, immanence still gives rise to an endless proliferation 
of inadequate names. “Signification is necessary”45—it is 
part of the becoming of immanence that it is necessarily 
falsified by signification; or, as Barber himself puts it, “The 
ontological priority of immanence runs into the mediatic 
priority of signification.”46 Hence, though no name ever 
successfully refers to immanence, with immanence comes 
an endless proliferation of names which attempt to do so. 
This proliferation is, dubbed by Barber, the excessiveness 
or surplus of immanence: immanence goes beyond itself by 
generating names which endlessly fail to capture it. So, while 
it is impossible to name immanence, it is also “impossible 
not to name immanence.”47
This is therefore Barber’s solution to the problem of improper 
names. Spinoza employs improper names for God, because 
immanence always necessarily generates more and more 
improper names. Immanence gives rise to “the paradoxical 
necessity of signifying that which has no proper name.”48
2.4 Barber and Apophaticism
At a number of points, Barber strongly distinguishes his 
position from apophaticism. His solution to the problem of 
proper names, he claims, “evade[s] the lure of apophaticism.”49 
This is because, for Barber, apophaticism negates names in 
favour of a nameless transcendent plane. Therefore, while it 
finite and rigid. To name is therefore to install a transcendent plane. This is 
why to name immanence (non-fictively) is to falsify it, and so immanence 
is properly nameless.







may superficially appear that Barber’s strategies in dealing 
with names are apophatic, the result of these strategies is 
profoundly non-apophatic: rather than indicating something 
beyond all immanence which cannot be named because it is 
so other, they indicate something so immanent it cannot be 
named. Thus, Barber continues, “Immanence exceeds signi-
fication not because it belongs to a plane beyond significa-
tion—this would turn immanence into yet another mode of 
transcendence.”50 Immanence does not exist beyond names, 
but logically prior to names (as their transcendental condition).
I am sceptical of this argument for a number of reasons. 
First, negative theologians would agree that their “God” ex-
ists prior to names, as an immanent condition productive of 
names. That is, Barber’s characterisation of apophatic theology 
as installing a transcendent plane is unfair. Second, apophati-
cism denotes a practice, rather than a result—a practice of 
apophasis or negation: one can therefore practice apophati-
cism in the name of immanence, just as happily as one can 
practice apophaticism in the name of transcendence. Henri 
Bergson and Samuel Beckett, for example, are apophatic 
thinkers of immanence.51 Therefore, I characterise Barber’s 
solution to the problem of improper names as apophatic, 
and this is because it shares the defining characteristic of all 
apophaticism: a dissatisfaction with language as such and so 
an overriding concern to negate or show up the inadequacy 
of that language in the name of the nameless. Barber’s central 
claim that immanence is properly nameless and so therefore 
50 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion,” Barber 
continues in On Diaspora, “The operation I am tracing here is not identifiable 
with the logic of negative theology. While it is the case that negative theology 
also grapples with the difficulty of naming the nameless, it is equally the 
case that negative theology addresses this difficulty by signifying that the 
object of signification is unsignifiable. Immanence, however, cannot permit 
this strategy, for such a strategy makes the unsignifiable into something that 
transcends signification” (8).
51 On Beckett’s non-theological apophaticism, see my comments on Sandra 
Wynands’ Iconic Spaces: The Dark Theology of Samuel Beckett’s Drama (Indi-
ana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) in Literature and Theology 22.4 
(2008): 494-7.
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all names are inadequate is the very claim repeated by all 
apophatic thinkers—theologians or otherwise.52
It is here that I locate my fundamental disagreement 
with Barber’s solution to the problem of improper names 
(at least as this problem is to be found in monistic philoso-
phies). Barber claims that immanence is properly nameless 
because it exists prior to all naming: “Immanence is prior 
to signification,” he claims—and this priority, he goes on to 
specify, is an “ontological priority.”53 As a reading of Spinoza’s 
use of improper names, the disjunction between names and 
nameless immanence is misguided for two reasons. First, for 
a rigorous monist like Spinoza (and, we shall see, the same 
is true for Schelling), immanence is each name. There is no 
ontological priority here, but only ontological identity. In fact, 
the productive monisms of Spinoza and Schelling do away 
with the hierarchy of being altogether—and this hierarchy 
is of course the precondition of being able to claim that 
something is prior to something else.54 For Spinoza, there 
is merely identity. Immanence does not exist before names, 
it only exists as names. In the second half of the paper, I am 
going to explore the metaphysical reasons why this is the 
case; for the moment, however, I merely want to claim that 
in asserting the priority of immanence to its names, Barber 
does not take Spinoza’s monism seriously enough.
Second, if Spinoza wrote the Ethics adequately (see sec-
tion 2.2), then the names he uses in the Ethics, like “God,” 
“substance” and “Nature,” cannot fail to refer to what they 
52 For example, Barber stands in the apophatic tradition when he claims 
that the task for philosophy of religion is to recognise the names of the 
secular “as fictive” (Barber, “Secularism, Immanence,” 169). He writes, “It 
is thus imperative to inhabit that difference between immanence itself and 
the fictions it intrinsically produces” (ibid., 169). Apophaticism is precisely 
the practice by which this difference is recognised and inhabited, for this 
difference represents the inadequacy of all language to capture what is 
properly nameless. See also Barber, On Diaspora, 8.
53 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence,” 163.
54 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza vol. 1 (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1968), 299; 
Gilles Deleuze, Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New 
York: Zone, 1990), Chapter 11.
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intend to refer to. If they were to fail, the whole of the Ethics 
would collapse and become mere wordplay with no genuine 
reference to reality.55 Therefore, for Spinoza’s philosophy to 
function as philosophy (i.e. to make claims about the truth), 
Barber cannot be right—Spinoza’s improper names for im-
manence must actually succeed in naming immanence.
These two reasons indicate that Barber’s solution to the 
problem of improper names cannot be correct in Spinoza’s 
case (although it might be a perfectly good solution more 
generally). Barber is wrong to claim that Spinoza employs 
improper names because they fail to refer. Moreover, just 
as Barber’s solution to this problem fails, so too does every 
apophatic solution, because apophaticism necessarily claims 
that all names fail in some way, shape or form. It is here that 
I am intervening in debates in philosophy of religion: apo-
phaticism is not the answer here, and this is a hard pill for 
continental philosophy of religion to swallow. The natural 
inclination of most continental philosophers of religion is 
to resort to apophatic solutions when there is any kind of 
conundrum concerning language. As soon as a difficulty con-
cerning religious language is raised, the assumption is that 
language is a falsification, because God is other or because 
God transcends human discourse or because language is 
structured by différance and so on. This is one of the reasons 
I am focusing on Spinoza and Schelling here, for they are the 
philosophers most distanced from the apophatic worldview. 
Their uncompromising rationalism—their concern to know 
everything because everything is immanent—means one 
cannot explain away their philosophy of religious language 
apophatically. One of the defining characteristics of such 
kataphatic thought is the excess of names they deploy—one 
name is insufficient for their purposes. Hence, Spinoza uses 
“God,” “substance” and “Nature” synonymously, while Hegel 
speaks almost synonymously of “God,” “the absolute” and 
“Spirit.” My contention is that every apophatic solution—every 
solution premised on the inadequacy of names—fails to ac-
55 It will be seen later in the paper that I need to qualify these claims somewhat.
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count for this plurality of names. Spinoza therefore wakes us 
from our apophatic slumbers: he forces us to look elsewhere, 
re-evaluate the problem of religious language and do philoso-
phy of religion differently. In other words, philosophers of 
religious language have been obsessed with the inadequacy 
of names to the point of ignoring kataphatic deployments 
of language. However, the speculative turn is kataphatic in 
orientation—and much work now needs to be done on ana-
lysing and unpacking the way kataphatic texts signify.
Part Three: Schelling’s Metaphysics of Language
I thus need to approach anew the problem of improper names 
in order to work out what a metaphysics would look like in 
which what is referred to by “God” or “substance” or “Nature” 
is ontologically identical with those names. Through this 
metaphysical inquiry, I hope to show how monists solve the 
problem of improper names. To do this, I now turn to the 
Identitätssystem of F.W.J. Schelling.56 In the Identitätssystem, 
Schelling demonstrates why, on the basis of a productive mo-
nism, God is the name “God” or reality is the name “reality.” 
The metaphysics of Schelling’s Identitätssystem reveals how 
names can be improper.
3.1 Schelling’s Productive Monism Presented in Six Propositions
Proposition One: Immanence has more than one name
Unsurprisingly enough, Schelling gives a plurality of names 
to immanence (or what fundamentally exists in reality). He 
56 For a fuller account of and further justification for the reading of Schelling 
which follows, see Daniel Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Form-
ing the System of Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 forthcoming). 
In this paper, I assume that between 1801 and 1805 Schelling’s work forms a 
self-sufficient whole and that the major works of this period can therefore 
be studied in isolation from the rest of his corpus. The philosophy of this 
period is called, following Schelling’s lead, the Identitätssystem (the system 
of identity), and all of the claims I make about Schelling in what follows are 
meant to apply to the Identitätssystem alone.
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employs these names practically interchangeably through-
out his Identitätssystem. The names include “the absolute,” 
“identity,” “indifference” and “God.” It is not the case that 
Schelling prefers one of these names (for example, “the 
absolute”) and uses the others derivatively or secondarily 
to describe certain properties or attributes of this absolute. 
Each name is an adequate name for what is. There is no ne-
cessity for Schelling to use more than one name, yet he does: 
“God,” “identity,” “indifference,” “reality” and “the absolute” 
are improper names. Why, to ask once again, is Schelling so 
insistent on employing them all?
Proposition Two: Immanence is one
The Identitätssystem effectively commences with Schelling’s 
claim, “Absolute identity is not the cause of the universe, 
but the universe itself.”57 Combating philosophy’s “long 
and profound ignorance about this principle,” Schelling re-
discovers the “true” nature of reality—monism.58 He writes, 
“All that is is, to the extent that it is, One…There is everywhere 
only One Being, only One true Essence.”59 This is, of course, why 
the Identitätssystem is called the Identitätssystem, because all 
of reality is self-identical. Immanence is identical with itself.
Proposition Three: Immanence consists in form and essence
Schelling sees immanence as comprised of two elements—es-
sence and form. While these two elements are utterly identical, 
the philosopher is able to isolate them individually. So, reality 
is in essence indeterminate identity, but it is also necessary 
57 F.W.J. Schelling, Werke, vol. 4, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 
129; Schelling, Presentation of My System of Philosophy, trans. Michael G. Vater 
in Philosophical Forum 32.4 (2001), 359.
58 Ibid., 129, 359.
59 Ibid., 6:156; Schelling, System of Philosophy in General and of the Philosophy 
of Nature in Particular in Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Esssays, ed. 
and trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany: suny Press, 1994), 153.
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that essence cannot exist without form. Essence always ex-
ists formed—there are no exceptions. There is therefore no 
such thing as unformed immanence; there is no such thing 
as essential identity free from formal identity. Immanence 
is always already determinate. There is no ineffable “behind” 
or “beyond” to what is expressed that never manifests itself; 
there is no hidden transcendence.
Proposition Four: Form produces essence 
Form neither represents nor emanates from essence; instead, 
Schelling conceives of a third model for the form/essence 
relation. The foundation on which Schelling’s alternative 
is built is the principle that formation is inescapable. For 
Schelling, this means that immanence exists by producing 
its own essence through a process of formation. Schellingian 
philosophy conceives essence as excessive: the produced es-
sence is always more than it was prior to production. Determi-
nation is not a prison which stops us reaching what matters 
most; what matters most is in fact first produced in the very 
act of determination. Formation can never be a diminution, 
alienation, distortion or loss of essence. There is a perpetu-
ally excessive surplus of essence.
Proposition Five: Even though all forms express identity, there is 
more than one form
If everything is the same—if Schelling is a monist—how can 
formal identity give rise to the irreducible multiplicity of ev-
eryday life? Schelling insists that form is not singular; there 
is a plurality of formal identities in existence. In other words, 
reality is refracted into multiple instances of identity. This 
is how plurality arises in the Schellingian cosmos. Schelling 
designates these various manifestations of the law of identity 
Darstellungen (or presentations or exhibitions). Every thing and 
every idea is a Darstellung, much like it is a mode for Spinoza.
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Proposition Six: Differentiation is quantitative
What then differentiates these forms? Schelling’s answer is 
classically monist: there is only one substance that comprises 
all there is; the only differentiating attribute is therefore the 
degree to which this substance is instantiated. This is what 
Schelling means when he speaks of “amounts of being”60 or 
“degrees of the absolute,”61 or “different grades of identity.”62 
It is also what Grant means when he speaks of “the quantity 
of identity” each entity possesses for Schelling.63 Two claims 
are therefore central to Schelling’s doctrine of quantitative 
differentiation: first, differentiation is a matter of form, and, 
second, it is a matter of the degree or the excess to which each 
form produces essential identity.
3.2 Schelling’s Theory of Language
Every Darstellung is a construction of reality to a certain inten-
sity; there is therefore a hierarchy of Darstellungen proceed-
ing from those which are maximally productive of identity 
to those which are minimally intense. Schelling once more 
has numerous names for the type of form that exists at the 
top of this hierarchy: “idea” is one name he uses, but for our 
purposes the most pertinent name is “symbol.”
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art, Schelling writes. 
“Darstellung of the absolute with absolute indifference of the 
universal and the particular…is possible only symbolically.”64 
The symbol represents the highest, most intense form—it 
stands at the top of the hierarchy: “The symbolic is the 
60 Schelling, Werke, 4:123; Schelling, Presentation, 355.
61 Ibid., 2:64; Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris 
and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 48.
62 Schelling, Werke, 4:431.
63 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophy of Nature after Schelling (London: Con-
tinuum, 2006), 174.
64 Schelling, Werke, 5:406; Schelling, Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas W. Stott 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1989), 45.
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absolute in itself.”65 Examples of symbols for Schelling are 
organisms, artworks, philosophy and theology—they are all 
examples of maximally intense productions of reality. Yet, 
Schelling is equally insistent that not all symbols are equally 
intense, because they do not all manifest the identity of real 
and ideal (or matter and idea) to the same extent. That is, 
Schelling conceives the possibility of predominantly real and 
predominantly ideal symbols. The extent to which symbols 
identify real and ideal thus becomes the criterion by which 
to differentiate and assess them. And, in fact, Schelling claims, 
there is only one symbol which identifies the real and the ideal 
fully, and this is symbolic language.
Language, Schelling writes, “is the most appropriate sym-
bol of the absolute or infinite affirmation of God”66: it is an 
absolute Darstellung, so exhibits identity to the maximum 
possible extent. Language is not just an ordinary Darstellung 
(or form of reality), it is not merely one instance of a symbol, 
it is the most intense possible symbol. Schelling argues that 
language is the only symbol which overcomes the real/ideal 
binary, and so it expresses identity to an even greater extent 
than any other symbol. It is the symbol of symbols—the 
“indifference of indifference…the identity of identity.”67 In 
Wanning’s words, “Nothing more intense is possible within 
the Identitätssystem.”68 The fact that language is the only 
symbolic form to fully indifferentiate real and ideal has the 
further consequence that language manifests reality most. To 
describe something in language is to produce it in the most 
intense possible manner. Entities exist most in words. Or 
65 Henry Crabb Robinson, “Schellings Aesthetik” in Ernst Behler, “Schellings 
Ästhetik in der Überlieferung von Henry Crabb Robinson,” Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch 83.1 (1976), 161.
66 Schelling, Werke, 5:483; Schelling, Philosophy of Art, 100.
67 Jochen A. Bär, Sprachreflexion der deutschen Frühromantik: Konzepte zwischen 
Universalpoesie und grammatischem Kosmopolitismus (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1999), 165.
68 Berbeli Wanning, Konstruktion und Geschichte: Das Identitätsphilosophie als 
Grundlage der Kunstphilosophie bei F.W.J. Schelling (Frankfurt am Main: Haag 
und Herchen, 1988), 166.
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put differently, the reality of an entity is its name. Discourse, 
names and propositions are more than anything else can 
possible be.
Our next question is what does this mean for language—what 
is the structure of a Schellingian name? There is one funda-
mental element to Schellingian symbolic language: “Meaning 
is here simultaneous with being itself, passed over into the 
object itself and one with it.”69 Schelling is committed to an 
absolute identification of meaning and being in symbolic 
language. What a word means is nothing different from what 
it is. Language does not signify something outside itself. It is 
its own meaning. Words do not represent something in the 
world; in fact, there is no outside to words. In short, Schelling 
eliminates signification from symbolic language. Meaning 
does not (even partially) exist separate from being—and so 
no process or activity (including signification) is required 
to transfer from the latter to the former. Language remains 
completely immanent to itself: it is completely self-contained 
and self-sufficient. Signification and reference are no longer 
valid categories. 
If reference is no longer a valid category for understanding 
language, what is? As we have seen, forms are characterised 
by the extent they produce essential identity—and the same 
is true for language. So, production of identity is the goal of 
Schellingian symbolic language; it is what remains after the 
elimination of reference. What matters is not the referent (for 
there is none), but the product. Symbolic language does not 
refer to reality; it produces reality. The rejection of reference 
frees language from correctly or incorrectly representing 
an already existing entity; what is rather at stake is how in-
tensely entities are generated through language. Description 
is replaced with production.
There is a further important consequence: if words produce 
the absolute more or less intensely, then there should be ways 
of increasing the intensity of such production. These modes 
of intensification I dub symbolic practices. Through them, 
Schelling hopes to transform all language into symbolic 
69 Schelling, Werke, 5:411; Schelling, Philosophy of Art, 49.
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language. What we have here is a version of the Romantic 
process of Bildung—what Schelling dubs, “the gradual inten-
sification of all forms,”70 and the symbolic practice required 
to make language symbolic is eclecticism: it is only through 
the eclectic accumulation of names for reality that Schelling 
thinks language (and so discursive practices, like philosophy) 
can become fully symbolic. 
Returning to Schelling’s metaphysics shows why: Schelling 
is a monist with regard to essence: there is one essence to real-
ity, and this essence is identity. In consequence, all sciences 
have essentially the same subject matter—identity. All future 
scientific endeavour will repeat the same essence over and 
over. Scientific progress does not therefore consist in what is 
said, but how it is said. The form of science becomes the crucial 
issue. The Schellingian ideal is a form of philosophy (a lan-
guage) which produces essential identity with the maximum 
possible intensity. This point can be turned reflexively back 
onto Schelling’s own practice: the Identitätssystem merely 
repeats the same essence as all other philosophies. It is when 
it comes to form, Schelling claims, that it is to be set above 
everything else. The Identitätssystem is self-consciously con-
structed around this insight into the centrality of form to the 
philosophical endeavour. This is ultimately the reason why 
Schelling experiments with dialogue (in Bruno) and with the 
more geometrico (most rigorously, in the 1804 System); it is the 
reason why he adopts Spinozist vocabulary, then Platonic 
vocabulary, then theological vocabulary. All these various 
experiments in form are variations on one fundamental 
practice which Schelling thinks will make his system the most 
intense. According to this symbolic practice, all previous sci-
entific discourse is reduced to the status of materials that can 
be appropriated to aid the production of identity. I designate 
this practice, “absolute eclecticism”—that is, the magpie-like 
appropriation of individual concepts and styles from various 
scientific discourses for the sake of producing reality.
70 Schelling, Werke, 5:147; Schelling, On Construction in Philosophy, trans. An-
drew A. Davis and Alexi I. Kukuljevic in Epoché 12.2 (2008), 285.
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In other words, all forms produce identity, but some do 
it better than others; therefore, the task of the thinker is to 
locate the most productive aspects of each science and as-
semble them into a system; the result is a system of identity, 
an Identitätssystem. The thinker must choose anything and 
everything that will intensify her form of discourse and so 
intensify identity. In consequence, impropriety becomes the 
very ideal of science—and the Identitätssystem in particular 
is built on the virtue of impropriety. An improper science 
is one unconcerned with borders between fields, but which 
plunders every science (and every name) equally in order to 
intensify its productivity. It is the reason behind Schelling’s 
appropriation of Platonic language and Spinozist method 
into his philosophy, and—most significantly for this paper—
eclecticism is the reason behind Schelling’s use of improper 
names. “God,” “the absolute,” “identity,” “indifference” are 
names taken from various different discourses and brought 
into the Identitätssystem for the purpose of intensifying the 
philosophical language in which Schelling writes. Improper 
names for God are eclectically appropriated and deployed for 
the sake of a higher level of intensity in the Identitätssystem 
itself. Because Schelling employs improper names, he pro-
duces reality better.71
This long detour into Schelling’s philosophy of language 
therefore helps with the problem of improper names. Two 
conclusions are especially crucial. First, reality is most para-
digmatically a name. What is exists most intensely as a name. 
Second, Schelling demonstrates that a monist must do away 
with reference: referential relations assume some difference 
between word and meaning—and this cannot be the case for 
monists. Adding these claims together leads immediately to the 
conclusion: names for God are God or names for immanence 
are immanence. For monists, whether a name successfully 
refers is a redundant question: the adequacy or inadequacy 
of a name has nothing to do with reference. The apophatic 
71 By which I mean intensively “better” or “better” in the sense of Spinozan 
adequacy, rather than “better” in reference to an external model or archetype.
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contention that names necessarily fail to refer to reality has 
no relevance to the problem of improper names as it occurs 
in Spinoza and Schelling’s philosophy. Instead—leaving 
behind the way apophaticism usually frames the debate—I 
contend that absolute eclecticism provides the model to 
account for improper names: the more names given, the 
more intense scientific language becomes. These names are 
intensive productions of the absolute—and they become 
more intense, the more names are used. The success of the 
productive monism Schelling proposes in his Identitätssystem 
ultimately depends on the plurality of names he incorporates 
into this system. Improper names are, for Schelling, always 
an improvement over proper names, because plurality is 
an intensification. This, then, is Schelling’s solution to the 
problem of improper names.
Part Four: Philosophy of Language for Monists
4.1 Spinoza Revisited
This Schellingian solution illuminates Spinoza’s own employ-
ment of improper names. First, Spinoza’s rigorous commit-
ment to immanence means that there is no such thing as pure 
immanence. Any notion of immanence existing separately 
from its manifestations is false. Just as for Schelling there is 
no essence that is not formed, so too for Spinoza there is no 
substance outside of its modes.72 Immanence does not in any way 
stand above or outside its expressions. Substance is “exhausted” 
in its modes. There is nothing behind the manifestations, for 
they are reality. In consequence, names for God (or substance 
or Nature) do not name something distinct from these names, 
for there is no substance as such or God as such. Immanence 
is fully and completely expressed in its modes—and names 
are modes too. Therefore, immanence is nothing outside of 
these names. Immanence is fully contained in the very names 
72 See Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 27; Genevieve Lloyd, Spinoza and 
the Ethics (London: Routledge, 1996), 41.
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for immanence. Names are self-sufficient: they need refer to 
nothing outside themselves. So, just like Schelling, Spinoza—as 
a rigorous monist—must eliminate the referential relation 
from his philosophy. “God,” “substance” and “Nature” are 
not referential, so whether they refer to immanence or not 
is just not an issue. There is no such thing as apophaticism 
for Spinoza, since a name cannot fail to refer.
This suggests an answer to the overriding question: if each 
name is a self-sufficient expression of immanence, why the 
need for a plurality of names? For Schelling, while all names 
construct immanence, some do so better than others—and 
the intensity of this construction ultimately depends on the 
number of names appropriated into philosophy (for it is 
through this plurality names are intensified). I contend that 
something like this must be true for Spinoza: the adequacy 
of the names employed in the Ethics depends on their inter-
relations with other names. The more complex the network 
of names, the more adequate the philosophy. So, just like 
Schelling, adding names intensifies philosophical discourse.
Numerous scholars have acknowledged that the Ethics is 
a text in which the meaning of traditional, philosophical 
names are transformed. Rocco Gangle writes, Spinoza “uses 
old terms in new ways such that a new subversive notion is 
created,”73 continuing,
Spinoza consistently employs philosophical terminology that has 
come to possess relatively precise and technical meanings across the 
sedimented histories of ancient philosophy and medieval Scholasti-
cism, yet Spinoza uses these terms in ways that shift or distort their 
traditional senses, imposing unfamiliar meanings…[often] directly 
opposed to the traditional sense.74
Spinoza’s use of “God” is a case in point: Spinoza begins with 
73 Rocco Gangle, “Theology of the Chimera: Spinoza, Immanence, Practice,” 
in Smith and Whistler (eds.), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern, 26.
74 Ibid. See also Zourabichvili, Spinoza, 111-2; Aaron Garrett, Meaning in 
Spinoza’s Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 6.
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a traditional-looking definition only to demonstrate over the 
first fourteen propositions that logical rigour necessitates 
a new, heterodox understanding of this name. Names are 
mutated by passing through the propositions.
Moreover, and this is the key claim, names are mutated 
by means of the relations they take up in respect to other 
names. Transformation occurs through the continual juxta-
position of different terms; their resulting new relations in 
Spinoza’s philosophical system is what alters their meaning. 
In Gangle’s words,
[A name is a term] whose relational context becomes altered. Its new 
sense is generated not internally or intensively, but externally or 
practically through syntactical and formally deductive connections 
with other terms.75
This is what Gangle (following Zourachbivili) terms “a 
chimerical translation”76: it is a form of alchemy by which 
names are transmuted by mixing, dissolving and colliding 
with other names, in the same way as all modes mix, dissolve 
and collide with each other. Names (as one specific type of 
mode) should not be excluded from this physics (as we have 
seen Zourachbivili and Montag argue). A physics of names is 
just as necessary as a physics of passions.
Hence, Gangle speaks of “a new textual practice of metaphysics”77 
in regard to the Ethics. The results of Spinoza’s philosophy 
are generated on the textual surface: Spinoza’s propositions 
chart the manner in which names collide—and this mapping 
process is named the geometrical method. Gangle thus speaks 
of the geometrical method in terms of topographical maps 
of “peaks and valley floors…or the hubs of a transportation 
75 Gangle, “Theology of the Chimera,” 27. Gangle’s work brings out the 
close relation between the problem of improper names and the problem 





network.”78 Names collide—and the record of these collisions 
is Spinoza’s philosophy.
In short, therefore, Spinoza employs improper names be-
cause only through putting to work a plurality of names can 
their mutation be guaranteed. “God” is an improper name 
because it needs other names (“substance” or “Nature”) in 
order to give rise to the philosophical transformations nec-
essary for adequate philosophy. Spinoza puts a plurality of 
names to work in order to intensify his philosophy: the more 
relations that build up between these names over the course 
of the Ethics (i.e. the different combinations and relations 
envisioned in the propositions), the better the philosophy.
Moreover, the type of relation that holds between different 
names is always, I contend, identity—just as for Schelling. This 
is another consequence of monism: everything is ultimately 
one, therefore the only possible form of relation between 
names is equality. So, the adequacy of Spinoza’s system is 
in fact achieved by means of the successive identifications 
of a plurality of names. As these identifications proliferate, 
Spinozan philosophy intensifies. “God” is not only equal 
to “substance,” it is equal to “Nature” and so “Nature” must 
be equal to “substance.” It is implicitly in this manner that 
Spinoza’s philosophy proceeds over the course of hundreds 
of propositions. And, what is more, this mode of procedure 
is the Spinozist solution to the problem of improper names.79
Armed with these resources, it is time to briefly return to 
Barber’s argument. In opposition to Barber, I maintain that 
immanence does not precede the name; immanence exists 
only as it is expressed in the name. In other words, immanence 
does not presuppose a nameless plane, but rather a textual 
surface on which names collide. Immanence is these names (such 
is the necessary implication of Spinoza’s monism) in their 
78 Gangle, “Theology of the Chimera,” 31.
79 It needs to be kept in mind that I am not arguing that the Holocaust is 
the same as ice cream for a monist (as one critic has recently argued [Conor 
Cunningham, Genealogies of Nihilism (London: Routledge, 2002, 68)]), but 
that the names “Holocaust” and “ice cream” are ultimately identified in an 
ideal monist discourse (see Part Five). The ethical implications of this dif-
ference are substantial.
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constantly complexifying interrelations and identifications. 
The surplus which characterises immanence is generated as 
more and more names are identified (for these identifications 
are the very surplus of immanence). The more improper 
names, the more intensely immanence exists. A philosophy 
of the secular, therefore, must name immanence as much as 
possible: not because we are doomed to fail again and again, 
but because naming intensifies immanence. Names bring 
immanence into being.
4.2 The Logic of Monist Sense
Improper names are involved in a process of indefinite 
identification, where the making identical of one name to 
another gradually intensifies philosophical form, making the 
discourse more and more adequate. This is how names func-
tion once reference is eliminated (as it must be for monists). 
And this is the solution to the problem of improper names: 
the more names are made identical, the better the philosophy.
Let us take one more look at this from a different angle, 
beginning from the standard Fregean picture of language, in 
which all names have both sense and reference. Frege defines 
a name as a word or sign which expresses its sense and desig-
nates its reference. As well as referring, names express—and 
this is the key to unlocking the problem of improper names 
for monists. Once reference is eliminated, what remains is 
expression or sense.80 What is particularly pertinent here is that 
Frege developed this theory precisely through an examination 
of the sorts of cases we have been considering. What is the 
difference, he famously asked, between saying “the morning 
star is the morning star” and “the morning star is the evening 
star?” That is, if “morning star” and “evening star” have the 
same reference, why use two names—what epistemic benefit 
is there in using two names for the same thing rather than 
one? In other words, when reference is redundant, what is 
left of language? As one commentator puts it,
80 Or what Schelling calls “production.”
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If the names corefer, there is no difference in the references of the 
constituents of a=a and a=b…So either they cannot express different 
propositions, or else—and this is the inference Frege drew—what 
determines the proposition…cannot just have to with the structure of 
the [sentence] and the references of its constituent words and phrases.81
In other words, either improper names are useless, because 
they all mean the same thing (by picking out the same 
referent),82 or there is something other than reference at 
stake in language which gives rise to improper names. The 
irreducible remainder—what is left over when reference 
becomes redundant—is sense. As Deleuze emphasises in 
The Logic of Sense, sense is absolutely irreducible to reference, 
for they work according to very different logics. The logic of 
sense is not the logic of truth and falsity.83 For monists (who 
have eliminated reference), names cannot be true or false 
because they can neither succeed nor fail to refer to some-
thing external. Sense works on a completely different model, 
a model of more or less intense expression.84
Monist philosophical texts therefore become surfaces on 
which names intensify their sense. This is what is theorised 
81 Graeme Forbes, “Proper Names” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 7, 752.
82 “If we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names 
‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a=b could not differ from a=a” (Frege, 
“On Sense and Meaning,” 157).
83 He writes, “This is the most general problem of the logic of sense: what 
would be the purpose of rising from the domain of truth to the domain of 
sense, if it were only to find between sense and nonsense a relation analo-
gous to the true and the false?” Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark 
Lester (London: Continuum, 1990), 80.
84 If, as Gabriel has argued, Frege establishes the distinction between sense 
and reference in order to show that “the semantic organisation of meaning, 
i.e. the order of words, is not identical with the ontological order of things” 
(Markus Gabriel, “The Mythological Being of Reflection” in Gabriel and 
Slavoj Žižek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Ideal-
ism [London: Continuum, 2009], 65), then by eliminating one of the terms 
in this distinction (reference), Spinoza and Schelling reaffirm the identity 
of words and things. Significantly, Frege does consider the possibility of “a 
special term for signs intended to have only sense” (Frege, “On Sense and 
Meaning,” 163)—but his choice, “representation,” does not seem helpful 
for my purposes here.
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in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense and practiced in Spinoza’s Eth-
ics. The Ethics as a whole is, to quote Deleuze out of context, 
“a machine for the production of incorporeal sense.”85 It is 
a surface on which names connect with each other in order 
to generate more and more intense—so more and more 
adequate—series of propositions. This is the “surface effect” 
which donates philosophical sense. Names “frolic on the 
surface of being, and constitute an endless multiplicity of 
incorporeal beings.”86
Now, as Deleuze makes clear, different texts chart different 
surface effects: each philosophical singularity is generated 
from specific operations on the textual surface. Hence, in 
The Logic of Sense Deleuze describes a specific set of surface 
operations employed by certain philosophers which he dubs, 
the “Carroll effect”:
Sense is always an effect…or, even better, a surface effect, a position ef-
fect and a language effect…It is a product which spreads out over, or 
extends itself the length of, the surface…Such effect, or such a product, 
have usually been designated by a proper and singular name…Thus 
physics speaks of the “Kelvin effect,” of the “Seebeck effect,” of the 
“Zeerman effect,” etc.87
This specific set of operations of the Carroll effect consists 
in paradoxes which give rise to heterogeneous series.
What I have been arguing in this paper is that there is a 
specific “Spinoza effect” which describes the set of operations 
employed by a rigorously monistic philosophy—and this “Spi-
noza effect” is irreducible to the “Carroll effect” described by 
Deleuze. There is ultimately only one operation performed on 
the surface of monistic philosophy—identification. Identifi-
cations proliferate indefinitely, devouring all that is different 
in the name of the same. There can be no contradiction, no 
absurdity, no excess or lack—only a continual and all-devouring 
85 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 82.
86 Bréhier, quoted in Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 8. In short, every name in 




process of identification.88 This is a “Spinoza effect”—a logic 
of sense without paradox, a proliferation of identifications 
on the textual surface of philosophy. The more names, the 
more identifications, the better the philosophy—this is not 
only true for Schellingian absolute eclecticism, it is true for 
all rigorous monists.
Part Five: An “Ideal” Spinoza
In the previous section, I outlined the rudiments of an “ideal” 
Ethics which would read as follows,
Proposition 1 “Substance”
Proposition 2 “Substance” = “God”
Proposition 3 “Substance” = “God” = “Nature”
Proposition 4 “Substance” = “God” = “Nature” = “Banana”
Proposition 5 “Substance” = “God” = “Nature” = “Banana” = “Harry Lime”
This structure would proceed ad infinitum, rather in the man-
ner of the paratacticism analysed in Anti-Oedipus (substance… 
and God…and Nature…).89 It exemplifies the logic of monist 
sense and the deployment of improper names. In this “ideal” 
structure of the Ethics, name after name is identified for the 
sake of philosophical amelioration. However, what becomes 
striking at this point is the discrepancy between this “ideal” 
Ethics and the Ethics Spinoza actually wrote. The Ethics does 
not look like this—and this is because the above logic of 
monist sense is only a partial reconstruction of Spinoza’s 
philosophical rhetoric. There is more going on and there are 
more linguistic forces at play than just the identification of 
names. Spinoza exceeds “the Spinoza effect.”
88 Even if Spinoza is read in terms of parallelism, there can in the end be only 
one series of sense, i.e. the series of propositions of the Ethics itself. This is 
one of the meanings of Spinoza’s claim that everything follows necessarily 
from God’s essence; there are no parallel series of sense.
89 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley et al (London: Continuum, 1984), 6.
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Yet, the above rewriting of the Ethics is not only ideal to 
the extent that it differs from the real Ethics, it is also ideal 
in a second sense. It reconstructs the Ethics by means of one 
ideal, expansive linguistic force alone. In other words, what 
has been under discussion in this paper is merely one ele-
ment of a Spinozist Naturphilosophie of language: the ideal 
force by which more and more names are appropriated into 
relations of identity.90 It corresponds to Negri’s delimitation 
of an “ideal phase” in Spinoza’s thinking (an idealism that 
is not surprising considering the proximity of Spinoza to 
Schelling in this paper).91 Here, we can fully realise the ex-
tent to which the transformation of language into a body has 
reversed itself into a transformation of bodies into language. 
The materialistic reduction of language into a Naturphilosophie 
leads necessarily to the anti-realistic insistence that there is 
nothing outside the name, that names are most real. Perhaps 
Badiou failed to acknowledge the radical materialism in 
which there are just bodies because this turns out not to be 
materialism at all, but linguistic idealism.
It is no surprise that the above structure comes closest to 
being realised at the end of Part V of the Ethics—the fulfilment 
and culmination of Spinoza’s construction of philosophy 
where he embraces monism most fully. Here, indeed, Spinoza’s 
propositions are often little more than a series of equations. 
To take one example, the human subject loves God,92 God loves 
himself93 and these two acts of love are identical: “The mind’s 
intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God 
loves himself.”94 Such a process of identification culminates 
90 As Žižek points out, expansion and the traversal of plurality are proper to 
monism: “Spinoza, the philosopher of the multitude, is, quite logically, also 
the ultimate monist, the philosopher of the one.” The Puppet and the Dwarf: 
The Perverse Core of Christianity (Boston: MIT Press, 2003), 24.
91 Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and 







in Vp36c: “Insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and 
consequently God’s love of men and the mind’s intellectual 
love of God are one and the same.”95 Here is how Matheron 
describes this climax to the Ethics:
Subject and object are utterly confused with one another. I love myself 
in God, I love God, God loves himself in me, God loves me. The four 
affirmations are equivalent...The terms of the relation are purely and 
simply identified...[in] the following quadruple equation: our love for 
God = our love for others = God’s love for men = others’ love for us = 
others’ love for God.96
Part V ends in a single series of equations proliferating 
identities.
However, the question of how Spinoza gets to this point 
has not been broached in this paper. This has only been a 
fragment of a linguistic physics: contraction, the realist force 
that counteracts expansion and brings it down to earth is yet 
to be determined. This force resists the infinite process of 
identifications of the ideal Ethics. Exposition of this element 




Thanks are due to Dan Barber for gracefully helping me 
articulate my worries with his work more precisely, as well 
as to Charlie Blake, Rocco Gangle, Philip Goodchild, Patrice 
Haynes, Joshua Ramey, Steve Shakespeare and Anthony Paul 
Smith for their discussions on this paper.
95 Spinoza, Ethics, Vp36d.
96 Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Minuit, 
1969), 596-7.
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Namelessness and the Speculative Turn
A Response to Whistler
Daniel Colucciello Barber
Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry
I appreciate the engagement of my work that Daniel Whistler has provided. I do not think his read-
ing is ultimately accurate, but that is to the side, because its 
point of approach allows me to develop a number of ideas 
that are central not only to the interpretation of Spinoza and 
the problematic of religious language (or the naming of the 
divine), but also—even moreso—to the future of thought in 
general after the speculative turn. In what follows I will argue, 
first, that Whistler fails to appreciate the way the concept of 
namelessness functions in my theoretical construction of 
Spinzoa’s thought. I will then address the various difficulties 
raised by Whistler’s own account of identity, before proceeding 
to consider how my disagreement with Whistler runs right to 
the heart of arguments about the nature of the speculative turn. 
Indeed, my contention is that namelessness, as I articulate its 
immanent relation with the act of naming, is resonant with 
an essential tendency in the work of philosophers such as 
Eugene Thacker and Ray Brassier. Finally, I will look at how 
the concept of namelessness serves to indicate and oppose a 
still-effective Christian hegemony over philosophy.
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Apophaticism’s Not the Right Word
The basic point of misrecognition in Whistler’s interpreta-
tion of my essay, I think, is found in the alliance he sets up 
between my work and apophaticism. He does, of course, note 
that I reject such an alliance, but he proceeds nonetheless to 
insist on it—and he does so by claiming that my argument 
“shares the defining characteristic of all apophaticism: a 
dissatisfaction with language as such and so an overriding 
concern to negate or show up the inadequacy of that language 
in the name of the nameless.”1 It is true, of course, that I am 
concerned to bring attention to the impossibility of properly 
naming immanence. I claim, as Whistler rightly notes, that 
there is a surplus of immanence, that immanence necessarily 
exceeds its names. This is true. But what is also true is that 
immanence must be named, and more precisely that it must 
be named in virtue of this excess. What is at stake, in other 
words, is the relation between names and namelessness. To say, 
then, that immanence cannot be adequately named, or that 
every naming of immanence must still contend, after the act 
of naming, with an excessive namelessness, is to utter only 
a partial truth. It is to attend to one side of the relation (the 
side with which Whistler identifies my position). The other 
side of the relation (the side of my position that Whistler 
ignores) concerns the way this excessive namelessness loops 
back upon names. My point is not just that namelessness 
exceeds names, it is that this excess necessitates the creation 
of new names. 
What this relationality should highlight is the processual 
nature of my proposal. To put it somewhat simplistically, the 
act of naming immanence must give rise to an awareness of 
the excess of immanence to the enacted names—this is what 
I have in mind when I speak of the namelessness of imma-
nence. But the process does not stop there. On the contrary, 
this awareness of excessive namelessness must give rise to 
1 Daniel Whistler, “Improper Names for God: Religious Language and the 
‘Spinoza-Effect,’” Speculations III: 114.
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the production of new names, i.e. to a further enactment 
of names, at which point the process I am outlining would 
repeat itself. What Whistler leaves to the side, I am claiming, 
is the moment whereby excessive namelessness loops back 
to necessitate the continued act of naming. By ignoring this 
moment he freezes the very relay about which I am speak-
ing. Indeed, the essence of my position is not the failure of 
language before nameless immanence (as Whistler implies). 
Neither is it the inelidable identity between names and im-
manence (as Whistler seems to positively argue). It is rather 
the irreducible nature of the relay between the naming of 
immanence and the namelessness of immanence. 
The upshot of my argument, then, is not that there is 
something called immanence that can never be named. It 
is rather that immanence is intrinsically relational, it is 
always immanent to itself, and therefore that the naming of 
immanence must be situated within this process of relation, 
or relay. Whistler appears to attribute to me the claim that 
immanence, because of its namelessness, is simply beyond 
all names. I do not make this claim, for to do so would be to 
turn immanence into something transcending signification; 
it would also be to make the nameless into its own kind of 
name. My position, more precisely, is that it is proper to 
immanence to be improper, to exceed itself, and to do so by 
doubling every name—a co-constitution of namelessness and 
names. Namelessness is the relay of names, and names are 
the relay of namelessness. Thus there is a basic temporality 
or diachronicity to my affirmation of relay, and Whistler’s 
oversight of this fact leads him to read me as talking about 
the objective inadequacy of improper names, when I would 
claim that what matters is the process of improperly naming. 
In order to substantiate this interpretation of my argu-
ment, let me refer to and comment upon a passage from 
my essay: “signification betrays immanence when it makes 
immanence immanent to what is signified, but, at the same 
time, immanence must be signified. Only by insisting on this 
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double necessity do we evade the lure of apophaticism.”2 It 
should be noted that my dissatisfaction with signification 
here has nothing to do with its existence as such, but rather 
with the position that it could possibly assume with regard 
to immanence. If signification betrays immanence, this is 
due not to its nature as signification, but rather to its ten-
dency to transcend immanence, to foreclose immanence 
under the banner of a name or names (and such a tendency 
toward foreclosure may be resisted or avoided). To affirm 
the namelessness of immanence, then, is not to oppose the 
naming of immanence, it is to oppose the reduction of im-
manence to signification. It is for this reason, in fact, that I 
join the affirmation of namelessness with the affirmation 
that “immanence must be signified.” This, once again, is to 
indicate that what is at issue here is not merely the excess of 
immanence to signification, but just as much the (necessary) 
looping back of this excess upon signification. Apophaticism 
focuses on the necessity of language exhausting itself in 
relation to the nameless, whereas my relay focuses on this 
necessity as well as the necessity of the nameless being con-
structively re-expressed through yet another act of naming. 
It should be noted, furthermore, that my argument is for 
the productivity of this relay—I continue, in the same pas-
sage, by contending that immanence “exceeds signification 
because it produces signification, and because this significa-
tion is within immanence.”3 Whistler sees apophaticism as 
laboring in virtue of “the name of the nameless,” and this 
is to attribute to it a kind of telos of protecting the nameless 
from names.4 The direction in which I take the inadequacy 
of signification, however, is the production of signification. 
Quite importantly, this produced signification is within 
immanence. In other words, signification, even when it is 
2 Daniel Colucciello Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy 
of Religion,” in Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler (ed.), After the 
Postsecular and the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars’ Press, 2010), 167.
3 Ibid., 167.
4 Whistler, “Improper Names for God,” 114.
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addressed in relation to the namelessness of immanence, is 
never severed from immanence. It is not a matter of some 
opposition between nameless immanence in-itself and a 
multitude of inadequate names, it is rather one of the relay 
between them. In fact, immanence just is this relay. To belabor 
the point a bit more, but also hopefully to confirm my claim 
that I have no stake in any opposition between immanence 
and names, it should be observed that I assert that the aim is 
“to restore signification to immanence, to signify immanently,” 
and that my position is  “less a matter of iconoclasm than a 
matter of polyiconicity.”5
I want to stress this notion of polyiconicity because it is the 
point at which my argument becomes most difficult to recon-
cile with Whistler’s portrayal of it as a kind of apophaticism. 
In fact, it is by way of polyiconicity that my position seems 
to advance some of the theses that Whistler sets forth in ap-
parent contradiction to my supposed apophaticism. When 
he claims, for instance, that “immanence is each name,” or 
that immanence “only exists as names,” what is he affirming 
that I am not already affirming in terms of polyiconicity?6 
To say that immanence is polyiconic, after all, is to say that 
immanence is multiply named, that immanence really is 
named in a variety of manners, or modes. Accordingly, it seems 
quite strange that Whistler would read my argument as an 
apophatically-motivated denial of the claim that immanence 
is expressed in its names. 
Interrelations Must Be External to Their Names
The fact that Whistler would read me as apophatic and 
iconoclastic, when I explicitly call for polyiconicity, is one 
that needs to be explained, and I think it can be explained 
by observing the narrative of continental philosophy of 
religion that he proposes in his own essay. There he tells us 
that he is “intervening” in debates about philosophy of reli-
5 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion,” 167.
6 Whistler, “Improper Names for God,” 115.
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gion precisely at the point where he opposes apophaticism. 
Indeed, “apophaticism is not the answer here, and this is a 
hard pill for continental philosophy of religion to swallow.”7 
He goes on to observe that “philosophers of religious lan-
guage have been obsessed with the inadequacy of names to 
the point of ignoring kataphatic deployments of language.”8 
So Whistler’s intervention, the “hard pill” he’s distributing, 
is that continental philosophy of religion needs to end its 
affair with the apophatic, and that it needs to give attention 
to the kataphatic. I highlight this narrative because I believe 
it is what structures Whistler’s misreading of my argument. 
According to this narrative, the obstacle to be overcome is 
apophaticism, and the way beyond this obstacle is kataphati-
cism. So which side is my argument on? It should be clear 
that it’s not straightforwardly identifiable with one side or 
another. But if Whistler ignores the kataphatic, polyiconic 
tendency of my position, then it becomes much easier to ally 
me with the apophatic. I hope to have already demonstrated 
why such an alliance requires misrepresentation of my 
argument. Now I would like to turn, briefly, to the difficulty 
created by Whistler’s own kataphaticism.
The approach of “absolute eclecticism,” whereby it is as-
serted that “the more names given, the more intense scientific 
language becomes,” is compelling, and one that I agree with 
in part.9 The appeal of this approach is its ability to bring a 
multitude of names into relation with one another, and to 
affirm that such names are expressive of immanence. These, 
in fact, are points that my own position advances, such that 
my position’s difference stems not from its failure to advance 
the kataphatic but rather from its insistence on the irreduc-
ible relation between the kataphatic and the apophatic (to 
continue using Whistler’s terms). The necessary connection 
between affirmative naming and namelessness can be seen 
in the difficulty to which Whistler’s own, sheerly affirmative 
position gives rise.
7 Whistler, “Improper Names for God,” 116.
8 Ibid., 117.
9 Ibid., 125.
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This difficulty begins to emerge when we pose the question 
of how these various names relate to one another. There is 
nothing to protest in Whistler’s claim that all names may be 
equally expressive of immanence, or even that “immanence 
exists only as it is expressed in the name.”10 The difficulty 
arises, however, when we begin to ask about the relations 
between these names. The names must be in common, they 
are univocal, yet this does not change the fact that the names, 
considered individually, do not agree. So what we face here is 
a univocity of disagreement. Again, thus far there is nothing 
off the mark, but such an account remains incomplete, for 
this disagreement must operate. Whistler grasps this when he 
speaks of immanence as “a textual surface on which names 
collide” and identifies immanence with the “constantly 
complexifying interrelations and identifications” of these 
names.11 All of this is true. Yet it must be asked: if these names 
are not just in identification but also in interrelation, then 
must not such relationality be thought as such? The relations, 
in other words, must be in excess of the names, and so what 
is this excess? It will be necessary to conceive not just the 
names, but also the condition that enables them to relate to 
one another productively. 
What I am here calling attention to, in Whistler, is the 
difficulty engendered by denying that there is anything 
conditioning names. Obviously that which conditions the 
naming of immanence cannot be something that transcends 
the names, but this condition (of the interrelation of names) 
must be otherwise conceived. Whistler does make some at-
tempt to conceive it when he speaks of a “textual surface.” 
But what is this surface? Does it have a name? If it does have 
a name, then it cannot be that on which names collide, for 
it would be yet another one of the colliding names. Thus it 
does not have a name. But if it does not have a name, then 
would it not be the very namelessness that I have advanced, 
and that he has critiqued?




Whistler appears to displace this difficulty by attributing 
to my position the invocation of “a nameless plane.”12 But 
there is no such thing in my argument: namelessness, once 
again, is not something beyond names but instead that which 
relays them with one another. Namelessness is interstitial, it 
is the condition that enables names to collide and to intensify 
one another. To speak, as Whistler does, of an identity of all 
names and immanence is not exactly incorrect, but it is in-
complete, for it cannot conceive the interstitial relations of 
these names. To write off attempts to conceive such interstitial 
namelessness as apophaticism is, in fact, to remain within 
apophaticism’s frame by way of inversion. Instead of asserting 
the inadequacy of names, Whistler inverts the approach and 
asserts the adequacy of all names. My contention is that these 
approaches are equally flawed, and that what is exigent is an 
account of the relay between adequacy and inadequacy—a 
relay that is prior to their mutual exclusion.
The relay of namelessness and a multitude of names, in the 
end, has nothing to do either with an absolute failure of lan-
guage or with an absolute identity of names and immanence. 
Its concern is the difference between a multitude of names, 
all of which express immanence, but each of which differs 
from the other. “Immanence,” Whistler remarks, “is fully and 
completely expressed in its modes—and names are modes 
too.”13 In these terms, the question becomes one of the rela-
tion between modes. Gilles Deleuze’s own attempt to improve 
Spinoza is here relevant. He transposed the relation between 
intensive and extensive modes into the relation, respectively, 
between the virtual singularities and actual individuals. In 
doing so, however, he broke with Spinoza’s one-to-one rela-
tion between intensive and extensive. The actual individual 
became a resolution of a virtual difference in-itself. What 
Deleuze grasped, in other words, was that virtual difference 
must be conceived as something akin to pure disagreement. 
The virtual, pre-individual field of singularities was univo-
12 Whistler, “Improper Names for God,” 128.
13 Ibid., 125.
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cal, but this univocity was irreducible to any identity. Only 
in this way, I would contend, is it possible to make sense of 
the sort of collision of which Whistler speaks. This, then, is 
the condition of interrelation of modes, or names—a condi-
tion that I speak of as excessive namelessness. Such excess is 
therefore not beyond or separate from names, but neither is 
it reducible to the names, or their simple identity; it is rather 
the differential, nameless colliding of names. 
The difficulty resulting from Whistler’s failure to conceive 
this namelessness—the namelessness which conditions the 
interrelation of univocally expressive names—becomes es-
pecially evident in his statement that “Immanence is fully 
contained in the very names for immanence.”14 This cannot 
be the case, precisely because (as Whistler himself acknowl-
edges) immanence is constituted not just by names but also 
by their interrelation. Immanence requires not just names, 
but also that which is produced by their collision—and that 
which is produced by the names must exceed the names, it 
must consist of their difference. Furthermore, it is not apt 
to think of immanence as something that is “contained in” 
something else. This would be to turn immanence into a name, 
one that is apparently both enclosed within in a multitude 
of other names and yet (confusingly) another one of these 
names. Once again, it is only by thinking of immanence not 
as simultaneously a name and the identity of all names, but 
instead as the relation of, or relay between, namelessness and 
names, that this difficulty can be avoided.
Namelessness and the Speculative Turn
I have already observed the presence, in Whistler’s argument, 
of a narrative according to which continental philosophy of 
religion is urged to leave behind its fetishization of negativ-
ity and to reclaim “kataphatic deployments of language.” His 
narrative adds, notably, that this demand concords with the 
14 Whistler, “Improper Names for God,” 125-126.
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speculative turn, which is “kataphatic in orientation.”15 So, if 
the speculative turn is bound up with Whistler’s kataphatic 
turn, does my argument also stand against, or at least outside 
of, the host of philosophical developments associated with 
speculative realism? Not at all. In fact, what I would like to 
observe, as a way of troubling Whistler’s narrative, is the pos-
sibility of espying, within the speculative turn, a tendency that 
is not at all kataphatic. Of course, the tendency I have in mind 
is not exactly apophatic either—hence my dissatisfaction 
with the mutual exclusion inherent in Whistler’s narrative. 
What is compelling about the speculative turn, when viewed 
in relation to the question of how immanence is named, is 
its ability both to critique the human pretension to delimit 
access to the real and to affirm the capacity to name the real 
through an encounter with that which exceeds pre-existing 
articulations. It is this sort of tendency, rather than a more 
traditional apophaticism, and rather than Whistler’s emer-
gent kataphaticism, that is indicated by the namelessness of 
immanence.
As an instance of the tendency I have in mind, we might 
refer to Thacker’s discussion of a “non-human” or “unhuman” 
mysticism, one which would no longer be theological in a 
traditional sense, but which would make use of this theologi-
cal material in a radically ungrounded manner. As he puts it: 
If the supernatural in a conventional sense is no longer possible, what 
remains after the “death of God” is an occulted, hidden world. Philo-
sophically speaking, the enigma we face is how to confront this world, 
without immediately presuming that it is identical to the world-for-us 
(the world of science and religion), and without simply disparaging it 
as an irretrievable and inaccessible world-in-itself.16
The emphases that emerge in Thacker’s prescription are 
those of the enigmatic and the hidden, and—importantly 
15 Whistler, “Improper Names for God,” 117.
16 Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Alresford, 
UK: Zer0 Books, 2011), 97.
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for my purposes—they are positioned neither in terms of 
the kataphatic (which would repress the enigmatic charac-
ter of the real) nor in terms of the apophatic (which would 
abandon the real to the simple beyond). Thacker’s interest, to 
translate it—surely with too much bluntness—into the terms 
of my debate with Whistler, is to focus on a real that is simul-
taneously non-manifest (at least in any direct manner) and 
non-inaccessible. We have to do, then, with something that is 
accessible yet hidden. If we take this as an instance of thought 
that emerges after the speculative turn, then we see that there 
is no need to adopt a narrative in which the kataphatic over-
comes the apophatic. An awareness of the immanent relay of 
namelessness and names is much more to the point. Indeed, 
we see something precisely like a conception of this relay in 
Thacker’s remark that “mysticism today—after the death of 
God—would be about the impossibility of experience, it would 
be about that which in shadows withdraws from any possible 
experience, and yet still makes its presence felt, through the 
periodic upheavals of weather, land, and matter.”17
While I agree with Whistler’s critique of continental phi-
losophy’s overdependence on apophaticism, I do not accept 
that namelessness, as I develop it, falls under this critique. 
Nor do I accept that namelessness need be seen as mutually 
exclusive with the speculative turn. On the contrary, as I hope 
to have indicated with this brief mention of Thacker’s work, it 
is possible to see namelessness as a novel and speculatively-
driven account of what it means to think under the condition 
of an encounter with the enigmatic real. There is no need to 
see this encounter in terms of Whistler’s definition of identity. 
In fact, even when identity plays a key role in speculative 
thought, such as it does for François Laruelle, it is encountered 
only through a radical displacement, through a bracketing of 
normative philosophical practice by way of the “non-.” Here, 
it could be said, namelessness functions as a condition for 
the performance of thought—of non-philosophy.
17 Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet, 158.
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Namelessness and Decontraction Against Biotheology
I thus contend that namelessness, far from involving a de-
fensive apophaticism that doubles-down on the limits of 
the human before an inaccessible beyond, bears an essential 
affinity with the speculative turn. It belongs to the attempt 
to conceive of negativity or unknowability in terms of active 
voiding or annihilating.18 Spinozist namelessness, as I have 
developed it, has a particularly strong resonance with the thesis 
of Brassier’s Nihil Unbound, especially its concluding remarks. 
There Brassier puts his account of the inorganic’s priority 
over organic life in terms of decontraction: “Although life 
diverges from the inorganic in ever more circuitous detours, 
these are no more than temporary extensions of the latter, 
which will eventually contract back to their original inorganic 
condition, understood as the zero-degree of contraction, or 
decontraction.”19 If we understand namelessness in terms of 
the inorganic, and names as so many divergent circuits of 
life, then we can find yet another resonance between the 
relay I am advancing and the possibilities of thought made 
available by the speculative turn. 
In fact, Brassier’s logic of the relation between the inorganic 
and organic life, like that of the relation between excessive 
namelessness and the multitude of names, articulates an 
unthinkability that, without being traditionally apophatic, 
calls for the voiding or annihilation of every desire for full 
identity, or for a plentitudinous containment of immanence. 
The identity that is here advanced is not the one proposed 
by Whistler, whereby all names would be identical with 
immanence. It is instead the identity that is unthinkable 
by human life. It is the identity of namelessness and every 
name, an identity much like that found in decontraction’s 
18 Along these lines, another vector of thought with which my concept of 
namelessness of resonates is that of Nicola Masciandaro. See, for instance, 
his “Unknowng Animals,” Speculations II: 228-44, or “The Sorrow of Being,” 
Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 19: 9-35.
19 Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), 360.
Daniel Barber – Namelessness and the Speculative Turn
147
“being-nothing,” where we find “the identity of entropic indif-
ference and negentropic difference.”20 Every name is made 
possible by an indifferent namelessness, and every name, 
in its construction of this indifference, differs from every 
other name, thus constructing namelessness collisionally 
and differentially. The identity that is ultimate, then, cannot 
finally be named—not even as identity—precisely because it 
is that of every name and namelessness; namelessness can-
not be integrated (nor contained) within identity, for identity 
is ultimately that of namelessness and every act of naming.
The implications of all this are not just philosophical, they 
are also political—or, more precisely, theologico-political. The 
desire to remove every obstacle to identity…from whence 
does it arise? Or, what makes it so powerful, so difficult to 
resist? There are, of course, a number of ways one might an-
swer this question, and without claiming to have found the 
only possible answer, I would like to call our attention to one 
possibility: Christianity. This is obviously not the only source 
motivating the tendency towards absolute identity, but it is 
certainly one of the major sources—historically and materi-
ally speaking—of this tendency’s support, maintenance, and 
normalization. For far too long we have treated philosophy as 
something clearly and distinctly differentiated from religion, 
when in fact these two domains (or concepts) have overlapped 
and interwoven everywhere, especially when their distinc-
tion is insisted upon. And this overlapping and intertwining 
of philosophy and religion has a history, a hegemonically 
Christian history.21
There are several implications and lines of research that 
stem from an insistence on this point, but for the moment 
I want to observe a single consequence—and this is that the 
20 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 364.
21 I have developed the genealogical and conceptual implications of this 
thesis in my recent book, On Diaspora: Christianity, Religion, and Secularity 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade Press, 2011). For more on the still-determinative in-
fluence of Christianity within our purportedly secular and post-Christian 
epoch, see the work of Gil Anidjar, especially Semites: Race, Religion, Literature 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008).
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Christian desire for the identity of all is very much still in play 
as we interpret and respond to the speculative turn. I would 
propose that Brassier’s antagonism towards “life” should be 
simultaneously understood as an antagonism towards the 
history of Christianity. Indeed, the philosophical concept 
of life—especially when we highlight its connotations of 
integration into the one true life, of all life in one, beyond 
its differences—cannot be disentangled from the theological 
concept of life. As Gil Anidjar has perceptively argued, the 
contemporary problem of the biopolitical is really a problem 
of the biotheological.22 On the interpretation I am advancing, 
then, when Brassier poses the inorganic against organic life, 
his basic orientation is not eliminativist, not nihilist, and 
not even anti-correlationist. It is anti-Christian, and precisely 
because it exerts violence on the ultimately violent instinct 
to integrate everything, including nothingness, into life (or 
“Life”). Before life, after life, always haunting life…there is death. 
Nothingness, we might say, is the alpha and the omega—or, 
even better, it is before the alpha and after the omega. 
Along these lines, I do not find it surprising that Nihil Un-
bound concludes with a discussion of two Jewish thinkers, i.e. 
Levinas and Freud, for Jewish thought has always defined itself 
in relation to (and more or less in opposition to) Christian 
thought. We should not presume that this Christian-Jewish 
difference passed away with the dawn of supposedly post-
Christian, secular thought. Indeed, both Levinas and Freud paid 
essential attention to the way being Jewish affected thought, 
which is to say not only that they knew the pressures of inte-
gration and identification, but also that—understanding how 
normative accounts of the thinking subject depended on a 
denial of this subject’s conditionality—they directed thought 
at the pre-cognitive. They understood that thought should be 
given not to what the human is defined as able to think, not to 
the world as it correlates with the human subject, but instead 
to what affects the subject prior to its self-identification, to 
22 See Anidjar, “The Meaning of Life,” Critical Inquiry 37: 697-723. My argument 
in this section is significantly indebted to the work Anidjar does in this essay.
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what the subject disavows in the name of its being-subject. 
Brassier, I am proposing, should be read as part of this anti-
normative, anti-Life, anti-Christian tradition. What he has in 
common with Levinas and Freud is an awareness of the way 
that every attempt at integration disavows its identity with 
that which makes it impossible—in this sense, Brassier’s 
entropic indifference belongs to the same lineage as Levinas’ 
alterity and Freud’s unconscious. 
And all of these, I might add, could be connected to the 
kabbalistic rendering of Genesis 1:1, which reads, “With Begin-
ning,                      created Elohim.”23 What this Jewish mystical 
text claims—against Christian orthodoxy’s belief that the 
life of God can be identified with the divine-human life of 
the Son of God, and that all human life can and/or should be 
identified with the concrete-universal of Jesus—is that even 
God (Elohim) is conditioned. Furthermore, the conditions 
of God cannot be correlated with God’s being. That which 
created God, or conditions God’s existence, is                     . 
It is nameless, and yet not beyond. Even God (or Nature) is 
haunted by this namelessness. 
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Badiou’s relationship to Derrida is complex, ambivalent, at times distinctly fraught, and often—
despite an impeccable politeness of phrasing—somewhat 
impatient in tone. All the same it doesn’t exhibit anything 
like the pattern of routine inter-generational conflict that 
has characterised so many episodes of post-war French in-
tellectual history. Thus it bears no resemblance to those acts 
of barely concealed parricidal intent by which Sartre ousted 
the dominant currencies of pre-war (whether rationalist or 
Bergson-influenced) thought, or the structuralism of Lévi-
Strauss, Althusser and company purported to consign Sartrean 
existentialism to the dustbin of outworn humanist ideas, or 
structuralism in turn gave way to the combined assaults of 
post-structuralists, postmodernists and other such reactive 
movements. Indeed there is something decidedly majestic 
about the way that Badiou rises above such manifestations of 
the short-term Zeitgeist or sad displays of the odium scholasticum 
that all too often substitutes for serious debate. His attitude 
toward Derrida—as evidenced by the brief but revealing 
encomium collected in the volume Pocket Pantheon—is one 
of admiration mixed with a certain ironic reserve and some 
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shrewdly aimed though far from hostile remarks about the 
lack of any direct activist involvement on Derrida’s part in 
the events of May 1968.1 Even here Badiou is keen to make 
allowance for the highly mediated character of “deconstruc-
tive politics” or the need to approach that topic with a due 
regard for Derrida’s immensely patient, meticulous and 
painstaking way with texts, among them (if belatedly) the 
texts of Marx.2 More than that: he puts the case for Derrida 
as a political thinker of the first importance, just so long as 
we read his work with the kind of extreme attentiveness and 
rigour that he brings to the work of others. 
So Badiou is unencumbered by any desire to stake his 
claim as a replacement maître à penser or as one who has 
seen through the kind of “textualist” mystification that has 
often been laid at Derrida’s door by Marxists, activists, and—
from a different through related angle—by Foucault in his 
early polemical rejoinder.3 Nevertheless, I shall argue, it is a 
complex relationship and one that brings out some salient 
tensions not only between the two thinkers but also within 
their respective projects. Badiou’s answer in the Pocket Pantheon 
essay might well be characterised as a case of interpretative 
“strong revisionism” as Harold Bloom describes it, that is, a 
mode of commentary that aims not so much to establish a 
relationship of fidelity and subservience to the text in hand 
but rather to transform or trans-value that text in keeping with 
the commentator’s own priorities.4 Of course this is Badiou’s 
regular practice in the many exegetical chapters of Being and 
Event where he takes a whole roster of the great philosophers 
from Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle to Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and their modern progeny—along with 
1 Alain Badiou, Pocket Pantheon: figures of postwar philosophy, trans. David 
Macey (London: Verso, 2009).
2 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning, 
and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994).
3 Michel Foucault, “My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” Oxford Literary Review, 
Vol. IV, No. 1 (1979), 9-28.
4 See for instance Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: a theory of poetry 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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poets such as Mallarmé and Hölderlin—and subjects them to 
a reading (mostly in the critical-diagnostic mode) accordant 
with the book’s general thesis.5 Such reading goes against 
the intentional grain so as to bring out those symptoms of 
conflict, internal contradictions, or conceptual stress-points 
that indicate the workings of a transverse or “diagonal” logic 
at odds with the overt gist. This is often a matter of showing 
how the argument turns back against itself and can be seen 
to undermine its overt commitment to a plenist ontology 
that would, in effect, preclude any real possibility of change 
whether in states of mathematical-scientific knowledge, 
conditions of the body politic, or modes of artistic practice. 
It involves an alertness to certain symptomatic blind-spots 
of repression whose existence, once detected, opens the way 
to a radically different “subtractive” ontology wherein that 
possibility not only exists but becomes the chief motor or 
driving force of progress in those various domains. 
My reference to Bloom on the process of creative mispri-
sion—the way that “strong misreaders” (poets for the most 
part) absorb and then transform the work of their great dead 
precursors—needs to be qualified in one major respect. That 
is to say, Badiou’s is a distinctively philosophical approach 
where intellectual creativity goes along with a high degree of 
conceptual and argumentative rigour and can therefore claim 
something more in the way of exegetical warrant or justifica-
tion. I must defer any detailed commentary on the crucial 
significance of mathematics (more specifically, of develop-
ments in set-theory after Cantor) for his thinking about the 
dialectic of being and event, or the process whereby a given 
ontology or conceptual scheme comes up against that which 
radically challenges and eventually transforms its operative 
scope and limits.6 What interests me here is the difference 
between Badiou’s deployment of this basically dialectical (or 
5 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 
2006).
6 See Badiou, Being and Event; also Number and Numbers, trans. Robin Mackay 
(London: Polity Press, 2008).
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immanent-critical) approach as applied to thinkers in the 
mainstream Western philosophical tradition and his particular 
take on Derrida’s project, involving as it does a more nuanced 
and delicate negotiation of the differences between them. At 
one level this has to do mainly with the question of political 
activism and with Derrida’s (as Badiou sees it) very marked 
disinclination to advance from the stage of intensive engage-
ment with complications in the texts of Western logocentric 
tradition to the stage of engagement with issues of direct or 
urgent political concern. At another—though closely related 
to that—it has to do with Badiou’s ambivalent relation to just 
those practices of textual close-reading, surely epitomised by 
deconstruction, that offer what he sees as an all too handy 
pretext for evading or endlessly deferring issues of political 
commitment. 
One would not expect Badiou to single Derrida out for ex-
emption from this particular line of attack. After all, the charge 
of political evasiveness has very often been laid at Derrida’s 
door by Marxists especially but also by thinkers of a broadly 
leftist or social-activist persuasion.7 Moreover, it would fit 
readily enough with Badiou’s emphatic opposition to the 
“linguistic turn” in its many and varied showings over the past 
century.8 These range from the Frege-Russell mode of analytic 
philosophy or its “ordinary-language” (e.g., Wittgensteinian 
or Austinian) variants to Heideggerian hermeneutics, post-
structuralism, Richard Rorty’s “strong” descriptivist brand of 
neo-pragmatism, Foucault’s archaeologies or genealogies of 
discourse, and postmodernism as theorised—with snippety 
reference to most of the above—by a thinker like Lyotard.9 
For Badiou, what marks them all out (though some more 
7 See especially Michael Sprinker (ed.), Ghostly Demarcations: a symposium 
on Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx (London: Verso, 1999).
8 For his most forceful statement of this view, see Alain Badiou, Manifesto 
for Philosophy, trans. Norman Madarasz (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1999).
9 For further discussion of these and allied developments, see Christopher 
Norris, The Truth About Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) and On Truth 
and Meaning: language, logic and the grounds of belief (London: Continuum, 2006).
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than others) as involving a sheer dereliction of philosophy’s 
proper role is their way of falling back on an appeal to language, 
discourse, or representation as the ultimate horizon of intel-
ligibility or the end-point of ontological enquiry. However, as 
I have said, he appears to exempt Derrida from the general 
charge and to do so for reasons closely connected with his 
own project. Although these emerge plain to view only in 
the Pocket Pantheon essay—after what must seem a remark-
ably long period of abstention from anything like a serious 
or sustained engagement with Derrida—they are likely to 
possess a revelatory force for suitably attuned readers, and 
moreover to strike them as casting a powerful retrospective 
light on crucial aspects of Badiou’s work. 
At any rate he does his utmost to deflect that blanket charge 
of Derrida’s having raised subtleties of verbal exegesis to a high 
point of “textualist” mystification which in turn provides a 
standing excuse for the avoidance of any definite, i.e., any non-
deconstrucible commitment in matters of politics. Nor does he 
subscribe to the other, more specific version of it which holds 
that the deconstructionist obsession with logical-rhetorical 
figures like aporia, paradox, undecidability, and so forth, is 
just what might be expected of a movement so determined 
to block any process of constructive or problem-solving 
thought and—beyond that—any prospect of its application 
to the sorts of problem confronted by theoretically minded 
political activists. If indeed there is a certain unwillingness 
to lay that commitment on the line then this should rather 
be attributed, as Badiou says in the passage already cited in 
my Introduction, to the kind of “diagonal obstinacy” that 
typifies Derrida’s thought, along with his clearly evinced 
“dislike of abrupt metaphysically derived divisions” and the 
fact that his way of brooding productively on fine points of 
textual interpretation gives rise to a mindset “clearly not 
suited to stormy times when everything comes under the 
law of decisiveness, here and now.”10 Of course these phrases 
carry more than a hint of irony, coming as they do from 
10 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 138.
Christopher Norris – Diagonals
155
one who has unceasingly upheld the good old cause of May 
1968 along with the undying political significance of other 
“failed” or abortive revolutions such as (pre-eminently) the 
1871 Paris Commune, and addressed as they are to a thinker 
whose revolutionary commitments were, to say the least, a 
great deal more guarded and circumspect.11 Still the irony 
is by no means so heavy or censorious as to cancel what is 
clearly Badiou’s genuine appreciation of a thinker whose 
intellectual temperament, though very different from his 
own, nevertheless has a fair claim to represent one possible 
way that a radical intelligence might come to terms with the 
conflicting pressures of its own time and place. 
One should also note, in that phrase “diagonal obstinacy,” 
a more than casual allusion to the role of set-theoretical 
concepts in Badiou’s re-thinking of the relationship be-
tween being and event, i.e., the Cantor-derived technique of 
“diagonalisation” as that which enables thought to conceive 
and then work with multiple orders or “sizes” of infinity.12 I 
shall have more to say in this connection at a later stage but 
will here just remark on its singular effect when drawn into 
a discussion of Derrida’s work in relation to politics, on the 
one hand, and to mathematics, logic and the formal sciences 
on the other. Thus it opens the way for Badiou to enlist Der-
rida as having arrived at something closely analogous to the 
formal procedure that Badiou sets out in Being and Event and 
elsewhere, albeit a procedure (that of deconstruction) that 
makes no explicit appeal to set-theoretical concepts and which 
operates more through the close-reading of philosophical and 
other texts. So we should, I think, take Badiou very much at 
his word—and not (or not merely) as conforming to the old 
11 On this and associated themes, see especially Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, 
trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005); Polemics, trans. Steve Corcoran 
(London: Verso, 2007); The Century, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Polity 
Press, 2007).
12 Badiou, Being and Event; also Infinite Thought: truth and the return to phi-
losophy, trans. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (London: Continuum, 




French custom of high-toned testamentary tributes—when 
he declares that he will henceforth emulate Derrida’s famous 
punning neologism différance (= difference/deferral/defer-
ence) by likewise substituting an anomalous a for the “correct” 
letter e in the final syllable of his own key-word inexistence.13 
Just as différance functions in Derrida’s texts as a signifier of 
that which eludes any possibility of conceptual closure or 
univocal definition so inexistance will function in Badiou’s 
texts as a pointedly apt designation of that which eludes the 
mathematical, scientific, or socio-political count-as-one. It is 
the term for whatever “inexists” or finds no place within some 
given situation or state of knowledge, whether through being 
denied any form of effective political representation (like the 
“paperless” North African immigrant workers in France) or 
through figuring nowhere in the currently accredited tally of 
beliefs, propositions, or truth-claims.14 Thus, for Badiou, “the 
wager of Derrida’s work, of his infinite work, . . . is to inscribe 
the inexistent.” If that word has acquired its deviant spelling by 
the end of Badiou’s short essay then this is no mere linguistic 
jeu d’esprit—any more than with Derrida’s numerous inven-
tive yet philosophically load-bearing neologisms—but a shift 
brought about strictly in consequence of certain precise and 
far-reaching analogies between their two projects. 
There is further evidence of this when the passage just 
cited brings together a markedly Derridean inscriptional-
ist or textual idiom with a thoroughly Badiouan appeal to 
the range of conceptual resources opened up by Cantor’s 
exemplary passage through and beyond the paradoxes of 
traditional thinking about the infinite. Thus the reference 
to Derrida’s “infinite work” of inscribing the inexistent is 
no idle compliment or piece of neatly turned phraseology 
but rather a precisely gauged evocation of the link between 
Badiou’s set-theoretically inspired re-thinking of ontologi-
13 See Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 3-27. 
14 For his full-scale philosophical treatment of this theme, see Alain Badiou, 
Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009).
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cal issues and Derrida’s less formally explicit but, in their 
own way, just as rigorous deconstructive procedures. This is 
most likely why Badiou exempts Derrida from his otherwise 
sweeping condemnation of the linguistic turn in its sundry 
current guises as merely an update on old sophistical or 
cultural-relativist themes. What is crucially different about 
Derrida’s commentaries on canonical texts from Plato to 
Husserl is his relentless teasing-out of aporetic or contradic-
tory chains of logical implication which can then be seen 
to pose a large problem to any orthodox or fideist account.15 
Such are those conflicts that arise between the vouloir-dire 
of authorial intent and that which a text is logically con-
strained to signify when examined with a readiness to track 
certain discrepant details that challenge or subvert more 
conventional protocols of reading. The result may very well 
go against not only our best evidence of what the writer ex-
pressly, consciously or knowingly meant to say but also the 
weight of received exegetical wisdom as well as, very often, 
our intuitive sense of interpretative validity or truth. Hence 
the elusive yet marked affinity between Derrida’s way with 
texts—his “patient deconstruction of oppositions” as Badiou 
puts it, not without a certain muted irony—and Badiou’s ap-
proach to the various thinkers (philosophers and poets) whose 
work he subjects to a form of immanent dialectical critique. 
Where they differ is chiefly in Derrida’s far greater emphasis 
on textual close-reading or exegesis as the means to locate 
those tensions, aporias, or moments of undecidability when 
classical (bivalent or true/false) logic is forced up against its 
limits. In Badiou, the procedure is pursued to broadly similar 
ends—with a view to exposing the covert implications, the 
suppressed premises or (in Derrida’s phrase) the “unthought 
15 For some classic examples, see Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 
and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973); Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri. C. 
Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); Dis-
semination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 1981); Margins 
of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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axiomatics” of a dominant tradition—but more by way of 
conceptual analysis than through a sedulous attention to 
details of the text. 
II
In this respect Badiou may be said to stand closer to Adorno, 
or negative dialectics in its first-generation Frankfurt mode, 
than to any version of the well-nigh ubiquitous linguistic turn 
that has undeniably left a strong imprint on Derrida’s work.16 
(Although Badiou is notably out of sympathy with Adorno as 
regards the latter’s critique of Wagnerian music-drama this is 
in a highly specific context of debate and scarcely indicative 
of any deeper-lying or principled opposition to that mode 
of thought.17) And yet, as emerges to striking (even moving) 
effect, Badiou is attracted not only by the rigour of Derrida’s 
work but also—what might seem at odds with that—by its 
quest for alternative, less sharply polarised terms of address or 
some means to shift argumentative ground from a downright 
clash of contradictory logics (within the text or amongst its 
commentators) to a “space of flight,” as Badiou describes it, 
beyond all those vexing antinomies.
You take, for example, the great metaphysical oppositions. We shall 
have to diagonalize them. Because restricting discursive space means 
leaving no massivity, no linear massivity. Binary oppositions cannot 
possibly locate the hors-lieu in any lieu. So, we will have to deconstruct 
them. We will have to cut across them. That is what deconstruction 
is. Deconstruction is, basically, the set of operations that can bring 
about a certain restriction of the space of flight, or of the space of the 
vanishing point.18
16 See especially Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1973).
17 Alain Badiou, Five Lessons on Wagner, trans. Susan Spitzer (London: Verso, 
2010); Theodor W. Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Verso, 2005).
18 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 136.
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“Restriction,” that is, in so far as it places certain definite 
limits on the space for manoeuvre as concerns this or that 
particular text, or again—more precisely—on what should 
count as a warranted claim with regard to those specific 
complications of sense, reference and logic that result from 
a properly deconstructive reading. Hence the well-known 
passages (in Of Grammatology and elsewhere) that find Der-
rida emphatically asserting the need to respect indications 
of authorial intent so far as possible while none the less re-
maining maximally alert to those symptoms of conceptual 
stress that signal the presence of a counter-logic at odds with 
the text’s overt (intentional) purport.19 Indeed, as Badiou very 
pointedly remarks, it is just this Derridean preference for 
re-inscribing (that is, first inverting then displacing) certain 
kinds of binary opposition that is most characteristic not only 
of deconstruction as a formal procedure or practice of textual 
close-reading but also of Derrida’s mode of address to politi-
cal and ethical themes. So we should not take it as a cunning 
backhander—or a case of praising with faint damns—when 
Badiou refers to Derrida’s having been “kept apart from the 
truth of the red years between 1968 and 1976,” and when he 
further explains that the truth in question “spoke its name 
with the words: One divides into two.”20 
No doubt Badiou is here staking his own militant distance 
from any such conflict-avoidance strategy, as well as signal-
ling for those in the know that this political difference goes 
along with an equally decisive difference in terms of their 
respective commitments with regard to certain aspects of 
the relation between language, truth and logic. Of course 
it is not the case that these two utterly distinctive thinkers 
are at bottom saying the same thing, the one (Derrida) in 
linguistically oriented or “textualist” and the other (Badiou) 
in mathematically derived or formalist terms. Yet one should, 
I think, take Badiou at his word in the Pocket Pantheon essay 
when he allows that some thinkers—those, like Derrida, with 
19 See especially Derrida, Of Grammatology, 157-8.
20 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 138.
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sufficient exegetical as well as political patience—can and 
should pursue the other, basically non-confrontational path. 
Moreover one can see how this way of thinking, or something 
very like it, played a role in the development of Badiou’s ideas 
from the binary-dominated concepts and categories of Being 
and Event to the more nuanced, differential understanding 
of the relationship between being and existence that typifies 
Logics of Worlds.
When Derrida outlines the concept of “différance” he wants to suggest 
a single term that can activate the being/existence distinction in its 
vanishing point. Derrida puts to flight what remains of a metaphysical 
opposition in the being/existence difference in such a way that we can 
grasp difference as such, in its act. And différance in action is obviously 
that which stands at the vanishing point of any opposition between 
being and existent, that which cannot in any sense be reduced to the 
figure of that opposition. And then we have to examine the democracy/
totalitarianism opposition in the same way. Or the real impact of the 
Jew/Arab opposition on the Palestinian conflict. When he takes a stance 
on the Jew/Arab opposition in the Palestinian conflict, he once again 
deconstructs its duality.21
This makes it very clear how close are the links, as Badiou 
perceives them, on the one hand between Derrida’s early 
and his later (more overtly political) writings, and on the 
other between Derrida’s work as a whole and Badiou’s critical 
ontology—his conception of the being/event dialectic—as it 
moved toward the more stratified or nuanced account laid 
out in Logics of Worlds.
So we shouldn’t too easily fall in with the idea that these 
two thinkers stand squarely apart as regards the single most 
divisive issue in present-day philosophy of language and 
logic. It is not just a matter of situating each of them at some 
point on a scale that runs from the language-first proposi-
tion, i.e., that any critique of prevalent (“logocentric”) ideas 
must always take account of its own embededness in a certain 
21 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 137-8.
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cultural-linguistic milieu or tradition, to the logicist claim 
that such critique has to start with a strenuous rejection of 
the turn toward language as—supposedly—the ultimate limit 
or horizon of intelligibility. This is basically the same issue 
that divides continental thinkers of a strongly hermeneutic 
or language-centred orientation such as Heidegger and Ga-
damer from those, like Adorno or Habermas, who whatever 
their otherwise sharp differences agree on the need for a criti-
cal approach that holds out against received ideas and their 
customary modes of expression. From the latter viewpoint 
it is a sine qua non of enlightened or progressive thought that 
it should always maintain the utmost vigilance with regard 
to those ingrained habits of belief that may always turn out 
to have been kept in place by the inertial force of communal 
usage or linguistically encoded prejudice. On this account 
the true dividing-line falls not, as the textbook story would 
have it, between (so-called) continental and (so-called) ana-
lytic philosophy but rather between those thinkers on either 
side who pretty much go along with the linguistic turn for all 
practical purposes and those others who reject it on philo-
sophical, political, or ethical grounds.22 Nobody who has read 
Badiou’s Manifesto for Philosophy or registered the impact of 
his forceful reflections on the prevalence of latter-day “soph-
istry”—especially where influenced by Wittgenstein—could 
be in any doubt as regards his deep and principled aversion 
to this whole movement of thought. Worst of all, in his view, 
is the way that it precludes any substantive critique of exist-
ing beliefs, values, or truth-claims by declaring that such 
criticism has to make sense by the lights of some communal 
consensus or cultural life-form which would otherwise find 
it unacceptable or downright unintelligible. 
One can therefore see why Badiou’s readings of (among 
others) Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, 
and Heidegger proceed more directly through a critical en-
gagement with the conceptual and argumentative structures 
22 For further discussion see Christopher Norris, Minding the Gap: epistemol-




of their thought and not, as in Derrida, through a practice of 
meticulous textual close-reading. Of course it is then open for 
any Derridean to ask how Badiou could possibly advance his 
strong-revisionist claims—for instance, his subversion of the 
plenist ontology or the static and immobile concept of being 
endorsed by a thinkers from Parmenides to Spinoza—unless 
through a rigorous textual analysis that locates and decon-
structs those specific passages where the doctrine in question 
can be shown to encounter certain problems unresolvable on 
its own express terms.23 And indeed it is the case that Badiou 
arrives at his unsettling conclusions through some careful 
and detailed as well as critically acute and markedly hetero-
dox readings. Still there is a difference between, on the one 
hand, Derridean close-reading where the problems emerge 
in and through a process of direct engagement with the text 
and, on the other, Badiou’s mode of dialectical critique which 
takes for granted the text’s having been read with adequate 
attention to detail and which thus—on the strength of that 
previous engagement—presumes the entitlement to argue its 
case at a certain level of abstraction from the kinds of exegeti-
cal detail required of an echt-deconstructive approach. One 
motivating factor here, as I have said, is Badiou’s opposition to 
anything—any argument, theory, or school of thought—that 
goes along with the linguistic turn or the notion of language 
as an end-point of critical enquiry. This helps to explain his 
ambivalence toward Derrida’s work despite their both being 
centrally concerned to expose the symptomatic blind-spots, 
aporias, or conflicts between manifest and latent sense which 
reveal the limits of a certain restrictive ontology (Badiou) or 
a certain logocentric “metaphysics of presence” (Derrida) 
whose liability to such disruptive effects is an index of its 
deeply ideological character. 
This kinship emerges with unmistakeable force if one 
compares, say, Badiou’s strongly heterodox yet rigorously 
consequent readings of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Rousseau, 
Kant, Hegel, or Heidegger with Derrida’s no less strenu-
23 Badiou, Being and Event, 112-20.
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ously argued deconstructive commentaries on those same 
thinkers.24 In Derrida it is chiefly a matter of revealing the 
various deviant, non-classical, or paraconsistent logics that 
can be shown to inhabit their texts and produce those mo-
ments of undecidability—aporias, in the strict sense of the 
term—which call into question certain of the author’s lead-
ing premises or presuppositions.25 If the modus operandi is 
that of textual close-reading then this should not be seen as 
consigning Derrida’s work to the realm of literary criticism 
or applied rhetoric but rather as offering the means to make 
that case with a high degree of demonstrative force and with 
reference to certain highly specific contexts of argument. In 
Badiou, it is a chiefly a matter of showing how certain overt 
ontological commitments—those that endorse some version 
of a plenist or changeless, timeless, and wholly determinate 
ontology—are fissured by the need to introduce an anoma-
lous term that implicitly concedes the problematical status 
of any such doctrine and its covert reliance on that which it 
has striven to keep off bounds. This is why Badiou devotes a 
large portion of his commentary in the early sections of Being 
and Event to a detailed rehearsal of the issue of the one and 
the many as raised to intensely thought-provoking though 
somewhat baffled effect in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides.26 What 
emerges here is the conceptual impossibility of thinking an 
absolute plenitude of being—an absolute dominion of the 
one over the many, or of the timeless and unchanging over 
everything subject to time and change—and hence the need 
(so deeply repugnant to Plato’s idealist mind-set) to reckon 
with this in any workable theory of truth and knowledge. 
24 Badiou, Being and Event; also entries for Derrida under Note 15, above.
25 See Graham Priest, “Derrida and Self-Reference,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 72 (1994), 103-111 and Beyond the Limits of Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); also Christopher Norris, “Derrida on 
Rousseau: deconstruction as philosophy of logic,” in Language, Logic and Epis-
temology: a modal-realist approach (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), 16-65.
26 Badiou, “Being: Multiple and Void. Plato/Cantor,” in Being and Event, 21-77; 
also “The Subtraction of Truth,” in Theoretical Writings, 95-160.
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Thus Badiou sees a strong proleptic link between Plato’s 
reflections on that topic and the subsequent history of more 
or less bewildered attempts, on the part of philosophers and 
mathematicians, to get a grip on the concept of the infinite 
as something more than a merely notional, virtual, or place-
holder term.27 His reading of intellectual history is premised 
on the claim that what Cantor eventually achieved—an 
operational grasp of the infinite and its multiple “sizes” or 
cardinalities—was there already as a readable subtext to the 
vexing antinomies of Plato’s dialogue and was then worked out 
through numerous episodes in the long history of subsequent 
attempts to resolve them. Only with Cantor did these dilem-
mas, supposedly endemic to any thinking about the infinite, 
at last give way to a conception that would “turn paradox into 
concept” or transform what had so far been a cause of intel-
lectual anxiety into a source of knowledge-transformative 
insights not only in mathematics but (so Badiou maintains) 
with respect to basic ontological questions across the whole 
range of scientific, social, and humanistic disciplines. What 
Cantor’s discovery made it possible to think was the concept 
(not merely the idea) that there existed multiple orders of the 
infinite—such as the infinity of integers and even numbers, 
or integers and fractions thereof, or rational and real num-
bers—and, moreover, that these could be reckoned with or 
subject to calculation in rigorous and perfectly intelligible 
ways. The effect was to open up a vast new region of trans-
finite operations that David Hilbert famously described as 
“a mathematician’s paradise,” and which finally laid to rest 
those deep misgivings about the topic that had typified the 
response of many thinkers from Plato and Aristotle down to 
Cantor’s more orthodox-minded contemporaries.28 So it was 
that his breakthrough soon gave rise to a whole range of pow-
27 Plato, Parmenides, trans. Mary L Gill and Paul Ryan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1966). 
28 On the often heated debate around Cantor’s claims concerning the 
multiple “sizes” of infinity and Hilbert’s enthusiastic endorsement, see 
especially Marcus Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty: a philosophical account 
of the foundations of mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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erful techniques for creating (or discovering, as mathematical 
realists would say) new possibilities of further extending the 
set-theoretical domain. 
Plato’s worry is conveyed in the dialogue through Socrates’ 
encounter with his senior and mentor Parmenides. It has to 
do with the way that reflection on the infinite tends to gener-
ate problems, dilemmas, aporias, or instances of limit-point 
paradox which pose a real threat to the kind of thinking—the 
pursuit of a well-defined systematic structure for the con-
duct of rational enquiry—that philosophers have typically 
espoused. The result of this encounter is to force Socrates 
and his admiring, ever-faithful, yet at this point discernibly 
independent-minded student and chronicler Plato into a se-
quence of hard-pressed dialectical manoeuvres on the theme 
of the one and the many that leads both thinkers, like many 
others after them, right up to and (arguably) just beyond the 
point of conceptual deadlock. Thus the dialogue, at least as 
Plato reconstructs it, brings Socrates out decidedly at odds 
with Parmenides’ doctrine that only the one can truly be said 
to exist while the multiple is merely a product of delusory 
phenomenal or sensuous experience. Instead it is seen to 
manifest an incipient grasp of the contrary truth according to 
which multiplicity precedes and outruns any limit arbitrarily 
placed upon it by this or that particular state of knowledge, 
ontological scheme, discursive regime, or appearance of 
consistency brought about by some local operation of the 
merely stipulative count-as-one. This the dialogue achieves 
despite and against Plato’s well-known predilection for the 
transcendent unifying power of that which participates in the 
abstract realm of the forms, or ideas, such as justice, beauty, 
and (ultimately) goodness. In short, “[w]hat Plato is endeav-
ouring to think here, in a magnificent, dense text, is evidently 
inconsistent multiplicity, which is to say, pure presentation, 
anterior to any one-effect, or to any structure.”29 And again, in 
a pithy formulation by Badiou that very clearly credits Plato 
with a precocious (perhaps preconscious) attempt to make 
29 Badiou, Being and Event, 33.
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sense of that thesis: “in the absence of any being of the one, 
the multiple in-consists in the presentation of a multiple of 
multiples without any foundational stopping-point.”30 
“In-consists” is here used in the pointedly technical sense 
developed throughout Being and Event. What the neologism 
nicely and compactly denotes is that absolute precedence 
of the multiple over the one—or the inconsistent over the 
consistent—which plays a central role in Badiou’s thinking 
not only about mathematics but also on other topics central 
to his work, among them most importantly politics. This he 
conceives as elementally a matter of the count-as-one and 
its exclusionary effect when deployed to distinguish some 
socially dominant fraction of the populace as members in 
good standing and to marginalise or negate some other 
fraction (for instance, that of the sans papiers or “economic 
migrants”) as lacking such status.31 Nevertheless, just as Plato’s 
“official” (Parmenidean) doctrine of transcendental monism 
encountered resistance from certain inbuilt necessities of 
thought—a resistance that would finally give rise to Cantor’s 
conceptual breakthrough—so likewise those oppressed or 
victimised minorities exert a counter-pressure at certain 
points in the existing body politic which at critical times 
may become the sites of protest, struggle, and (potentially) 
social transformation. Thus, in terms of the more-than-
analogical relation that Badiou posits between set theory and 
politics, any such change is likeliest to start at “evental sites” 
where conditions exist for the emergence of an aberrant or 
“uncounted” multiple, that is, a collectivity—something like 
Sartre’s “group-in-fusion”—with a shared interest in bringing 
it about.32 These are subject-multiples who “belong” but are 
not “included,” or owing to whose conspicuous absence from 
30 Badiou, Being and Event, 33.
31 See Note 11, above.
32 Jean-Paul Sartre, A Critique of Dialectical Reason, Vol. 1, Theory of Practical 
Ensembles, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith (London: New Left Books, 1976) and 
Vol. 2, trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 2006); also Badiou, “Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980),” in Pocket Pantheon, 14-35.
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the count-as-one the extant social structure can be known 
to “inconsist,” i.e., to harbour absences (defects of adequate 
representation or shortfalls of accountability) that call its 
legitimacy into question. 
This is all worked out with great precision and care for 
detail in Badiou’s writings on the course of set-theoretical 
investigation after Cantor. It is expounded chiefly with refer-
ence to the work of Paul Cohen who devised (or discovered) a 
formal means of explaining how certain as-yet unknowable 
or unprovable truths in mathematics might none the less 
be implicit through their absence from the present state of 
knowledge and the power of that absence to generate certain 
specific problems and aporias.33 Here again, as so often with 
Badiou, the Sartre comparison—famously exemplified by 
Pierre’s absence from the café—is one that fairly leaps to mind.34
I hope that by now it will be clear what I am suggesting with 
regard to the relationship between Badiou and Derrida. There 
is no doubt that Badiou is the more overtly formal thinker, or 
the one whose work has drawn more heavily on developments 
in mathematics, logic, and the formal sciences. There is also 
no doubt that Derrida is the more language-oriented or text-
conscious thinker of the two, a difference that might seem to 
set them apart on basic philosophical grounds. However, to 
repeat, this impression ought to be checked by considering the 
well-nigh ubiquitous character of the “linguistic turn” across 
numerous schools of post-1920 “analytic” and “continental” 
thought. One effect of this—for thinkers not overly in hock 
to that typecast dichotomy—has been to question the very 
idea that an extreme sensitivity to linguistic nuance can-
not go along with (must indeed be inimical to) an adequate 
power of conceptual grasp. Nor should it be forgotten, as so 
often it has by admiring and hostile commentators alike, that 
33 Paul J. Cohen, Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis (New York: W.A. 
Benjamin, 1966). See also Michael Potter, Set Theory and Its Philosophy: a 
critical history (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
34 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 9. 
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Derrida more than once invokes formal arguments such as 
Gödel’s undecidability-theorem in order to explain what is 
involved in the deconstructive reading of a text.35 This is not 
just a vaguely analogical or downright opportunist appeal 
to the presumed authority of mathematics and logic but a 
reference-point that precisely captures the movement—the 
logico-syntactic-semantic procedure—of Derrida’s classic 
readings.
III
My point is that Derrida’s meditations on the logics of the 
pharmakon in Plato, of supplementarity in Rousseau, of 
parergonality in Kant, or of différance in Husserl along with 
his later, more generic reflections on the aporetic logics of 
the gift, hospitality, and auto-immunity are all of them es-
sentially formal despite (or more accurately just on account 
of) their often starting out from some localised evidence 
of textual complication.36 That is, they have to do with the 
scope and limits of classical (bivalent) logic—its coming up 
against strictly unresolvable instances of self-contradiction 
or aporia—and are therefore dependent on textual exegesis 
only though crucially in order to present this case with the 
maximum degree of evidential warrant and demonstrative 
(logical) rigour. 
Indeed, one could plausibly interpret the development of 
Derrida’s thought over five decades of intense activity as a 
35 See Note 27, above; also Paul Livingston, “Derrida and Formal Logic: 
formalizing the undecidable,” Derrida Today, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010), 221-39 and 
Norris, “Deconstruction, Science and the Logic of Enquiry,” 178-200.
36 See entries under Note 15, above, and Jacques Derrida, “The Parergon,” 
in The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), 15-147; also—for the more obviously “topical” 
turn in his later work—Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. Rachel Bowlby 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); On Cosmopolitanism and 
Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 
2001); Rogues: two essays on reason, trans Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael 
Naas (Stanford U.P., 2005); Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. 1, ed. Michel Lisse, 
Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. G. Bennington (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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shift of focus from textual close-reading as the sine qua non of 
interpretative truth or validity to a somewhat more generalised 
or less context-specific mode of conceptual analysis. I have 
ventured this claim in somewhat cautious and tentative style 
because it is misleading in one respect at least, namely its 
failure to acknowledge the wider (referential or real-world) 
contexts to which those later writings are very specifically ad-
dressed and to which they often respond in strongly marked 
ethico-political terms.37 Here again, as with the (putative) issue 
concerning “formal” versus “textualist” modes of thought, if 
one takes due account of this dimension—always present in 
Derrida’s work but latterly more overt and emphatic—there 
will seem fewer problems about finding significant points 
of contact between that work and various aspects of Badiou’s 
project. It will then become clearer that their thinking con-
verges on certain shared objectives, among them the concern 
to articulate a formally adequate account of the contradictions 
that they both find implicit across a great range of discourses, 
concepts, institutions, socio-political orders, and practices. 
Moreover, they can then be seen as holding the shared belief 
that those contradictions have their locus of emergence only 
in the various specific contexts—from mathematics, logic 
and the physical sciences to politics, ethics, and art—where 
thinkers and practitioners must henceforth discover the 
relevant validity-conditions as well as an anticipatory grasp 
of what would truthfully count as an advance on the present 
state of knowledge or current ideas of justificatory warrant. 
All this was implicit in the well-known aphorism of Roland 
Barthes when he sought some common ground between struc-
turalists and their Marxist or socialist-realist opponents by 
remarking that “a little formalism turns one away from history, 
but a lot brings one back to it.”38 What I think he had more 
specifically in mind—and what bears directly on our current 
37 See Notes 2 and 38, above; also Cathy Caruth and Deborah Esch (eds.), 
Critical Encounters: reference and responsibility in deconstructive writing (New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1995).
38 Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” in Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (Lon-
don: Granada, 1973), 112.
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discussion—is the difference between a wholesale version 
of the “linguistic turn” (whether post-structuralist, Wittgen-
steinian, late-Heideggerian, or Rortian neo-pragmatist) and 
a version that concedes the centrality of language to human 
thought and cognition yet also acknowledges the constraints 
imposed by logic on the one hand and referential ties or com-
mitments on the other. Thus a formalist approach is one that 
preserves at least this much of the classical trivium model with 
its three major disciplines of logic, grammar, and rhetoric. 
The model was devised so as to allow rhetoric its appointed 
place as the study of language in its suasive or performative 
aspect but always within the order of priority laid down by 
a due regard for logic and, next to that, for grammar as the 
structural component of language that serves to articulate 
its proper relation to the correspondent structures of truth, 
fact, or veridical knowledge and experience. It was subject to 
drastic revision through various programmes of reform from 
Ramus down, and is nowadays either consigned to the intel-
lectual history-books or resurrected by boa-deconstructors 
like Paul de Man in order to advance a radically extended 
conception of rhetoric that would claim to undo—subvert 
or undermine—the priority of logic and grammar.39 
Whatever one’s assessment of de Man’s somewhat wire-
drawn arguments to this effect it is clear that the trivium 
conception suffers from an overly literal understanding of 
the correspondence-relation between logic, language and 
reality and a failure to conceive how that relation might be 
subject to disturbance by factors beyond the remit of logical 
or grammatical analysis. Still it is the model that looms over 
Wittgenstein’s early Tractarian account of these matters, and 
also—of course—the model that he roundly rejected in the 
Philosophical Investigations and other “late”-period writings.40 
39 For further discussion (albeit from a decidedly idiosyncratic angle) see 
Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1986); also Christopher Norris, Paul de Man and the Critique of Aesthetic 
Ideology (New York: Routledge, 1988).
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. David Pears and 
Brian McGuiness (London: Routledge, 1961) and Philosophical Investigations, 
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Wittgenstein’s was the most extreme—arguably the most naïve 
and literal-minded—of those doctrines that typified analytic 
philosophy in its early, predominantly logicist period. His 
subsequent turnaround was likewise the most extreme of 
those sundry reactive movements of thought which swung 
right across to a notion of language (language-games, dis-
courses, phrase-regimes, descriptive paradigms, worldviews, 
conceptual schemes, etc.) as the furthest we can get toward 
a better understanding of the relation between thought and 
world.41 It is in this context that Badiou and Derrida can be 
seen to hold out against the limiting conditions imposed on 
philosophy by a cyclic swinging back and forth between op-
posite and equally disabling doctrinal poles. Both thinkers 
maintain a steady commitment to standards of logical con-
sistency and analytic-conceptual rigour along with an acute 
critical awareness of the ways in which certain problematic 
or anomalous instances—“events” for Badiou, aporias or 
moments of undecidability for Derrida—may on occasion 
require a suspension and consequent redefinition of those 
same standards. 
Badiou focuses on the effect of some crucial intervention 
in mathematics, science, politics, or art which establishes a 
novel truth-procedure whose longer-term consequences are 
then worked out by “militants of truth”—or those with the 
requisite degree of post-evental fidelity—and brought to the 
point where there occurs a decisive transformation in the 
existing order of knowledge, society, or artistic expression. 
Derrida is more apt to describe such events in textual terms, 
that is to say, as likewise transformative occurrences but of the 
sort best exemplified by what happens when a deconstructive 
reading of (say) Plato, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, 
Husserl or Heidegger controverts not only the received un-
derstanding of those thinkers but also its bearing on issues 
in the sphere of general and regional ontology. Indeed there 
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954).
41 See entries under Note 9, above, for more extended analysis and critique 
of these various (as I see them) closely related developments.
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are some major misconceptions about Derrida that might 
be dispelled by noting the salient points of convergence 
between his project and Badiou’s more explicitly ontological 
approach to the ongoing dialectic of being and event. One is 
the old canard, still much bandied about amongst Derrida’s 
detractors, that in making his notorious claim to the effect 
that “there is nothing outside the text” (“il n’y a pas de hors-
texte;” better rendered “there is no ‘outside’ to the text”) he 
should be taken to espouse a textualist variant of absolute or 
transcendental idealism according to which, quite literally, 
written marks on the page are all that can be known to exist.42 
Another is the notion often advanced by critics on the left 
that when Derrida claims to deconstruct the Western logo-
centric “metaphysics of presence” from Plato to Heidegger 
he must have in mind some timeless and seamless structure 
of false consciousness—or mode of self-perpetuating error 
and delusion—that has remained perfectly unaffected by even 
the most radical interim changes of socio-political life.43 My 
comparison with Badiou may help to make the contrary point, 
i.e., that each of those textual engagements raises a histori-
cally specific range of issues which in turn have to do with a 
particular form of ideological misrecognition or a distinct, 
politically inflected way that the logocentric prejudice has 
taken hold under given material and cultural conditions. In 
short the main task of critical reading, as Derrida conceives 
it, is precisely to articulate those fault-lines in the structure 
of metaphysical presupposition that are normally concealed 
by our placid assurance of knowing our way around language 
and the world but which show up to most striking effect when 
placed under deconstructive scrutiny. 
Nor should this for one moment be taken to suggest that 
Derrida is proposing linguistic therapy in the Wittgensteinian 
mode, i.e., seeking to talk us down from the giddy heights of 
metaphysical abstraction and restore us to a communally 
42 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158; also Note 38, above.
43 See Note 7, above.
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sanctioned sense of what constitutes apt or proper usage.44 
One additional benefit of viewing his work in relation to 
Badiou’s is that it shows just how far they share a decidedly 
anti-Wittgensteinian emphasis on the power of critical thought 
to question, challenge, unsettle and subvert the complacent 
habits of belief typically enshrined in (so-called) ordinary 
language. This in turn allows both thinkers to locate a certain 
very specific role for the subject—the human subject of choice, 
agency, knowledge, and commitment albeit here defined in 
terms far removed from those of traditional humanism—as 
that which alone brings about the possibility of any such criti-
cal advance. Such is Badiou’s concept of the subject as itself 
brought about or summoned into being through its faithful 
adherence to a truth-procedure in the wake of some particular 
breakthrough event in mathematics, the sciences, politics, or 
art.45 Beyond that, it suggests perhaps the most promising 
solution to those long-running and by now somewhat dead-
end debates over whether or not Derridean deconstruction 
goes so far in its (supposed) rejection of all such (supposed) 
humanist residues as to leave no room for the subject as locus 
of truth-seeking and activist engagement.46 That is to say, it gets 
over the false antinomy—one very pointedly deconstructed 
in Derrida’s early writings on Husserl—between truth as a 
matter of absolute ideal objectivity and truth as that which 
has to be conceived as discovered or at any rate discoverable 
by human enquirers at a certain stage of intellectual advance, 
political progress, or artistic achievement.47 
44 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
45 See especially Alain Badiou, Theory of the Subject, trans. Bruno Bosteels 
(London: Continuum, 2009) and Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011). 
46 See for instance Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), 
Who Comes After the Subject? (London: Routledge, 1991). 
47 See especially Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s 
Theory of Signs (Note 15, above); also Edmund Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”: 
an introduction, trans. John P. Leavey (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978) and “‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology,” in Writing and Dif-
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This is I think the key to resolving what would otherwise 
constitute an insuperable problem for any attempt to find 
common ground between Badiou’s insistence on mathematics 
as ontology, i.e., as that which always potentially exceeds the 
compass of human epistemic grasp and Derrida’s undoubted 
starting-point in the project of Husserlian phenomenology, 
no matter how deep and far-reaching his critique of its basic 
suppositions. It is here that both thinkers stake their claim 
to have moved decisively beyond the whole range of typecast 
dilemmas—ultimately those between subject and object, mind 
and world, or truth within the bounds of human cognition 
and truth as recognition—or verification-transcendent—that 
have vexed the discourse of Western philosophy since its an-
cient Greek origins, and all the more so in the wake of Kant’s 
self-professed “Copernican Revolution.”48 Hence Badiou’s 
highly qualified version of mathematical Platonism, one 
that unlike the classical (and inherently dilemma-prone) 
version makes due allowance for the truth-revealing powers 
of actively engaged exploratory thought. Hence also, in a dif-
ferent register, Derrida’s meticulous analysis of the constant 
alternating movement in Husserl between a transcendental 
phenomenology premised on the existence of absolute ideal 
objectivities and a more historically grounded and lifeworld-
oriented approach that instead takes account of the various 
temporal factors that can now be seen to have impinged on 
the process of discovery.49 It is in this way that a better un-
derstanding of Badiou’s claims with regard to mathematics, 
ontology and truth can help toward a better—since again 
less dilemma-prone—grasp of how subjectivity figures in 
Derrida’s readings of Husserl and other thinkers. 
As we have seen, Badiou offers numerous examples of the 
process or procedure whereby some given state of knowledge, 
ference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 154-68, 160.
48 On the dubious warrant for Kant’s claims in this regard, see Quentin 
Meillassoux, After Finitude: an essay on the necessity of contingency, trans. Ray 
Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008); also Norris, Re-Thinking the Cogito: 
naturalism, reason and the venture of thought (Continuum, 2009). 
49 See entries under Note 49, above.
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political situation, or stage of artistic advance—along with 
the ontology that underwrites it—is thrown into doubt or 
forced to the point of crisis and transformation through vari-
ous strictly consequent though strictly unforeseeable turns 
in the logic of events. Indeed that phrase, “logic of events,” 
is one that neatly encapsulates the nature of this process as 
Badiou describes it, since the logic (or intelligible sequence 
of developments) emerges fully formed only “after the event” 
yet with no less a sense of rigorous necessity given the new 
advance in knowledge, the new access to political power on the 
part of a hitherto oppressed group, or the new possibilities of 
expression opened up by some breakthrough artistic achieve-
ment. In mathematical terms—always his ultimate point of 
reference—it involves that quintessentially set-theoretical 
operation of “turning paradox into concept,” or finding the 
resources for a radical re-thinking of some presently insoluble 
problem which then becomes the springboard for a full-scale 
conceptual revolution. Such were prototypically the advances 
achieved by Cantor with his grasp of the multiple orders of 
infinity and by Cohen with his account of “forcing” as that 
which made possible all such advances, itself included.50 If 
one asks what relevance this might have to Derrida’s (on the 
face of it) very different body of work then the answer has to 
with that jointly logical and referential dimension which, as I 
have argued, sets it decidedly apart from most developments 
in sceptically-inclined philosophy of language or critical 
theory over the past half-century.
Thus Derridean deconstruction, as distinct from its various 
spin-offs or derivatives, necessarily maintains a due respect 
for those axioms or precepts of classical logic (such as biva-
lence and excluded middle) that have to be applied right up to 
the limit—the point where they encounter some instance of 
strictly irresolvable aporia—if such reading is to muster any 
kind of demonstrative force. The same goes for those basic 
referential constraints on language that are built into its very 
nature as a mode of informative-communicative discourse 
50 See Notes 28, 30 and 35 above.
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and which Derrida doesn’t for one moment deny even though 
he shows how they are subject to certain complicating fac-
tors when approached with a sufficiently nuanced sense of 
their involvement in larger chains of contextual and logico-
semantic entailment. Moreover the two considerations are 
closely intertwined since, as can be seen from debates on the 
topic from Frege down, there is simply no separating issues 
of reference from issues of truth, issues of truth from issues 
of (Fregean) sense, and these in turn from issues concerning 
the logical structure of the sentences, propositions, or other 
such larger units of discourse within which alone terms can 
properly be said to refer or to possess a determinate (refer-
entially warranted) truth-value.51 Of course that set of claims 
has been subject to much debate, with some—Quine among 
them—criticising Frege on radically holistic grounds for not 
having pressed right through with the contextualist argument 
and extended it beyond the sentence to the entire “web” or 
“fabric” of discourse (or currently accredited knowledge) at 
any given time.52 However this contention has been chal-
lenged in turn by those, like Michael Dummett, who object 
that we could never get a purchase on language—never learn 
to use it in the first place or manifest a grasp of its working 
principles—unless (contra Quine) we had a prior grasp of its 
compositional structure, i.e., the dependence of language-as-a-
whole on those sentential structures that define the conditions 
of assertoric warrant for this or that statement or truth-claim.53 
Quite simply, we should then be at a loss to understand the 
most basic elements of linguistic intelligibility or to figure 
out other people’s meanings, intentions, or communicative 
gist on the basis of a rationally informed conjecture as to the 
sense (and the truth-conditions) that they are likeliest to have 
51 For further discussion see Norris, Language, Logic and Epistemology.
52 See especially W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969) and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 
in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1961), 20-46.
53 Michael Dummett, Frege and Other Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1996).
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in mind for their discourse from one sentence to the next.  
What most needs stressing against the common currency of 
pro- and anti-Derrida commentaries alike is that Dummett’s 
argument is fully borne out in the case of those classical de-
constructive readings that constitute the heart of Derrida’s 
project. To be sure there are passages, much cited in the 
secondary literature, where he does give every appearance 
of endorsing a wholesale contextualist position à la Quine. 
On this account it must be the aim of such readings to sub-
vert or undermine every last appeal to the “transcendental 
signified,” whether this be conceived in idealist terms as the 
ultimate reality behind sensory-phenomenal appearances 
or—in realist terms—as the referential point of anchorage 
between language and reality or word and world. However 
it will soon strike any attentive reader that when Derrida 
writes about the logic of the pharmakon in Plato, or supple-
mentarity in Rousseau, or the parergon in Kant, or différance 
in Husserl (etc.) he is certainly out to discredit the former 
(idealist) conception but by no means seeking to undermine 
the very notions of truth and reference. Indeed, if one wanted 
to characterise “deconstruction” in philosophical (as distinct 
from literary-theoretical or cultural-critical) terms then its 
specific differentia would lie precisely in the tension—or the 
constant possibility of conflict—between an adherence to 
those “classical” values and the kinds of anomalous or dis-
crepant evidence that may be encountered in the course of a 
sufficiently intelligent, sensitive, and rigorous deconstructive 
reading. My point, to repeat, is that Derrida shares with Badiou 
this desire not only to detect and locate but, so far as possible, 
to analyse and formalise whatever creates such an obstacle or 
challenge to existing modes of belief. More than that, it gives 
rise to a truth-procedure that may for some time—like Cantor’s 
proposals—come up against strong doxastic or institutional 
resistance, but which thereafter acts as a periodic spur to the 




I would therefore suggest that Derrida’s protocols of reading, 
early and late, can best be understood as closely analogous to 
those transformative events that Badiou describes across a 
range of disciplines, domains or practices from mathematics 
to politics and which find their most rigorous formal specifi-
cation in the set-theoretical procedure of forcing developed 
in the work of Cohen. Thus when Badiou offers his against-
the-grain readings of canonical philosophers from Plato and 
Aristotle to Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, or Heidegger 
it is through a formal procedure—not merely an interpreta-
tive option—devised in order to explain how set-theoretical 
theorems or conjectures can be truth-tracking or sensitive to 
future discovery even though they exceed the utmost compass 
of current provability or present-best knowledge. That is to 
say, those thinkers can be held to have thought truer than 
they knew just on condition (1) that their texts are read with 
sufficient care, and (2) that this care is directed more toward 
structures of conflictual logico-semantic implication than 
toward whatever the author may have declared with regard 
to their express, conscious, programmatic, or manifest pur-
port. For Derrida likewise, as explained in a famous passage 
from Of Grammatology, it is a matter of bringing out the often 
complex and contradictory relationship between that which 
an author knows or acknowledges concerning his/her writ-
erly intentions and that which eludes their grasp precisely 
on account of its resisting or subverting any straightforward 
intentionalist approach. 
This point is worth more detailed treatment since it has 
often been ignored or subject to misunderstanding among 
a sizeable number of Derrida’s commentators. On the one 
hand, he declares, it is vital to take stock of an author’s mani-
fest intent since “[w]ithout this recognition and this respect, 
critical production would risk developing in any direction at 
all and authorize itself to say almost anything.”54 Neverthe-
less—the point of departure for a deconstructive reading—
54 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158.
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“this indispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has 
never opened a reading.” To suppose otherwise would be to 
confine criticism or philosophy to the subaltern and wholly 
uncritical task of “reproducing, by the effaced and respectful 
doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional 
relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges with 
the history to which he belongs thanks to the element of 
language.”55 What deconstruction seeks to reveal, conversely, 
is “a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between 
what he commands and what he does not command of the 
patterns of the language that he uses.” And again—as should 
be emphasised in view of its distorted reception-history to 
date—deconstruction in the proper sense of that term, i.e., 
as exemplified by Derrida’s classic essays must involve not 
only a keen awareness of these intra-linguistic complications 
but also a strong analytical grasp of the logical or logico-
semantic structures that are thereby subject to a dislocating 
torsion beyond their power to contain or control. After all, 
this could be the case—or register as such—only on condition 
that the reader is able and willing to apply the most rigorous 
standards of logical accountability (including the axioms of 
classical or bivalent true/false reasoning) and thereby locate 
those moments of aporia or logico-semantic breakdown that 
signal the limits of any such reckoning. 
Hence Derrida’s doubtless mischievous but by no means 
disingenuous expression of outrage when John Searle up-
braids him for thinking to deconstruct Austin’s categorical 
distinctions—e.g., between proper and improper speech-acts, 
or apt and non-apt contexts, or good-faith and insincere, 
deceptive, or imitation speech-acts—by applying a strict 
bivalent logic that is simply out of place (Searle claims) in 
the context of everyday, ordinary, non-regimented linguistic 
usage.56 The passage is worth quoting at length since it goes 
clean against—and helps to discredit—such a range of preju-
dicial ideas on the topic of Derridean deconstruction. Thus:




[f]rom the moment that Searle entrusts himself to an oppositional 
logic, to the “distinction” of concepts by “contrast” or “opposition” (a 
legitimate demand that I share with him, even if I do not at all elicit 
the same consequences from it), I have difficulty seeing how he is nev-
ertheless able to write [that] phrase . . . in which he credits me with the 
“assumption,” “oddly enough derived from logical positivism,” “that 
unless a distinction can be made rigorous and precise, it is not really 
a distinction at all.”57
Derrida’s point is not so much to cock a snook at logical 
positivism but rather to bring home the unwitting irony of 
Searle’s setting up as the appointed guardian of “analytic” 
values and priorities while blithely recommending that they 
be relaxed, suspended, or held in abeyance whenever (as in 
the context of speech-act theory) they encounter problems 
or anomalous instances. Here again he agrees with Badiou 
that thought can make progress—whether in mathematics, 
the physical sciences, politics, art, or ethics—only so long 
as it persists in the effort to work its way through and beyond 
those dilemmas that periodically emerge in the course of 
enquiry and can later be seen to have supplied the stimu-
lus to some otherwise (quite literally) unthinkable stage of 
advance. There is no direct equivalent in Derrida to the set-
theoretical procedure of “forcing” as formalized by Cohen 
and extended by Badiou to fields that would normally be 
seen as altogether resistant to any such approach. Neverthe-
less, as I have said, there is a more than suggestive analogy 
between Badiou’s meticulous working-out of that procedure 
in its various contexts of application through a stage-by-stage 
sequence of mathematically-based demonstrative reasoning 
and Derrida’s likewise meticulous attention to those devi-
ant or non-classical logics—of supplementarity, différance, 
57 Jacques Derrida, “Afterword: toward an ethic of conversation,” in Gerald 
Graff (ed.), Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989), 
111-54, 123. For the background to this rejoinder see also Derrida, “Signature 
Event Context,” Glyph, Vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1975),  172-97; John R. Searle, “Reiterating the Differences,” ibid, 198-208; 
Derrida, “Limited Inc abc,” Glyph, Vol. 2 (1977), 75-176.
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parergonality, autoimmunity, and so forth—which he finds 
at work in the texts of a culture that has consistently striven 
to conceal or efface them. 
Moreover, the analogy is greatly strengthened by his tell-
ing invocations of Gödel’s incompleteness-theorem at just 
those cardinal points—notably in his treatment of Mal-
larmé’s paradoxical reflections on language, logic, reference, 
and truth—where deconstruction is most deeply engaged 
in exposing the extent of that same concealment.58 In Ba-
diou’s essay of tribute to Derrida he elects to pass over the 
Gödelian connection and to focus instead on the link with 
Cantor’s technique of diagonalization, that is, his proof that 
there exist infinite sets (like that of the real numbers) that 
cannot be placed in a one-for-one order of correspondence 
with the infinite set of integers or natural numbers, just as 
the power-set of any given set (the set of all its subsets) must 
always numerically and exponentially exceed the set itself. 
However that technique was taken over and put to various 
other mathematical and logical purposes, among them most 
notably Gödel’s incompleteness theorem.59 At any rate these 
various connections help to explain not only Badiou’s (as it 
might seem) curious take on Derrida in the Pocket Pantheon 
piece but also the development in his thinking—some would 
say the outright transformation—between the two master-
texts Being and Event and Logics of Worlds. After all, it is in 
the latter that Badiou offers his full-scale exposition of the 
themes that dominate his later work and which also find 
cryptic though eloquent expression in the tribute to Derrida. 
Chief among them are the ideas of existence (as distinct from 
being), inexistence (with its proximate source in the subtrac-
tive ontology of Being and Event), degrees of existence (these 
58 See Note 37, above; also Derrida, “The Double Session,” in Dissemination, 
173-286.
59 Kurt Gödel, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Math-
ematica and Related Systems,” trans. B. Meltzer (New York: Basic Books, 
1962); see also Ernest Nagel and James Newman, Gödel’s Theorem (London: 




taken to vary for any given being or entity across different 
worlds), and the likewise differing transcendentals that exert 
their existence-bestowing effect on or in each of those worlds. 
“Given a multiplicity that exists in a world, there will always 
be an element in that multiplicity that is a non-existent in 
that world. A non-existent cannot be characterised in onto-
logical terms, but only in existential terms; it is a minimal 
degree of existence in any determinate world.”60 To be sure, 
this conception has its ultimate source in the set-theoretical 
terms and procedures laid out in Being and Event. But they 
have now undergone a major shift of emphasis with the turn 
to a scalar (differential) account of the way that existence 
supervenes on being, or the process by which certain beings 
make the passage from existing only in that “minimal” degree 
to existing in a world that allows full scope to their diverse 
powers of thought, imagination, scientific inventiveness, 
political activism, or artistic creativity. 
It is here that Badiou locates the point of convergence be-
tween his own and Derrida’s work, i.e., in the latter’s kindred 
desire to articulate those various kinds and degrees of inex-
istence that mark the subordinate term of any binary pair, or 
whatever finds itself excluded or marginalised by prevalent 
social, political, cultural, or conceptual structures. The greatest 
error, according to Derrida as Badiou reads him, is to confuse 
the order of being with that of existence, and—by the same 
token—to confuse inexistence with nothingness. This leads 
to the wholly mistaken presumption that there is no need to 
reckon with multiples (e.g. ethnic, social or political groups) 
that occupy a world wherein their existence is restricted to a 
bare minimum by a transcendental that rules against their 
enjoying a more active or effective mode of involvement. 
Thus “any multiplicity is assigned a degree of existence in 
the world, a degree of appearance. The fact of existing, qua 
appearing in a determinate world, is inevitably associated 
with a certain degree of appearance in that world, with an 
intensity of appearance, which we can also call intensity of 
60 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 130.
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existence.”61 Hence Badiou’s recognition of Derrida as having 
raised this topic to a high point of critical visibility despite 
doing so in a “textualist” register that he (Badiou) clearly 
finds less than appealing. Indeed, within the short compass 
of this Pocket Pantheon text he manages to link up the major 
concerns of “early” and “late” Derrida with a force of logical 
(as opposed to merely suggestive or associative) argument 
that has so far eluded most of Derrida’s commentators. In 
particular, he brings out the marked though elusive continu-
ity between a mode of deconstruction primarily focused on 
issues of textual exegesis (albeit with large epistemological 
and ontological implications) and a mode of deconstruction 
that engages more directly with real-world problems and 
dilemmas. 
Badiou offers a way of reading Derrida that has no problem 
in negotiating the passage from texts like Of Grammatology, 
Margins of Philosophy or Writing and Difference to later works 
where his approach is for the most part conceptual-thematic 
and therefore, as I have said, takes the work of textual close-
reading very largely for granted. Most striking here is Badiou’s 
brief but pregnant commentary on Derrida’s Spectres of Marx, 
a text that many critics have found brilliantly inventive, pas-
sionate, and ethically stirring yet oddly devoid of substantive 
political or theoretical content.62 Derrida’s refusal to meet 
those demands—to deliver some programme, formula, or 
theory that might be cashed out in the present—is itself a 
sure mark of the desire to make room for that which cur-
rently lacks any adequate means of representation, or any 
acknowledged right to exist (in Badiou’s distinctive sense of 
that term) under currently prevailing cultural, political, or 
socio-economic conditions. Badiou’s reading does much to 
redeem Spectres from the charge brought against it by left-
activist detractors who deplore what they see as its merely 
gestural Marxist “commitment” and failure to achieve any 
real depth of political or philosophic thought.63 On the other 
61 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 128.
62 Derrida, Spectres of Marx (Note 2, above). 
63 See Note 7, above.
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hand his reading strikes a cautionary note for those Derridean 
adepts overly enthused by the notion of “hauntology,” that is, 
the idea that Marxism ought to embrace a “spectral” concep-
tion of political justice which accepts its endless deferral to 
a future of indefinite or unspecifiable since ontologically 
fugitive possibility. Although Derrida works this conception 
out with his usual inventive brilliance—and, be it said, with a 
charge of ethico-political passion undiminished by the book’s 
highly speculative character—there is no doubt that it can 
easily serve, for others more impressed by the brilliance than 
inspired by the passion, as a pretext for the failure or refusal 
to engage with practical issues in the world outside the text.
Thus to read Marx through Derrida, or with an eye to those 
aspects of Derrida’s Marx so adroitly drawn out by Badiou, 
is to see how and why these (seemingly) opposite responses 
both fall short of an adequate reckoning. Let me quote the 
most relevant passage at length since it makes this point 
with the inseparable mixture of passion and precision that 
typifies all three thinkers.
In Marx’s analysis of bourgeois or capitalist societies, the proletariat 
is truly the non-existent characteristic of political multiplicities. It is 
“that which does not exist.” That does not mean that it has no being 
. . . . The social and economic being of the proletariat is not in doubt. 
What is in doubt, always has been, and is now so more than ever, is its 
political existence. The proletariat is that which has been completely 
removed from political representation. The multiplicity that it is can 
be analysed but, if we take the rules of appearance in the political world, 
it does not appear there . . . . That is obviously what the Internationale 
sings: “We are nothing, let us be all.” . . . From the point of view of their 
political appearance, they are nothing. And becoming “all” presupposes 
a change of world, or in other words a change of transcendental. The 
transcendental must change if the ascription of an existence, and there-
fore a non-existence or the point of a multiplicity’s non-appearance 
in a world, is to change in its turn.64
64 Badiou, Pocket Pantheon, 130-31.  
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This is clearly a “creative” or revisionist reading of Spectres in 
so far as it attributes to Derrida words, phrases, concepts, onto-
logical concerns, and certain “technical” (mainly mathemati-
cal) thought-procedures that are not to be found in Derrida’s 
work, at least on the literal face of it. However it can fairly be 
said to respect what Derrida calls the “classical exigencies” of 
interpretation, that is, the conditions incumbent upon any 
reading that wishes to avoid the familiar charge—one often 
brought against Derrida himself although, I would argue, 
without adequate warrant—of treating the text in hand as 
merely a pretext for some ingenious display of self-willed 
“strong” misprision. Those conditions include (though it 
might surprise some of Derrida’s “literary” disciples) an at-
titude of qualified regard for the claims of authorial intent 
and also—what entails that qualification—a demand that texts 
be read with the utmost attentiveness to their complex and 
sometimes contradictory structures of logical implication. 
Such is the requirement even, or especially, where this leads 
up to an aporetic juncture or moment of strictly unresolv-
able impasse so that the logical necessity arises to deploy a 
non-classical, i.e., a deviant, paraconsistent, non-bivalent, or 
(in Derrida’s parlance) a “supplementary” logic.65 
However, crucially, this is not the kind of readiness to switch 
or revise logics at the drop of a speculative hat that has charac-
terised a good deal of Anglo-American “analytical” discussion 
in the wake of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Hilary 
Putnam’s kindred reflections.66 Rather it is revisionism only 
under pressure, that is, as the upshot of a logically meticulous 
reading that must be undertaken if deconstruction is not to 
take refuge in irrationality or even—as with certain of its 
US literary variants—in some specially (often theologically) 
sanctioned realm of supra-rational ambiguity or paradox.67
65 See Notes 27 and 37, above.
66 For classic statements of the “strong” logical-revisionist case, see Wil-
lard Van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and Hilary Putnam, 
Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975); also Christopher Norris, Hilary Putnam: realism, reason and the uses of 
uncertainty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).




This is the aspect of Derrida’s work that has made the greatest 
impression on Badiou, as witness his striking re-assessment of 
Spectres of Marx. Above all, it offers a needful corrective to the 
widespread idea—one that Badiou, given his antipathy toward 
the “linguistic turn” in its sundry manifestations, might well 
be expected to endorse—that Marxism “after Derrida” is a 
merely textual or rhetorical affair with no purchase on issues 
of real-world history and politics. What counts so strongly 
against that charge is Derrida’s sheer analytic acuity, a virtue 
that places him more in the company of an echt-analytical 
philosopher like Russell than exponents of the language-first, 
conventionalist, social-constructivist, or communitarian outlook. 
Or again, it is Derrida’s temperamental as well as intellectual 
affinity with a thinker like Austin who managed to combine 
a Wittgensteinian attentiveness to “ordinary language” with 
an undiminished power of analytic thought and—owing to 
that—a very un-Wittgensteinian precision of conceptual grasp 
as applied to the finest nuances of linguistic usage.68 Thus 
despite his ill fame amongst analytic philosophers as the ne 
plus ultra of “textualist” (i.e., post-structuralist, postmodernist, 
or more broadly “continental”) thinking, Derrida is much 
better understood as an immensely gifted close-reader of 
numerous philosophical texts who has also—by way of that 
same close-reading activity—put forward some remarkably 
original theses concerning the structural and historical geneal-
ogy of certain crucially load-bearing philosophical concepts. 
This is why Badiou can advance a speculative reading which 
itself goes beyond the letter of Derrida’s text—beyond any 
“straight” interpretation—and yet finds adequate probative 
University of Chicago Press, 1984) and John D. Caputo, Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida: religion without religion (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997); also Arthur Bradley, “Derrida’s God: a genealogy of the theologi-
cal turn,” Paragraph, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), 21-42. For a powerful and timely 
antidote to such thinking, see Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and 
the time of life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).  
68 See entries under Note 59, above.
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warrant in aspects, features, or logical dimensions of that text 
that lack (and may even turn out to controvert) the supposed 
self-evidence of direct or express authorial intent. 
It is therefore a reading very much in line with Badiou’s 
repeated demonstrations, both in and outside the set-the-
oretical context, of the way that thought typically achieves 
its most radical or world-transformative advances through 
a process either identical with or closely analogous to the 
formal operation of “forcing” as defined by Cohen. The truth-
procedure set to work in this particular instance of Badiou’s 
practice as a textual analyst-commentator is the same as 
that brought to bear in those passages of strong-revisionist 
yet closely reasoned and intensely critical commentary on 
philosophers from Plato to Heidegger that punctuate Being 
and Event. Such, to repeat, is the process of enquiry by which 
certain truths can be shown to have been latent within some 
earlier state of knowledge and yet, at the time in question, to 
have exceeded any currently available means of proof, dis-
covery, or verification. This leaves Badiou flatly opposed to 
the strain of logico-semantic-metaphysical anti-realism that 
was first introduced to analytic philosophy of mathematics, 
logic and language by Michael Dummett and which denies 
on principle the objectivist (alethic realist) claim that truth 
might always exceed or transcend our best intellectual or 
cognitive powers.69 Indeed, it is on account of their shared 
resistance to this and other doctrines of epistemic, linguistic, 
or discursive constraint—doctrines which make truth coter-
minous with the scope and limits of human knowledge and/or 
linguistic expression—that Badiou can propose his heterodox 
reading of Derrida as nothing less than what Derrida’s work 
requires if that work is to be read in keeping with its own 
critical practice. Or again, the great virtue of Badiou’s brief 
yet piercing traversal of Derrida’s oeuvre is that it brings out 
69 See especially Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London: 
Duckworth, 1978) and The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Duckworth, 1991); 
also Christopher Norris, Truth Matters: realism, anti-realism and response-
dependence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002) and Neil Tennant, 
The Taming of the True (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
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the crucial though less than obvious relationship between 
textual close-reading, political engagement, and a formal 
dimension none the less rigorous for going by way of those 
essential formative and motivating “conditions” that Badiou 
considers indispensable to any philosophical project merit-
ing the name. 
For it is just his point that the approach to these issues via 
mathematics—as the discourse of ontology par excellence—is 
uniquely revealing even when applied to thinkers who make 
no explicit use of it just so long as their thought is sufficiently 
disciplined to register the pressures and counter-pressures of 
a truth-oriented discourse capable of pointing beyond their 
present-best state of knowledge. That Derrida would accept this 
characterisation of his own work is, I think, strongly attested 
by the fact that he makes such careful allowance for the con-
stant imbrication of blindness and insight—or ideology and 
critical acumen—in so many texts of the Western logocentric 
canon from Plato to Husserl. What gives Badiou’s reading of 
Derrida a special interest is its clear demonstration of the 
fact—to adapt Barthes’ aphorism once more—that while “a 
little formalism” may lead thought away from a sense of its 
larger historical and social responsibilities the effect of adopt-
ing a more consistent and rigorously formalised approach 
may well be to restore that missing dimension.70
70 See Note 40, above.
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Synchronicity and Correlationism
Carl Jung as Speculative Realist
Michael Haworth
Goldsmiths, University of London
The name of Carl Gustav Jung tends not to be associated with a concern for philosophical 
realism, seen, as he is, as one of the worst apologists for 
obscurantism, mysticism and spiritualism of the modern 
age. Yet the thesis I try to defend here is that Jung’s work can 
be read as an elaborate attempt to escape the “correlationist 
circle” and the impasse of finitude every bit as rigorous and 
compelling as that undertaken by Quentin Meillassoux in 
After Finitude. I propose to advance this argument via a read-
ing of that work of his which is considered perhaps the least 
defensible in terms of philosophical or scientific realism, 
namely the short treatise entitled Synchronicity: An Acausal 
Connecting Principle. It is here that the monist or “psychoid” 
ontology underpinning all of Jung’s psychological work on 
the archetypes of the collective unconscious is given its most 
extensive treatment. This, I will argue, rather than being a 
pre-critical metaphysical curio is a remarkably sophisticated 
philosophical concept, consistent with Kant’s transcendental 
conditions while transgressing them from within in order to 




In the letter to Marcus Herz of February 1772, in which he 
famously announces his readiness to embark on the critical 
project, Kant interrogates the correspondence between the 
object of our representation and the representation itself. What, 
he asks, guarantees the reference of the internal sense-image 
to the external object? If the former is merely the result of the 
subject’s being affected by the latter then it can be explained 
as of cause to effect, otherwise:
if that in us which is called representation was active with regard to 
the object, i.e., if the object were produced by the representation itself [my 
italics] (as one thinks of divine cognitions as the archetypes of things) 
then the conformity of the representations with the objects would also 
be understood. And so one can at least understand the possibility of 
both an archetypal intellect, upon whose intuition the things themselves 
are grounded, as well as an ectypal intellect, which attains the data of 
its logical activity from the sensuous intuition of things.1
In finite sensuous intuition the object is the cause of the 
representation, while in the divine intellectual intuition it 
is the other way around: its “objects” spring forth from the 
cognition itself. So while our intuition is dependent upon 
the object being given to it, the infinite mind of God could 
not conceivably be so dependent upon an object to which it 
has to conform because this would amount to a limitation 
and the Supreme Being, as infinite, could have no such limi-
tations. Intellectual intuition is thus a limit concept, like the 
noumenon, invoked in order to ground our finite cognition 
and root it in the senses. It acts to demonstrate that if we were 
to step outside of the Kantian system we would immediately 
involve ourselves in contradictions and absurdities.
This distinction is at the heart of the transcendental turn 
1 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the Letter to Marcus 
Herz, February 1772, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett), AA 130.
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and plays a key role in Kant’s critique of dogmatic pre-critical 
metaphysics, the latter tacitly assuming that the things as they 
appear to us are the same as they are outside of any reference 
to our faculties of cognition. Such a doctrine assumes an 
eternal God’s-eye perspective as the normative, ideal arche-
type, of which our human perspective is but a less perfect, 
confused, although strictly homogeneous version. The belief 
is that the further we extend our understanding of the way 
things are—the structure of being—the closer we come to 
absolute knowledge. The move Kant instigates, however, is 
to radically separate finite human cognition from infinite 
divine cognition and this is at the root of the division into 
appearances and things in themselves, this dichotomy being 
the difference between things as they appear from our human 
standpoint and the same things as seen in their intrinsic be-
ing by God. Due to its reliance upon receptivity there is thus 
an insuperable limit in place upon our knowledge: we can 
know the object only as it appears to us, which structurally 
obscures the thing as it is in itself.
So fundamental and far-reaching is this schism that any 
philosophy that makes a claim to positive knowledge of a 
truth beyond sensibility must reckon with this question of 
correspondence and give an account of how it purports to 
have come by this knowledge. So when Quentin Meillassoux 
boldly asserts that through the knowledge of the necessity of 
facticity we gain access to a purely intelligible absolute, the 
question must be raised as to just what kind of knowledge this 
is. It cannot be gathered through sensible intuition because it 
is precisely our senses that impose upon us the belief in the 
necessity of natural laws, through habit and superstition, while 
from a rational point of view nothing at all supports such an 
inference. It is here that Meillassoux, somewhat surprisingly, 
resorts to the Kantian concept of intellectual intuition:
[We] discover in our grasp of facticity the veritable intellectual intuition 
of the absolute. “Intuition,” because it is actually in what is that we 
discover a contingency with no limit other than itself; “intellectual” 
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because this contingency is neither visible nor perceptible in things 
and only thought is capable of accessing it, just as it accesses the chaos 
that underlies the apparent continuity of phenomena.2
Evidently it is not being employed in a faithful Kantian sense 
because here thought accesses absolute being while by no 
means creating it, but it is nothing less than noumenal insight, 
as described by Kant in a memorable passage in the second 
Critique bearing the grandiose subheading “On the Wisely 
Commensurate Proportion of the Human Being’s Cognitive 
Power to His Practical Vocation.” However, in a move exactly 
counter to Kant’s, such a knowledge does not impress upon 
us a vision of “God and eternity, with their dreadful majesty,” 
but rather the complete absence of any necessity, whether 
divine or otherwise.3 Knowledge is thus radically separated 
from the senses, indeed on this point is shown to be in direct 
conflict with the senses.
Now we are entitled to ask, as Kant does in the letter to 
Herz, how we are to guarantee the necessary reference of this 
intellectual intuition to the nature of being itself. The two 
alternatives Kant presents us with surely still apply: either the 
innately mathematical essence of being gives itself to thought 
or thought projects its logical reasoning into being. However, 
neither option is available to Meillassoux, since taking the 
former would commit him to an untenable Pythagorean 
ontology, which he has already explicitly ruled out, and the 
latter, of course, is intellectual intuition in the Kantian sense. 
This is why for Kant intellectual intuition could never be re-
ceptive, because it is impossible to conceive of how its object 
would be transmitted to thought. The very bedrock of Meil-
lassoux’s enterprise is the thesis that mathematics allows us 
access to a reality independent of thought, but if this is merely 
thought’s projection onto reality then we are not yet free of 
2 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 82.
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (In-
dianapolis: Hackett, 2002), AA 146.
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the correlationist circle. Ray Brassier makes a similar point, 
writing that if reality is “neither inherently mathematical 
nor necessarily intelligible,” why should we assume that being 
is susceptible to intellectual intuition?4  If this reference is 
itself also intuited intellectually then too much is conceded 
to thought and correlationism creeps back in.
In the face of Brassier’s objections, Meillassoux clarified 
his position somewhat, implicitly acknowledging that his 
somewhat impish use of such a problematic term from 
German Idealism conspired to undermine his project, and 
had to be jettisoned. Thus he proposes instead to employ 
the oxymoronic term “dianoetic intuition,” meaning “the 
essential intertwining of a simple intuition and of a discur-
sivity, a demonstration—both being entailed by the access to 
factuality.”5 As he goes on to explain, if in order to break out 
of the correlationist circle we were to merely posit an autono-
mous real axiomatically, the correlationist will always have 
the rejoinder that this supposedly autonomous real is still 
posited by thought. The only remaining strategy, Meillassoux 
says, is the one taken by After Finitude, namely to start from 
within the circle of correlationism and demonstrate how, in 
order to maintain its consistency, it must itself appeal to an 
absolute—facticity:
Hence, the only way to the Real, according to me, is through a proof, a 
demonstration: a demonstration unveils that facticity is not an ignorance 
of the hidden reasons of all things but a knowledge of the absolute con-
tingency of all things. The simple intuition of facticity is transmuted 
by a dianoia, by a demonstration, into an intuition of a radical exteri-
ority…We have a nous unveiled by a dianoia, an intuition unveiled by 
a demonstration. This is why I called it an intellectual intuition: not, 
of course, because it is an intuition which creates its object, as Kant 
defined it, but because it is an intuition discovered by reasoning.6
4 Ray Brassier, “The Enigma of Realism: On Quentin Meillassoux’s After 
Finitude,” Collapse II, (2007): 46.




A direct intuition could never give us access to the Real, be-
cause, as the correlationist would remind us, we only ever 
intuit our own phenomenal presentations. But a simple 
logical positing of the Real from which we then draw con-
clusions will not satisfy the correlationist either. So intel-
lectual (or dianoetic) intuition in Meillassoux’s sense is not 
an immediate, all-at-once revelation of the way things are 
but is the logical explication of a prior intuition. Through 
rational demonstration, this intuition (of facticity) is shown 
to be not what we thought it was. What had seemed to be the 
insurmountable limit to thought and the essence of finitude 
is, through dianoetic intuition, revealed to be the key to the 
very overcoming of finitude.
So methodologically speaking, any philosophy that attempts 
to break free of the correlationist circle must of necessity start 
from within it. In other words, a philosophy which seeks to 
transgress the Kantian limits of possible experience must 
nevertheless remain consistent with Kant in order to avoid 
charges of indulging in groundless metaphysical speculation. 
These two critical moments in Meillassoux’s procedure—the 
immanent point of departure and the subsequent transgres-
sion through logical reasoning—I will argue, describe equally 
Jung’s approach to the circle of correlation and his compa-
rable endeavour to secure a “primary absolute” in order to 
guarantee further, derived speculative theses.
Archetypes and Noumena
As has often been noted by Jungian scholars, one understands 
nothing of Jung’s concept of the archetypes, the prepersonal 
ideas, motifs and symbols recurrent throughout human his-
tory, if one takes it to be a doctrine asserting that every man is 
born with a set of innate fully-formed psychic images. Rather, 
in spite of occasional terminological inconsistencies which 
can lead to confusion, Jung draws a clear and unequivocal 
distinction between the archetypal ideas and the archetypes 
themselves, corresponding very closely to the Kantian divi-
sion between phenomena and noumena. The term archetype 
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applies exclusively to “those psychic contents which have 
not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration and are 
therefore an immediate datum of psychic experience.”7 The 
archetypes stricto sensu are hypothetical and irrepresentable 
deep-structure psychic patterns leading to certain types of 
universal mental experience, and we must only assume their 
existence from their effects and the way they are expressed 
in fantasmatic forms. Therefore the name archetype does 
not designate the myths, fables, fairytales or religious sto-
ries that are their conscious derivatives, and which already 
bear the trace of critical evaluation and distance. Nor does 
it refer to their “immediate manifestation, as we encounter 
it in dreams and visions,” which “is much more individual, 
less understandable and more naïve than in myths.”8 Their 
appearance in dreams, hallucinations or fantasy is a truer 
representation than in myths and religious stories, which 
have become hardened into dogma over time, but they are 
still manifestations, and as such not the archetypes themselves: 
The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is altered by 
becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour 
from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear.9
The archetypes in themselves are the same in every subject 
but the form or manner in which they appear is constituted 
and shaped by the personal history and circumstances of 
the subject, although generally proceeding according to 
familiar patterns. So rather than images sitting there deep 
within the unconscious of every person’s psyche, they are 
patterns of behaviour making their appearance “only in the 
course of amplification.”10 The therapeutic process Jung calls 
7 Carl G. Jung, “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” in The Collected 




10 Carl G. Jung, “On the Nature of the Psyche,” in The Collected Works of Carl 
Jung, 8, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 205.
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active imagination is the forcing or helping on its way of this 
course of amplification, delving into the unconscious psyche 
by way of active, spontaneous fantasy. On following these 
fantasmatic inventions where they lead of their own volition 
they invariably follow certain ‘grooves’ or psychic imprints, 
where archaic or mythological figures and motifs appear 
which betray their archetypal character. So they are not so 
much inborn, inherited ideas but rather the predisposition 
or propensity towards those ideas.
There is thus a clear, although implicit, correspondence 
between the archetypes and the Kantian rational ideas which 
govern our moral behaviour. These latter are not subject to 
temporal conditions, but are fixed and unchanging; all that 
is variable are the particular circumstances in which they 
make their appearance. They determine our actions only 
indirectly, via the categorical imperative, since immediate, 
direct access is constitutively denied to us. Likewise, the ar-
chetypes are timeless, inborn and sensuously unconditioned, 
however unlike the ideas of reason they are dynamic rather 
than fixed and non-rational. But just as we have practical but 
not theoretical proof of freedom and the other supersensible 
ideas, we have pragmatic proof of the archetypes without our 
being able to encounter them directly. Indeed were we to do 
so the consequences would no doubt be as catastrophic for 
our psyche as immediate access to the noumenal dimension 
is said to be. Gazing straight into this abyss would overwhelm 
and engulf our individual ego, obliterating us as a result.
Perhaps the closest Kantian parallel is with the early parodical 
work Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, in which Kant allows himself, in 
an ironic fashion, to speculate upon that which is beyond the 
bounds of human experience and knowledge. Here, through 
a satirical reading of the work of Swedish mystic Emmanuel 
Swedenborg (more of whom later), Kant posits in addition 
to the material world of sense an immaterial, or spirit world, 
which is a whole self-subsisting realm, “its parts in mutual 
conjunction and intercourse without the instrumentality of 
anything corporeal.”11 The human soul is said to be conjoined 
11 Immanuel Kant, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics, 
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in the two worlds at the same time, but so long as it is incar-
nated in a body it only clearly perceives the material world, 
having but a hazy intimation of the other side. As soon as 
the material body dies this link between the two territories 
is severed but the soul continues to exist in the spirit realm, 
unencumbered by materiality.
This spirit world bears an obvious resemblance to the col-
lective unconscious, which we likewise inhabit alongside our 
personal psyche without being clearly aware of it. Furthermore, 
Kant (still in a satirical register) suggests that there can be 
communion between the two worlds and spiritual ideas can
pass over into the personal consciousness of man, indeed, not immedi-
ately, but still in such a way that, according to the law of the association 
of ideas, they stir up those pictures which are related to them and awake 
analogous ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual 
conceptions themselves, but yet their symbols.12 
What else is the archetypal idea other than a mediated, “analo-
gous idea of the senses” that acts as a symbol for the archetype 
itself. Since these archetypes cannot be presented immediately 
but only indirectly evoked, this account corresponds very 
closely with the model of “aesthetic ideas” Kant develops in 
the Critique of Judgement. These are artistic presentations of 
the imagination which strive to give sensuous form to that 
which transgresses the limits of all possible experience, evok-
ing something universal and absolute while manifesting it 
in an original and singular expression.
Not only is the collective unconscious “the repository of 
man’s experience” but “at the same time the prior condition 
of this experience.”13 So archetypes are not merely the effect 
and deposits of ancestral events but at the same time they 
are significant determinants of such events. They are there-
trans. E.F. Goerwitz, Reprint Ed. (Indianapolis: Kessinger, 2003) 56.
12 Kant, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, 69.
13 Carl G. Jung, “Two Essays on Analytical Psychology,” in The Collected Works 
of Carl Jung, 7, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 93.
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fore both cause and effect, the snake eating its own tail. As 
Jung often notes, the constellating of archetypal ideas in 
the unconscious takes place as compensation for neglected 
parts of the subject’s psyche, so that when they build up an 
irresistible force they impose themselves on the life of the 
subject, forcing them in a certain direction so as to reorient 
their psychic balance. “Perhaps—who knows?—these eternal 
images are what we mean by fate.”14
Unus Mundus
Jung equates the irrepresentable nature of the archetypes 
with the smallest particles that physics deals with, whose 
nature can only be known by their effects. In both cases the 
physicist or psychologist is attempting to define an objective 
order of nature whose behaviour is altered by the fact of its 
being observed and can at best build up a probable model or 
construction of how these quantities behave based on their 
observable effects. In a situation where we have two entities 
or properties whose existence must be assumed but which 
cannot be represented or shown in person,
there is always the possibility—which we tend to overlook—that it may 
not be a question of two or more factors but of one only. The identity 
or non-identity of two irrepresentable quantities is something that 
cannot be proved.…Since psyche and matter are contained in one 
and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one 
another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, 
it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter 
are two different aspects of one and the same thing.15
Jung uses the term “psychoid” (always as an adjective, never a 
substantive) to describe these irrepresentable psychophysical 
14 Jung, “Two Essays on Analytical Psychology,” 107.
15 Carl G. Jung, “Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle,” in The 
Collected Works of Carl Jung, 8, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London : Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), 214-5.
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processes and this “one and the same thing” which is neither 
psychic nor material in nature but prior to both, antecedent 
to their differentiation, is named, using the terminology of 
alchemy and Medieval philosophy, unus mundus, meaning 
“one unitary world.” Jung felt this hypothesis to be far from 
the obscure mysticism it can appear to be at first sight, but 
to be a legitimate response to empirical data, informed by 
developments in particle physics. Indeed, as is well known, 
Jung developed this concept in collaboration with the Nobel 
Prize winning physicist and quantum pioneer Wolfgang Pauli 
(a relationship generally passed over in silence in physics 
circles, or excused as the individual eccentricities of a great 
man that has no bearing on his work.)
For Jung there are certain privileged events or experiences 
which manifest this irrepresentable unity of psyche and 
world and which carry profound and far-reaching implica-
tions. Such events are those statistical anomalies attributed 
to chance or coincidence which seem to fall outside of any 
known causality and so elude rational explanation. A classic 
example is the well-documented case of the above-mentioned 
spiritualist Emanuel Swedenborg’s dramatic vision of the great 
fire of Stockholm in 1759 while he was dining in Gothenburg, 
250 miles away. It was only two days later that reports from 
Stockholm confirming Swedenborg’s vision, down to the 
smallest detail, reached them in Gothenburg. Another famous 
example is one of Jung’s own, from his analytic experience. 
A young patient of his was describing a dream she had had 
in which she was given a golden scarab. In the middle of 
her account Jung noticed a tapping against the window of 
his practice and opened the window, through which flew a 
rose-chafer beetle, “the nearest analogy to a golden scarab 
that one finds in our latitudes…which contrary to its usual 
habits had evidently felt an urge to get into a dark room at 
this particular moment.”16
Although the two cases are very different in nature—for one 
thing the patient was not presenting her dream as if it were 
16  Jung, “Synchronicity,” 438. 
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a prophetic vision—both are examples of the phenomenon 
Jung calls synchronicity, defined as the “coincidence of a psychic 
state with a corresponding objective process.”17 More everyday, 
commonly experienced instances are unlikely meaningful 
coincidences, such as thinking of a friend from whom you 
haven’t heard in a long time immediately before receiving a 
telephone call from that same friend, or successions of chance 
events such as a number or word recurring again and again 
throughout the course of a day or number of days.
Jung does not try to explain away such occurrences with 
rational accounts, which we are all well versed in providing, 
but takes them at face value, wishing to account for them on 
their own merits. However, since these are singular, anoma-
lous occurrences they are on principle incapable of being 
premeditated and examined in controlled conditions, for the 
experimental method by nature aims at establishing regu-
lar, repeatable events and thus ruling out of consideration 
the unique or rare results which are put down to chance 
deviations. Causality, says Jung, anticipating Meillassoux, is 
a statistical truth, not an absolute truth, and is only generally 
valid, when operating on the macrocosmic scale: “In the 
realm of very small quantities prediction becomes uncertain, 
if not impossible, because very small quantities no longer 
behave in accordance with the known natural laws.”18 So 
broadly speaking the course of nature can be unfailingly 
expected to follow the laws of cause and effect, but when we 
are dealing with particular events on a micro scale we can 
never predict the outcome with complete certainty. Jung also 
asserts, repeating an often-voiced limitation of the scientific 
procedure, that the answers given by nature in experimental 
practices are influenced by the questions asked, thus giving 
only a partial, statistical or average view of the natural world. 
So far, so relatively uncontroversial, but Jung draws from 
this the contentious conclusion that since causality is not 
an absolute there must be connections of events which are 
17 Jung, “Synchronicity,” 480.
18 Ibid., 421.
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acausal, and thus demanding another connecting principle 
to account for them.
However, discovering such a principle poses considerable 
problems, for how can one base a theory on “[a]bsolutely 
unique or ephemeral events whose existence we have no 
means of either denying or proving?”19 We can only rely on 
anecdotal evidence, which is inherently unreliable. Further-
more, how are we to distinguish genuinely synchronistic or 
acausal events from mere chance? Much of Jung’s evidential 
foundations rest on J.B. Rhine’s famous parapsychic experi-
ments (later used by Bill Murray in Ghostbusters) which involve 
the experimenter turning up a series of cards with different 
geometrical patterns on them while the subject, who is sepa-
rated by a screen, guesses the sign as each card is turned. In a 
significant number of cases the quantity of correct guesses 
exceeded to a highly improbable degree that which would 
be expected by chance. After the first set of experiments the 
distance between experimenter and subject was increased, 
even up to hundreds of miles, and much the same results were 
achieved. Yet more tests were done in which the subjects were 
told to predict the series of shapes in a set of cards that were 
only to be turned over at some point in the future, and still 
the amount of correct guesses exceeded chance probability. 
Since evidently neither time nor space is an inhibitory factor 
over the results Jung stresses that such phenomena can have 
nothing to do with the transmission of force, as the distance 
to be overcome would diminish its effects. What it points 
to in fact, Jung suggests, is a psychic relativity of time and 
space, and a “psychic function or psychic condition” which is 
capable of abolishing the time factor and the spatial factor.20
What these experiments, as well as the events referred to 
above, demonstrate according to Jung, is that “there are events 
which are related to one another…meaningfully, without there 





one.”21 So we are not dealing with a relation of cause and effect, 
but rather a “falling together in time, a kind of simultane-
ity. Because of this factor of simultaneity, I have picked on 
the term ‘synchronicity’ to designate a hypothetical factor 
equal in rank to causality as a principle of explanation.”22 
It is important to note the term hypothetical, and the sense 
that synchronicity does not constitute a positive addition 
to knowledge but rather a regulative model to help guide an 
explanation of seemingly unaccountable phenomena.
Like Freud before him, Jung refers to Kant’s conditions 
of sensibility and suggests, albeit in a very different way to 
Freud, that these conditions do not hold in the unconscious. 
They are “postulated” by the conscious mind, only becoming 
fixed concepts “in the course of [man’s] mental development, 
thanks largely to the introduction of measurement.”23 This 
strongly recalls Heidegger’s account of the genesis of our 
vulgar concepts of time and space, and the covering over of 
our primordial existential experience:
They [time and space] are hypostatised concepts born of the discrimi-
nating activity of the conscious mind, and they form the indispensable 
coordinates for describing the behaviour of bodies in motion. They are, 
therefore, essentially psychic in origin, which is probably the reason 
that impelled Kant to regard them as a priori categories. But if space 
and time are only apparently properties of bodies in motion and are 
created by the intellectual needs of the observer, then their relativisa-
tion by psychic conditions is no longer a matter for astonishment but 
is brought within the bounds of possibility. This possibility presents 
itself when the psyche observes, not external bodies, but itself.24
In the case of the parapsychic experiments, the subjects do 
not “see” the shapes on the cards through some magical 
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them from the outside but from the inside. Thus for Jung 
the distinction between inner and outer is not as clear-cut 
as it is for Freud and what the latter calls “reality testing”—
assessing whether an internal perception corresponds to 
an external object—is not such a straightforward matter.25 
These inner processes can become drawn to the subject’s at-
tention by the seeming “impossibility” of the task, for as we 
saw above archetypal contents emerge in a state of impasse 
or hopelessness and it is generally with the archetypes that 
we are dealing in synchronistic phenomena. The dream of 
the golden scarab, for instance, occurred at a critical mo-
ment of deadlock in the patient’s treatment, and the scarab 
is supposedly a familiar archetypal symbol of rebirth. Since 
the collective unconscious is universal and unlocalisable, 
and by nature the same across every case, there is the ever-
present possibility that what is taking place at any one time 
in the collective psyche of an individual is “also happening 
in other individuals or organisms or things or situations.”26 
This is what apparently seems to have occurred in the scarab 
dream; it was a conscious representation deriving from the 
causally inexplicable unconscious knowledge of the events 
of the following day’s session with her doctor.
What this points to, according to Jung, is a form of “‘knowl-
edge,’ or ‘immediacy’ of psychic images” which does not 
derive from sense perception.27 The conscious interpretation 
of this unconscious knowledge comes upon the subject like 
any other spontaneous thought and can only be verified as 
a synchronistic occurrence after the physical event has been 
noted. This suggests that there may be many such examples 
of this inexplicable knowledge which are never recognised as 
such because the physical event with which it corresponds is 
not witnessed by the person to whom it has appeared. Many of 
25 Cf. Sigmund Freud, “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of 
Dreams,” in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 





us must have experienced at some time or another that uneasy 
sensation of ominous precognition, and there are numerous 
stories, an example of which is given by Jung, where a person 
claims to have “sensed” or known when a loved one has died. 
What happens in such cases “is a kind of creatio ex nihilo, an 
act of creation that is not causally explicable,” something 
ruled out as inconceivable by any finitist philosophy.28 The 
two seemingly immovable impediments to such a notion are, 
firstly, that every psychical image or impression derives from 
sensibly given material, and so any exercising of the imagina-
tion amounts only to a reorganisation of this material, and 
secondly, that the necessary consistency of the time-series 
precludes it. As Kant argues, if something were to arrive out 
of nothing there would have had to have been a point of time 
in which it was not, but “to what will you fasten this point of 
time, if not to what is already there?”29 Both objections, how-
ever, are overcome in the light of synchronistic phenomena: 
the first by the inexplicable non-sensible knowledge such 
experiences exhibit and the second by the “psychic relativity” 
of time and its abolition in the unconscious.
So what Jung is “finally compelled to assume” is that “there 
is in the unconscious something like an a priori knowledge or 
immediate presence of events which lacks any causal basis.”30 
If such events were a case of causality then either the dream 
or vision which foresees a future or simultaneous event 
“caused” the event to take place in some telekinetic way or the 
physical event “caused” the psychical process, retroactively 
positing itself somehow. “In either case,” says Jung, “we come 
up against the unanswerable question of transmission.”31 This 
question of transmission is, of course, that of the two possible 
relationships explaining the correspondence between object 
and representation that Kant gives in the letter to Marcus 
28 Jung, “Synchronicity,” 480.
29 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (India-
napolis: Hackett, 1996), A188 / B231.
30 Jung, “Synchronicity,” 447.
31 Ibid., 483.
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Herz. What Jung does, however, is to displace the terms of 
the question by presenting a third alternative that Kant did 
not, and indeed could not, have considered.
This third alternative relies on the unus mundus hypothesis, 
suggesting that the two related terms—the psychical experi-
ence and the physical event—take place on another plane 
prior to their differentiation, and both the knowledge and 
the event itself could be said to be its respective manifesta-
tions. In other words, “the same living reality [is] expressing 
itself in the psychic state as in the physical.”32 So with regard 
to the two alternatives Kant poses, this would be neither a 
receptive nor a productive intuition, but still nevertheless 
a form of intelligible correspondence between thought and 
object, one that is not mediated through the senses. As such 
the problem of transmission is overcome, but what exactly 
forms the correspondence between the two states if it is not 
a case of causation? Jung’s answer to this question postulates 
an a priori “meaning” or equivalence, which exists indepen-
dently of the psyche:
If—and it seems plausible—the meaningful coincidence or “cross-
connection” of events cannot be explained causally, then the connecting 
principle must lie in the equal significance of parallel events; in other 
words, their tertium comparationis is meaning. We are so accustomed to 
regard meaning as a psychic process or content that it never enters 
our heads to suppose that it could also exist outside the psyche. But 
we do know at least enough about the psyche not to attribute to it any 
magical power, and still less can we attribute any magical power to the 
conscious mind. If, therefore, we entertain the hypothesis that one and 
the same (transcendental) meaning might manifest itself simultane-
ously in the human psyche and in the arrangement of an external and 
independent event, we at once come into conflict with the conventional 
scientific and epistemological views.33





orous explanation that does justice to the empirical data 
without ascribing to the psyche “a power that far exceeds its 
empirical range of action,” namely intellectual intuition.34 
However, by avoiding attributing this particular supernatural 
power to the psyche Jung risks ascribing to it another, equally 
extravagant faculty. For when the threshold of conscious-
ness is sufficiently lowered so that unconscious, archetypal 
contents can penetrate into our conscious mind this can 
grant us access to what Jung calls, in quotation marks for 
caution, “absolute knowledge,” pointing to “the presence in 
the microcosm of macrocosmic events.”35 The microcosm 
here, which like the Leibnizian monad reflects the whole of 
reality, is the collective unconscious.
This is speculative language which must necessarily sound 
somewhat fantastic because it aims to render intelligible to 
consciousness something which is essentially inconceivable to 
it. So in the case of Swedenborg’s prophetic vision, for instance, 
we are not dealing with paranormal foreknowledge, or still 
less psychokinesis, but with two distinct manifestations of the 
same event that are connected by “meaning” or significance. 
Since in the unconscious psyche time and space no longer 
apply and “knowledge finds itself in a space-time continuum 
in which space is no longer space, nor time time,” then if the 
unconscious should “develop or maintain a potential in the 
direction of consciousness, it is then possible for parallel 
events to be perceived or ‘known.’”36 Such a knowledge can-
not be deliberately utilised, however, since such events are 
by their nature rare and incapable of being premeditated.
Towards a Neutral Language
For Jung, the psyche is not exclusively localised to cogni-
tive activity, it rests also on “a nervous substrate like the 
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cerebrospinal system in point of origin and function, [and 
which] can evidently produce thoughts and perceptions just 
as easily as the latter.”37 Jung illustrates this with anecdotal 
accounts of people in comas “seeing” or “knowing” what 
is going on around them and giving detailed reports of 
what they saw upon regaining consciousness, as well as the 
behaviour of lower organisms such as bees, which in their 
much-discussed communicative movements (or dances) 
display “transcerebral thought and perception.”38 This non-
cerebral, bodily form of knowledge is, for Jung, an exemplar 
of the psychoid property inherent in matter so that “thought,” 
broadly conceived, is not confined to the human mind but 
pervades that which is its “object.” But this is not a simple 
panpsychism, suggesting that water, plants or rocks possess 
a rudimentary form of conscious perception, although it is 
undoubtedly redolent of it. For such a notion could still be 
considered a dualism, extending the capacity for thought to 
inanimate objects while upholding its exceptional status.39 
Rather, Jung’s ontology levels down the disjunction between 
“mere thought” and positive being, since it is only for a system 
which strictly upholds such a distinction that the synchron-
icity phenomena remain inconceivable. These latter do not 
erect a miraculous bridge across two properties, establishing 
a momentary sympathetic connection between thought and 
external reality while forever keeping them separated by an 
irreducible chasm, but point to a way of re-conceiving the 
relationship itself. For a bridge would merely be a means of 
passage or communication between isolated territories, and 
this correspondence can only be conceived according to the 
relation of causality. Rather, Jung offers us a way of escaping 
the problem, appearing to show “that there is some possi-
bility of getting rid of the incommensurability between the 
37 Jung, “Synchronicity,” 510-11.
38 Ibid., 511.
39 As a caveat it should be noted that panpsychism is a far from homoge-
neous concept and the charge of dualism would not necessarily apply to 
all of its variants.
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observed and the observer. The result, in that case would be 
a unity of being which would have to be expressed in terms 
of a new conceptual language—‘neutral language,’ as W. Pauli 
once called it.”40 Neutral because it does not distinguish or 
discriminate between what is inner and what is outer, the 
knower and the known.
Just as in Jung’s analytic treatment the archetypes are 
constellated at a point of impasse to disclose a hitherto un-
thinkable means of escape, so Jung himself shows us a line 
of advance out of the impasse of finitude. As long as thought 
is considered as an ontological exception we will be forever 
barred access to the in-itself. The postulate of psychophysi-
cal synchronisation, then, simultaneously accomplishes two 
seemingly contradictory demands: Firstly, by redrawing the 
ontological lines of demarcation it abolishes the special 
status of thought, bringing it down from its lonely tower 
and is thus consistent with cognitive science’s insistence on 
treating consciousness as fundamentally no different from 
any other physical phenomenon. But secondly, in doing so, 
thought is not reduced but greatly enhanced and set free from 
finite limits and its enslavement to receptivity. In passing it 
could be noted that this thesis proposes a new reading of the 
Parmenidean dictum that thinking and being are the same, 
without resorting to an idealist privileging of the former 
over the latter.
The obvious objection presents itself that this is merely a 
variation on the procedure Meillassoux calls “absolutising the 
correlation.”41 What I have tried to show here however, is that 
far from an absolutised reciprocity of thinking and being, 
Jung’s psychoid absolute takes place prior to the correlation and 
names a stratum of being antecedent to the differentiation into 
subject and object, thought and the given. Neither side of the 
relationship can be conceived in such terms—thought is not 
yet thought, being is not yet given to thought; this is why a new 
“neutral language” is required. To return to those two founding 
40 Jung, “Synchronicity,” 512.
41 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 37.
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moments of Meillassoux’s discourse, it can now be seen that 
his procedure could be quite comfortably mapped onto that 
of Jung. As we have shown, Jung too recognises the necessity 
of remaining consistent with Kantian limits to avoid charges 
of dogmatism, while breaking free of them to allow thought 
to exceed itself and access an absolute independent of and 
prior to thought. Or in Meillassoux’s terms, Jung escapes the 
correlationist circle from within rather than merely positing 
an autonomous real. Secondly, just as Meillassoux proceeds 
to access an absolute truth via the logical explication of an 
intuition (of facticity), so Jung’s absolute is approached via 
rational demonstration following the intuition of causally 
inexplicable phenomena. In both cases we run up against the 
“unanswerable question of transmission” but it is boldly and 
convincingly sidestepped through an imaginative “specula-
tive solution.”42 And finally, is the thesis of unus mundus really 
any more outlandish or counter-intuitive than Meillassoux’s 
hyper-chaos or Graham Harman’s vicarious causation? It is 
perhaps time for Jung to be re-claimed for philosophy and 
rescued from his most fervent New Age admirers as much 
as his fiercest rationalist detractors.
42 The name of a piece of music by Florian Hecker composed in collabora-




übersetzt von Sergey Sistiaga
trotz der aNhalteNdeN uNbeliebtheit der Metaphysik, sowie des Realis-mus innerhalb der kontinentalen 
Tradition, entwirft dieser Artikel den Umriss einer realistischen 
Metaphysik. Anstelle eines trüben Materialismus geistloser Atome 
und Billardkugeln, der üblicherweise heraufbeschworen wird, um 
den Spaß in der Philosophie zu verderben, werde ich einen selt-
samen Realismus verteidigen. Dieses Modell beinhaltet eine Welt, 
vollgepackt mit gespenstigen, realen Objekten, die sich gegenseitig 
aus unerforschlicher Tiefe Signale senden und unfähig sind sich 
einander ganz zu berühren. Hier besteht eine offenkundige Bezie-
hung zur Tradition, die als Okkasionalismus bekannt ist und die 
als Erste nahelegte, dass eine direkte Wechselwirkung zwischen 
Entitäten unmöglich sei. Eine andere klare Verbindung besteht 
zur verwandten skeptischen Tradition, die Objekte als nebenein-
anderliegend und ohne direkte Verbindung betrachtet, obwohl die 
betreffenden Objekte hier eher menschliche Wahrnehmungen, denn 
reale unabhängige Objekte sind. Dennoch wird dieser Artikel die 
Lösung des Problems durch eine einsame, magische Superentität, 
1 Übersetzung von Graham Harmans Aufsatz: On Vicarious Causation. Dieser 
wurde zuerst publiziert in: Collapse II (March 2007), S.171-205 (A.d.Ü.).
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die verantwortlich für jede Relation ist (sei es Gott für Malebranche 
und seine irakischen Vorläufer oder der menschliche Geist für Skep-
tiker, Empiristen und Idealisten), zugunsten einer stellvertretenden 
Verursachung verwerfen, welche lokal über jeden Teil des Kosmos 
verteilt ist. Obwohl ihre Seltsamkeit eher zu Verwunderung als zu 
Widerstand führen mag, ist stellvertretende Verursachung nicht 
irgendein autistischer Mondstrahl, der durch das Fenster eines 
Asyls eindringt. Stattdessen ist sie die Startrampe für eine rigoros 
post-heideggerianische Philosophie einerseits, wie die angemes-
sene Rückkehr zum ehrwürdigen Problem der Kommunikation 
zwischen Substanzen andererseits.
•
Der Begriff der „stellvertretenden Verursachung”2 besteht aus 
zwei Teilen, die beide gegen den Strich der heutigen Philoso-
phie gehen.3 Kausalität war seit dem 17. Jahrhundert selten 
ein eigenständiges Thema der Forschung. Die vermeintlich 
große Debatte zwischen skeptischen und transzendentalen 
Philosophen über Kausalität ist bestenfalls ein Streit über das 
Ja oder Nein der Frage, ob kausale Notwendigkeit existiere 
oder nicht und in der Praxis nur eine Auseinandersetzung, 
ob diese erkannt werden könne oder nicht. Was fehlte, war 
eine aktive Auseinandersetzung über die eigentliche Natur 
der Kausalität als solcher. Folgendes wird heute für selbst-
verständlich gehalten: Ein Objekt übt Kraft auf ein anderes 
aus und bewirkt eine Änderung seiner physikalischen Lage 
oder anderer Eigenschaften. Niemand sieht auch nur die 
Möglichkeit über die Interaktion zwischen Feuer und Baum-
wolle zu sprechen, da sich die Philosophie ausschließlich mit 
der alleinigen Kluft zwischen Mensch und Welt beschäftigt, 
sei es auch nur um diese zu verneinen. Unbelebte Beziehu-
ngen wurden den Laboratorien zur Erforschung überlassen, 
2 Übersetzung von vicarious causation: Das englische vicarious, vom latei-
nischen vicarius = stellvertretend stammend, wurde mit „stellvertretend” 
übersetzt (A.d.Ü.). 
3 Dieses Konzept wurde zuerst in meinem Buch; Guerrilla Metaphysics. Phe-
nomenology and the Carpentry of Things, Chicago, Open Court 2005, eingeführt.
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wo deren metaphysischer Charakter offen verworfen wird. 
Das Thema der Verursachung in der Philosophie wieder zu 
beleben, bedeutet die Dominanz Kants kopernikanischer 
Revolution mitsamt ihrem einzigen und einsamen Graben 
zwischen Menschen und allem anderen zurückzuweisen. 
Obwohl ich behaupten werde, dass reale Objekte jenseits 
des sinnlichen Zugangs der Menschen existieren, sollte dies 
nicht mit Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Phaenomena 
und Noumena verwechselt werden. Während Kants Unter-
scheidung nur für Menschen alleine besteht, behaupte ich, 
dass sich eine Billardkugel vor einer anderen nicht weniger 
verbirgt, wie die Billardkugel an sich sich vor Menschen 
verbirgt. Wenn ein Hagelsturm Weinhänge verwüstet oder 
Wellen in einem Teich schlägt, dann sind diese Relationen4 
der Philosophie genauso würdig, wie der endlose Disput über 
die Kluft oder Nicht-Kluft zwischen Sein und Denken. Weder 
Kant noch Hegel oder deren heutige Cousins haben etwas 
über die Kollision von Billardkugeln an sich zu sagen. Im 
vergangenen Jahrhundert wurde Parmenides’ Doktrin, dass 
Sein und Denken dasselbe seien, von Husserl impliziert, von 
Heidegger explizit gemacht und nachdrücklich von Badiou 
wieder betont. Aber diese Gleichsetzung von Sein und Denken 
muss abgelehnt werden, da sie uns in einer Mensch-Welt-
Kupplung stranden lässt, die die Erfolge vergangener Jahre 
bloß nachstellt. Das Problem der Kausalität wiederzubeleben 
bedeutet aus einer epistemologischen Sackgasse auszubrechen 
und die metaphysische Frage, was Relation bedeutet, wieder 
zu beleben. Neben der Verursachung gibt es auch noch den 
„stellvertretenden” Teil des Begriffs, der anklingen lässt, dass 
Relationen niemals direkt auf die autonome Realität ihrer 
Komponenten stoßen. Auch nach tausend Jahren ist „Substanz” 
der beste Name für eine solche Realität. Die weitverbreitete 
Zurückhaltung gegenüber der Substanz ist nichts anderes als 
die Abscheu vor gewissen unzutreffenden Substanzmodellen 
und solche Modelle können ersetzt werden. Neben Substanz 
4 Die Worte „Relation” und „Beziehung” werden synonym für das englische 
relation verwendet (A.d.Ü.).
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wird der Begriff der „Objekte”5 benutzt, um auf unabhängige 
Realitäten aller Art zu verweisen. Mit dem Vorteil, dass dieser 
Begriff Platz für zeitliche und künstliche Objekte schafft, die 
zu oft vom Rang der Substanz ausgeschlossen wurden.
Indem dieser Artikel jedes Privileg menschlichen Zu-
gangs zur Welt zurückweist und die Frage des menschlichen 
Bewusstseins auf genau die gleiche Grundlage stellt, wie 
ein Duell zwischen Kanarienvögeln, Mikroben, Erdbeben, 
Atomen und Teer, könnte man meinen er höre sich an wie 
eine Verteidigung des wissenschaftlichen Naturalismus, der 
alles auf physikalische Ereignisse reduziert. Aber der Begriff 
„stellvertretend” wurde dazu entworfen, allen Formen des 
Naturalismus entgegenzuwirken, indem er darauf hinweist, 
dass wir immer noch keine Ahnung haben, wie physische 
Relationen (oder jeder anderen Art) an erster Stelle möglich 
sind. Denn wie ich behaupten werde, verbergen sich Objekte 
endlos voreinander und fügen sich ihre Stöße nur über einen 
Vikar6 oder Mittelsmann zu. Die Philosophie befindet sich 
seit einigen Jahrhunderten in der Defensive gegenüber den 
Naturwissenschaften und genießt nun weniger gesellschaftli-
ches Prestige und hat überraschenderweise einen engeren 
Gegenstandsbereich. Ein kurzer Blick auf die Geschichte 
zeigt, dass dies nicht immer der Fall gewesen ist. Um die 
Offensive wieder aufzunehmen, müssen wir nur den lange 
bestehenden Trend umkehren, der besagt auf alle Spekula-
tion über Objekte zu verzichten. Und freiwillig für eine 
Ausgangsperre für immer kleinere Gettos rein menschlicher 
Wirklichkeiten eintreten: Sprache, Text, politische Macht. 
Stellvertretende Verursachung befreit uns von einer solchen 
Gefangennahme, indem sie uns ins Herz der unbelebten Welt, 
ob künstlich oder natürlich, zurückführt. Die Einzigartigkeit 
5 Im Folgendem werden die Wörter „Objekt” und „Gegenstand” synonym 
für das englische object verwendet (A.d.Ü.).
6 Im Original handelt es sich um ein Wortspiel bestehend aus der Kombi-
nation des Adjektivs vicarious und dem Substantiv vicar. Ein Vikar ist ein 
Stellvertreter. Üblicherweise ein ständiger oder zeitweiliger Stellvertreter 
einer anderen Amtsperson innerhalb der kath. Kirche. In der Schweiz kann 
ein Vikar auch Stellvertreter eines Lehrers sein (A.d.Ü.).
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der Philosophie wird nicht durch die Abschottung einer 
erlesenen Zone menschlicher Wirklichkeit, die durch die 
Wissenschaft unantastbar bleibt, gewonnen, sondern durch 
die Behandlung derselben Welt, nur auf andere Art und Weise. 
In klassischen Worten ausgedrückt müssen wir einmal mehr 
über Verursachung spekulieren und zugleich deren Reduk-
tion auf effiziente Verursachung verbieten. Stellvertretende 
Verursachung, von der die Wissenschaft momentan nichts 
weiß, ist dem, was man formale Ursache nennt näher. Zu sagen, 
dass die formale Ursache stellvertretend operiert, heißt, dass 
Formen einander nicht direkt berühren, sich aber irgendwie 
verschmelzen, fusionieren und in einen gemeinsamen Raum 
dekomprimieren, von dem alle teilweise abwesend sind. 
Meine Behauptung ist, dass sich zwei Entitäten gegenseitig 
nur beeinflussen, wenn sie sich im Inneren einer Dritten 
treffen, wo sie nebeneinander existieren, bis etwas passiert, 
das ihnen erlaubt in Wechselwirkung zu treten. In diesem 
Sinne ist die Theorie der stellvertretenden Verursachung eine 
Theorie der geschmolzenen Innenkerne von Objekten—eine 
Art Plattentektonik der Ontologie.
1. Zwei Arten von Objekten
Während die phänomenologische Bewegung Husserls und 
Heideggers zu wenig unternahm den Idealismus des vorange-
gangenen Clusters großer Philosophen zu überwinden, zeigen 
sie und ihre Nachfolger oftmals ein neuartiges Interesse an 
spezifischen und konkreten Entitäten. Briefkästen, Hämmer, 
Zigaretten und Seidenkleidung sind in der Phänomenologie 
auf eine Weise zu Hause, wie sie es niemals für die früheren 
klassischen Figuren des deutschen Denkens waren. Auch 
wenn Husserl und Heidegger dem menschlichen Dasein 
als dem Mittelpunkt der Philosophie zu verhaftet bleiben, 
so heben doch beide, leise und jeder in unterschiedlicher 
Manier, Objekte in die Hauptrolle. Während Husserl sein 
System auf intentionalen oder ideellen Objekten basiert 
(welche ich in sinnliche Objekte umtaufen werde), stellt 
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Heidegger mithilfe seiner berühmten Zeug-Untersuchung7 
reale Objekte wieder für die Philosophie her. Es wird selten 
erkannt, dass diese zwei Objekttypen beide unterschiedlich 
und ergänzend sind. Wird das Zusammenspiel zwischen 
realen und sinnlichen Objekten ernst genommen, liefert es 
der Ontologie ein radikal neues Thema.
In Heideggers Zeug-Untersuchung, die seine Gegner nicht 
weniger fasziniert wie seine Verbündete, finden wir vielleicht 
die beständigste Einsicht der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. 
Unser ursprüngliches Verhältnis zu Objekten liegt nicht in 
der Wahrnehmung oder unserem theoretisieren über sie, 
sondern einfach in unserem sich auf sie Verlassen für ein 
tiefer liegendes Ziel. Dieser erste Schritt ist zwar nützlich 
genug, verfehlt aber das Wesen des heideggerschen Durch-
bruchs, den selbst er nie ganz begreift. Bleiben wir auf dieser 
Stufe stehen, könnte es den Anschein haben, dass Heidegger 
bloß behauptet, alle Theorie sei in der Praxis begründet und 
wir bräuchten eine alltägliche Beziehung zu Leoparden oder 
Säuren, bevor wir sie anstarrten oder eine Wissenschaft über 
sie entwickelten. Man halte fest, dass selbst unsere praktische 
Bezugnahme zu diesen Objekten es versäumt diese voll-
ständig zu erfassen. Der Stammesangehörige, der mit dem 
gottgleichen Leopard lebt oder der Gefangene, der geheime 
Nachrichten mit Zitronensaft schreibt, sind der dunklen 
7 „Zeug-Untersuchung” ist lediglich die Übersetzung des vom Verfasser dieses 
Artikels als tool-analysis bezeichneten Konzepts. Dieses ist so bei Heidegger 
oder in der Heideggerforschung nicht zu finden, stellt aber den zentralen 
Interpretationszugang des Verfassers zu Heidegger dar. Die tool-analysis 
bezieht sich auf die Unterscheidung zwischen der „Vorhandenheit” und 
„Zuhandenheit” von Gegenständen oder Zeug, wie dem berühmten Hammer 
Heideggers. Für Harman ist Heideggers Untersuchung des Zeugs nicht als 
Sieg der Praxis über die Theorie oder sprachlicher Zeichen über die „Dinge 
an sich” zu deuten, sondern im Gegenteil, als Weg zu den Gegenständen an-
sich zurück. „Zuhandenheit” bezieht sich für Harman nicht auf Gegenstände, 
insofern diese menschlichen Zwecken dienen, sondern auf Objekte, die sich 
theoretischem wie praktischem Zugang der Menschen entziehen und die 
eine eigene, nie fassbare, Realität besitzen, die auf keinem Weg vollständig 
erschöpft oder gekannt werden kann. Siehe dazu: Harman, G., Tool-Being: 
Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Open Court Publishing Company 
2002, hier: S.1-2. (A.d.Ü.).
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Realität dieser Objekte nicht weniger weit entfernt, als der 
Wissenschaftler, der sie anstarrt. Wenn beide—Wahrnehmung 
und Theorie—Entitäten objektivieren und sie zu einseitigen 
Karikaturen ihrer tosenden Tiefe reduzieren, dann ist dasselbe 
für praktische Manipulation wahr. Wir verzerren, wenn wir 
sehen und wir verzerren, wenn wir benutzen. Auch ist die 
Sünde der Karikatur kein rein menschliches Laster. Hunde 
haben keinen Kontakt mit der vollen Realität des Knochens, 
genauso wenig wie Heuschrecken mit Getreidestängeln, Viren 
mit Zellen, Steine mit Fensterscheiben oder Planeten mit 
Monden. Es ist nicht das menschliche Bewusstsein, das die 
Realität verzerrt, sondern Relationalität per se. Heideggers Zeug-
Untersuchung gibt uns unbewussterweise die tiefstmögliche 
Darstellung des klassischen Risses zwischen Substanz und 
Relation. Wenn etwas „vorhanden” ist, bedeutet dies schlicht, 
dass es durch irgendeine Art der Relation registriert wird: 
ob sinnlich, theoretisch, praktisch oder rein kausal. „Zu-
handen” zu sein bedeutet nicht im engeren Sinne nützlich 
zu sein, sondern sich in unterirdische Tiefen zu entziehen, 
auf die sich andere Objekte stützen, ohne diese jemals voll 
zu sondieren oder auszuloten.8 Wenn Objekte uns verfehlen 
erfahren wir eine Negation ihrer zugänglichen Konturen 
und werden uns gewahr, dass sich das Objekt all dem was wir 
von ihm erfassen entzieht. Dieses Dilemma gibt den Anlass 
zum Thema der stellvertretenden Verursachung. Denn wenn 
Objekte sich allen Relationen entziehen, könnten wir uns 
wundern, wie sie überhaupt Kontakt herstellen. Heideggers 
Zeug-Untersuchung öffnet die Tore für einen neuen selt-
samen Realismus, in dem Entitäten vage vom Meeresgrund 
aufflimmern: die unfähig sind Kontakt herzustellen, aber es 
trotzdem irgendwie schaffen. 
Eine andere Art Objekt bildet die Basis für Husserls Phi-
losophie. Trotz komplizierter Anstrengungen Husserl von 
Anschuldigungen des Idealismus freizusprechen, grenzt er 
die Philosophie zu einem Raum purer Idealität ein. Die Phän-
8 Für eine detaillierte Interpretation von Heiderggers „Zeug-Untersuchung,” 
siehe mein erstes Buch: Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, 
Chicago, Open Court 2002.
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omenologie kann nicht darüber sprechen, wie ein Gegenstand 
einen anderen zerbricht oder verbrennt, da dies die Welt der 
Macht wissenschaftlicher Erklärungen ausliefern würde, die 
ausschließlich naturalistische Theorien verwendet. Die einzige 
rigorose Methode besteht für Husserl darin, zu beschreiben, 
wie die Welt dem Bewusstsein vor aller solcher Theorie gege-
ben ist. Philosophie wird zur Studie von Phänomenen, nicht 
von realen Objekten. Nichtsdestoweniger sind Phänomene 
Objekte: in einem neuen idealen Sinne. Denn was wir in der 
Wahrnehmung erfahren sind keine körperlosen Eigenschaften, 
wie der Empirist meint; stattdessen begegnen wir einer in 
Stücke zerbrochenen Welt. Bäume, Briefkästen, Flugzeuge 
oder Skelette liegen vor uns ausgebreitet, von denen jedes 
spezifische Stimmungen herbeiführt und mit verschiedenen 
untergeordneten Eigenschaften funkelt. Da wir nur über den 
phänomenalen Bereich sprechen, macht es nichts aus, ob es 
sich bei diesen Dingen um Halluzinationen handelt; selbst 
Illusionen leisten die ehrliche Arbeit, unsere Wahrnehmung 
in diskrete Zonen zu organisieren. Es ist bereits anzumerken, 
dass sinnliche Objekte ein anderes Schicksal als reale Ob-
jekte teilen. Während echte Zebras und Leuchttürme sich 
direktem Zugang entziehen, entziehen sich ihre sinnlichen 
Gegenstücke nicht im geringsten. Denn hier ist ein Zebra vor 
mir. Zugegebenermaßen kann ich es aus einer unendlichen 
Vielfalt von Winkeln und Abständen betrachten, in Trauer 
oder Begeisterung, während eines Sonnenuntergangs oder im 
peitschenden Regen und keiner dieser Momente erschöpft 
alle möglichen Wahrnehmungen davon. Trotzdem ist das 
Zebra als Ganzes in allen möglichen partiellen Profilen für 
mich da; ich sehe direkt durch diese hindurch und schaue 
auf es, als ein vereinigtes Objekt. Obwohl gewisse spezifische 
visuelle oder konzeptuelle Profile des Zebras für uns nötig 
sind, um es zu erfahren, liegt das vereinigte sinnliche Zebra 
auf einer tieferen Ebene der Wahrnehmung, als diese vorü-
bergehenden und veränderbaren Bilder. Jedes sinnliche 
Profil ist auf dem vereinigten Zebra-Objekt verkrustet, wie 
ein Überzug aus Salzlake. Während sich reale Objekte entz-
iehen, liegen sinnliche Objekte direkt vor uns, über und über 
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vereist mit einer wirbelnden und überflüssigen äußeren 
Schale. Dieser Unterschied aber scheint den sinnlichen 
Objekten den entgegengesetzten kausalen Status von realen 
Objekten zu geben. Vorausgesetzt, dass reale Objekte sich 
niemals direkt berühren, können deren Kausalbeziehungen 
nur stellvertretend sein. Sinnliche Objekte dagegen, weit 
davon entfernt sich zu entziehen, existieren von Beginn an 
nebeneinander in demselben Wahrnehmungsraum, da wir 
zahlreichen Phänomenen gleichzeitig begegnen. Dies stellt 
das gegenteilige Problem zur stellvertretenden Verursachung 
dar: namentlich, warum nicht alle Erscheinungen sofort in 
einem einzigen Klumpen verschmelzen? Hier muss es ein 
unbekanntes Blockadeprinzip zwischen ihnen geben. Wenn 
reale Objekte stellvertretende Verursachung verlangen, dann 
sind sinnliche Objekte einer gepufferten Verursachung 
ausgesetzt, in der ihre Interaktionen teilweise gedämmt und 
nicht voll entwickelt sind. 
Die Lage ist verworren, dennoch sollte der allgemeine Pfad 
dieses Artikels bereits klar sein. Reale Objekte entziehen sich, 
kausaler Verbindungen beraubt, in dunkle gähnende Unter-
welten zurück. Im Kontrast dazu neigen sinnliche Objekte 
derart dazu mit ihren Nachbarn zu interagieren, dass wir 
uns wundern, warum sie dies nicht jeden Augenblick tun. 
Der einzige Ort im Kosmos, wo Wechselwirkungen auftreten, 
ist in anderen Worten der sinnliche, phänomenale Bereich. 
Gegen Philosophien, die die Oberfläche als formal oder steril 
betrachten und kausale Kraft nur schattigen Tiefen gewähren, 
müssen wir die gegenteilige Ansicht verteidigen: Diskrete, 
autonome Form liegt nur in der Tiefe, während dramatische 
Kraft und Wechselwirkung entlang der Oberfläche fließen. 
Alle Beziehungen sind oberflächlich. Aus diesem Grund 
müssen wir herausfinden, wie reale Objekte in den Bereich 
der Erscheinungen durchstoßen, dem einzigen Ort, an dem 
man Verbindungen eingeht. Die vielfältigen Eruptionen 
realer Objekte in die Sinnlichkeit liegen Seite an Seite vor 
sofortiger Wechselwirkung gepuffert. Irgendetwas muss auf 
der sinnlichen Ebene passieren, das ihnen erlaubt in Kontakt 
zu treten, genauso wie bei korrosiven, Seite an Seite in einer 
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Bombe liegenden Chemikalien, die nur durch einen dünnen 
Film getrennt werden, der über die Zeit hinweggefressen wird 
oder von entfernten Signalen durchbrochen wird.
2. Ein Puzzlespiel
Es ist bekannt, dass Husserl Wert auf die Intentionalität des 
Bewusstseins legt. Wir sind uns immer etwas bewusst, immer 
auf ein bestimmtes Haus fokussiert, eine Kiefer, einen Wass-
erball oder einen Stern und in der Tat auf viele solche Objekte 
zugleich. Es ist nicht weithin bekannt, dass Husserl auch über 
das schicksalhafte Paradox stolpert, wonach Intentionalität 
beides sei, eines und zwei. In einem ersten Sinne ist meine 
Begegnung mit einer Kiefer eine vereinigte Relation. Wir 
können von der Begegnung als Ganzem sprechen und dieses 
Ganze widerstrebt einer erschöpfenden Beschreibung. Aber 
in einem anderen Sinne fusioniere ich klarerweise nicht mit 
dem Baum in einen einzigen massiven Klumpen; er bleibt 
in der Wahrnehmung von mir unterschieden. Daraus ergibt 
sich das seltsame Resultat, dass wir beide in meiner Inten-
tion des Baumes das Innere der gesamten intentionalen 
Relation bewohnen. Diese scheinbar trockene Beobachtung 
Husserls hat nicht viel Interesse bei seinen Lesern entfacht. 
Sogar dann, wenn sie kombiniert mit Heideggers Einsicht 
in den Entzug realer Objekte hinter jede Relation alle Teile 
für eine neue Philosophie liefert.
Um es zu wiederholen, die Kiefer und ich sind separate 
Gegenstände im Innern eines Dritten liegend: der Intention 
als Ganzem. Es gibt aber eine faszinierende Asymmetrie un-
ter den Mitgliedern dieses Trios. Wir kommen nicht umhin 
zu bemerken, dass von den zwei Objekten im Inneren eines 
Dritten lebend, ich ein reales Objekt bin, die Kiefer aber ein 
bloß sinnliches. Das Ich, aufrichtig vertieft in die Dinge, die 
es wahrnimmt, ist nicht das Ich von anderen aus gesehen, 
sondern eher das reale Ich, da mein Leben in diesem Mo-
ment tatsächlich darin besteht von diesen Erscheinungen 
beschäftig zu werden und nicht darin ein sinnliches Objekt 
für den Blick anderer oder sogar für meinen eigenen zu 
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sein. Im Gegensatz dazu bewohnt die reale Kiefer nicht die 
Intention, da der echte Baum (angenommen es gibt so ein 
Ding) außerhalb jeder Relation zu ihr steht und sich in Ti-
efen zurückzieht, in die niemals Außenstehende eindringen. 
Schließlich muss die Intention als Ganzes eher als reales 
Objekt klassifiziert werden, denn als sinnliches Objekt: Denn 
selbst wenn meine Intention des Baumes die verkommenste 
Halluzination darstellen sollte, so ist die Intention selbst 
tatsächlich im Gange, völlig unabhängig davon, ob sie sich 
mit etwas Außenstehendem in Beziehung setzt. Um zusam-
menzufassen; wir haben eine reale Intention, deren Kern von 
einem realen Ich und einer sinnlichen Kiefer bewohnt wird. 
Zusätzlich ist da auch ein entzogener realer, außerhalb der 
Intention liegender Baum (oder etwas, das wir dafürhalten), der 
aber fähig ist, diese Intention auf noch unbekannten Wegen 
zu affizieren. Zu guter Letzt erscheint der sinnliche Baum 
niemals in der Form eines nackten Wesens, sondern immer 
mit verschiedenen Sorten von Lärm verkrustet. Woanders 
habe ich es „schwarzes Rauschen” genannt, um hervorzuhe-
ben, dass es stark strukturiert ist und keine Art formloses 
Chaos, nahegelegt vom „weißen Rauschen” des Fernsehers 
oder Radios.9 Schwarzes Rauschen scheint anfänglich in 
drei Varianten vorzukommen. Erstens besitzt der sinnliche 
Baum zentrale oder essenzielle Qualitäten10, die immer zu 
ihm gehören müssen, unter Androhung der Strafe, dass das 
intentionale Agens es nicht länger als dasselbe Ding ansieht. 
Zweitens hat der Baum akzidentelle Eigenschaften, die von 
Moment zu Moment an seiner Oberfläche schimmern, ohne 
unsere Identifikation von ihm als ein und demselben zu 
beeinträchtigen. Schließlich steht die Kiefer in Beziehung 
zu unzähligen peripheren Objekten, die dieselbe Intention 
bevölkern (benachbarte Bäume, Berge, Wild, Hasen, Nebel-
wolken).
Wir sollten fünf verschiedene Relationsarten zwischen all 
diesen Objekten festhalten:
9 Guerrilla Metaphysics, S. 183ff.
10 Die Wörter „Eigenschaft” und „Qualität” werden synonym für das engli-
sche quality benutzt (A.d.Ü.).
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1. Enthaltensein. Die Intention als Ganzes enthält beides, 
das reale Ich und den sinnlichen Baum. 
2. Nachbarschaft. Die verschieden sinnlichen Objekte in 
einer Intention liegen Seite an Seite, ohne sich einander zu 
beinträchtigen. Nur manchmal verschmelzen oder vermischen 
sie sich. Innerhalb gewisser Grenzen kann jeder Nachbar des 
sinnlichen Objektes vermischt und variiert werden, ohne die 
Identität dieses Objekts zu beschädigen, genauso wie wenn 
wabernde Nebelschwaden nicht mit meinem Blickpunkt auf 
den Baum interferieren.
 3. Aufrichtigkeit. Genau in diesem Augenblick bin ich in 
den sinnlichen Baum vertieft oder von ihm fasziniert, selbst 
wenn meine Haltung zu ihm völlig zynisch und manipulativ 
sein sollte. Ich beinhalte nicht den sinnlichen Baum, denn das 
ist die Rolle der vereinigten Intention, die die Bühne meiner 
Aufrichtigkeit liefert, ohne mit ihr identisch zu sein. Und ich 
bin nicht bloß mit dem Baum benachbart, da er mich in der 
Tat auf eine Weise berührt, die mein ganzes Leben ausfüllt. 
Ich gebe meine Energie aus, um den Baum ernst zu nehmen, 
wohingegen der sinnliche Baum mir diesen Gefallen nicht 
erwidern kann, da er nicht real ist.
4. Verbindung. Die Intention als Ganze muss aus einer 
realen Verbindung realer Objekte erwachsen, wenngleich 
einer indirekten Verbindung. Immerhin liefern die anderen 
möglichen Verbindungen komplett verschiedene Resultate. 
Zwei sinnliche Objekte sitzen schlicht Seite an Seite. Und 
mein aufrichtiges Vertieftsein in Bäume oder Windmühlen 
ist bloß das Innere der Intention, nicht die vereinigte Inten-
tion selbst. Daher wird aus der Verbindung zweier anderer 
realer Gegenstände, durch unbekannte stellvertretende Mittel, 
selbst ein reales Objekt geboren.
5. Überhaupt keine Relation. Das ist der gewöhnliche 
Zustand der Dinge, verneint nur von fanatischen Holisten, 
jenen Extremisten, die Spiegel wie Zucker in der Straße an 
jedes Objekt verteilen, das die Straße herunterstolpert. Reale 
Objekte sind zu direktem Kontakt unfähig und viele üben in 
der Tat überhaupt keine Wirkung aufeinander aus. Selbst das 
allgemeine Gesetz der Gravitation trifft nur auf eine kleine 
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Klasse physikalischer Objekte zu und betrifft selbst dann nur 
einen kleinen Teil ihrer Realität.
Und in einem unterschiedlichen Fall hat der sinnliche 
Baum keinerlei Beziehung zu mir, selbst wenn ich aufrichtig 
in ihn vertieft bin. Der Sauerstoff, den ich einatme, kommt 
vom realen Baum, nicht von meiner Wahrnehmung dessel-
ben. Der sinnliche Baum ist ein Phantasma, das nur im Kern 
irgendeiner Intention überlebt und nicht einmal unabhängige 
Relationen mit seinen phantomartigen Nachbarn unterhält. 
Diese werden nur stellvertretend durch mich zueinander in 
Beziehung gesetzt, insofern ich aufrichtig in beide vertieft bin. 
Die diese Welt bevölkernden Objekte stehen immer in einer 
dieser fünf Beziehungen zueinander. In Guerilla Metaphysics 
schlug ich vor, dass Verursachung immer stellvertretend, asym-
metrisch und gepuffert ist. „Stellvertretend” bedeutet, dass sich 
Objekte durch einen Stellvertreter begegnen. Über sinnliche 
Profile, die ausschließlich im Inneren einer anderen Entität 
gefunden werden. „Asymmetrisch” bedeutet, dass sich die 
anfängliche Konfrontation jedes Mal zwischen einem realen 
Objekt und einem sinnlichen entfaltet. Und „gepuffert” bedeutet, 
dass weder ich mit dem Baum verschmelze, noch der Baum 
mit seinen sinnlichen Nachbarn, da alle durch unbekannte 
Firewalls in Schach gehalten werden, welche die Privatsphäre 
eines jeden aufrechterhalten. Aus dem asymmetrischen und 
gepufferten Innenleben eines Objekts entstehen gelegentlich 
stellvertretende Verbindungen (im zweifachen Sinne), die 
neuen Objekten mit eigenem Innenraum das Leben schenken. 
Es besteht ein beständiges sich Treffen von asymmetrischen 
Partnern im Inneren eines vereinigten Objektes: Ein Reales 
trifft den sinnlichen Vikar oder Stellvertreter eines anderen. 
Verursachung selbst ereignet sich, wenn diese Hindernisse 
irgendwie aufgehoben oder durchbrochen werden. In den 
Begriffen des 17. Jahrhunderts ist die unmittelbare Nähe von 
realen und sinnlichen Objekten bloß die Okkasion für eine 
Verbindung zwischen einem realen Objekt innerhalb der 
Intention und einem anderen, außerhalb von ihr liegendem 
realen Objekt. Auf diesem Weg werden Schächte und Fracht-
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tunnel zwischen Objekten konstruiert, die andernfalls in 
privaten Vakua in Quarantäne gehalten würden. 
Wir haben jetzt fünf Objektarten (reale Intention, reales Ich, 
realer Baum, sinnlicher Baum, sinnliches Rauschen) und fünf 
verschiedene Relationstypen (Enthaltensein, Nachbarschaft, 
Aufrichtigkeit, Verbindung, und keine). Des Weiteren haben 
wir drei Adjektive für das, was sich in einem Objekt entfaltet 
(stellvertretend, asymmetrisch, gepuffert) und drei verschiedene 
Arten des Rauschens (Qualitäten, Akzidentien, Relationen), 
welche das sinnliche Objekt umgeben. Während dies nicht 
unbedingt einen vollständigen Zensus der Wirklichkeit darstellt 
und eventuell aufpoliert werden muss oder einer Erweiterung 
bedarf, so bietet es doch ein gutes Anfangsmodell, dessen 
bloße Strenge helfen wird, jene Elemente auszuräuchern, die 
es vielleicht übersehen haben könnte. Was abzuwarten bleibt, 
ist, wie diese Elemente interagieren, wie eine Relationsart 
sich in eine andere umwandelt und wie neue reale Objekte 
paradoxerweise aus der Interaktion zwischen realen und 
sinnlichen Objekten entstehen und sogar wie sinnliche Ge-
genstände es schaffen sich zu verkuppeln und zu entkuppeln 
wie Waggons eines Geisterzuges. Diese Art von Problemen 
stellt den Inhalt Objekt-orientierter Philosophie11 dar; dem 
unvermeidlichen Mutanten aus Husserls intentionalen Ob-
jekten und Heideggers realen. Diese wiederum sind nur die 
derzeitigen Erben von Humes benachbarten Impressionen 
und Ideen (Husserl) und den unzusammenhängenden Ob-
jekten Malebranches und dessen asch‘aritischen Vorläufern 
(Heidegger).
11 Das Label „Objekt-orientierte-Philosophie” wurde vom Autor Graham 
Harman selbst geprägt. Object-oriented philosophy kann diesem zufolge als 
Unterart des „Spekulativen Realismus” (speculative realism) gesehen werden. 
Die zwei zentralen Pfeiler dieser auf Objekte zentrierten Philosophie sehen 
wie folgt aus: 1. Verschiedene Entitäten unterschiedlichen Maßstabs (nicht 
nur Quarks oder Neutrinos) sind der ultimative Stoff, aus dem das Univer-
sum besteht. 2. Diese Entitäten werden niemals durch ihre Relationen oder 
die Summe all ihrer Relation erschöpft, sie sind mehr als das. Im Gegenteil, 
Objekte entziehen sich geradezu jeder Relation. Vgl.: Graham Harman, brief 




Das Problem der Philosophie ähnelt nun einem Puzzlespiel. 
Wir haben die Teile so vorsichtig wie möglich ausgemacht und 
keines scheint in aller Deutlichkeit zu fehlen. Auch haben 
wir ein Bild davon, wie die ultimative Lösung aussehen sollte: 
die Welt, so wie wir sie kennen, mit ihren verschiedenen Ob-
jekten und Wechselwirkungen. Ungleich einem Puzzlespiel 
entfaltet sich diese in mindestens drei Dimensionen, die sich 
unablässig von Augenblick zu Augenblick verändern: Aber wie 
ein solches Puzzle ist es, statt das Originalbild nachzuahmen, 
mit Spalten und strategischen Überschneidungen übersät, 
die alles in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lassen. Genauso 
wie Fünfjährige gegenüber einem riesigen tausendteiligen 
Puzzlespiel, liegt unsere größte Bedrohung darin, den Mut 
zu verlieren. Aber während frustrierte Kinder wütend die 
Stücke auf den Boden werfen und ihre Betätigung wechseln, 
bleiben wir von Beginn an in unserem Puzzle gefangen, da 
es das Rätsel unserer Welt selbst ist. Philosophen können 
nur mittels Wahnsinn, mithilfe eines Strickes oder Revolvers 
daraus entkommen.
3. Ontologie und Metaphysik
Neulinge in der Philosophie fragen oft nach dem genauen 
Unterschied zwischen Ontologie und Metaphysik. Fakt ist, 
dass es hier keine konsistente Unterscheidung gibt, da jeder 
Philosoph diese Begriffe für individuelle Zwecke redefiniert. 
Für Heidegger ist Ontologie die Darstellung, wie den Menschen 
das Sein enthüllt wird, während Metaphysik ein beleidigender 
Begriff für Philosophien bleibt, die alles Seiende in Begriffen 
irgendeiner privilegierten Entität erklären. Für Levinas gehört 
Ontologie zum globalen Krieg zwischen Seienden, während 
Metaphysik vom unendlichen Anderssein, das jenseits eines 
solchen Konfliktes liegt, spricht. Ich für meinen Teil habe 
diese Begriffe generell austauschbar für eine realistische 
Position benutzt, die allen menschenzentrierten Philoso-
phien entgegengesetzt ist; manchmal, wie im Eröffnungsteil 
dieses Artikels, bleibt eine solche Beweglichkeit nützlich. 
Dennoch würde ich gerne eine exaktere Unterscheidung 
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vorschlagen—eine die nicht ohne Bezug auf ihre klassische 
Abgrenzung ist. Von nun an soll sich „Ontologie” auf die 
Beschreibung der basalen strukturalen Eigenschaften—die 
von allen Objekten geteilt werdenbeziehen und „Metaphysik” 
soll die Diskussion fundamentaler Charakteristiken spezi-
fischer Entitätstypen bedeuten. In diesem Sinne gehören die 
vorher erwähnten Puzzleteile alleinig der Ontologie an, da 
kein Objekt von ihrer Herrschaft befreit ist. Diese schließen 
die basalen Gegensätze zwischen realen und sinnlichen 
Objekten, die fünf Relationstypen zwischen ihnen und die 
Bindung der sinnlichen Objekte an ihre unterschiedlichen 
Qualitäten, Akzidentien und Relationen ein. Raum und Zeit 
gehören ebenfalls zur Ontologie, da selbst ewige und nicht-
räumliche Objekte dem engen raumzeitlichen Bereich ent-
weichen, aber keineswegs Raum und Zeit in einem breiteren 
Sinne entkommen. Die Frage der Universalien scheint auch 
ein globales Thema der Ontologie zu sein und hier könnte 
es noch andere geben. Was die Metaphysik betrifft, die sich 
abgrenzt und die inneren Organe jeder spezifischen Entität 
analysiert, so sind offensichtlicherweise Menschen, Sprache, 
Kunstwerke und sogar Gott mögliche Themen. Jede Art vo-
neinander verschiedener Objekte, wie verschwommen auch 
immer ihre Grenzen sein mögen, kann zum Gegenstand einer 
Metaphysik werden. Es könnte eine Metaphysik der Kunst-
werke, der Psyche oder der Sprache geben und sogar über 
Restaurants, Säugetiere, Planeten, Teehäuser oder Sportligen. 
Insofern sich die Philosophie klar von anderen Aktivitäten 
wie Singen oder dem Glückspiel unterscheidet, könnte es 
eine Metaphysik der Philosophie selbst geben, welche die 
ausschlaggebenden Eigenschaften dieser Disziplin aufdeckt, 
egal wie ihre unzähligen Variationen und degenerierten und 
ausgeklügelten Formen auch aussehen mögen. 
 Die Unterscheidung zwischen Ontologie und Metaphysik 
wird hier aus einem besonderen Grund vorgeschlagen. 
Entlang realer Objekte haben wir auch sinnliche Objekte 
beschrieben, die nur im Inneren irgendeines intentionalen 
Ganzen existieren. Dennoch wird Intentionalität von fast 
allen als eine aufs Menschliche beschränkte Eigenschaft 
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angesehen. Sollte diese Schilderung wahr sein, dann würden 
sinnliche Objekte auf eine Metaphysik der menschlichen 
Wahrnehmung beschränkt werden, ohne Platz in einer 
Ontologie, die dafür entworfen wurde, um sich an Plastik 
und Sanddünen nicht weniger zu richten, wie an Menschen. 
Diese Beschränkung der Sinnlichkeit auf das menschliche 
Reich muss abgewiesen werden. Intentionalität ist überhaupt 
keine speziell menschliche Eigenschaft, sondern eine on-
tologische Eigenschaft von Gegenständen im Allgemeinen. 
Für unsere Zwecke bedeutet Intentionalität Aufrichtigkeit. 
Mein Leben wird immer zu einem begrenzten Umfang von 
Gedanken und Wahrnehmungen in Anspruch genommen. 
Während es verlockend ist solch ein Vertieftsein mit Bewusst-
sein zu verwechseln, müssen wir uns auf die rudimentärste 
Bedeutung der Aufrichtigkeit konzentrieren: dem Kontakt 
zwischen einem realen und einem sinnlichen Objekt. Zum 
Beispiel könnte ich aufrichtig in die Kontemplation auf der 
Tischoberfläche angeordneter Glasmurmeln vertieft sein. 
Das ist meine Aufrichtigkeit in diesem Moment, da ich auf 
andere Möglichkeiten größerer oder geringerer Wichtigkeit 
verzichte, um dieses asketische Zen-Spektakel zu erleben. Man 
bemerke, dass die Glasmurmeln selbst aufrichtig in ihr Auf-
dem-Tisch-Liegen vertieft sind, statt in einem Hochofen zu 
schmelzen oder durch einen Minenschacht zu rollen. (Auch 
wenn sie „Murmeln” für niemand sonst außer Menschen 
oder verspielte Kätzchen sein mögen, brauchen wir einen 
Spitznamen für das vereinigte Objekt, dass wir in unsere 
Spiele einbeziehen.) Die Frage für uns ist nicht die Fragestel-
lung des Panpsychisten, ob diese Murmeln irgendwelche 
rudimentären Denk- und Fühlfähigkeiten besitzen, sondern 
ob sie als reale Objekte der Tischoberfläche als sinnlichem 
Objekt begegnen.
Die Antwort lautet Ja. Wir müssen die üblichen Bedeutun-
gen der Sinnlichkeit ignorieren und unseren Blick auf eine 
primitivere kosmische Schicht richten. Es ist klar, dass die 
Murmeln irgendwo in der Realität in Kontakt mit gewissen 
anderen Entitäten stehen müssen, die sie kurzzeitig in dem 
einen oder anderem Zustand stabilisieren. Die Entitäten, 
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die sie konfrontieren, können keine realen Objekte sein, da 
diese sich dem Kontakt entziehen. Noch können die Mur-
meln gegen ungebundene sinnliche Qualitäten anrennen, 
da Eigenschaften im sinnlichen Bereich immer an Gegen-
stände gebunden sind. Es bleibt nur eine Alternative übrig: 
Die Murmeln sind aufrichtig in sinnliche Objekte vertieft. 
Dieses indirekte Argument wird noch überzeugender, wenn 
wir die von Murmeln bewohnte Landschaft überprüfen, von 
der sich herausstellt, dass sie die grundlegenden strukturellen 
Eigenschaften der menschlichen Intentionalität teilt. Man 
nehme zunächst Notiz davon, dass diese Murmeln absolut 
dazu fähig sind, zwischen dem Tisch und der benachbarten 
relationalen Umgebung zu unterscheiden, wenn auch nicht 
mit einer primitiven Urteilsfähigkeit im Sinne des Panpsy-
chismus. Gegenwärtig liegen die Murmeln auf dem Tisch, 
sind aber andererseits von Luft umgeben; weswegen Luft 
und Tischoberfläche im Leben der Murmeln benachbart 
sind. Selbst wenn wir die Murmeln vorsichtig mit Büchern 
oder geschmolzenem Wachs einrahmen, bleibt der Tisch, 
unberührt von unseren ausgefallenen Manipulationen, das-
selbe intentionale Objekt. Zweitens konfrontiert die Murmel 
die Tischoberfläche gänzlich abseits ihrer akzidentiellen 
Kälte und Glattheit, obwohl es diese Eigenschaften wom-
öglich genauso auf eine Weise registriert. Erhitzen wir die 
Oberseite des Tisches oder machen sie klebrig oder körnig, 
indem wir verschiedene Materialien auf sie gießen, so ble-
ibt der Tisch als intentionales Objekt der gleiche. Die letzte 
Frage ist, ob die Murmeln einen Unterschied zwischen dem 
Tisch und seinen wesentlicheren Eigenschaften, wie seiner 
Härte, Ebenheit, Stabilität oder dem Mangel an Perforation 
machen können. Selbst Menschen können diese Unters-
cheidung zwischen Objekten und deren Qualitäten nur in 
sehr speziellen Fällen treffen; da ich diese Fälle bald unter 
der Überschrift „Verlockung” beschreiben werde, sollten 
wir mit der Frage warten, ob Glasmurmeln fähig sind, dem 
zu gehorchen. Was schon offensichtlich geworden ist, ist, 
dass alle realen Objekte eine Landschaft sinnlicher Objekte 
bewohnen—eine Spielwiese—deren Fluktuationen das Ent-
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stehen neuer realer Verbindungen ermöglicht. Einige dieser 
Fluktuationen sind ein bloß häusliches Drama, während 
andere neue Relationen mit der Außenwelt hervorrufen. 
Alles aber was an der menschlichen Kognition besonders ist, 
gehört zu einer komplizierteren Ebene der Philosophie als 
derjenigen der sinnlichen Gegenstände, obwohl sie in den 
Begriffen dieser ausgedrückt werden können muss.
Woanders habe ich die Wendung „jede Relation ist selbst 
ein Objekt” gebraucht und ich halte diese Behauptung immer 
noch für wahr. Aber da dieser Artikel Relationen redefini-
ert hat und diese jetzt Enthaltensein, Aufrichtigkeit und 
Nachbarschaft mit einschließen, muss der Slogan wie folgt 
umformuliert werden: „Jede Verbindung ist selbst ein Objekt.” 
Mein Enthaltensein im intentionalen Akt macht uns beide 
nicht zu einem neuen Objekt und genauso wenig machen 
(meistens) zwei oder drei nahe gelegene Wahrnehmungen 
von Autos kein vereinigtes Objekt. Zwei stellvertretend ver-
bundene reale Gegenstände aber formen ein neues Objekt, 
da sie einen neuen Innenraum kreieren. Wenn zwei Objekte 
ein neues durch stellvertretende Verbindung verursachen, 
erschaffen sie ein neues vereinigtes Ganzes, das nicht nur 
von außen unerschöpflich ist, sondern auch im Inneren mit 
einem realen Objekt gefüllt ist, das aufrichtig in sinnliche 
vertieft ist. Und genauso wie jede Verbindung ein Objekt ist, 
ist jedes Objekt das Resultat einer Verbindung. Die Geschichte 
dieser Verbindung bleibt in dessen Herz eingemeißelt, wo 
seine Bestandteile in einer Art kaleidoskopischem Duell 
eingesperrt sind. Verbindungen entstehen aber nur zwischen 
realen Objekten und keinen anderen Kombinationen. Dies 
zieht nach sich, dass meine Beziehung zur sinnlichen Kiefer 
selbst kein Objekt darstellt, sondern einfach nur eine Konfron-
tation zwischen zwei Objekten völlig unterschiedlicher Art. 
Daher ist Intentionalität, obwohl sie eine Relation zwischen 
mir und der sinnlichen Kiefer zu sein scheint, bloß ihr In-
neres. Die Intention selbst resultiert nur aus der ungeklärten 
stellvertretenden Fusion zwischen mir und der realen Kiefer 
oder mit was auch immer, das meinen irregeleiteten Glauben 
erzeugt, ich würde eine wahrnehmen.
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Um es zu wiederholen; meine Relation mit der sinnlichen 
Kiefer ist keine ausgewachsene Verbindung, sondern nur 
eine Aufrichtigkeit. Diese Aufrichtigkeit kann in der Tat in 
ein Objekt konvertiert werden, wie es in der Analyse unserer 
eigenen Intentionen oder der anderer geschieht. Wenn ich 
meine Beziehung zur sinnlichen Kiefer analysiere, habe ich 
diese Relation zum ersten Mal in ein Objekt umgewandelt. Sie 
wurde zu einem realen Objekt, insofern ihre exakte Natur der 
Sicht entweicht, da diese egal wie oft analysiert unerschöpflich 
bleibt. Wir stehen nun einer bloß sinnlichen Erscheinung der 
ursprünglich aufrichtigen Beziehung gegenüber, die sich jeder 
Analyse entzieht, genauso wie Hämmer sich ihrer Handhabung 
entziehen. Ein zweiter und noch gelangweilterer Beobachter 
könnte sich nun dazu entschließen eine Analyse meiner 
Analyse durchzuführen und sie damit in einen Gegenstand 
zu konvertieren, dessen Natur niemals erfasst werden kann 
und so weiter bis ins Unendliche. Aber man sollte registri-
eren, dass es sich nicht um einen infiniten Regress handelt: 
all diese Objekte sind nicht von Beginn an unbegrenzt in der 
Situation enthalten, sondern werden abfolgend ad nauseam 
von einer immer verdrehteren und pedantischeren Reihe 
an Analysten produziert. Zurück zur ersten Ebene, wo sogar 
meine Beziehung zur sinnlichen Kiefer kein reales Objekt 
darstellt, sondern einfach eine aufrichtige Relation zweier 
verschiedener Elemente innerhalb eines größeren Elements. 
Vereinigte Objekte können beliebig aus diesem tonartigem 
Inneren geformt werden. Dies zeigt bereits einen Weg für 
aufrichtige Relationen auf, in reale Verbindungen konvertiert 
zu werden. Ob dies der einzige Weg ist und ob diese Methode 
alleine den Menschen gehört ist noch unklar.
Ein anderer Punkt ist nun an der Reihe, bevor zum letzten 
Abschnitt übergegangen wird. Zu sagen, dass sich jedes Ob-
jekt auf dem geschmolzenen sinnlichen Kern eines anderen 
Objektes befindet, unterminiert einige von Heideggers 
Schlüsselannahmen. Für ihn transzendiert das menschliche 
Dasein teilweise anderes Seiendes, indem es sich erhebend 
einen Blick auf dieses, vor dem Hintergrund der Nichtigkeit 
erhascht. Aber das Innere eines Objektes lässt weder Raum 
Speculations III
230
für Transzendenz noch für Distanz zu: ein in einem einige 
Meilen entfernten Tal gesehenes Pferd berührt mich immer 
noch direkt, insofern ich es sehe. Entfernung liegt nicht 
in der Sphäre der Wahrnehmung, wo mich alles direkt mit 
größerer oder geringerer Intensität streift, sondern nur in 
den sich gegenseitig ausschließenden, hinter der Wahrneh-
mung liegenden, realen Gegenständen. Wir schreiten nicht 
über irgendetwas hinaus, sondern sind eher wie Maulwürfe, 
die sich durch Wind, Wasser und Ideen, nicht weniger wie 
durch Sprechakte, Texte, Sorgen, Staunen und Dreck tun-
neln. Wir transzendieren die Welt nicht, stattdessen steigen 
oder buddeln wir uns hinab in Richtung ihrer zahllosen 
unterirdischen Hohlräume—jeder eine Art Kaleidoskop, wo 
sinnliche Objekte ihre Farben und Flügel ausbreiten. Weder 
Endlichkeit noch Negativität befinden sich im Herz der 
Objekte. Und jeder Fall menschlicher Sterblichkeit ist nur 
ein tragisches Ereignis unter Trillionen von anderen, den 
Tod von Haustieren, Insekten, Sternen, Zivilisationen und 
schlecht geführten Läden oder Universitäten eingeschlossen. 
Der Heidegger-Blanchot Todeskult muss aus der Ontologie 
verbannt werden und gegebenenfalls sogar aus der Metaphysik.
4. Verlockung und Verursachung
Manche mögen es störend finden an eine Welt, bestehend 
aus vakuumversiegelten Objekten zu denken, jedes mit ei-
nem funkelnden phänomenalen Inneren, in welches nur 
von Zeit zu Zeit benachbarte Gegenstände eindringen. Ein 
wahrscheinlicheres Problem jedoch ist Gleichgültigkeit. Es 
scheint kein Bedarf an einer solch sonderbaren Sicht der 
Wirklichkeit zu geben, da es leicht genug ist an eine Welt 
bestehend aus rohen Stücken unabänderlicher fester Mate-
rie zu denken: wo „primäre Qualitäten” die flüchtigen und 
dynamischen Serien menschlicher Projektionen stützen. 
Meiner Ansicht nach, jedoch hat Heidegger dieses Weltbild 
obsolet gemacht. Obwohl seine Zeug-Untersuchung nur auf 
eine Beschreibung des Entzogenseins der Objekte vor dem 
menschlichen Bewusstsein zielt, ist auch praktische Tätig-
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keit unfähig die Tiefe der Objekte zu erschöpfen und selbst 
Kausalrelationen scheitern darin einander vollständig zu 
begegnen.12 Schließlich wird auch das Konzept der schieren 
physikalischen Präsenz im Raum von der Zeug-Untersuchung 
in seinen Grundfesten erschüttert: Eine Position innerhalb 
des Raumes einzunehmen heißt immerhin auf Relationen 
einzugehen und auch wenn Gegenstände Raum einnehmen, 
ihre Realität ist etwas Tieferes. Die Welt ist weder einer graue 
Matrix objektiver Elemente, noch Rohmaterial für die Pro-
jektion eines sexy menschlichen Dramas auf Schotter und 
Schlamm. Stattdessen ist sie mit nur lose zusammenge-
wobenen Realitätspunkten gefüllt: Ein Archipel aus Orakeln 
oder Bomben, die nur aus der Verborgenheit hervorgesprengt 
werden, um neue abgeschiedene Tempel hervorzubringen. 
Die Sprache hier ist metaphorisch, weil sie es sein muss. 
Während die analytische Philosophie darauf Stolz ist, nie 
mehr zu unterstellen, als sie tatsächlich sagt, wird dieses 
Verfahren einer Welt nicht gerecht, wo Gegenstände immer 
mehr sind, als sie buchstäblich ausdrücken. Diejenigen, die 
nur Wert darauf legen Argumente zu erzeugen, erzeugen 
fast nie Objekte. Neue Gegenstände jedoch sind die einzig 
heiligen Früchte für Schriftsteller, Denker, Politiker, Reisende, 
Liebende und Erfinder.
Entlang der Unterscheidung zwischen realen und sinnli-
chen Objekten gab es fünf verschiedene Beziehungsweisen 
zwischen diesen: Enthaltensein, Nachbarschaft, Aufrichtigkeit, 
Verbindung und keine. Unser Ziel ist es etwas Licht auf den 
Ursprung der Verbindung zu werfen, der einen der fünf Re-
lationen, die am meisten Ärger für eine Theorie geisterhafter 
und entweichender Objekte zu bereiten scheint. Eine Verbind-
ung existiert einfach oder scheitert zu existieren; es handelt 
sich schlicht um eine binäre Frage. Des Weiteren muss eine 
Verbindung stellvertretend sein, da ein bloß nacktes Objekt 
dem anderen immer entweicht. Ein Gegenstand existiert 
12 Die Idee, dass physikalische Relationen auch eine intentionale Struktur 
haben, ist eine Minderheitsansicht, aber keineswegs meine eigene Erfin-
dung. Siehe zum Beispiel George Molnars faszinierendes Powers: A Study in 
Metaphysics, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003, S. 60 ff.
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einfach und diese Existenz kann niemals vollständig im Her-
zen eines anderen gespiegelt werden. Was wir suchen, ist ein 
fruchtbarer Boden für Relationen, aus dem Verbindungen in 
die Existenz hervorquellen: eine Art Relation, die fähig ist, als 
Motor der Veränderung im Kosmos zu dienen. „Verbindung” 
selbst kann nicht die Lösung liefern, da sie genau das ist, was 
wir versuchen zu erklären; wenn zwei Objekte verbunden 
sind, dann ist die Arbeit, die wir zu beobachten wünschen 
bereits getan. Die Option „überhaupt keine Relation” hilft 
auch nicht, denn wenn Dinge nicht aufeinander bezogen 
sind, dann bleiben sie es, solange wie der gesuchte Vermit-
tler fehlt. „Enthaltensein” ist uns genauso wenig behilflich. 
Auch hier haben wir bloß eine binäre Frage: Entweder sind 
die sinnliche Kiefer und ich zusammen innerhalb einer 
gegebenen Intention oder wir sind es nicht. Letztlich gibt 
uns auch „Nachbarschaft” nicht, was wir brauchen: Besten-
falls verteilt das Wechselspiel der sinnlichen Objekte nur die 
Grenzen unter ihnen neu, ohne aber zu echten Veränderungen 
außerhalb ihres geschmolzenen inneren Heimatlandes zu 
führen. Die einzig verbliebene Option ist „Aufrichtigkeit.” 
Dies muss die Stätte des Wandels in der Welt sein. Ein reales 
Objekt wohnt, gegen zahlreiche sinnliche gedrückt, dem Kern 
einer Intention inne. Irgendwie durchbohrt es den farbigen 
Beschlag und verbindet sich mit dem bereits in der Nähe 
liegenden, aber vom direkten Kontakt gepuffertem realen 
Objekt. Wenn Licht auf diesen Mechanismus geworfen werden 
kann, könnte sich die Natur der vier anderen Relationstypen 
ebenfalls aufklären.
Es läuft alles auf eine Dynamik der Aufrichtigkeit hinaus, 
egal ob für ein menschliches oder andersgeartetes reales 
Objekt. Aufrichtigkeit hat mit sinnlichen Objekten zu tun, 
die über ihre Qualitäten definiert werden und in periphere 
Akzidentien und Relationen eingehüllt sind. Was wir suchen, 
ist die Weise, auf der die aufrichtige Beziehung mit einem 
sinnlichen Objekt in eine direkte Verbindung mit einem 
realen Objekt umgewandelt wird. Das Kuppeln und Entkup-
peln realer und sinnlicher Objekte ist jetzt unser zentrales 
Thema. Wir wissen, dass ein sinnlicher Gegenstand von seinen 
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Akzidentien und Relationen abtrennbar ist. Die interessante 
Frage ist, ob er auch von seinen Qualitäten abkoppelbar ist, 
die auf intimere Weise zu ihm zu gehören scheinen. Mit Qual-
itäten meine ich die wesentlichen Qualitäten, ohne die man 
ein Objekt nicht mehr länger als dasselbe Ding betrachten 
würde. Man erinnere sich, dass es hier keine händeringende 
Krise der Objektivität gibt, da wir von Eigenschaften spre-
chen, die nicht zum Wesen eines realen Objektes gehören, 
sondern ausschließlich zu den sinnlichen Dingen, die un-
sere Aufmerksamkeit verlangen—einem Bereich, indem wir 
selbst die höchsten Richter im Land sind. Jetzt kann man sich 
vorstellen, dass wir die Eigenschaften der Murmeln dadurch 
befreien können, indem wir offen alle bedeutenden Eigen-
schaften der Murmeln entdecken und auflisten, ohne die sie 
nicht sein könnten. Dies war die große Hoffnung Husserls 
Methode der eidetischen Variation. Aber der Effekt dieser 
Prozedur ist oberflächlich und kann die sinnlichen Murmeln 
nicht in ihrer Wesenheit erfassen. Es gilt einzufangen, dass 
sogar während unsere Analyse dieser Objekte fortschreitet, 
wir diese weiterhin als Einheiten ansehen, selbst wenn wir 
sie auf bestechende Weise in Tausende separater Merkmale 
zerschneiden. Sogar im Falle eines sinnlichen Objektes 
können die wesentlichen Eigenschaften nicht angegeben 
und analysiert werden, ohne zu etwas wie Akzidentien zu 
werden: ungebundene vom Objekt als Ganzem losgelöste 
Merkmale. Unsere Aufrichtigkeit beschäftigt sich nicht 
wirklich mit einer Liste solcher losgelöster Merkmale, wie 
Husserl es einsieht, wenn er dem vereinigtem sinnlichen 
Objekt Priorität über die Myriaden seiner Facetten gewährt. 
Die Einheit solcher Objekte deutet sogar darauf hin, dass da 
nur eine Eigenschaft infrage kommt: dieses Murmel-Wesen 
oder diese Kieferessenz. Die vereinigte Dingqualität ist über-
haupt kein Rauschen, sondern das sinnliche Objekt selbst. 
Was Aristoteles Frage betrifft, ob ein Ding mit seinem Wesen 
identisch sei, so lautet die Antwort für sinnliche Objekte Ja. 
Obwohl Eigenschaften weiter oben im Artikel als eine Form 
des Rauschens beschrieben wurden, ist dies nur insofern wahr, 
falls diese in Richtung eines akzidentellen Status abschweifen, 
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sie ausgebrochen sind und einzeln angeführt werden. Aber 
die Existenz einer vereinigten Dingqualität bedeutet, dass 
dem sinnlichen Bereich ein gewisses „ich weiß nicht was” 
innewohnt, welches die Murmel zu einem stetigen Fokus 
meiner Aufmerksamkeit macht. Anders als die Anhänger von 
Locke sagen wir nicht je ne sais quoi in einem Geist leichten 
Spottes, sondern als wahre Aussage über sinnliche Gegen-
stände. Das sinnliche Ding selbst hat einen vereinigten und 
im Grunde unaussprechlichen Effekt auf uns—einen, der 
nicht zu irgendeiner Auflistung von Merkmalen reduziert 
werden kann. Aber wenn so eine Aufzählung der Merkmale 
ein Ding nicht von seinen Qualitäten abtrennt, dann könnte 
es einen anderen Weg geben, der dies ermöglicht. Wir haben 
schon gesehen, dass die stellvertretende Verursachung—das 
verzauberte Einhorn, welches wir suchen—den Kontakt mit 
den wesentlichen Qualitäten eines Dinges erfordert, ohne den 
Kontakt zum Ding als Ganzem. In diesem Sinne könnte die 
Entdeckung, wie das sinnliche Objekt sich von seinen Eigen-
schaften abspaltet, ein Sprungbrett dafür sein ein analoges 
Ereignis unter realen Objekten zu finden. 
Die Trennung eines sinnlichen Objekts von seinen Eigen-
schaften kann als „Verlockung”13 bezeichnet werden.14 Diese 
Bezeichnung zeigt genau den bezaubernden Effekt an, der 
dieses Ereignis häufig für Menschen begleitet und zudem 
deutet er auf den verwandten Begriff der „Anspielung” hin, 
da die Verlockung nur auf das Objekt anspielt, ohne des-
sen Innenleben direkt zu vergegenwärtigen. Im sinnlichen 
Bereich begegnen wir mit rauschenden Akzidentien und 
Relationen verkrusteten Gegenständen. Mögen wir uns auch 
ausdrücklich einiger ihrer wesentlichen Qualitäten bewusst 
sein, auch wenn so eine Liste die Qualitäten bloß in etwas 
13 Im Original spricht der Autor von allure, das mit „Verlockung” übersetzt 
wurde, um den Aspekt des Köderns auszudrücken, der sich aus dem fran-
zösischen leurre herleitet. Das Wort Ködern selbst gibt aber die ästhetische 
Dimension des Reizes nicht adäquat wieder und da beide Dimensionen 
(ködern, reizen) im Begriff der „Verlockung” enthalten sind habe ich dafür 
optiert (A.d.Ü.).
14 Siehe auch Guerrilla Metaphysics, S. 142-4. 
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Akzidentielles umwandelt und es verfehlt uns die vereinigte 
Bindung zu geben, die das sinnliche Ding zu einem einzel-
nen Ding macht. Wir benötigen stattdessen eine Erfahrung, 
in welcher das sinnliche Objekt von seinen vereinigten und 
zusammengefügten Eigenschaften abgetrennt ist, denn dies 
wird zum ersten Mal auf ein reales, hinter einer einzel-
nen Oberflächenqualität liegendes Objekt, hindeuten. Für 
Menschen ist die Metapher eine solche Erfahrung. Wenn 
der Dichter, „mein Herz ist ein Hochofen” schreibt, dann 
fängt das sinnliche Objekt, bekannt als Herz, vage bestim-
mte Hochofeneigenschaften ein und zieht diese stockend in 
seine Umlaufbahn. Die Unfähigkeit des Herzens leicht mit 
Hochofenmerkmalen zu verschmelzen (im Gegensatz zu 
wörtlichen Aussagen wie „mein Herz ist der stärkste Muskel 
meines Körpers”), bringt eine Anspielung auf ein gespenstiges, 
hinter der familiären und alltäglichen Bekanntschaft mit 
einem sinnlichen Herz, liegendes Herzobjekt zuwege. Man 
nehme Notiz, dass die umgekehrte Metapher gegenüber der 
Ersten vollständig asymmetrisch ist: „Der Hochofen ist ein 
Herz” zieht kardiale Züge in die Umlaufbahn eines sinnlichen 
Hochofens, welches befreit von den Bindungen zu seinen 
gewöhnlichen Eigenschaften als versteckte Hochofenseele 
evoziert wird, eine deren animus jetzt rhythmisches Klopfen 
und einen Kreislauf antreibt. Humor tut etwas Ähnliches: 
Wir können Bergsons Das Lachen folgen und die Spannungen 
zwischen einem komisch Düpiertem und den Charakter-
zügen bemerken, die er nicht mehr frei an sich ändernde 
Gegebenheiten anpasst. Diese Eigenschaften werden nun 
als diskret sichtbare Hülle zur Schau gestellt, unter welcher 
der Akteur glücklos daran scheitert diese zu kontrollieren. 
Es gibt unzählbare Beispiele für Verlockung. In Momenten 
der Schönheit ist ein Objekt nicht die totale Summe seiner 
schönen Farben und Proportionen an der Oberfläche, sondern 
eine Art Seele, die Eigenschaften von innen heraus beseelend 
zu Schwindel oder sogar Hypnose beim Betrachter führen 
kann. Wenn Heideggers Hammer versagt, scheint sich ein 
verborgenes Hammerobjekt in einiger Distanz zu seinen 
einstmals familiären Eigenschaften aus dem Dunkeln ab-
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zuzeichnen. In der Sprache rufen Namen nach Objekten, die 
tiefer liegen als ihre Qualitäten; in der Liebe hat die geliebte 
Entität eine gewisse unter den Konturen und Mängeln der 
zugänglichen Oberfläche schwebende Magie. Die Liste der 
Möglichkeiten ist so umfassend, dass sie es verdienen in einer 
Enzyklopädie der Ästhetik kategorisiert zu werden. Bis jetzt 
hat die Ästhetik der Philosophie im Allgemeinen als verar-
mte Tänzerin gedient—bewundert für ihren Charme, kein 
Gentleman jedoch würde sie heiraten. Doch in Anbetracht 
des scheinbar überwältigenden Ausmaßes der Verlockung 
könnte die Ästhetik eine eher große Rolle in der Ontologie 
verdienen. Verschiedene sinnliche Objekte innerhalb der 
gleichen Intention werden als benachbart beschrieben, sie 
verschmelzen nicht miteinander, sondern werden vom in-
tentionalen Agens als unterschiedlich angesehen und dieses 
Agens ist das letzte Berufungsgericht im Reich des Sinnlichen. 
Dies trifft auf das zu, was Relationen der sinnlichen Objekte 
genannt wurde. Akzidenzien aber stellen einen anderen Fall 
dar. Die Oberfläche eines sinnlichen Objekts liegt nicht bloß 
Seite an Seite mit ihnen. Selbst wenn wir direkt durch diese 
Akzidenzien hindurchschauen, um das zugrundeliegende 
sinnliche Ding zu fixieren, werden die Akzidenzien nicht 
als vom Ding abgetrennt, sondern als auf seiner Oberfläche 
verkrustet aufgefasst. Dieses Vereisen mit peripheren Qual-
itäten kommt auf interessante Weise daher. Man erinnere 
sich daran, dass der sinnliche Baum als Ganzes nur aus einer 
Eigenschaft besteht (derjenigen von der er in der Verlockung 
getrennt wird). Man beachte, dass diese vereinigte Baumers-
cheinung immer noch Teile besitzt. Beginnen wir Zweige und 
Blätter zu entfernen, dann kommen wir zu einem Punkt, an 
dem wir ihn nicht mehr als denselben Baum ansehen; der 
Baum hängt von seinen Teilen ab. Dennoch sind diese Teile 
nur entlang eines eigentümlichen Pfades im Baum vereinigt. 
Er verschlingt diese nie vollständig, verwendet aber nur eine 
begrenzte Portion ihrer Realität. Was wir als die Akzidenzien 
des sinnlichen Baumes kennen, sind einfach die Überbleibsel 
seiner Teile, die im neuen Objekt nicht eingesetzten Überreste. 
Jedes dieser Teile ist kompliziert, weil es aus weiteren Teilen 
Graham Harman – Über stellvertretende Verursachung
237
besteht und so weiter bis ins Unendliche. Wie weit auch im-
mer wir in Richtung dieser Unendlichkeit vordringen, wir 
finden weiterhin Objekte, keine rohen Sinnesdaten. Es wäre 
falsch zu denken wir würden einem Feld von Farbpixeln 
gegenüberstehen und dieses dann in objektive Abschnitte 
formen. Zuerst ist es willkürlich zu denken, dass Punkte von 
Grün qualitativ basaler seien als eine vereinigte Baum- oder 
Zweigeigenschaft; alle sind dazu fähig meine Aufrichtigkeit 
auszufüllen und alle haben einen spezifisch persönlichen 
Stil. Zweitens nimmt auch ein angenommenes Grünpixel 
mindestens die räumliche Ausprägung eines Punktes ein 
und ist deshalb selbst ein kompliziertes Objekt. Im Reich des 
Sinnlichen gibt es immer größte Objekte: nämlich jene, die 
in der Aufrichtigkeit jeden Moment erkannt werden. Aber 
man kann kein Kleinstes finden, da es immer ein Überbleibsel 
vom Rest der Teile gibt und Teile von Teilen, wie die endlosen 
Obertöne angeschlagener Klaviernoten. Diese Akzidenzien 
sind die einzig mögliche Quelle des Wandels, da sie alleine 
die potenzielle Brücke zwischen einem sinnlichen Objekt 
und einem anderen sind. Denn in einem sinnlichen Objekt 
selbst, welches immer als ein fait accompli erkannt wird, kann 
es keine Veränderung geben, es kann höchstens vernichtet 
oder durch ein Neues ersetzt werden. Akzidenzien besitzen 
den dualen Status der Zugehörigkeit und Nicht-Zugehörigkeit 
zu einem Objekt, wie Wimpel an einem Maibaum oder 
Juwelen auf einer Wasserpfeife. Akzidenzien sind verführe-
rische Haken, die aus dem sinnlichen Objekt hervorragen 
und ihm die Chance geben sich mit anderen zu verbinden 
und dadurch zwei in eines zu fusionieren.
Aber die Teil-Ganzes Relation taucht nicht nur im sinnlichen 
Bereich auf. Auch ein reales Objekt wird aus Teilen gebildet, 
deren Verschwinden geradezu dessen Existenz bedroht.
Der Unterschied liegt darin, dass die Teile eines sinnlichen 
Objekts eingekrustet an seiner Oberfläche liegen: Eher noch 
fusionieren gewisse Aspekte dieser Teile, um es zu erschaffen, 
während der Rest dieser Teile als Rauschen von der Oberfläche 
ausströmt. Im Gegensatz dazu sind die Teile eines realen Ob-
jekts im Inneren dieses Objekts enthalten und nicht auf des-
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sen äußere Kruste gepflastert. In beiden Fällen gibt es jedoch 
eine stellvertretende Ursache, die es den Teilen ermöglicht 
sich zu verbinden. Das kann durch die historische Unters-
cheidung zwischen Skeptizismus und Okkasionalismus, die 
auf dieselbe Weise komplementär sind, wie Verkrustung und 
Verbindung, verdeutlicht werden. Hume und Malebranche 
stehen gegensätzlichen Versionen desselben Problems ge-
genüber. Obwohl Hume vermeintlich die Möglichkeit einer 
Verbindung anzweifelt, sollte man Notiz nehmen, dass sich 
für ihn bereits eine Verbindung ergeben hat: Er ist niemals 
überrascht, dass zwei Billardkugeln gleichzeitig in seinem 
Geist liegen, er zweifelt nur daran, ob diese unabhängige 
Kräfte besitzen, um sich gegenseitig Stöße zu versetzen. In 
diesem Sinne beginnt Hume mit der Verbindung innerhalb 
der Erfahrung und zweifelt bloß an der Trennung außerhalb 
dieser. Malebranche beginnt, die Existenz getrennter Sub-
stanzen voraussetzend, auf die umgekehrte Weise, zweifelt 
aber daran, dass diese denselben Raum auf solch eine Weise 
einnehmen können, um ihre Kräfte auszutauschen—was ihn 
dazu führt, die Macht Gottes als ultimativen Verbindungsraum 
aller Entitäten zu postulieren. Wie Hume können wir das 
intentionale Agens als stellvertretende Ursache anderenfalls 
getrennter Erscheinungen betrachten. Der Baum und sein 
bergiger Hintergrund sind tatsächlich verschieden, den-
noch sind sie in sofern vereinigt, wie ich aufrichtig in beide 
vertieft bin. Aber mehr als das: Wenn die Teile des Baumes 
fusionieren, um den Baum mit seiner einzelnen Baumqual-
ität hervorzubringen, dann bin auch ich die stellvertretende 
Ursache für die Verbindung dieser sinnlichen Gegenstände. 
Selbst wenn ich bloß passiv herumsitze ohne auf übertriebene 
Weise meine Augen oder meinen Geist zu überanstrengen, 
haben sich diese Teile immer noch für mich verbunden. 
Hier dient ein reales Objekt (ich selbst) als stellvertretende 
Ursache für zwei oder mehr sinnliche. Im umgekehrten 
Falle Malebranches können wir den Pistolenschuss einer 
Gottheit nicht als unsere vermittelnde Ursache akzeptieren, 
da nicht erklärt wird, wie Gott als ein reales Objekt andere 
reale Objekte berühren könnte: Angst vor Blasphemie ist der 
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einzige Schutz für diese unvollständige Theorie. Stattdessen 
müssen, genau wie zwei sinnliche Objekte von einem realen 
stellvertretend verbunden werden, zwei reale Objekte stell-
vertretend durch ein sinnliches verbunden werden. Ich trete 
mit einem andern Objekt nicht durch den unmöglichen 
Kontakt mit seiner Innenwelt in Beziehung, sondern nur 
indem ich seine Oberfläche in einer Weise streife, die sein 
Innenleben ins Spiel bringt. Genauso wie nur die gegenteili-
gen Pole von Magneten Kontakt aufnehmen und wie auch 
nur gegensätzliche Geschlechter allein fruchtbar sind, ist 
es auch der Fall, das zwei Objekte desselben Typs sich nicht 
gegenseitig berühren. Direkter Kontakt zwischen sinnlichen 
Objekten ist ohne ein intentionales Agens unmöglich und 
eine Verbindung zwischen zwei realen ereignet sich nicht, 
außer durch einen sinnlichen Vermittler. 
Daraus folgt, dass jeder Kontakt asymmetrisch sein muss. 
Egal wie tief ich mich in die Welt hinein grabe—ich begegne 
nur sinnlichen Gegenständen und genauso wenig begegnen 
reale Gegenstände jemals etwas anderem als meiner eigenen 
sinnlichen Fassade. Der Schlüssel zur stellvertretenden 
Verursachung liegt darin, dass sich zwei Objekte irgendwie 
berühren müssen ohne sich zu berühren. Im Falle des sinnli-
chen Bereichs passiert dies, wenn das intentionale Agens als 
stellvertretende Ursache für die Fusion multipler sinnlicher 
Objekte dient: Eine Fusion, die nur unvollständig verbleibt, 
verkrustet mit zurückbleibenden Akzidenzien. Aber im Falle 
realer Objekte ist der einzige Weg eines zu berühren ohne 
es zu berühren nur durch Verlockung beschreitbar. Nur hier 
entkommen wir dem toten Punkt eines bloßen Herumwälzens 
in den Düften der sinnlichen Dinge und begegnen Qualitäten, 
die eher zu einem entfernten signalisierendem Ding gehören 
als zu einem fleischlich Präsentem. Die einzige Möglichkeit 
reale Objekte in die sinnliche Sphäre zu bringen, ist sinnliche 
Objekte auf so eine Weise zu rekonfigurieren, dass sie nicht 
mehr nur länger in ein Neues fusionieren, wie Teile in ein 
Ganzes, sondern vielmehr durch die Anspielung auf eine 
dahinterliegende, tiefe Kraft animiert werden: einem realen 
Objekt. Das Gravitationsfeld eines realen Gegenstandes muss 
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irgendwie in das existierende sinnliche Feld einfallen. So 
wie ich der stellvertretende Link zwischen zwei sinnlichen 
Objekten bin, ist der verlockende Baum die stellvertretende 
Verbindung zwischen mir und dem realen Baum. Die genaue 
Dynamik dieses Prozesses verdient eine ausgedehntere 
Behandlung, aber dennoch ist etwas Ungewöhnliches offen-
sichtlich geworden. Die Trennung eines Dinges von seinen 
Eigenschaften ist nicht länger ein lokales Phänomen der 
menschlichen Erfahrung, stattdessen aber die Wurzel aller 
Beziehungen zwischen allen realen Objekten, Kausalrelationen 
eingeschlossen. Verlockung, in anderen Worten, gehört zur 
Ontologie als ganzer und nicht zur speziellen Metaphysik 
der tierischen Wahrnehmung. Relationen zwischen allen re-
alen Objekten, inklusive geistloser Dreckklumpen, ereignen 
sich nur durch eine Form der Anspielung. Aber insofern wir 
Verlockung mit einem ästhetischen Effekt identifiziert haben, 
bedeutet dies, dass die Ästhetik zur ersten Philosophie wird. 
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Speculative Realism
After finitude, and beyond?
A vade mecum
Louis Morelle
Translated by Leah Orth with the assistance of Mark Allan Ohm, 
Jon Cogburn, and Emily Beck Cogburn
Introduction: Does speculative realism even exist?
Presented as the first signifi-cant movement in continental philosophy since structuralism, 
speculative realism (SR) vociferously announces the end of 
correlationism and anthropocentrism in philosophy in favor 
of a “speculative turn.” By accommodating things, matter, sci-
ence, and the real qua objects as important as (if not more so 
than) language, thought, the phenomenal, and the social, SR 
has garnered attention and criticism from all sides these past 
few years. “Speculative Realism” was originally the title of a 
conference in 2007 that brought together four lesser-known 
but promising philosophers, and then it subsequently spread 
like wildfire via the Internet through blogs and open-access 
publishers, in addition to the traditional journal articles, books, 
colloquia, conferences and other official channels of academia. 
It has now become a “legitimate” subject of scholarship, 
taught in certain departments of contemporary philosophy 
and aesthetics and acquiring a section on the website Phil-




Anglo-Saxon “continental” circles, a buzzword, one of these 
fashionable terms whose meaning is obscured the more it 
spreads. Originally naming a philosophically diverse core of 
young philosophers seeking to emphasize themes that have 
become relatively marginal in continental philosophy such 
as metaphysical speculation, the inorganic, or the absolute, 
and united by a common refusal to attend solely to textual 
objects or phenomenal experience, this vague designation 
has sparked a diffuse desire among continental intellectuals 
to break with some presuppositions inherited from previous 
generations. Crystallizing a Zeitgeist, the term has lost its 
specificity, becoming the generic name for all those among 
the philosophical “young guard” who are laying claim to a 
“new metaphysics.” 
The undertaking of this exposé is therefore risky on several 
accounts, since it concerns the state of a current of thought 
with a conceptual solidity and durability that may appear 
uncertain at first glance. I will certainly not strive to regulate 
the correct or incorrect use of the term “speculative realism,” 
nor make it strictly historical, but rather attempt to offer a 
concise list of the positions, arguments, and concepts at work 
among the founding practitioners of SR, beginning from 
what they have in common.
My preliminary hypothesis is therefore the following: it is 
possible to discover a nontrivial philosophical core of SR. The 
verification or refutation of this hypothesis will settle one 
way or the other all related questions about SR, its future, its 
actual importance, and its ephemeral or fashionable character. 
•
With these preliminary precautions in mind, we can begin 
by studying the central question: what are the common 
characteristics of SR? Evidently, this cohesiveness must first 
be sought in the only agreed upon reference point for these 
philosophers: correlationism. If we refer to Quentin Meillas-
soux’s original definition:
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By “correlation” we mean the idea according to which we only ever 
have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never 
to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call 
correlationism any current of thought which maintains the unsurpass-
able character of the correlation so defined.2
The term refers to the tendency of Western philosophy since 
Kant to base all philosophical discourse on conditions of 
knowledge and to reject metaphysical propositions since they 
involve freedom from reference to experience, particularly 
phenomenal experience. More precisely, it seeks to point 
out the refinement that correlationism brings to idealism, 
namely, that we do not reduce everything to a single origin, 
but to a dual relation (subject-object, Dasein-Being, etc.) from 
which escape is impossible. This improvement is intended 
to provide philosophy with a foolproof protection from any 
realist or metaphysical illusion. It does not change the thrust 
of the thesis, to reduce every real being to being dependent 
on the relation to an originary ground, which is itself invari-
ably reduced to an anthropological determination (whether 
of experience or language).
This condensed description of the most criticized aspects 
of correlationism (it is, after all, an intrinsically polemical 
concept) is more or less common to all the philosophers 
identified with “speculative realism.” None of them, however, 
solely subscribe to this general characterization; by studying 
them closely one can distinguish extremely acute deviations. 
In fact, the problem is understanding which element, which 
assumption the correlation is based on (“the correlationist 
two-step,” as Meillassoux calls it) and how correlationism 
should be characterized. We can say that the challenge is to 
give substantial meaning, proper content, to the undeter-
mined form of correlationism outlined by Meillassoux in 
After Finitude by linking it to a fundamental source or error. 
However, according to the nature of the diagnosed error, the 
2 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 5. 
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excesses of correlationism accepted as symptomatic reveal 
diseases of a very different sort.
For two of these philosophers, the problem resides in the 
relation between ontology and epistemology, between being 
and knowledge.
• For Ray Brassier, the problem of correlationism is found 
in the dissolution of the barrier between metaphysics 
and epistemology. Indeed, by reducing all possible 
knowledge to a singular apprehension determined by 
the nature of a fundamental correlation, correlationism 
contributes to the reduction of every factual proposition, 
every meaning, to a particular standpoint cut off from 
any universality. It is therefore impossible to single 
out a solid epistemological criterion—this impossi-
bility, which Brassier most strongly opposes, is due to 
misconstruing a contingent relation as a fundamental 
feature of reality, typically, but not exclusively, subjec-
tive or phenomenal experience.3
• In contrast, for Graham Harman, the problem is the 
reduction of every statement to its epistemological 
preconditions, that is to say, to human knowledge; the 
original sin of correlationism is the implicit presuppo-
sition of the superiority of the epistemological relation 
of knowledge over all other relations.4
3 “Correlationism is subtle: it never denies that our thoughts or utterances aim 
at or intend mind-independent or language-independent realities; it merely 
stipulates that this apparently independent dimension remains internally 
related to thought and language. Thus contemporary correlationism dismisses 
the problematic of skepticism, and of epistemology more generally, as an 
antiquated Cartesian hang-up.” Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment 
and Extinction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 53.
4 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Washington: Zero Books, 2011), 
chapter 3. Also: “Correlationism arbitrarily treats the human/world rela-
tion as philosophically more important than any object/object relation.” 
“In correlationism, human and world are the sole realities and are mutually 
determined by their permanent rapport.” Graham Harman, Prince of Networks 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 176, 185.
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The other two philosophers believe it is essential to search 
for a solution in the relation between thought and the absolute.
• Iain Hamilton Grant sees the correlationist error in 
the confusion between the structure of knowledge (the 
Kantian transcendental) and its dynamic preconditions, 
which can be reconstructed from the structure, but are 
not found within it.5
• Finally, for Quentin Meillassoux, correlationism errs by 
ignoring the intrinsic possibility of a relation between 
thought and the absolute, which is revealed to be the 
absolute character of contingency.
We are thus dealing with versions of the same concept that 
are, if not opposed, at the very least clearly distinct. Moreover, 
it is possible to articulate the differences by demonstrating 
that the speculative realists recapitulate certain elements 
of correlationism, while at the same time rejecting a central 
element of it. In other words, we can identify, in each of their 
positions, elements that partially validate the correlationist 
position. While keeping this in mind in each of the fol-
lowing sections, it will be necessary to elucidate precisely 
how each position is anti-correlationist, and, perhaps more 
importantly, how some of their theses are implicitly drawn 
from correlationism.
Nevertheless, one may certainly be tempted to think that 
this diversity seems to clearly constitute evidence against 
a cohesiveness of SR, since nobody seems to even agree on 
the nature of the problem to be tackled. Does it still make 
sense, then, to discuss a cohesiveness based on a mere re-
jection of an idea? I think so, insofar as this denial and the 
disagreements that it entails make significant philosophical 
debate between theorists possible, although it is clear that the 
5 “The Idea is external to the thought that has it, the thought is external to 
the thinker that has it, the thinker is external to the nature that produces 
both the thinker and the thought and the Idea.” Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton 
Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux, “Speculative Realism,” 
in Collapse, Vol. III, 340.
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unity thereby produced is a weakened one. One can make an 
historical analogy here: just as the rejection of Kantian and 
Hegelian idealism gave rise to currents as diverse as Peirce’s 
and James’ pragmatism,6 the logical positivism of the Vienna 
Circle, ordinary language philosophy, and phenomenology; 
in the same way the rejection of correlationism enables the 
birth of heterogeneous philosophical currents capable of 
communicating with one another. This is due to the fact that 
the rejection of correlationism remains a topic of discussion 
and a project common to all these currents, even though 
disagreement reigns over the effective content of the project.
Despite the vagueness of the positive content, it can be 
formulated. Rejection of correlationism implies the truth of 
at least parts of modern naturalism as exemplified by Meillas-
soux’s concept of ancestrality. The problem then becomes the 
same as with correlationism: what is the truth that naturalism 
superficially manifests? For Brassier, “naturalism” means 
complete materialism; for Harman, one must go beyond 
naturalism to reach an ontology where all levels of the world 
would be equally real; for Grant, nature as a power of creation 
and irreducible transformation becomes the absolute.
It is thus apparent that the rejection of correlationism is 
full of consequences, and this allows one to say quite seri-
ously that speculative realism signs the birth certificate of a 
possible continental metaphysics.
A metaphysics first, because introducing the term “cor-
relationism” into philosophy shifts the presuppositions 
correlationism rests on from the status of obvious facts to 
questionable and debatable points. Thus, correlationism is 
no longer a rejection of metaphysics, but one metaphysics 
among others, an additional metaphysics. As such, all attempts 
(for example, along the lines of Heidegger and Derrida) of 
an “overcoming of metaphysics”7 are rejected as obsolete, 
6 Jean Wahl, The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America, trans. Fred 
Rothwell (London: Open Court, 1925).
7 Pierre Aubenque, Faut-il déconstruire la métaphysique? (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 2009).
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not so much because they are false, but because they rely on 
a disavowed metaphysics. Bypassing certain usual precau-
tions, we can then reinterpret certain theses with uncertain 
status in continental philosophy as properly metaphysical 
propositions. For instance, when, at the end of “The Earth 
Does Not Move,” Husserl postulates the transcendental ego 
that precedes and remains independent of the existence 
of every living being,8 or when Heidegger asserts that the 
historicity of Being involves literal metamorphoses of it, 
transforming from ancient Greece and medieval theology to 
modernity,9 are we not thus dealing with propositions sup-
ported by “metaphysical” entities every bit as speculative as 
Spinozist substance or Leibnizian monads? The speculative 
realists abandon the suspicion associated with metaphysical 
activity: rather than being required to justify its metaphysical 
approach, or examine its endless possibility, we must simply 
tackle the problem, since we cannot escape it10
There is room then for metaphysics, and rational discus-
sion between conflicting positions, where argumentation 
and refutation cannot be evaded. Every metaphysical attempt 
is prima facie legitimate, because of the mere fact that no 
absolute prohibition can be put in place prior to discussion. 
It is true that the form metaphysics must take still remains 
vague, especially with respect to what it must abandon and 
what it can keep, precisely because it must first be discussed, 
8 See also his affirmation, in the Ideas, that God would perceive not the things 
in themselves, but a thing’s adumbrative perception. Edmund Husserl, Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First 
Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The 
Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1982), §43.
9 Lee Braver, A Thing of this World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism (Evan-
ston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 270-272.
10 “Heidegger seeks a way out of metaphysics. He endeavors to clear a space 
where he can evade its grasp. But Whitehead doesn’t yearn for a return 
before, or for a leap beyond, metaphysics. Much more subversively, I think, 
he simply does metaphysics in his own way, inventing his own categories 
and working through his own problems.” Steven Shaviro, Without Critera: 
Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (Cambridge ma: mit Press, 2009), x.
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proven.11 In this way SR has been hailed as a “liberation” by 
those who rejoiced in seeing the possibility reestablished of 
discussing a thing as something other than a constitutive 
impasse of thought, this famous “finitude.” To paraphrase 
Harman, a pleasing aspect of this metaphysical revival is 
that while SR’s followers may run the risk of uttering falsities 
or nonsense, at least they are saying something, that is, they 
maintain precise theses and defend them through consider-
ations and argument, rather than cloaking themselves in the 
pathos of a principle of undecidability.
Continental, then, for three reasons. The first reason, which 
is not insignificant, is that most of SR’s participants come 
out of Anglo-Saxon academia, where continental philosophy 
constitutes a specific and autonomous field in the margins 
of mainstream, analytical philosophy, which most people 
see as “philosophy tout court,” while in France for example 
the situation is exactly reversed. For this reason, we should 
not be surprised that they choose to identify themselves as 
continentals. 
Second, because correlationism can be presented as the 
unifying characteristic of the quasi-totality of what had been 
coupled with the term “continental philosophy,” Bergson, 
Whitehead, and Deleuze, the only notable (although this is 
certainly a subject of discussion) exceptions to this unity, can 
be considered the precursors of SR. The almost completely 
“definitive” character of the Kantian turn in the eyes of classic 
continental philosophers (i.e., the endorsement of correla-
tionism) provides evidence for this historical argument. This 
is developed in detail in Lee Braver’s A Thing of this World: A 
History of Continental Anti-Realism, which has became a col-
lective reference SR supporters use in interpreting the philo-
sophical tradition. In this text, Braver identifies a continuous 
line of thought from Kant to Derrida through other major 
figures (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault), where anti-
realism12 develops in a more and more radical manner, from 
11 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 109-110.
12 Composed of six possible cumulative theses: rejection of the truth-
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a common conceptual scheme that serves as the foundation 
for the various options adopted. This extremely ambitious 
reconstruction is interesting in that it provides a common 
framework for the evolution of continental philosophy,13 
presenting it as a coherent project, which is precisely what 
SR seeks to reject.
Finally, the metaphysics that SR produces is certainly a 
continental metaphysics to the extent that it does not depart 
from another central point in the continental tradition, namely, 
the problematic status given to rationality, in particular 
discursive rationality. It is for this reason that “typically con-
tinental” philosophers such as Heidegger, Laruelle, Deleuze, 
or even Derrida (according to Martin Hägglund), far from 
being dismissed, are quite acceptable references in these 
metaphysical debates. The paradoxical idea of a metaphysics 
that does not seek to ignore objections to it but to incorporate 
their contributions, makes the “realism” in question “specula-
tive,” since it tries to develop specific modes of thought and 
foundation, taking seriously the inevitable intertwining of 
reason with other forms of thought, apprehension, and exis-
tence. Of course, this last point is highly problematic for the 
justification of doctrines resulting from such a process (we 
will have the opportunity to return to this), but it is crucial 
to understand how SR is very much a continuation of the 
continental line of thought.
In this text, I will attempt to present the main threads of 
SR. I will not concentrate as much on the proposed renewal 
of subjects of philosophical inquiry (thus leaving aside the 
insistent call to “return to the real,” to focus on material 
objects or the contributions of natural science or the social 
sciences), but rather on the various metaphysical and on-
tological alternatives that underlie this “turn” (the central 
anthology of SR is titled The Speculative Turn, echoing the 
correspondence, of independence from the mind, ontological pluralism, 
rejection of bivalence, active role of the subject relative to its knowledge, 
plurality of the subject.




“linguistic turn”). I will also consider the arguments, concepts, 
and points of debate that emerge, as this is the heart of the 
subject. I will successively present Harman’s object-oriented 
ontology, Brassier’s “nihilism”, and finally Grant’s variety of 
neo-vitalism.14
I. Object-Oriented Ontology: Graham Harman
(Latour / Heidegger)
Variants: Levi Bryant, Bruno Latour
Correlationism: Every apprehension and every relation is 
essentially different from the object it aims at (the tree that I 
think is by definition different from the tree itself).
Anti-correlationism: there is no fundamental ontological 
difference in the relations between subject and object and 
the relations between objects.
•
Object-oriented ontology (OOO)15 asserts the reality and 
fundamentality of singular individuals, baptized objects. 
An object is defined as a substantial singularity endowed with 
14 I leave aside Quentin Meillassoux, firstly because Martin Fortier has more 
than adequately introduced his work in the seminar in which this paper 
was initially presented (now archived at http://www.atmoc.fr/seances/; scroll 
down to the seventh presentation in the series for Fortier’s talk), secondly, 
because, unlike other currents, Meillassoux does not “make a school,” at least 
to my knowledge, for reasons due to human contingency (non-appearance 
of L’Inexistence divine), and probably, also to the very singular character of 
his thought.
15 [In Morelle’s translation, l’ontologie objectuelle, literally, “philosophy ori-
ented towards the object” (Tristan Garcia translates this literally in French as 
philosophie-orientée-objet). The term dates from 1999, and its variant (OOO) 
from 2008. The “official” translation [in French] is philosophie centrée sur 
l’objet [“philosophy centered on the object”]. Graham Harman, L’Objet 
quadruple, trans. Olivier Dubouclez (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2010). The term adopted [by Morelle, i.e., ontologie objectuelle] is personal, 
and responds to criteria of simplicity and euphony.] 
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unity and irreducible to the whole of relations that relate to it 
(what Harman summarizes by the expression “unified and 
autonomous”16). OOO is therefore an attempt to argue that 
the concept of substance is still as indispensible to metaphys-
ics as it is to every other theory and discourse. The domain 
of objects includes: physical objects (a quark) and theoreti-
cal objects (concepts), natural objects (a dog) and artificial 
objects (a computer), intangible objects (a multinational) 
and concrete objects, real objects and imaginary objects. The 
central claim of OOO is that these are all on equal footing. 
And the concept of object has the concept of relation as its 
correlate, either determining the object independently, or 
on the interior of another object (the car that I observe and 
the car that the road supports are one and the same object, 
but apprehended through two distinct relations: vision and 
spatial copresence). Yet these relations are not dealing with 
the car itself, in its proper being, but with a version of this: 
the “visible car” and the “heavy car.” The real car itself is in-
accessible to every relation. To be real, it must exist by itself, 
from itself, and not by another thing: the reality of a thing, 
whatever it may be, is its withdrawal (and for this reason 
relations only deal with second-order objects, equivalent to 
Husserlian intentional objects, distinct from real objects: 
Harman baptizes them “sensual objects”). 
The concept of withdrawal is directly inherited from Heidegger. 
But whereas the German philosopher attributed withdrawal 
to Being alone, denying it to beings “immediately accessible,” 
present at hand entities, OOO claims that withdrawal is the 
essential characteristic of every reality qua individual reality. 
In fact, because it equates reality with withdrawal, every ne-
gation of the fundamental feature of objects is, in effect, the 
negation of their reality. If objects were in some way effects 
in an order of things distinct from themselves, they would 
quite simply not exist. Consequently, a “radical” position, that 
denies the reality of objects,17 is equivalent in the end to a 
16 Harman, Prince of Networks, 154.
17 Harman, Prince of Networks; Harman, The Quadruple Object, chapter I: 
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more or less well-disguised monism, essentially returning 
to a form of correlationism. And yet correlationism only 
consists in elevating a specific type of relation above all oth-
ers: the relation between human being and world. In order to 
maintain a reality full of individual objects, it is necessary to 
assert that there is no ontological difference between subject/
object relations and object/object relations.
Thus experience and thought are restricted to a particular 
case of the universal category of relation: their emergence 
can only be envisioned as one leap among others, purely 
“ontic,” and never ontological.18 The problem that remains is 
knowing how each relation—of causality, of subjectivity, or of 
mereological composition—is metaphysically possible, which 
leads to the renewal of the ancient problem of occasionalism.19 
What is essential, however, is that the mystery is not limited 
to the sphere of humanity or sentience. 
In addition, perception, qua relation, is necessarily a cari-
cature, but a legitimate caricature, present on all levels of the 
cosmos; from there perceptual realism dissolves, since no 
object is present in any relation, but always in the reduced, 
intelligible form given to experience. We are faced with a 
paradox: objects are precisely as they are given (qua sensual 
objects) and precisely other than they are given (qua real 
objects). OOO is presented as an ontological realism and an 
epistemological anti-realism, a position that sparks a number 
of internal difficulties.
Indeed, as we have said, since there is no difference between 
subject/object relations and object/object relations, in Hus-
serlian language they are both “intentional” (because they 
take place between singular objects).20 To contest this thesis 
“Undermining and Overmining.”
18 Harman, The Quadruple Object, chapter VIII: “Levels and Psyche.” See also 
Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of 
Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), chapter XII: “Some Implications;” the 
emergence of perception is presented there as a simple case among other 
“gradations” composing the history of the universe.
19 Harman, The Quadruple Object, chapter V: “Indirect Causation.”
20 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Chi-
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would mean denying the specific character of each interaction, 
namely, that it depends upon the nature of the objects in play. 
For example, obviously a table does not enter into a similar 
relation with a feather falling on it as it does with a heavy 
stone that is capable of smashing it. We notice, however, that 
it is through Husserl that Harman defends this thesis; in fact, 
his refutation of empiricism in the Logical Investigations uses 
an interpretation of the sensible as composed of immanent 
or intentional objects.21 But such a theoretical gesture is not 
made without raising a number of difficulties. 
Indeed, activating a distinctive category of experience, 
intentionality, in order to attribute it to every relation qua 
relation, is double-edged; on one hand, it seems to exhaust 
the logic of the decentering of ontology by attributing what 
seems to only be a privilege of human perception to every 
interaction between objects of all sorts; on the other, the 
specter of what one can call the sophism of the projection, that is, 
the idea of covertly reducing what is called ontology to only 
human subjectivity, becomes a looming danger. The type of 
position defended by OOO is at times called a flat ontology,22 
and the metaphor is here quite meaningful: by “flattening” 
the ontological terrain, and as a result forcing the rethinking 
of every type of existence and relation “on the same level,” 
the problem immediately arises of knowing which level this 
is, how to succeed in determining its essence, and above all, 
whether it constitutes a form more or less disguised by pro-
jection in the way we just introduced.
Therefore, we are again confronted with a particular version 
of the absolute like “the night in which all cows are black.” 
Such a difficulty was already present in a precursor of SR 
such as Whitehead, who admits to identifying his concept 
cago: Open Court, 2002), 121, 220; Graham Harman, “Intentional Objects 
for Non-Humans,” Lecture given at the Université de Toulouse le Mirail, 
France, November 18 2008.
21 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, chapter II and 154-158; Harman, The Qua-
druple Object, chapter II. 
22 Term borrowed from Manuel De Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Phi-
losophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 47.
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of prehension (that is to say, every relation between entities) 
with the concept of thought or of idea:
With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology, “prehen-
sions” are a generalization from Descartes’ mental “cogitations,” and 
from Locke’s “ideas,” to express the most concrete mode of analysis 
applicable to every grade of individual actuality.23
This question, which can be called the “problem of decenter-
ing,” is especially troublesome with respect to OOO, because it 
cannot itself be envisioned, since the will to abolish all ontologi-
cal privilege connected to human subjectivity precludes any 
conceptual account of the modalities of human subjectivity, 
and therefore cannot avoid making its central idea unclear. 
It thus fails to conceive of subjectivity as a “mere” particular-
ization of ontology, that is to say, as something other than a 
hidden model that would dissolve the decentering. For this 
reason, it is not satisfying to conceive of alterity solely via a 
fundamental withdrawal, despite Harman’s call for “polypsy-
chism” as a remedy to “panpsychist” excesses, claiming that 
only the latter falls prey to the “sophism of projection.” This 
is because, in both cases, the relational variations begin from 
the model of human subjectivity.24 This problem of decenter-
ing would involve an incapacity, in the end, to distinguish 
“flat” ontologies from their correlationist adversaries (see, 
for example, the literature on the rapprochements between 
Whitehead and phenomenology, and Pierre Cassou-Noguès” 
recent book, Le bord de l’expérience [puf, 2010], dealing explic-
itly with such a project).
23 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology corr. 
and ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 
1978), 19.
24 Despite the exciting possibility that this opens. On the description of the 
interior of objects: “I would even propose a new philosophical discipline 
called ‘speculative psychology’ dedicated to ferreting out the specific psychic 
reality of earthworms, dust, armies, chalk, and stone” (Harman, Prince of Net-
works, 213). This project is taken seriously by Ian Bogost, who concentrates 
on technological objects in his Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a 
Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
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The discussion within SR focuses on the possibility of a 
valid epistemology starting from the presuppositions of 
OOO. In order to summarize this debate, it is useful for us to 
focus on Bruno Latour, and more precisely on his explicitly 
ontological work, Irreductions, which can be used as a smaller 
model of OOO’s essential propositions on this terrain. Ray 
Brassier targets it in his article “Concept and Objects,” with 
the same goal. In short, Latour is criticized for the complete 
dissolution of the limits separating real objects from repre-
sentations; that is, he is guilty of endorsing the impossibility 
of every notion of the true and false by way of a collapsing 
of all things into a neutral monism of “actants” and their 
mutual “trials of strength.”
Indeed, Latour redraws the epistemological relations of 
knowledge in pragmatic terms, envisaging representations 
and concepts, not as detached modes of contemplating es-
tablished facts, but as relations between actants. As beings 
of the world these actants not only demand an exercise of 
force and a material effort in order to be realized, but are an 
exercise of force themselves: “Nothing is known—only real-
ized” (Irreductions, 1.1.5.4). For example, in order to know the 
chemical properties of a liquid, it is necessary to subject it to 
diverse trials of composition and decomposition, as in some 
sort of torture where the liquid actant reveals its character-
istics through resistance to confronting forces. “A sentence 
does not hold together because it is true, but because it holds 
together we say that it is ‘true.’”25 If concepts have truth, it is 
because they are things among others and are subject to the 
same rules of efficacy as any other relation. The reading of 
Irreductions is extremely disturbing in this regard, because 
it forces one to consider ideas from a completely desecrated 
view, yet within the framework of a fully coherent line of 
reasoning.
Yet for Brassier, this “actualist” conception of ontology 
only serves to destroy every limit which might allow the 
separation of valid discourse from fabrication. He accuses 
25 Bruno Latour, “Irreductions,” in The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 2.4.8.
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Latour of reductionism with regard to epistemology, forming 
a metaphysics liberated from any demand for justification 
and argumentation:
the difference between “words” and “things” turns out to be no more 
than a functional difference subsumed by the concept of “actant”—that 
is to say, it is a merely nominal difference encompassed by the meta-
physical function now ascribed to the metaphor “actant.”26
Brassier’s critique proves problematic, both because it rests 
on a rather heavy set of presuppositions (see the following 
section), and because it does not give an account of the finer 
points of Latour’s ontology. However, it certainly helps make 
the problem of Latour’s “flat ontology,” as well as OOO, very 
acute as they fail to offer an internal epistemological criterion: 
why qualify ontological unities as actants rather than as pas-
sive subjects of external forces? Thus, the confusion produced 
by ontological decentering proves to be difficult to eliminate 
without the risk of falling into a metaphysics with a founda-
tion that would prove, ultimately, irrational. The fundamental 
problem then consists in noticing how difficult it is to sup-
ply it with a true epistemological foundation with the proper 
tools of OOO. Such a foundation would be the complete loss 
of OOO’s project, hopelessly engulfing it in a theory of sense 
and representation as the point of departure for philosophy. 
Effectively, the responses of OOO’s followers to the objections 
born from epistemological preoccupations such as Brassier’s, 
26 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Har-
man (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 52. See also: “It is instructive to note how 
many reductions must be carried out in order for irreductionism to get off 
the ground: reason, science, knowledge, truth—all must be eliminated. Of 
course, Latour has no qualms about reducing reason to arbitration, science 
to custom, knowledge to manipulation, or truth to force: the veritable object 
of his irreductionist afflatus is not reduction per se, in which he wantonly 
indulges, but explanation, and the cognitive privilege accorded to scientific 
explanation in particular.” Thus, it is impossible, according to Brassier, to 
philosophically recontextualize the category of explanation without putting 
a radical attack in its place, since epistemology is, irrevocably, first philosophy.
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or from the relation between the sophism of projection and 
ontologies of decentering are something like denial, or, in 
the best case scenario, accusing opposing positions of being 
victims of idealism.27 On this account, the problem remains 
unresolved, even if it is not necessarily insoluble.




Variants: Peter Wolfendale, Martin Hägglund
Correlationism: There can only be knowledge and meaning 
within the limits specified by rationality.
Anti-Correlationism: Rationality is independent from any 
origin situated in subjective experience.
•
The second theoretical side of SR is clearly less unified than 
the first since as it does not boast of a distinct conceptual 
invention theorists could be reunited around. Rather, we are 
dealing with a current of thought with diverse aspirations 
and variable forms: transcendental nihilism (Brassier), non-
philosophy (Laruelle), radical atheist materialism (Hägglund), 
transcendental realism (Brassier, Wolfendale), methodological 
naturalism, normativism, inferentialism, anti-vitalism…This 
is not about enumerating labels, and I would not do it if this 
diversity were not significant. In fact, the unification of the 
viewpoint is less about a particular concept or original thesis 
than allowing the possibility of linking together a number 
of separate and individually discussed theses. It consists of 
the following positions:
27 Graham Harman, “And I am also of the opinion that materialism must be 
destroyed,” in Environment and Society D: Society and Space, 28 (2010), 772-790; 
Harman, The Quadruple Object, chapter VIII.
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(a) Ordinary realism (independence of the world from the mind)
(b) Inferentialism (formal autonomy of reason)
(c) Scientific realism (the propositions produced by scientific 
and mathematical method genuinely inform us about 
the world)
(d) Eliminativism concerning experience (the contents of ex-
perience do not literally represent any real determination)
(e) Materialism (ontological priority of inorganic over 
organic, of matter over the living)
Not only are these compatible, but they also mutually entail 
one another based on concepts of a reality independent of 
the mind and reason being tied to truth. The conclusion of 
nihilism, that is, the inexistence of any “meaning” inherent 
to things thus emerges, as the essential truth of the Enlighten-
ment project (the emancipation of Reason).28 In other words, 
if for Continentals the truth (or, in its stead, what philosophy 
produces) is supposed to be exciting or grand, and if, for 
the analytics, to discover it involves making it tedious,29 for 
28 An attempt, which I am not entirely satisfied with, at connecting these 
theses: Reason, impersonal and formal, is the condition of possibility of all 
thought and speculation (inferentialism). It compellingly makes possible 
the rational knowledge of reality (transcendental realism). This knowledge 
is based on the idea of a reality absolutely independent of thought, and 
postulated by the already established concept of reason. In turn, this allows 
a set of substantial deductions about the world, devoid of meaning and 
harmony between human being and the world, thought and being, facts 
and values (nihilism).
29 “Any effort in philosophy to make the obscure obvious is likely to be 
unappealing, for the penalty of failure is confusion while the reward of 
success is banality.” Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance (Boston: 
R. Reidel, 1977). On the continental side, see the concept of image of thought 
defended by Gilles Deleuze in Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994). “As long as we’re content with criticizing the ‘false,’ 
we’re not bothering anyone (true critique is the criticism of true forms, not 
false contents. You don’t criticize capitalism or imperialism by denouncing 
their ‘mistakes’).” Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2004), 138, or the more systematic defense of 
rhetoric by Harman in Prince of Networks, 168-174. Let us add (“of course”) 
that these characterizations do not constitute value judgments. Here I es-
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Brassier, the truth proves to be despairing, (even must be, 
according to the interpretation that we will form) or, more 
rigorously, violently demystifying.
It is the link between these fundamental theses, rather than 
these theses themselves, that give an identity to this current. 
It would be largely inaccurate, except for the sake of exposi-
tion, to discuss this position only through its eliminativist 
or scientist aspects, as is often done, since the conceptual 
framework of the theory is actually much larger.30 That also 
complicates the task of summarizing this underlying philo-
sophical project in an intelligible way, since one could dedicate 
(and some indeed have) entire books to each individual thesis.
One can quickly give an adequate idea of Brassier’s position 
by contrasting it with another “materialist” of SR, Quentin 
Meillassoux. As we have seen with Meillassoux, the discovery 
of the absence of an ultimate reason for things is that of an 
absolute:
Instead of laughing or smiling at questions like “Where do we come from?” 
or “Why do we exist?,” we should ponder instead the remarkable fact 
that the replies “From nothing. For nothing” really are answers, thereby 
realizing that these really were questions—and excellent ones at that.31
But if, for Meillassoux, this absence of reason (or principle of 
unreason) is an absolute fact, in an even more audacious way 
for Brassier, it is a fact which carries a substantial thesis: the 
absolute ontological primacy of matter over mind, of death 
over life.32 Philosophy then becomes the discipline charged 
with bringing to light the insurmountable truth of extinction.
sentially refer to the differences in attitude concerning language, rhetoric, 
and the nature of knowledge produced by philosophy in the two traditions.
30 It would be difficult for “standard” eliminitavists, à la Churchland, not 
only to refer to, but to admit as acceptable, the philosophical methods drawn 
from Laruelle, Badiou, or Heidegger...
31 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 110.
32 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, preface.
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For instance, coming back to the eliminativist thesis, if one 
supposes its literal truth,33 then one infers from it that the 
ultimate meaning of this truth is that thought and experience 
allow access to no real determination. Therefore, it passes 
from “grass is not really, in itself, green,” to “our experience 
of grass is only a secondary effect and foreign to grass itself.” 
Ultimately Brassier’s anti-correlationism consists in its literal 
inversion: the correlate of thought is not being, but non-being. 
This project, and the theses that it proposes, can seem ex-
cessively heavy, arbitrary, or absurd (a sort of philosophical 
Houellebecq). This would be the case indeed if there were no 
method to support this ambition. And yet one of them exists, 
found principally by Brassier, in the French philosopher 
François Laruelle.34 I will certainly not venture to summarize 
the thoughts of this rather arduous author, but will quickly 
present the part which concerns us here: Laruelle’s project 
involves replacing philosophy with “non-philosophy,” i.e., the 
systematic opposition to every philosophical attempt to use 
thought to add anything to the “flat” discoveries of scientificity 
and the “radically immanent” presence of the Real. The Real 
is always present, always accessible, but, since it is not an idea 
or a concept, the nature of philosophy is to perpetually miss 
it. Indeed, the sin of philosophy is its inaugural Decision to 
understand the Real (or the One) by something other than 
it (by idea, intuition, language, etc.), to divide itself from it 
in order to understand it. Philosophy does nothing except 
develop this circular Decision. All the subsequent work of 
philosophy involves the desperate attempt to rejoin what has 
been separated, forming a synthesis from an always-arbitrary 
control-point.35 This negative thesis, which corresponds to 
a formal and generalized version of denunciations of meta-
33 We understand what we suppose to be true, if demonstrated philosophi-
cally to be true. I will return to this. That is, if we suppose it philosophically 
demonstrated to be true.
34 Hägglund makes use of Derrida in his approach, seeking to unearth the 
constructive tools of a “radical atheist materialism” within deconstruction.
35 What Laurelle calls the method of “transcendental deduction” Brassier, 
Nihil Unbound, 123.
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physics by Heidegger or Derrida,36 permits abolishing every 
attempt to think about the world apart from the insurmount-
able facts of the real that are proposed to us.37 To think of the 
Real as separate from thought requires a “non-Decisional” 
philosophy that, with one of the most painful lexical choices 
of the twentieth century, Laruelle baptizes “non-philosophy.”
We now return to eliminativism (which is not the only 
thesis of Brassier’s nihilism, but is rather useful for us as a 
guiding thread here): the most contemporary opposition 
against eliminativism involves categorizing it as nonsense, 
either through self-contradiction, or because it is incapable 
of giving a ground for itself, and must resort to a form of, at 
the very least, insufficient pragmatism.38 Laruelle’s method, 
reviewed by Brassier, accepts philosophical irreducibility 
from the fact of the absence of correlation between being and 
thought—not only the empirical, but the ontological truth of 
the consequences of eliminativism: “We gain access to the 
structure of reality via a machinery of conception which 
extracts intelligible indices from a world that is not designed 
to be intelligible and is not originarily infused with meaning.”39
36 “[Laruelle’s] innovation is fundamentally formal,” Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 148.
37 “Metaphysics conceived of the autonomy of the object in terms of the 
model of substance. But successive critiques of the hypostatization of 
substance from Kant to Heidegger have undermined the plausibility of 
metaphysical (substance based) realism, thereby securing the triumph of 
correlationism. Laruelle’s work challenges this correlationist consensus 
by proposing a version of transcendental realism wherein the object is no 
longer conceived of as a substance but rather as a discontinuous cut in the 
fabric of ontological synthesis. It is no longer thought that determines the 
object, whether through representation or intuition, but rather the object 
that seizes thought and forces it to think it, or better, according to it.” Ibid., 149.
38 Teed Rockwell, “Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Im-
plications of Churchland’s Pragmatic Pluralism,” Revised version, October 
1998, unpublished article. Accessed May 31 2011: http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/
beyondem.html
39 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” §4 (Our emphasis). Compare this 
with Churchland’s declaration: “it is far from obvious that truth is either the 
primary or the principal product of [cognitive] activity. Rather, its function 
would appear to be the ever more finely tuned administration of the organ-
ism’s behaviour.” Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The 
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Brassier’s other method of supporting his position consists 
in maintaining that every attempt to deny the objectivity-
nihilism correlation, through vitalism or an overturning of 
the category of objectivity, is based on an illegitimate concept 
of reason or thought that exceeds what can be defended by 
reason. The paradigmatic example here would be that of 
Bergson, whose philosophy of life celebrates novelty and 
relies heavily on a limited conception of reason, the latter 
being marginalized in favor of intuition. Against such a cur-
rent of thought (which brings together Deleuze, Whitehead, 
Heidegger, Hegel, and all the metaphysicians of SR), Brassier 
resorts to a deconstruction inspired by Wilfrid Sellars and his 
critique of the “myth of the given.” The myth of the given is 
“the idea that there is a certain stratum of experience which is 
somehow making a truth claim and which is somehow more 
basic than any acquired conceptual system.”40 For Brassier, all 
the vitalist or phenomenological claims of conceptual priority 
for lived experience and the non-conceptual over conceptual 
reason are reduced to nothingness, either through critique 
of the myth of the given,41 or through a prior reduction to a 
form of correlationism undermined by this critique: “In the 
absence of any physicalist corrective to vitalist hubris, biocen-
trism leads infallibly to noocentrism.”42 Thus, every appeal to 
intellectual or sensual intuition is humiliated and rejected 
in favor of an irreducible attachment to an “impersonal” 
concept of reason borrowed from Robert Brandom (Making 
It Explicit). This rejection is not only formal, but also implies 
a substantial conclusion, namely the priority of death over 
Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989), 
150, cited in Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 19.
40 Wilfrid Sellars, Notre Dame Lectures, 1969-1986, transcr. Pedro Amaral, 
249. Accessed July 1 2012: http://zimmer.csufresno.edu/~pedroa/Wilfrid%20
Sellars%20Notre%20Dame%20Lectures.pdf 
41 Ray Brassier, “Bergson, Lived Experience, and the Myth of the Given,” 
Lecture given at colloquium in Zagreb, June 18 2011.
42 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 200.
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life: “The living is only a form of what is dead, and a very rare 
form” (Nietzsche).43 The omnipresence of extinction in the 
very heart of life and thought is the highest truth.
How, then, can this conception be critiqued? The most 
obvious problem resides in its very specific usage of philo-
sophical rationality that claims to discover some “subtrac-
tionist” truths—both substantial and negative truths (namely, 
nihilism)—by a formal method. It is uncertain whether such 
a position is tenable, at least according to the precision with 
which Brassier guards himself. So, more generally, his posi-
tion is based on an emphatic interpretation of the nature 
of the ideas of objectivity and rationality, which in their 
proper form would have profound substantial content;44 yet 
this method, though proving definitively powerful when it 
comes to refutation, appears much weaker when it comes to 
defending its own theses. Moreover, the arguments against him, 
incidentally, are less concerned with the extremely technical 
metaphysical presuppositions borrowed from Badiou and 
Laruelle, than his reprise of scientific realism (and his elimi-
nativist conclusions) via inferentialism, titled “transcendental 
realism.” The metaphysical tit-for-tat response (from Harman 
to Brassier) consisted in showing how attempts to identify 
scientific rationality with ontology were doomed to failure 
because they themselves rely on an extremely unsophisticated 
metaphysics equivalent to a “naïve” process-relationalism 
(cf. the next section). On a broader level, Harman objects 
to Brassier because he absolutizes scientific methods and 
results. This, argues Harman, does not constitute the deeper 
message of the Enlightenment, but simply underwrites a form 
of correlationism, since this affirms that the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge delimit the framework of ontology.45 
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), III, §109.
44 As Brassier summarizes it: “I am a nihilist because I believe in truth.” 
45 Cf. Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” §1, and Harman, “I am also of the 
opinion that materialism must be destroyed.”
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It seems that the question remains open since the rejection 
of the position (normative nihilism) involves an ontology 
close to OOO (and inversely), because the two tend to mutu-
ally refute each other. We will therefore examine what makes 
up the last type of position.
III. Neo-Vitalisms: Iain Hamilton Grant
(Schelling/Deleuze/Whitehead)
Variants: Manuel De Landa, Steven Shaviro
Correlationism: No essential difference exists between the 
material and the ideal.
Anti-correlationism: It is impossible to reduce the origin 
of existence to properties or determinations that are indi-
vidually identifiable or can be apprehended by an experience.
•
The last current of SR is not the easiest to approach, on the 
one hand, because alternate versions abound (especially in-
spired by Deleuze and Whitehead46), and, on the other hand, 
because its “original” representative, Iain Hamilton Grant, 
expresses his thought in a way that is difficult to access, by 
confining it to the narrow space of Schellingian studies. In 
fact, for Grant, the abandonment of active nature, which char-
acterizes modern philosophy in general and correlationism 
in particular (its aphysia, or forgetting of Nature), found a 
worthy adversary in F. W. J. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. His 
essentially historical work demonstrates the existence of 
nontrivial thought about nature in Schelling, and he argues 
that it is irreducible to any other philosophical alternative. 
In doing so, he arrives at a vitalist version of idealism. By 
“idealism,” he means:
46 I will not linger here on the Whiteheadians, such as Steven Shaviro, in 
order to simplify this introduction somewhat.
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(a) Platonist realism (the Idea exists just as much as thought 
and things),
(b) a concept of matter as active and substantial rather than 
as a mere negation of form,47 and
(c) relativity of the existence of singular things, commen-
surate with a dynamism more profound than the things 
themselves (Nature).
Idealism is the condition, (a) of every metaphysics, (b) of 
every true materialism, and (c) of a realism that is not na-
ïve and essentialist. We obtain the only tenable realism by 
reuniting these three aspects: a speculative realism, in the 
sense Schelling gave to speculative physics. What matters for 
Grant is to be opposed to contemporary negations of these 
three fundamental theses. e Idea within correlation to the 
thinking subject, endorsing the incessant survival of a neo-
Fichteanism against the Schellingianism he defends. Against 
(b), the Aristotelian privilege accorded to form, resulting in 
a negative conception of matter against Plato’s active mat-
ter. The other forms of speculative realism do not literally 
subscribe to (a), but, are not, strictly speaking, opposed to it 
(above all object-oriented ontology, which accepts the reality 
of concepts as objects); by contrast, it is with (b) and (c) that 
the difference is the clearest. First, concerning (b), there is 
no doubt that OOO and transcendental nihilism are clearly 
devoted to the autonomy of form over matter.
For Brassier, the negation of (b) is twofold: there is a reality 
of form, since its autonomy with respect to every determi-
nation is the condition of existence of reason and thought, 
uprooted from every “intuition;” but there is also a primary 
reality of inert matter, since Brassier completely adopts the 
concept of inert matter that Grant rejects and makes the 
ultimate truth of ontology from it.




For Harman, who does not hide his Aristotelian heritage 
on this point,48 the presence of formalism is rather patent: 
the world is structured in terms of objects, and, since we 
cannot know the full reality of objects, then strictly speak-
ing only their generic form is accessible to ontology. Yet this 
form is universal and identical for all objects. Harman would 
completely agree with Grant on the fact that it is necessary 
to reject the concept of physical matter as the fundamental 
category of ontology (i.e., physicalism), because such a con-
cept is only the pretext for a hidden idealism.49 However, he 
does not support the concept of active matter, but only the 
idea of objects being active.
The last point is, in reality, the true grounds for opposition 
between the various neo-vitalisms, (whether they are inherited 
from Schelling, as in Grant, from Deleuze, or from Bergson) 
and OOO. Active matter is rejected by OOO not because of 
a taste for an inert conception of matter, but because active 
matter deprives singular objects of their reality by situating 
activity, novelty, and, in the end, reality, outside of objects 
in a mysterious substrate. Critiquing Jane Bennett’s “vital 
materialism,” Harman thus declares:
Ultimately, what is real in her new Nicene Creed is a pluriverse not 
of many things, but of “one matter-energy” that is “traversed by het-
erogeneities.” The danger for Bennett, as for Deleuze and Deleuze’s 
Spinoza, is that objects are liberated from slavery to the human gaze 
only to fall into a new slavery to a single “matter-energy” that allows 
for no strife between autonomous individual things.50
48 Graham Harman, “Aristotle With a Twist,” in Speculative Medievalisms: A 
Laboratory-Atelier. Edited by Nicola Masciandro and Eileen A. Joy. (Brooklyn, 
NY: punctum books, forthcoming 2012)
49 “To define a thing as material stuff that occupies space is to reduce it to 
a system of coordinates and measurable properties. Though it may seem 
that matter is autonomous, it is only autonomous insofar as humans define 
it according to certain properties, not in its own right.” Harman, Prince of 
Networks, 141. See also 107-112, as well as Harman, “I am also of the opinion 
that materialism must be destroyed.”
50 Graham Harman, “Autonomous objects: a review of Jane Bennett’s Vibrant 
Matter: a political ecology of things,” New Formations 71 (Spring 2011), 125-130.
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Thus, it is because (b) and (c) are closely linked in Grant’s 
idealism and contemporary neo-vitalisms that OOO is op-
posed to the idea of matter defined as active. On the other 
side, the neo-vitalists are opposed to the existence of indi-
vidual things and prefer a form of non-individuated monism, 
because these things would be inextricably tied to a concept 
of a manipulable and calculable thing: “[we] view the world 
as if it consisted not of an ever-changing flow of time but of 
a calculable set of things,” laments Bennett.51 Such a flow, a 
“process,” is at the center of vitalist ontologies,52 and is criti-
cized very insistently by the other SR participants.53 Either 
we are literally dealing with a unique “dynamism” (or the 
beyond of unity) that produces the individuality of things, 
in which case it becomes difficult to see how things have ever 
been able to be individuated from an entirely indeterminate 
apeiron); or, we assert that only non-individual dynamism is 
real, and that separate things are only a product of a human 
sensation,54 in which case we are dealing with an idealism 
that privileges subjectivity over the real being of things. Or, 
finally, we take recourse to hybrid concepts such as Gilbert 
Simondon’s “preindividual singularities” or De Landa’s 
51 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 77.
52 “To take the most obvious example, in some realist approaches the 
world is thought to be composed of fully formed objects whose identity is 
guaranteed by their possession of an essence, a core set of properties that 
defines what these objects are. Deleuze is not a realist about essences, or any 
other transcendent entity, so in his philosophy something else is needed to 
explain what gives objects their identity and what preserves this identity 
through time. Briefly, this something else is dynamical processes. Some of 
these processes are material and energetic, some are not, but even the latter 
remain immanent to the world of matter and energy.” De Landa, Intensive 
Science and Virtual Philosophy, 2-3.
53 Harman, Prince of Networks, 160-161; Tristan Garcia, Forme et objet: un traité 
des choses (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011), 46.
54 “The distinct outlines which we see in an object, and which give it its in-
dividuality, are only the design of a certain kind of influence that we might 
exert on a certain point of space: it is the plan of our eventual actions that 
is sent back to our eyes, as though by a mirror, when we see the surfaces and 
edges of things.” Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 12.
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“heterogeneous continuum” in order to explain such a pas-
sage, although the consistency of such concepts is greatly 
diminished by their synthetic nature and they simply name 
a problem, rather than solving it. This is the main challenge 
that all vitalist, and, more broadly, panpsychist, positions 
must face, and that emerges in contemporary continental 
metaphysics: to show how their concepts are both sound and 
capable of overcoming “poor” materialism.
•
How to conclude after multiple back and forths, tentative 
philosophical hypotheses, and their repeated rebuttals? Ul-
timately, what can be said about speculative realism as such, 
which appears so divided and dispersed? The best response I 
have at my disposal to these two questions consists in main-
taining that, despite the incomplete or problematic nature 
of the theories proposed, they all contain a philosophical, 
and perhaps an even larger existential, core. This seems to 
be the essential contribution of speculative realism: namely, 
that realism cannot be a trivial or obvious position, but con-
versely, a reality that is not a pragmatic expedient requires 
important ontological commitments in order to retain the 
specificity of the real in relation to every representation. In 
a word, that realism has a price.
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Outward Bound
On Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude
Christian Thorne
Williams College
il N’y a pas de hors-texte. If post-structuralism has had a motto—a proverb and quotable provocation—
then surely it is this, from Derrida’s Of Grammatology.1 Text has 
no outside. There is nothing outside the text. It is tempting to put 
a conventionally Kantian construction on these words—to 
see them, I mean, as bumping up against an old epistemo-
logical barrier: Our thinking is intrinsically verbal—in that 
sense, textual—and it is therefore impossible for our minds to get 
past themselves, to leave themselves behind, to shed words and in 
that shedding to encounter objects as they really are, in their own 
skins, even when we’re not thinking them, plastering them with 
language, generating little mind-texts about them. But this is not, 
in fact, what the sentence says. Derrida’s claim would seem to 
be rather stronger than that: not There are unknowable objects 
outside of text, but There are outside of text no objects for us to 
know. So we reach for another gloss—There is only text…ain’t 
nothing but text—except the sentence isn’t really saying that 
either, since to say that there is nothing outside text points to 
1 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158.
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the possibility that there is, in a manner yet to be explained, 
something inside text, and this something would not itself 
have to be text, any more than caramels in a carrying bag 
have to be made out of cellophane.
So we look for another way into the sentence. An alternate 
angle of approach would be to consider the claim’s implica-
tions in institutional or disciplinary terms. The text has no 
outside is the sentence via which English professors get to tell 
everyone else in the university how righteously important they 
are. No academic discipline can just dispense with language. 
Sooner or later, archives and labs and deserts will all have to 
be exited. The historians will have to write up their findings; 
so will the anthropologists; so will the biochemists. And if 
that’s true, then it will be in everyone’s interest to have around 
colleagues who are capable of reflecting on writing—literary 
critics, philosophers of language, the people we used to call 
rhetoricians—not just to proofread the manuscripts of their 
fellows and supply these with their missing commas, but to 
think hard about whether the language typically adopted by 
a given discipline can actually do what the discipline needs 
it to do. If the text has no outside, then literature professors 
will always have jobs; the idea is itself a kind of tenure, since 
it means that writerly types can never safely be removed from 
the interdisciplinary mix. The idea might even establish—or 
seek to establish—the institutional primacy of literature pro-
grams. Il n’y a pas de hors-texte. There is nothing outside the 
English department, since every other department is itself 
engaged in a more or less literary endeavor, just one more 
attempt to make the world intelligible in language.
Such, then, is the interest of Quentin Meillassoux’s After 
Finitude, first published in French in 2006.2 It is the book 
that, more than any other of its generation, means to tell the 
literature professors that their jobs are not, in fact, safe. Against 
Derrida it banners a counter-slogan of its own: “it could be 
that contemporary philosophers have lost the great outdoors, 
2 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (New York: Continuum, 2008).
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the absolute outside.”3 It is Meillassoux’s task to restore to us 
what he is careful not to call nature, to lead post-structuralists 
out into the open country, to make sure that we are all getting 
enough fresh air. Meillassoux means, in other words, to wean 
us from text, and for anyone beginning to experience a cer-
tain eye-strain, a certain cramp of the thigh from not having 
moved all day from out his favorite chair, this is bound to be 
an appealing prospect, though if you end up unconvinced 
by its arguments—and there are good reasons for doubt, as 
the book amounts to a tissue of misunderstanding and turns, 
finally, on one genuinely arbitrary prohibition—then it’s all 
going to end up sounding like a bullying father enrolling his 
pansy son in the Boy Scouts against his will: Get your head out 
of that book! Why don’t you go in the yard and play?!
Of course, Meillassoux’s way of getting the post-structuralists 
to go hiking with him is by telling them which books to read 
first. If you start scanning After Finitude’s bibliography, what 
will immediately stand out is its programmatic borrowing 
from seventeenth and early eighteenth-century philoso-
phers. Meillassoux regularly cites Descartes4 and poses anew 
the question that once led to the cogito, but will here lead 
someplace else: What is the one thing I as a thinking person 
cannot disbelieve even from the stance of radical doubt? He 
christens one chapter after Hume and proposes, as a knowing 
radicalization of the latter’s arguments, that we think of the 
cosmos as “acausal.”5 In the final pages, Galileo steps forward 
as modern philosophy’s forgotten hero.6 His followers are 
given to saying that Meillassoux’s thinking marks out a totally 
new direction in the history of philosophy, but I don’t think 
anyone gets to make that kind of claim until they have first 
drawn up an exhaustive inventory of debts. At one point, he 
praises a philosopher publishing in the 1980s for having 
“written with a concision worthy of the philosophers of the 






seventeenth century.”7 That’s one way to get a bead on this 
book—that it resurrects the Grand Siècle as a term of praise. 
The movement now coalescing around Meillassoux—the 
one calling itself speculative realism—is a bid to get past 
post-structuralism by resurrecting an ante-Kantian, more 
or less baroque ontology, on the understanding that nearly 
all of European philosophy since the first Critique can be 
denounced as one long prelude to Derrida. There never was 
a “structuralism,” but only “pre-post-structuralism.”
Meillassoux, in sum, is trying to recover the Scientific 
Revolution and early Enlightenment, which wouldn’t be all 
that unusual, except he is trying to do this on radical philoso-
phy’s behalf—trying, that is, to get intellectuals of the Left 
to make their peace with science again, as the better path to 
some of post-structuralism’s signature positions. His argu-
ment’s reliance on early science is to that extent instructive. 
One of the most appealing features of Meillassoux’s writing 
is that it restages something of the madness of natural phi-
losophy before the age of positivism and the research grant; 
it retrieves, paragraph-wise, the sublimity and wonder of an 
immoderate knowledge. In 1712, Richard Blackmore published 
an epic called Creation, which you’ve almost certainly never 
heard of but which remained popular in Britain for several 
decades. That poem tells the story of the world’s awful mak-
ing, before humanity’s arrival, and if you read even just its 
opening lines, you’ll see that this conception is premised on 
a rather pungent refusal of Virgil and hence on a wholesale 
refurbishing of the epic as genre: “No more of arms I sing.” 
Blackmore reclassifies what poets had only just recently been 
calling “heroic verse” as “vulgar;” the epic, it would seem, has 
degenerated into bellowing stage plays and popular romances 
and will have to learn from the astrophysicists if it is to regain 
its loft and dignity. Poets will have to accompany the natural 
philosophers as they set out “to see the full extent of nature” 
and to tally “unnumbered worlds.”8 
7 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 95.
8 Richard Blackmore, Creation: A Philosophical Poem (Unknown: London, 
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The point is that there was lots of writing like this in the 
eighteenth century, and that it was aligned for the most part 
with the period’s republicans and pseudo-republicans and 
whatever else England had in those years instead of a Left. 
This means that the cosmic epic was to some extent a muta-
tion of an early Puritan culture, a way of carrying into the 
eighteenth century earlier trends in radical Protestant writing, 
and especially the latter’s Judaizing or philo-Semitic strains. 
The idea here was that Hebrew poetry provided an alternative 
model to Greek and Roman poetry: a sublime, direct poetry 
of high emotion, of inspiration, ecstasy, and astonishment. 
The Creation is one of the things you could read if you wanted 
to figure out how ordinary people ever came to care about 
science—how science was made into something that could 
turn a person on—and what you’ll find in its pages is a then 
new aesthetic that is equal parts Longinus and Milton, or 
rather Longinus plus Moses plus Milton plus Newton, and 
not a Weberian or Purito-rationalist Newton, but a Newton 
supernal and thunder-charged, in which the Principia is 
made to yield science fiction. It is, finally, this writing that 
Meillassoux is channeling when he asks us—routinely—to 
contemplate the planet’s earliest, not-yet-human eons; when, 
like a boy-intellectual collecting philosophical trilobites, he 
demands that our minds be arrested by the fossil record or 
that all of modern European philosophy reconfigure itself to 
accommodate the dinosaurs. And it is the eighteenth-century 
epic’s penchant for firebolt apocalyptic that echoes in his 
descriptions of a cosmos beyond law:
Everything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars to 
laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some 
superior law whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue 
of the absence of any superior law capable of preserve anything, no 
matter what, from perishing.9
1712), 1 (all quotations). 
9 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 53.
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Meillassoux’s followers call this an idea that no-one has ever 
had before. The epic poets once called it Strife.
That so many readers have discovered new political ener-
gies in Meillassoux’s argument is perhaps hard to see, since 
the book contains absolutely nothing that would count, in 
any of the ordinary senses, as political thought. There are, 
it’s true, a few passages in which Meillassoux lets you know 
he thinks of himself as a committed intellectual: a (badly 
underdeveloped) account of ideology critique;10 the faint 
chiming, in one sentence, of The Communist Manifesto;11 a few 
pages in tribute to Badiou.12 With a little effort, though, the 
political openings can be teased out, and they are basically 
twofold: 1) Meillassoux says that thought’s most pressing task 
is to do justice to the possibility—or, indeed, to the archaic 
historical reality—of a planet stripped of its humans. On at 
least one occasion, he even uses, in English translation, the 
phrase “world without us.”13 For anyone looking to devise a 
deep ecology by non-Heideggerian means—and there are 
permanent incentives to reach positions with as little Hei-
degger as possible—Meillassoux’s thinking is bound to be 
attractive. The book is an entry, among many other such, in 
the competition to design the most attractive anti-humanism. 
2) The antinomian language in the sentence last quoted—laws 
could collapse; there is no superior law —or, indeed, the very no-
tion of a cosmos structured only by unnecessary laws—is no 
doubt what has drawn to this book those who would otherwise 
be reading Deleuze, since Meillassoux, like this other, has 
designed an ontology to anarchist specifications, though he 
has done so, rather surprisingly, without Spinoza. Still, there 
may be good reasons for going back Kant and Hegel. Another 
world is possible wasn’t Marx’s slogan—it was Leibniz’s—except 
at this level, it has to be said, the book’s politics remain for 
all intents and purposes allegorical. Meillassoux’s argument 
operates at most as a peculiar, quasi-theological reassurance 
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that if we set out to change the political and legal order of 
our nation-states, the universe will like it.14
Maybe this is already enough information for us to see 
that After Finitude’s relationship to post-structuralism is ac-
tually quite complicated. Any brief description of the book 
is going to have to say that it is out to demolish German 
Idealism and post-structuralism and any other philosophy 
of discourse or mind. But if we take a second pass over After 
Finitude, we will have to conclude that far from flattening 
these latter, its chosen task is precisely to shore them up, to 
move anti-foundationalism itself onto sturdy ontological 
foundations. Meillassoux’s niftiest trick, the one that having 
mastered he compulsively performs, is the translating of 
post-structuralism’s over-familiar epistemological claims into 
fresh-sounding ontological ones. What readers of Foucault 
and Lyotard took to be claims about knowledge turn out to 
have been claims about Being all along, and it is through this 
device that Meillassoux will preserve what he finds most valu-
able in the radical philosophy of his parents’ generation: its 
anti-Hegelianism, its hard-Left anti-totalitarianism, its attack 
on doctrines of necessity, its counter-doctrine of contingency, 
its exploding of ideology.
Adorno was arguing as early as the mid-‘60s that thought 
needed to figure out some impossible way to think its other, 
which is the unthought, “objects open and naked,” the world 
out of our clutches. “The concept takes as it most pressing 
business everything it cannot reach.” Is it possible to devise 
“cognition on behalf of the non-conceptual?”15 This is the 
14 Leibniz’s position, of course, was that other words were possible but un-
desirable, and the political consequences of that idea have never been lost 
on anyone. It was left to Leibniz’s students in the late twentieth century to 
retain the possible worlds and ditch the theodicy. See Deleuze’s The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) 
or, in a very different idiom, David Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1986), or, for that matter, some of string theory’s more oc-
cult byways, such as brane cosmology and M-theory. 
15 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 




sense in which Meillassoux, far from breaking with post-
structuralism and its cousins, is simply answering one of its 
central questions. It’s just that he does so in a way that any 
convinced Adornian or Left Heideggerian is going to find 
baffling. Cognition on behalf of the non-conceptual turns 
out to have been right in front of us all along—it is called 
science and math. Celestial mechanics has always been 
the better anti-humanism. A philosophical anarchism that 
has thrown its lot in with the geologists and not with the 
Situationists—that is the possibility for thought that After 
Finitude opens up.  The book, indeed, sometimes seems to 
be borrowing some of Heidegger’s idiom of cosmic awe, but 
it separates this from the latter’s critique of science—such 
that biology and chemistry and physics can henceforth 
function as vehicles of ontological wonder, astonishment at 
the world made manifest. And with that idea there comes to 
an end almost a century’s worth of radical struggle against 
domination-through-knowledge, against bureaucracy, rule by 
experts, the New Class, technocracy, instrumental reason, and 
epistemological regimes. On the back cover of After Finitude, 
Bruno Latour says that Meillassoux promises to “liberate us 
from discourse,” but that’s not exactly right and may be ex-
actly wrong. He wants rather to free us from having to think 
of discourse as a problem—precisely not to rally us against 
it, in the manner of Adorno and Foucault—but to license us 
to make our peace with, and so sink back into, it.
Lots of people will find good reasons to take this book seri-
ously. It is, nonetheless, unconvincing on five or six fronts 
at once.
1) It is philosophically conniving. There are almost no em-
pirical constraints placed on the argumentative enterprise 
of ontology. Nothing in everyday experience is ever going 
to suggest that one generalized account of all Being is right 
and another wrong, and this situation will inevitably grant 
the philosopher latitude. Ontologies will always be tailored to 
extra-philosophical considerations, any one of them elected 
only because a given thinker wants something to be true about 
the cosmos. Explanations of existence are all speculative and 
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in that sense opportunistic. It is this opportunism we sense 
when we discover Meillassoux baldly massaging his sources. 
Here he is on p. 38: “Kant maintains that we can only describe 
the a priori forms of knowledge…, whereas Hegel insists that 
it is possible to deduce them.” Kant, we are being told, doesn’t 
think the categories are deducible. And then here’s Meillas-
soux on pp. 88 and 89: “the third type of response to Hume’s 
problem is Kant’s…objective deduction of the categories as 
elaborated in the Critique of Pure Reason.”
2) The leap from epistemology to ontology sometimes falls short. 
At one point, Meillassoux thinks he can get the better of post-
structuralists like so: Imagine, he says, that an anti-founda-
tionalist is talking to a Christian (about the afterlife, say). The 
Christian says: “After we die, the righteous among us will sit 
at the right hand of the Lord.” And the anti-foundationalist 
responds the way anti-foundationalists always respond: “Well, 
you could be right, but it could also be different.” For Meil-
lassoux, that last clause is the ontologist’s opening. His task 
is now to convince the skeptic that “it could also be different” 
is not just a skeptical claim about what we can’t know—it is 
not an ignorance, but rather already an ontological position 
in its own right. What we know about the real cosmos, exist-
ing apart from thought, is that everything in it could also 
be different. And now suppose that the anti-foundationalist 
responds to the ontologist by just repeating the same sen-
tence—again, because it’s really all the skeptic knows how to 
say: “Well, you could be right, but it could also be different.” 
Meillassoux at this point begins his end-zone dance. He has 
just claimed that Everything could be different, and the skeptic 
obviously can’t disagree with this by objecting that Everything 
could be different.16 The skeptic has been maneuvered round 
to agreeing with the ontologist’s position. But Meillassoux 
doesn’t yet have good reasons to triumph, because, quite 
simply, he is using “could be different” in two contrary senses, 
and he rather bafflingly thinks that their shared phrasing 
is enough to render them identical. He has simply routed 
16 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 57-58.
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his argument through a rigged formulation, one in which 
ontological claims and epistemological claims seem briefly 
to coincide. The skeptical, epistemological version of that 
sentence says: “Everything could be different from how I am 
thinking it.” And the ontological version says: “Everything 
could be different from how it really is now.” There may, in 
fact, occur real-word instances in which skeptics string words 
into ambiguous sentences that could mean either, and yet 
this will never indicate that they unwittingly or via logical 
compulsion mean the latter.
3) Meillassoux’s theory of language is lunatic. Another way of 
getting a bead on After Finitude would be to say that it is trying 
to shut down science studies; it wants to stop literary (and 
anthropological) types from reading the complicated utter-
ances produced by science as writing (or discourse or culture). 
Meillassoux is bugged by anyone who reads scientific papers 
and gets interested in what is least scientific in them—anyone, 
that is, who attributes to astronomy or kinetics a political 
unconscious, as when one examines the great new systems 
devised during the seventeenth century and realizes that they 
all turned on new ways of understanding “laws” and “forces” 
(or, depending on the language, “powers”). Meillassoux’s own 
philosophy requires, as he puts it, “the belief that the real-
ist meaning of [any utterance about the early history of the 
planet] is its ultimate meaning—that there is no other regime 
of meaning capable of deepening our understanding of it.”17 
The problem is, of course, that it’s really easy to show that sci-
ence writing does, in fact, contain an ideological-conceptual 
surcharge; that, like any other verbally intricate undertaking, 
it can’t help but borrow from several linguistic registers at 
once; and that there is always going to be some other “order 
of meaning” at play in statements about strontium or the 
Mesozoic. Science studies, after all, possesses lots of evidence 
of a more or less empirical kind, and Meillassoux’s response 
is to object that this evidence concerns nothing “ultimate.” 
But then what would it mean for a sentence to have an “ulti-
17 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 14.
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mate meaning” anyway? A meaning that outlasts its rivals? 
Or that defeats them in televised battle? What, then, is the 
time that governs meanings, such that some count as final 
even while the others are still around? And at what point do 
secondary meanings just disappear? What are the periods of 
a meaning’s rise and fall? 
Meillassoux doesn’t possess the resources to answer any 
of those questions; nor, as best as I can tell, does he mean to 
try. The phrase “ultimate meaning” is not philosophically 
serious. It does little more than commit us to a blatant reduc-
tionism, commanding us to disregard any complexities and 
ambiguities that a linguistically attentive person would, upon 
reading Galileo, discover. We can even watch Meillassoux’s 
own language drift, such that “ultimate meaning” becomes, 
over the course of three pages, exclusive meaning. “Either 
[a scientific] statement has a realist sense, and only a realist 
sense, or it has no sense at all.”18 It exasperates Meillassoux 
that an unscientific language would so regularly worm its 
way into science writing; and it exasperates him, further, 
that English professors would take the trouble to point this 
language out. His response is to install a prohibition, the 
wholly unscientific injunction to treat scientific language as 
simpler than it is even when the data show otherwise. It is 
perhaps a special problem for Meillassoux that the ideologi-
cal character of science writing is especially pronounced in 
the very period to which he is looking for intellectual salva-
tion—the generations on either side of Newton, which were 
crammed with ontologies explicitly modeled on the political 
theology of the late Middle Ages—new scientific cosmologies, 
I mean, whose political dimensions were quite overt. And it 
is definitely a problem for Meillassoux that he has himself 
written a political ontology of roughly this kind—a cosmol-
ogy made-to-order for the punks and the Bakuninites—since 
one of his opening moves is to disallow the very idea of such 
ontologies. After Finitude only has the implications its anar-
chist readership takes it to have if its language means more 
18 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 17.
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than it literally says, and Meillassoux himself insists that it 
can have no such meaning.19
4) He poses as secular but is actually a kind of theologian. It is 
not just that Meillassoux is secular. He is pugnaciously secu-
lar or, if you prefer, actively anti-religious. He casually links 
Levinas with fanaticism and Muslim terror.20 He sticks up for 
what Adorno once called the totalitarianism of enlightenment, 
marveling at philosophy’s now vanished willingness to tell 
religious people that they’re stupid or at its determination to 
make even non-philosophers fight on its terms. And against 
our accustomed sense that liberalism is the spontaneous 
ideology of secular modernity, Meillassoux sees freedom of 
opinion instead as an outgrowth of the Counter-Reformation 
and Counter-Enlightenment. Liberalism, in other words, is 
how religion gets readmitted to the public sphere even once 
everyone involved has been forced to concede that it’s bunk.21 
And yet for all that, Meillassoux has entirely underestimated 
how hard it is going to be to craft a consequent anti-humanism 
without taking recourse to religious language. At the heart of 
After Finitude is a simple restatement of the religious mystic’s 
ecstatic demand that we “get out of ourselves”22 and thereby 
learn to “grasp the in-itself;” the book aches for an “outside 
which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of 
being on foreign territory—of being entirely elsewhere.”23 
In the place of God, Meillassoux has installed a principle he 
calls “hyper-Chaos,” to which, however, he then attaches all 
manner of conventional theological language, right down to 
the capital-C-of-adoration. Hyper-Chaos is an entity…
…for which nothing is or would seem to be impossible…capable of 
19 One good walkthrough of seventeenth-century political ontology is pro-
vided by Francis Oakley’s Omnipotence, Covenant, & Order: An Excursion in the 
History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
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destroying both things and worlds, of bringing forth monstrous absurdi-
ties, yet also of never doing anything, of realizing every dream, but also 
every nightmare, of engendering random and frenetic transformations, 
or conversely, of producing a universe that remains motionless down 
to its ultimate recess, like a cloud bearing the fiercest storms, than the 
eeriest bright spells.24
No-one reading that passage—even casually, even for the 
first time—is going to miss the predictable omnipotence 
language with which it begins: Chaos is the God of Might. 
Meillassoux himself acknowledges as much. What may be 
less apparent, though, is that this entire line of argument 
simply extends into the present the late medieval debate 
over whether God was constrained to create this particular 
universe, or whether he could have, at will, created another, 
and Meillassoux’s position in this sense resembles noth-
ing so much as the orthodox Christian defense of miracles, 
theorizing a power that can, in defiance of its own quotidian 
regularities, “bring forth absurdities, engender transforma-
tions, cast bright spells.” There have been many different 
theories of contingency over the last generation, especially 
among philosophers of history. As a philosopheme, it has, in 
fact, become rather commonplace. Meillassoux is unusual 
in this regard only in that he has elevated contingency to 
the position of demiurge and so returned a full portion of 
metaphysics to a position that had until now been trying to 
get by without it. Such is the penalty after all for going back 
behind Kant, that you’ll have to stop your ears again against 
the singing of angels. 
Two generations before the three Critiques there stood 
Christian Wolff, whom Meillassoux does not name, but on 
whose system his metaphysics is modeled and who wrote, 
in the 1720s and ‘30s, that philosophy was “the study of the 
possible as possible.” Philosophy, in other words, is the one 
all-important branch of knowledge that does not study actual-
ity. Each more circumscribed intellectual endeavor—biology, 
24 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64.
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history, philology—studies what-now-is, but philosophy studies 
events and objects in our world only as a subset of the much 
vaster category of what-could-be. It tries, like some kind of 
interplanetary structuralism, to work out the entire system 
of possibilities—every hypothetical aggregate of objects or 
particles or substances that could combine without contra-
diction—and thereby reclassifies the universe we currently 
inhabit as just one unfolding outcome among many unseen 
others. Meillassoux, in this same spirit, asks us to imagine a 
cosmos of “open possibility, wherein no eventuality has any 
more reason to be realized than any other.”25 And this way of 
approaching actuality is what Wolff calls theology, which in this 
instance means not knowledge of God but God’s knowledge. 
Philosophy, for Wolff—as, by extension, for Meillassoux—is 
a way of transcending human knowledge in the direction 
of divine knowledge, when the latter is the science not just 
of our world but of all things that could ever be, what Hegel 
called “the thoughts had by God before the Creation”—sheer 
could-ness, vast and indistinct.26
5) He misdescribes recent European philosophy and is thus un-
clear about his own place in it. Maybe this point is better made 
with reference to his supporters than to Meillassoux himself. 
Here’s how one of his closest allies explains his contribution:
With his term “correlationism,” Meillassoux has already made a per-
manent contribution to the philosophical lexicon. The rapid adoption 
of this word, to the point that an intellectual movement has already 
assembled to combat the menace it describes suggests that “correla-
tionism” describes a pre-existent reality that was badly in need of a 
name. Whenever disputes arise in philosophy concerning realism and 
idealism, we immediately note the appearance of a third personage who 
dismisses both of these alternatives as solutions to a pseudo-problem. 
This figure is the correlationist, who holds that we can never think of 
25 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 58.
26 On Wolff (and Hegel), see Werner Schneiders’ “Deus est philosophus ab-
solute summus: Über Christian Wolffs Philosophie und Philosophiebegriff,” 
in Christian Wolff, 1679-1754: Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren 
Wirkung, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983), 9-30.
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the world without humans nor of humans without the world, but only 
of a primal correlation or rapport between the two.27
As intellectual history, this is almost illiterate. We weren’t 
in need of a name, because the people who argue in terms of 
the-rapport-between-humans-and-world or subject-and-object 
were already called “Hegelians,” and the movement opposing 
them hasn’t just “sprung up,” because philosophers have been 
battling the Hegelians as long as there have been Hegelians 
to fight. Worse still is the notion, projected by Meillassoux 
himself, that all of European philosophy since Kant must be 
opposed for leading inexorably, shunt-like, to post-structuralism. 
This is just the melodrama to which radical philosophy is 
congenitally prone; the entire history of Western thought has 
to become a single, uninterrupted exercise in the one perhaps 
quite local error you would like to correct, the cost of which, in 
this instance, is that Meillassoux and Company have to turn 
every major European thinker into a second-rate idealist or 
vulgar Derridean and so end up glossing Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger and Sartre and various Marxists in ways that are 
tendentious to the point of unrecognizability. There are central 
components of Meillassoux’s project that philosophers have 
been attempting since the 1790s, and he occasionally gives 
the impression of not knowing that European philosophy 
has been trying for generations to get past dialectics or hu-
manism or the philosophy of the subject or whatever else it 
is for which “correlationism” is simply a new term. Perhaps 
Meillassoux thinks that his contribution has been to show 
that Wittgenstein and Heidegger were more Hegelian than 
they themselves realized. But then this, too, seems more like 
a repetition than a new direction, since European philosophy 
has always had a propensity for auto-critique of precisely this 
kind. Auto-critique is in lots of ways its most fundamental 
move: One anti-humanist philosopher accuses another of 
having snuck in some humanist premise or another. One 
27 Harman, Graham, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 7-8.
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philosopher-against-the-subject accuses another of being 
secretly attached to theories of subjectivity. And so on. For 
Meillassoux to come around now and say that there are resi-
dues of Kant and Hegel all over the place in contemporary 
thought—well, sure: That’s just the sort of thing that European 
philosophers are always saying.
6) He is wrong about German idealism. Kant, Meillassoux says, 
is the one who deprived us all of the Great Outdoors, which 
accusation seems plausible…until you remember that bit 
about “the starry sky above me.” This is one more indication 
that Meillassoux is punching air, though the point matters 
more with reference to Hegel than to Kant. Hegel’s philoso-
phy, after all, turns on a particular way of relating the history 
of the world: At first, human beings were just pinpricks of 
consciousness in a world not of their own making, mobile 
smudges of mind on an alien planet. But human activity 
gradually remade the world—it refashioned every glade and 
river valley—worked all the materials—to the point where 
there now remains nothing in the world that hasn’t to some 
degree been made subject to human desire and planning. 
The world has, in this sense, been all but comprehensively 
humanized; it is saturated with mind. What are we to say, 
then, when Meillassoux claims that no modern philosopher 
since Kant can even begin to deal with the existence of the 
world before humans; that they can’t even take up the ques-
tion; that they have to duck it; that it is what will blow holes 
in their systems? Hegel not only has no trouble speaking of 
the pre-human planet; his historical philosophy downright 
presupposes it. The world didn’t used to be human; it is now 
thorough-goingly so; the task of philosophy is to account 
for that change. And it is the great failing of Meillassoux’s 
book that, having elevated paleontology to the paradigmatic 
science, he can’t even begin to explain the transformation. 
You might ask yourself again whether Meillassoux’s account 
of science is more plausible than a Hegelian one. What, after 
all, happened when Europeans began devising modern sci-
ence? What did science actually start doing? Was it or wasn’t 
it a rather important part of the ongoing process by which 
Christian Thorne – Outward Bound
289
human beings subjected the non-human world to mind? 
Meillassoux urges us to think of science as the philosophy 
of the non-human, positing as it does a world separable from 
thought, a planet independent of humanity, laws that don’t 
require our enforcing. But does science, in fact, bring that 
world about? Meillassoux hasn’t even begun to respond to 
those philosophers, like Adorno and Heidegger, who wanted 
to pry philosophy away from science, not because they were 
complacently encased in the thought-bubbles of discourse 
and subjectivity, but more nearly the opposite—because they 
thought science was the philosophy of the subject, or one 
important version of it, the very techno-thinking by which 
human being secures its final dominion over the non-human. 
Meillassoux, in this sense, is trying to theorize, not the sci-
ence that actually entered into the world in the seventeenth 
century, but something else, an alternate modernity, one in 
which aletheia and science went hand in hand, a fully non-
human science or science that humans didn’t control: gelas-
sene Wissenschaft. But the genuinely materialist position is 
always going to be the one that takes seriously the effects of 
thought and discourse upon the world; the one that knows 
science itself to be a practice; the one that faces up to the re-
alization that the concept of “the non-human” can only ever 
be a device by which human beings do things to themselves 
and their surroundings. There is nothing real about a realism 
that offers itself only as a utopian counter-science, a com-
munication from the pluriverse, a knowledge that presumes 
our non-existence and so requires, as bearer, some alternate 
cosmic intelligence that it would be simplest to call divinity.
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A spectre is haunting conti-nental philosophy—the spectre of Object-Oriented Ontology 
(OOO). All the disciplines and groupings that have traditionally 
allied themselves with continental theory in the anglophone 
world are poised to greet its manifestation: aesthetic theory 
and artistic practice, political philosophy and heterodox ge-
ography, Francophile post-post-structuralists and Germanist 
neo-romantics. Who among them has not heard the siren 
song of OOO’s litanies of inhuman objects (menageries 
of stock markets and stock cubes, quarks and clerks, etc.)? 
1 This paper has been a long time in development. It was initiated at the 
suggestion of Graham Harman, after previous attempts at informal engage-
ment with his ideas (which can be found in the commentary section of my 
blog here: http://deontologistics.wordpress.com/commentary) became too 
extensive for him to easily respond to. In its long gestation it has benefited 
immeasurably from my discussions with Ray Brassier, Damian Veal, Robin 
Mackay, Daniel Sacilotto, Dustin McWherter, Nick Srnicek and Jon Cogburn, 
some of whom were gracious enough to provide comments on early drafts 
of the material that has come to make up this paper. It has also benefited 
from the comments of numerous more or less anonymous individuals who 
have read and responded to the informal engagements already mentioned. 
Finally, I owe an immense debt to Fabio Gironi, without whose incredible 
patience and careful encouragement this piece never would have appeared.
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Who among them has not begun to shrug off the oppressive, 
anthropocentric legacy of Post-Kantian philosophy, bravely 
railing against the tyrannical correlationists of the continental 
academy, the dreary technicians of the analytic mainstream, 
and even the scientistic fury of its Neo-Kantian heirs?
I will plead forgiveness for my bombast, but there is a certain 
grandeur to the pronouncements regarding the emergence 
of OOO as a philosophical movement that demands parody, 
and I hope this can be taken in good spirit, as a sort of ges-
ture to clear the air. I have every intention of taking these 
pronouncements as seriously as possible, and perhaps even 
more seriously than they are intended. Graham Harman, 
the erstwhile leader of this most vocal faction of what was 
once, fleetingly, called Speculative Realism (SR), has often 
expressed a preference for what he calls hyperbolic readings 
of philosophies.2 The idea here is to imagine the relevant 
philosophy in a position of nigh-unassailable strength, so 
as to tease out what would be missing from a world in which 
it had become dominant. To imagine a given philosophical 
tendency actually winning the discursive battles in which it 
is engaged is to treat it with the utmost seriousness. It is to 
treat it as a genuine contender for truth, whose claims to truth 
are sincere enough to be taken at face value. This is the kind 
of respect that any serious philosophical position should be 
treated with, and this goes double for nascent philosophical 
movements that claim to have both wide ranging implica-
tions and applications. The aim of this paper is to take OOO 
seriously, and to treat it with at least this level of respect (my 
initial parody aside).
However, the hyperbolic method is surprisingly difficult to 
apply to OOO itself, given both the diversity and tentativeness 
of the commitments of its principal practitioners (canonically: 
Graham Harman, Levi Bryant, Ian Bogost, and Tim Morton). 
There is most definitely a common rhetoric binding these fig-
2 “Delanda’s Ontology: Assemblage and Realism” in Continental Philosophy 
Review (2008) 41:3, 367-383; Prince of Networks, 121-122; Graham Harman, 
Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 152-158.
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ures together—an insistence upon ontological egalitarianism, 
a rehabilitation of the concept of substance, and a pervasive 
metaphorics of withdrawal—but a deeper examination of 
each of these raises serious questions regarding the content 
of the shared commitments they purport to name. There are 
disagreements regarding just how egalitarian we must be (e.g., 
what it is to say that everything is an object), just what it means 
to return to a metaphysics of substance (e.g., whether it is 
permissible to conceive it in processual terms), and precisely 
what it is to say objects are withdrawn and thereby what we can 
know about them. There are obviously a number of common 
issues to which these ideas are addressed, but it’s not clear 
that they represent genera of common solutions that could 
be neatly broken up into variant species. It is quite possible 
that this problem will be alleviated by time, but for now, at 
least, we must pursue another strategy.3
Given this problem, the aim of the current paper is to lay the 
groundwork for a proper engagement with OOO by focusing 
upon the philosophical system of its progenitor: Graham 
Harman’s own Object-Oriented Philosophy (OOP). As the 
oldest and most well-defined variant of OOO, this provides 
us with the best starting point for any wider engagement with 
the movement. However, to treat OOP with proper respect 
means to deal with it in its specificity, which in turn means 
outside of the context of the overarching rhetoric which 
binds together the different strands of OOO. This is particu-
larly important, insofar as although it is often clear what the 
proponents of OOO think, it is often far less clear why they 
think it, which only exacerbates the problem of divergences 
between them. The first step of my approach will thus be to 
present as complete and concise a summary of the “what” 
of OOP as I can, breaking the metaphysical system down 
into three distinct aspects: withdrawal, the fourfold, and 
vicarious causation. The second step will then be to present 
3 Some may think that this is a hasty conclusion. I would direct them to my 
more informal (but nonetheless extensive) attempts to engage with and 
understand the differences between Harman’s and Bryant’s variants of OOO, 
which can also be found in the commentary section of my blog (see fn. 1).
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as charitable an interpretation of the “why” of OOP as I can, 
teasing out and reconstructing the possible arguments for 
each of these three aspects in as much detail as is feasible, 
before assessing them on their merits. The third step will be 
to make a number of overarching criticisms of the project of 
OOP on the basis of this assessment, pinpointing several key 
problems that run throughout it. The final step will then be to 
present the hyperbolic projection of OOP initially promised, 
and to draw some conclusions about precisely what OOP (and 
perhaps OOO) has to offer on these grounds. Carrying out 
these steps will be a lengthy process, and so the paper will be 
split in two: the first two steps will be carried out here, and 
the second two will be published subsequently.4
Before delving into the details (and wrestling with the Devil 
who hides in them), it’s also worthwhile to explain the title 
of this paper, the meaning of which may not yet be evident. 
Although he is willing to admit that his philosophy amounts 
to a radicalisation of a certain kind of correlationism (the 
weak form), in similar fashion to Meillassoux’s philosophy 
(in relation to the strong form), Harman nevertheless pres-
ents his work as both a trenchant critique and an important 
step beyond the menace of correlationism in contemporary 
philosophy. I do not intend to dispute the idea that there is 
such a correlationist menace (though I do take it to be more 
complicated than it is sometimes thought to be), but I will 
take issue with Harman’s presentation of his own relationship 
to it. When it is properly understood, Harman’s work should 
be seen not as a critique of correlationism, but a consolidation 
of its central tenets.
Harman essentially attempts to overcome the inconsisten-
cies inherent within correlationism by sacrificing one of its 
core features—the prohibition on metaphysics—in order to 
construct a metaphysical prop whose purpose is nothing less 
than to bolster the rest of the calamitous edifice. He revives 
and transforms Kant’s noumenal realm in order to preserve 
4 This will of course appear in the next issue of Speculations. I must once 
again express my gratitude to Fabio, and the whole Speculations team, for 
making possible something as unusual as this piece.
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the most disastrous prejudices of the correlationist tradition 
he claims to break with. Far from being a truly “weird” realism, 
OOP is no more than the eccentric uncle of the correlationist 
family. The metaphysical spoils it claims to have liberated 
from the Kantian stronghold are so much ashes and rust. 
After all is said and done, it returns to us naked, claiming to 
be wreathed in the finest vestments. The only proper gesture 
of respect in this circumstance is to point out its immodesty.5
1. The Lava that Dares not Speak its Name
Before performing exploratory surgery on the beating heart 
of OOP, it is first necessary to present the customary compli-
ments regarding the overall shape and style of its vascular 
architecture. Whatever else can be said about Harman’s 
presentation of OOP, it is certainly compelling. On the one 
hand, it attempts to reveal the inherent oddness of the world 
we live in, by painting us a landscape of a reality in which 
everything is radically individual, cut off from everything 
else in almost every respect, connected only by fleeting glim-
mers of phenomenal appearance. On the other, it attempts 
to humble humanity by seeing humans as just one more dis-
parate association of objects within the universal diaspora, 
and the intentional terms through which they relate to one 
another as merely an expression of a more fundamental sen-
sual connectivity in which everything may partake. We must 
applaud such willingness to countenance counter-intuitive 
metaphysical conclusions and to embrace ontological humil-
5 As this indicates, this paper is indeed a polemic of sorts. I will not pre-
empt this polemic by endeavouring to outline its scope in advance, but I 
will attempt to pre-empt objections based on the idea that I violate my own 
principle of respect simply by adopting a polemical tone. Harman’s own 
words on this topic are eminently suited for this purpose: “Polemical writ-
ing in philosophy no longer enjoys its previous level of acceptance, and is 
now often dismissed as the product of incivility, aggression, even jealousy. 
Against this attitude, we should appreciate the clarifying tendencies of 
polemic—always the favored genre of authors frustrated by the continued 
clouding of an important decision, whether through fashionable cliché or 
dubious conceptual manoeuvres.” Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 
(Open Court, 2005), 11.
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ity wherever we find it.
Moving on, the central axis around which Harman’s meta-
physical system turns is the distinction between the real 
and sensual. He is fond of describing this by appealing to 
a volcanic metaphor: the reality of things consists in their 
“molten cores,” the liquid specificities of which withdraw 
behind a “sensual crust” of visible features. On this view, 
the substantial magma at the heart of every entity is forever 
trapped beneath a rocky outer surface whose stillness is only 
occasionally interrupted by the tectonic forces it unleashes. 
However, these occasional eruptions always catch us unawares. 
We never glimpse the molten essence as it leaks through the 
fault lines in its phenomenal facade, but only catch it as it 
cools, already crystallising into new sensual continents. The 
metaphorical lava is nowhere to be found. To twist this meta-
phorical register for the purposes of summary: Harman’s is 
a world of disconnected volcanic island nations floating in 
a cool sensual sea. A world in which you can travel as much 
as you like, but you’ll always be a tourist. No matter how hard 
you try, you’ll never see the real island, only beaches full of 
German holidaymakers and chintzy gift shops. You might get 
the occasional taste of it—a wiff of the exotic food the real 
islanders eat as you pass by, or a stolen glimpse of the real 
lives of the inhabitants over a whitewashed wall—but that’s 
all you’ll ever get.
In order to provide an adequate exposition of Harman’s 
noumenal cosmology, I’m going to divide my discussion of 
the ways in which he develops and expands upon the split 
between the real and the sensual in three. I will tackle the 
relation between the real and the sensual under the heading 
of withdrawal, which is the most famous aspect of Harman’s 
position. I will then tackle the way this is complicated by 
the introduction of a second axis—the distinction between 
objects and qualities—under the heading of the fourfold, 
which is the name of the structure Harman derives from 
their intersection. Finally, I will address the most prominent 
metaphysical problem that emerges from Harman’s system 





It is all too easy to say that Harman’s world is divided in two: 
a celestial plane of intentional facades masking a hellish 
realm of machinic forces, an open space of sensual contact 
concealing the endlessly churning reality that makes it pos-
sible. The truth is that these two sides of his cosmos are folded 
into one another at every opportunity: there is no straight 
line from one sensual point to another that does not pass 
through a real one, nor vice-versa. What we have instead is 
a pluriverse of infernal engines that present themselves to 
one another so as to hide their internal machinations, each 
a realm unto itself, like the many hells of Buddhist lore, com-
posed out of further layers of tortuous machinery, each part 
of which is available to its fellows only in outline, containing 
its own inexplicable depths, concealing further strange and 
sulphurous landscapes, evermore intricate and malicious 
economies of action, yet to be explored. This is the world of 
real objects. It is a world to which we ourselves belong, along 
with everything that has any real effect upon us—or indeed, 
upon anything at all. This is the site of everything that really 
happens in the world.
It’s important to distinguish between two kinds of happening 
though: execution and causation. For Harman, a real object 
just is its execution, which is to say it’s being-whatever-it-is, 
or rather, doing-whatever-it-does. This is to say that each real 
object is defined by some inscrutable end for which it is the 
corresponding act. The relation between every real thing taken 
as a whole and the parts that compose it is to be understood 
in terms of functional relations, like the relation between a 
machine and its components. The real object consists in the 
unitary action of its parts deployed towards the given end: it is 
its execution insofar as it is a function in action. There is more 
that could be said about this, but it’s important to recognise 
that although this action is certainly a happening of sorts, it is 
the occurrence of sameness, or simple persistence. The various 
machinic arrangements of parts and wholes that compose 
the real are essentially synchronic. For Harman, causation is 
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the occurrence of difference, or change, and it emerges from 
diachronic relations of interaction between real objects. The 
paradox with which he closes his first book, Tool-Being, is that 
his characterisation of such objects as persisting unities seems 
to preclude the possibility that they could effect change in 
one another, implying an essentially static cosmic order, in 
opposition to the seeming reality of change that constantly 
assails our senses.
The reason for this is that the reality of persistence qua ex-
ecution implies that real objects withdraw from one another, 
unable to affect one another by default. This withdrawal has 
two facets: the excess of everything over its presentations, 
and the independence of everything from everything else. 
Excess follows from the inscrutability of the end governing 
each object, insofar as it occludes its internal economy of ac-
tion (execution) and thereby the external capacities for action 
(causation) that emerge from it. Execution is a pure act of 
persistence underlying every actual interaction, and a pure 
actuality underlying every possible interaction. This means 
that it transcends both interaction and possibility. We can 
never know the sheer execution of the thing that lies behind 
every possible encounter. Insofar as ontological humility 
demands that we treat the way we grasp the capabilities of 
objects, through either theoretical or practical engagement 
with them, as just one more instance of an encounter between 
any two real objects, we must conclude that our inability to 
grasp an object’s veiled execution through any particular 
possible interaction is a deeper fact about the metaphysics of 
encounters. This is the fact that the world also contains sensual 
objects. Our own experience of the world is phenomenologically 
constituted by intentional relations directed at unitary objects, 
and this implies that objects’ experience of one another is 
metaphysically constituted by something similar. If objects 
encounter one another as unities, and yet fail to encounter 
one another directly, then encounters must be mediated by 
unitary intentional facades or caricatures entirely distinct 
from the executant realities that project them. Independence 
follows from this, insofar as every real object is protected from 
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every other by an honour guard of distinct sensual objects, 
forever precluding access to it, at least by default.
Finally, it must be emphasised that withdrawal does not 
merely occur between isolated real objects, like a non-aggression 
pact between the many hells, but also occurs within them, in 
the form of mereological isolation. It is easy to see how this 
involves the mutual withdrawal of the parts of an object from 
one another, insofar as they are real objects in their own 
right, but it also consists in the withdrawal of parts from the 
wholes they compose, and wholes from the parts they contain. 
Of course, the whole is dependent upon its parts, insofar as it 
cannot subsist without them, but it is equally independent of 
them in two senses: a) it is entirely possible for its parts to be 
replaced without significantly altering its internal economy, 
and b) this economy produces capacities which exceed the 
capacities of the parts taken in isolation. Similarly, although 
the parts may be reciprocally dependent upon one another 
to some extent, insofar as they require certain conditions 
in which to function, they are equally independent of their 
context in two senses: a) it is entirely possible for them to be 
transplanted into a different whole without dissolving their 
own distinct unity, and b) new contexts may reveal hitherto 
unexpressed capacities that were previously suppressed. A 
real object considered as a whole is a specific arrangement of 
parts that both transcends and fails to exhaust their specificity. 
Despite the fact that the real object consists in transcending 
this excess of specificity, it nevertheless plays an additional 
role, insofar as the whole draws upon it in generating the 
sensual objects it hides behind. The various inessential fea-
tures of a real object’s parts become resources for producing 
the phenomenal accidents that cloak its executant reality.
b) The Fourfold
Once we begin to talk about the features and capacities of ob-
jects as distinct from the objects themselves, we are stumbling 
upon the second fundamental axis around which Harman’s 
system turns: the distinction between objects and their qualities. 
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Things are not just torn between their subterranean execu-
tion and its phenomenal effects, but between their persistent 
unity and its constituent plurality. This does not concern 
how a singular whole is composed by a multiple parts (e.g., the 
composition of an ice cube out of molecules), though this is a 
related issue, but how a single entity is determined in a various 
ways (e.g., the coldness, hardness, or translucency of the ice 
cube). The mutual withdrawal between parts and whole we’ve 
already seen consists in wholes having qualities their parts 
lack (e.g., the molecules are neither translucent nor hard), and 
parts having qualities their wholes ignore (e.g., the unique 
chemical properties of the trace amount of minerals in the 
water is usually entirely irrelevant to the ice cube). Qualities 
are not objects, even if the qualities a thing possesses somehow 
bubble up from the objects that compose it.6
These two distinctions are not merely parallel, but cut across 
one another. This produces a fourfold of terms: in addition 
to the distinction between sensual objects (SO) and real ob-
jects (RO), there is a distinction between sensual qualities 
(SQ) and real qualities (RQ). The objects that appear in our 
phenomenal experience are encrusted with sensible features 
that may vary from moment to moment, but the latter are 
entirely distinct from the real features submerged in the 
silent execution they conceal. Here we begin to see the way 
the four poles interact with one another to form Harman’s 
ten categories. The relation between a sensual object and its 
sensual qualities (SO-SQ) is the condition of the variation 
of its encrusted accidents, or time itself, whereas the relation 
between a sensual object and its real qualities (SO-RQ) is the 
submerged anchor around which this variation is fixed, or 
what Husserl calls eidos. These two categories are the first of 
what Harman calls the tensions between object and quality. 
The emergence of sensual objects in our experience is de-
pendent upon the sensible features the corresponding real 
objects allow them to present from perspective to perspective, 
and the distinctness of these underlying real objects is in 
6 We will complicate this claim to some extent in section 2(a)(iii) and 2(b)(i).
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turn dependent upon differences between the features they 
can never present. This gives us the remaining two tensions. 
The relation between a real object and its sensual qualities 
(RO-SQ) is the condition under which it can relate to another 
object through a sensuous facade, or space, whereas the rela-
tion between a real object and its real qualities (RO-RQ) is its 
principle of uniqueness, or what Zubiri calls essence. Taken 
together, these four tensions provide the schema of sameness 
and difference between objects, both real and apparent, along 
with their constancy and variation.
Harman calls the changes that emerge within this schema 
fissions and fusions. This is because two tensions (time and 
eidos) have a persistent state of connection between object 
and quality for two of the tensions—so that change demands 
fission of this connection—and two (space and essence) have 
a persistent state of separation—so that change demands 
fusion of what is separated. It’s important to recognise that 
the fissions take place within the sensual realm, insofar as 
they involve breaks in the connections between the sensual 
objects we experience and their qualities. In confrontation, 
it gets broken from its sensual qualities (time), such that its 
accidental features are somehow revealed as accidental. This 
occurs when we recognise something as something (e.g., a tree 
as a gallows), thereby separating those qualities irrelevant to 
this characterisation (e.g., height, branch structure, etc.) from 
those that aren’t (e.g., colour, foliage, etc.). In theory, it gets 
broken from its real qualities (eidos), such that its eidetic 
features are somehow contrasted to its accidental ones. This 
occurs when we strive to grasp the constants that underlie 
the shifting surface variations all things are subject to (e.g., 
to analyse the tree’s morphology, or its genetic structure). 
By contrast, only one of the fusions marks the emergence 
of the real object within the phenomenal sphere, so as to 
redraw its boundaries from within, whereas the other is 
entirely withdrawn, and so is only apparent in the ways it 
redraws these boundaries from without. The former is allure, 
where it interacts with the features of the sensible facades it 
projects (space), such that there is an apparent juxtaposition 
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between its accidental elements and its eidetic core. This 
occurs in various aesthetically significant experiences (e.g., 
cuteness, beauty, humour, embarrassment, humility, disappoint-
ment, loyalty),7 but is most prominently displayed in the use 
of metaphor (e.g., when we frame our experience of the tree 
by describing it as “a flame”). The latter is causation, where it 
interacts with its own real features (essence), so as to unlock 
its capacities to affect the withdrawn core of other things. As 
already indicated, the possibility of causation is thrown into 
question by withdrawal, and this necessitates the theory of 
vicarious causation to follow, which will turn upon its rela-
tion with allure.
Before getting into this though, we must examine the re-
maining six categories, which are divided into the radiations 
between qualities and qualities and the junctions between 
objects and objects. Much as there was a rift between one of 
the tensions and the other three with regard to their role in 
experience, there is a crucial difference between the roles 
that radiations and junctions play therein. On the one hand, 
the radiations cover the way that qualities are related within 
experience by the sensual objects that populate it: the relation 
between two sensual qualities (SQ-SQ) is their emanation 
through the same object of experience, the relation between 
two real qualities (RQ-RQ) is their contraction behind this 
same object, and the relation between the sensual qualities 
and the real qualities (SQ-RQ) is their duplicity in the way 
they differ from one another. On the other hand, the conjunc-
tions cover the way that relations between objects constitute 
experience in relation to ourselves qua real objects: the relation 
between two sensual objects (SO-SO) can only take place as 
continguity within our experience, the relation between two 
real objects (RO-RO) is the withdrawal of the corresponding 
real objects behind our experience, and the relation between 
a real object and a sensual object (RO-SO) is the sincerity 
that constitutes this experience itself. Together, the three 
radiations and three conjunctions provide the framework 
7 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 212-213.
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in which the three experiential tensions can unfold. They 
give us an abstract map of the phenomenal realms that lie 
between infernal kingdoms of execution—the borderlands 
through which they smuggle causal contraband, or the em-
bassies through which they communicate.
c) Vicarious Causation
We can now turn to the problem of how this communication 
occurs. The independence of real objects from one another 
demands such an explanation: how can mutually withdrawn 
objects possibly interact, so as to produce real changes in one 
another? These are quite distinct from the  mere phenomenal 
variations that sensual objects undergo in experience, because 
they can reconfigure the intentional space in which experi-
ence occurs. Yet it is only within these intentional spaces that 
a real object can encounter the variable facades projected by 
other real objects, and only through these sensual vicars that 
any sort of contact can be established between them. The fact 
that all causal contact arises out of an intentional relation 
between an experiencing real object and an experienced sen-
sual object that mediates between it and its real counterpart 
implies that the causal relation is not just vicarious, but also 
asymmetrical and buffered. It is asymmetrical because the 
relation has direction, proceeding from the object the vicar 
conceals to the object the vicar appears to. This means that 
causation can occur one-way between real objects, without 
reciprocation (e.g., when a bee is hit by an oncoming car, the 
bee may be destroyed while the car is entirely unscathed). It 
is buffered because there are many contiguous sensual objects 
present in the same experience, and this does not result in 
interactions between the real objects they hide (e.g., the bee 
may be drawn into the path of the truck by an enticing flower, 
but the truck and the flower may be entirely unrelated). This 
means that a real object’s sincerity in encountering a sensual 
object is the condition of that object’s receptivity.
However, we are not causally affected by every object we 
experience. The phenomenal realms that real objects find 
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themselves immersed in are filled to the brim with myriad 
sensual unities, many of which have no impact upon them 
at all. This means that intentional relations are not automati-
cally causal relations. The question is thus what more there 
is to causal contact than mere sincerity. Harman responds 
by drawing the link between causation and allure mentioned 
above. Genuine change is internal to a real object, insofar as 
it only occurs when a real object becomes connected to its 
qualities in regenerating its essence, but this nevertheless 
requires an external trigger, which can only take the form of 
some variation within the intentional space it’s immersed in. 
Harman proposes that the confrontations usually precipitated 
by such variation are insufficient to trigger causal contact, 
because the qualities encountered therein are still tied to 
the facade that hides the triggering object from the triggered 
object. It is only in allusion that these ties are broken, and the 
qualities are allowed to orbit the real object underlying them 
(e.g., when the metaphorical comparison of the tree with a 
flame highlights the relevant qualities in a way that makes 
them alien to it as we are familiar with it). Allure lets real-
ity obliquely slide into appearance, striking the object that 
experiences it in a way that surpasses the sensual flux it is 
accustomed to, so that the accidental features of the affecting 
object catalyse the reshuffling of essential features within 
the affected object. 
Nevertheless, the latter does not strictly see the former, even 
if it feels it in some specific aesthetic mode (e.g., as humorous) 
and to some specific degree of aesthetic intensity (e.g., as only 
mildly humorous). The brief suspension of causal independence 
that occurs in causal connection never really overcomes the 
corresponding epistemic excess. Allure may play an important 
role in enabling us to reconfigure the ways we think about 
entities, but it never amounts to knowledge of them. This is 
why Harman grants aesthetics a special philosophical privilege. 
In examining the varieties of allure and their relationships 
it gives us insight into the metaphysical structure of reality 
that forever escapes the stale practice of epistemology. With 
the tenfold categorical schema derived from the fourfold, 
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Harman has provided a general theory of objects, which he 
calls ontography, capable of application to the various specific 
domains of objects that compose the cosmos. Yet it is only 
through extending of the sorts of aesthetic analysis indicated 
by his theory of allure that these domains can be fleshed out. 
Ultimately, Harman proposes an alliance of aesthetics and 
metaphysics that promises to lay bare the various regions of 
the cosmos to renewed philosophical inquiry. It now falls to 
us to assess this proposal, and its worth.
2. The Withdrawal of Arguments
Having looked into the “what” of OOP, it’s time to concern 
ourselves with the “why.” This means locating the various 
arguments that Harman presents for each of the different 
aspects of his metaphysical system that we’ve distinguished. 
As I hinted in the introduction, this is by no means an easy 
task. Although Harman’s work is peppered with phrases such 
as “I will show...,” “I have already argued...,” or “As argued 
repeatedly...,” these do not often refer to specific arguments 
as much as to the overarching dramatisation of a given idea 
that takes place throughout the work.8 There are a few notable 
exceptions to this, as we will see, but what arguments there 
are in Harman’s work tend to be blended together in ways 
that make them hard to tease apart—a task which is vital if 
they are to be properly assessed. To draw on Harman’s own 
preferred metaphors once more, the arguments often seem 
to withdraw into themselves, leaving textual vicars that tan-
talise one’s cognitive faculties by alluding to their real logical 
depths. Our current task is thus to draw them out of hiding 
and expose them to the light of reason.9
8 These examples are all taken from Tool-Being (Chicago and la Salle: Open 
Court, 2002), 19, 61, 70, but one can find many similar phrases in all his 
works. It is very rare to find such a phrase that is tied to a specific chain 
of inferences, such as by referencing the pages upon which the supposed 
argument takes place.
9 Harman himself looks down on this sort of critical engagement with 
the arguments underlying a philosophical position for various reasons (cf. 
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Of course, Harman also has his own (fairly derogatory) 
opinions about the role of argument within philosophy, as part 
of his wider concerns with the importance of philosophical 
style, and these must be taken into account.10 However, we will 
address these later on in the present essay. For now, our aim is 
to delineate and perhaps even repair as much as is feasible of 
the justificatory tissue holding together the skeletal structure 
of Harman’s corpus which we’ve already revealed. This is a 
delicate operation that requires exegetical care, logical skill, 
and not a small amount of discursive charity. Returning to 
the medical metaphor opening the first section, we are about 
to move from exploratory to reconstructive surgery. In order 
to facilitate this, I’m going to draw a threefold distinction 
articulating the different ways in which Harman frames his 
ideas with an eye to their justification: historical narrative, 
phenomenological description, and metaphysical argument.
Historical narratives introduce an idea by reconstructing 
its genesis within a particular historical dialectic; usually con-
stituted by a series of different thinkers, each of which makes 
some important contribution to the problematic in which 
the idea gestates, only to emerge fully formed in the author’s 
own work. These rational reconstructions are an important 
philosophical tool deployed by many of the great figures in 
the history of philosophy.11 The philosophies of Hegel, Hei-
Guerilla Metaphysics, §12a), some of which are curiously intertwined with 
elements of his own position. He would rather that, instead of systematically 
critiquing a position on the basis of flaws in its argumentation, we strove to 
present counter-narratives that construct suggestive alternatives to it. Even 
while Harman admits that “such debunking may be necessary work at times,” 
he nevertheless maintains that “we should not forget that it is mainly the 
work of dogs (cynics, to say it in Greek).” (Ibid.) Even if we grant this, it cannot 
get in the way of the work that respect demands. Mere preference has no say 
upon when the dogs must be released. Woof. 
10 Cf. Graham Harman, Prince of Networks (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 169-175.
11 For an account of the logic of this process reconstruction, see Brandom’s 
work on the historical dimension of rationality in the introduction to Tales 
of the Mighty Dead (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) and 
his own reconstruction of Hegel in Reason in Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), ch. 3.
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degger and Deleuze would not be as compelling or even as 
accessible without the thematic vectors they trace through 
their forebears in the direction of their own work. Harman 
is thus to be commended for wielding this method of exposi-
tion with some skill. However, the danger associated with this 
method is that it can easily slip from licit exposition to illicit 
justification in the form of arguments from authority. Such 
arguments can be useful as shorthand forms of justification 
(equivalent to saying “you need to go read Aristotle/Hegel/
Heidegger/etc. before we can talk seriously about this”), but 
they wither under more sustained forms of philosophical 
scrutiny. The issue is exacerbated if the readings of the figures 
in question are particularly controversial, such as Harman’s 
reading of Heidegger, which forms a crucial part of his own 
object-oriented history.12 As such, in separating out these 
narratives from the other forms of exposition and argument 
in Harman’s work, my primary goal will be to ensure that 
they play no such illicit justificatory role.
Phenomenological descriptions play an important part 
in Harman’s work, insofar as his metaphysics is thoroughly 
influenced by an appropriation of the ideas of Husserl and 
Heidegger. His is a metaphysics of intentional relation, and 
his account of intentionality is fundamentally culled from 
the phenomenological tradition and its methodology of 
immanent description. However, the methodological ques-
tions regarding the nature and status of phenomenological 
description that were of such concern to Husserl and Hei-
degger receive little attention in Harman’s work. He is often 
all too eager to delve directly into phenomenological analysis 
without clarifying precisely what it is he is doing in doing so. 
Where Husserl devotes a enormous amount of time and effort 
to elaborating the various aspects of the phenomenological 
12 This is an area in which I can speak with at least enough authority to be 
taken seriously, given the fact that my PhD thesis (The Question of Being: 
Heidegger and Beyond) presents a synoptic reading of Heidegger’s work that, 
while diverging from both the standard analytic and continental readings 
much as Harman’s does, comes to radically different (and, I would argue, far 
more nuanced) conclusions than Harman’s own.
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reduction, and Heidegger devotes a serious (if not neces-
sarily comparable) effort to modifying this within his own 
existential-hermeneutic framework, Harman gives us little 
in the way of phenomenological methodology. This not only 
makes the precise content of many of his phenomenological 
claims unclear, but more worryingly brings into question the 
metaphysical conclusions that are leveraged on the basis of 
these claims. It is thus of the utmost importance to identify 
precisely which of Harman’s claims are motivated by phe-
nomenological analysis, and how they are deployed in the 
attempt to justify his more contentious metaphysical claims.
This brings us to the third form of exposition: metaphysi-
cal argument itself. Specifically, it raises the question of what 
qualifies either a philosophical claim or its justification as 
metaphysical. Put differently: just what is metaphysics any-
way? This question should weigh heavily on the shoulders 
of anyone intending to engage in renewed metaphysical 
speculation regardless of their preferred method, but this 
weight becomes particularly acute when one intends to derive 
metaphysical conclusions from phenomenological premises. 
Although it is possible to find his account wanting, one can’t 
say that Heidegger merely identifies phenomenology and 
ontology without addressing and attempting to justify this 
quite radical divergence from the metaphysical tradition.13 
Heidegger’s detailed historical and methodological work 
on the problem of metaphysics and the question of Being 
garners almost no attention in Harman’s work, nor is it sup-
plemented by any detailed alternative schema. Indeed, the 
most sustained engagement with the question I have been 
able to locate dismisses the possibility of even addressing 
the methodological task of clarifying the question of Being 
prior to answering it: “...the question of [B]eing cannot be 
elucidated until the meaning of [B]eing itself has already 
somehow been clarified, prior to any special description of 
Dasein.”14 This sidelining of methodological issues is very 





worrying given Harman’s unapologetic calls to return to the 
problems of pre-critical metaphysics.15
All this indicates just how important it is to separate out 
the roles these different forms of exposition play in the more 
or less explicit arguments within Harman’s work, and the way 
overlaps between them further complicate many of the implicit 
assumptions undergirding the latter. However, the critical 
purchase upon Harman’s work this would provide requires 
an exhaustive approach that has some of its own problems. 
First, the ideal of exhaustiveness places exegetical demands 
upon a commentator (and critic) that are often unrealistic, 
and this can easily lead to accusations of impropriety. I have 
gone out of my way to read as much of Harman’s extant work 
as I can, in order to forestall such accusations, but I expect 
them nonetheless.16 Second, it places hermeneutic demands 
on those who would read (and perhaps respond to) the 
commentary that are substantial, if not always unreasonable. 
Not only must they be willing to cover the same exegetical 
ground as the commentator, but they must keep track of 
15 It is also helpful to note that despite using the term “being” quite exten-
sively throughout Tool-Being, Harman never provides any generic definition 
or analysis of the term that goes beyond his own metaphysical account of it. 
If pushed to provide a quick analysis of his usage of the term, I would say that 
he uses it in one of two senses: a) in the particular sense to refer to the being 
of a given object (cf. 85), or b) in the singular sense to refer to the totality of 
objects (cf. 294). This almost entirely elides the general sense referring to 
the Being of objects as such that Heidegger himself is principally concerned 
with (as the subject of the question of Being). In addition, in accordance with 
his own metaphysical proclivities, the senses in which Harman does use 
the term are almost universally deployed in opposition to seeming (cf. 26), 
which is only one of the major oppositions that Heidegger outlines (and 
indeed, questions) in the course of his career (cf. Introduction to Metaphysics 
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000], 103-122).
16 I have read all published books and essay collections, but I have not read 
all of Harman’s published papers, nor any unpublished material that may 
be circulating. I have also followed his writings on his blog (http://doctorza-
malek2.wordpress.com) rather extensively, though I have refrained from 
referencing them in justifying any of the substantial points in this paper, 
for obvious reasons. I consider this to be an eminently reasonable level of 
work to justify the present essay, even if I cannot completely rule out the pos-
sibility that I have missed something crucial in the writings I have not read.
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multiple different arguments and their intersection. I have 
endeavoured to organise the present essay in as accessible 
a manner as possible, but this can only ameliorate these 
problems to some extent. Third, it often has profoundly 
counterproductive psychological effects. It’s an unfortunate 
fact that it is often easier to convince someone of the falsity 
of a theory or the wrongness of a policy by focusing upon a 
single objection to it, rather than aiming to present several 
equally serious objections. We all have a finite amount of 
attention, and thus a limited ability to cope with barrages of 
arguments, and these unavoidable limitations can often lead 
to us dismissing arguments that overload our attentional 
capacities. This phenomenon is a serious problem in many 
mainstream political debates, where certain multifariously 
flawed ideas often survive precisely because no unitary line 
of attack upon them is obvious. I will beg the reader to pay 
attention (ironically enough) to this phenomenon, and en-
deavour not to take the lack of a singular criticism as a point 
in favour of the position criticised.
This brings me to the last substantive point in the current 
prolegomena, regarding the nature of philosophical disagree-
ment and its presentation. Harman has complained to me 
before that I fail to follow the proper procedure for engaging 
with a discursive opponent in my more informal debates with 
him: first outlining the areas in which one agrees with one’s 
interlocutor, before proceeding to outline the relevant disa-
greements.17 My response to this criticism is that, sometimes, 
there simply aren’t enough points of agreement to make this 
more than an empty gesture. My own commitments, which I 
have endeavoured to keep out of the present paper wherever 
possible,18 are quite radically different from Harman’s, and 
this leaves little ground for praise on my part. Nevertheless, 
17 This was written in private correspondence.
18 For an unpolished overview of my own position, I recommend reading the 
available draft of my Essay on Transcendental Realism (http://deontologistics.
wordpress.com/2010/05/essay-on-transcendental-realism.pdf). This is a 
rough draft that has yet to be revised and expanded for publication, but it 
does a reasonable job of outlining the central themes of my work.
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I will mention six areas in which there is something resem-
bling agreement between us: (i) we both think that correla-
tionism is problematic; (ii) we both hold that individuality 
is an important metaphysical topic; (iii) we agree that there 
is more to panpsychism than is often thought; (iv) we each 
take it that aesthetics is an important philosophical field 
with wider ramifications than commonly accepted; (v) we 
are jointly committed to both the possibility and necessity 
of metaphysics in some form; and (vi) we strongly agree that 
realism is essential if it is to be pursued properly. 
The problem is that once we begin to define what is meant 
by the core terms in each case (correlationism, individuality, 
panpsychism, aesthetics, metaphysics, and realism) the agree-
ments are revealed as fairly superficial: (i) I agree with Meil-
lassoux19 that the essence of correlationism is epistemological 
rather than metaphysical, and that it must be challenged on 
this terrain rather than dismissed as ontologically arrogant; 
(ii) I think that there can be no study of the metaphysics of 
individuality that does not begin with its logic (e.g., identifi-
cation, quantification, existential commitment, etc.) rather 
than leaping headlong into intuitive speculation; (iii) the 
features of the history of panpsychism I am concerned with 
(e.g., Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Whitehead, and Deleuze) 
consist in their generalisation of non-intentional features of 
thought (i.e., conation and sensation); (iv) I’m convinced that 
aesthetics, as the study of a certain kind of value, has less to 
do with the sensations and feelings that signal its presence than 
the actions this demands of us; (v) I predict that a return to 
metaphysical speculation without the methodological awareness 
accompanying an answer to the question “what is metaphys-
ics?” is doomed to failure; and (vi) I think that there can be 
no viable “realism” without a definition of “real” more subtle 
than “that which is always other than our knowledge of it.”
This is all I will say about these disagreements for now. 
The criticisms upon which they turn will be revealed as we 
19 “Speculative Realism” in Collapse III: Unknown Deleuze, 445-446, in con-
versation with Peter Hallward.
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look at Harman’s arguments themselves. I will group these 
arguments on the basis of the aspect of his system that they 
underpin (withdrawal, the fourfold, and vicarious causation, 
respectively), such that the order of the following subsections 
corresponds directly to the order of those in the previous 
section. Each subsection will deal with a number of different 
arguments of varying strength and complexity, with vary-
ing degrees of reconstruction on my part. Each will also be 
smaller than the last, as the relevant arguments build upon 
one another. I will do my best to indicate exegetical concerns 
surrounding my reconstructions, but my aim is to present 
the strongest possible forms of each argument, so as to make 
the corresponding criticisms as strong as possible. This is 
the core feature of the respect owed to OOP discussed in the 
introduction. 
a) Tools, Knowledge, and Distinctness
Harman has a several arguments for his account of with-
drawal. By far the most famous is the reading of Heidegger’s 
tool-analysis, presented in his first book: Tool-Being. Howev-
er, despite the fact that the tool-analysis is referred to and 
summarised to different degrees all over Harman’s work, it 
remains fairly opaque in its logical structure.20 This is prin-
cipally because, as much as it gets referred to as if it were a 
single argument, it is really a blend of a number of distinct 
arguments, mixing all three forms of exposition discussed 
above: historical, phenomenological, and metaphysical. 
Disentangling these expository and justificatory strands is 
difficult enough when focusing on one text, but its manifold 
presentation confronts us with some serious choices about 
how to go about doing so. I have decided to focus upon two 
presentations of the analysis: the original and most detailed 
presentation of it in Tool-Being, and a more recent and concise 
20 To give a representative example, in the collection Towards Speculative 
Realism (Winchester: Zer0 Books, 2010), 8 out of 11 essays contain truncated 
summaries of the tool-analysis.
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presentation of it in Harman’s Meillassoux book.21 I highly 
recommend reading the relevant sections of these texts along 
with my reconstruction of the tool-analysis, so as to confirm 
the fidelity of my reconstruction. These preliminaries aside, 
I will break the tool-analysis down into two separate parts. I 
call these the argument from execution and the argument 
from excess. This will be followed by an examination of an 
additional argument that often accompanies them, which I 
call the argument from identity.
i) Harman’s Heidegger
Before delving into the details of the tool-analysis, it’s neces-
sary to address the exegetical elephant in the room. I have 
already announced my disagreement with Harman’s reading 
of Heidegger. Harman is very clear that his version of the 
tool-analysis is not one that Heidegger would himself endorse, 
and that as such it must be assessed on its own merits. This 
is precisely what I intend to do. However, in line with the 
earlier remarks about the role of historical narrative, it will 
be helpful to present the crucial errors of Harman’s reading 
of Heidegger as I see them. On the one hand, this inoculates 
against any illicit slip from exposition to justification, and, 
on the other, it helps to situate many of the issues Harman 
is dealing with within their correct historical context. There 
are five principal aspects of Harman’s reading with which I 
disagree: (i) he reads Heidegger’s critique of presence as cham-
pioning a complementary notion of execution; (ii) he takes 
the distinction between the ontological and the ontic to be 
equivalent to the distinction between the ready-to-hand and 
the present-at-hand, respectively; (iii) he claims that the “world” 
should not be understood as a phenomenological horizon; 
(iv) he holds that Dasein is not central to Heidegger’s ontol-
ogy; and (v) he identifies the encounter with the broken tool 
with the as-structure. I’m going to tackle these disagreements 
by addressing several characteristic criticisms that Harman 
21 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 135-136.
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deploys liberally against other interpreters of Heidegger. If 
understanding these exegetical points is of little interest to 
you, you might wish to skip the rest of this section, though I 
don’t recommend it.
To begin with, Harman repeatedly criticises other interpreters 
for mistaking the significance of the distinction between read-
iness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) and presence-at-hand (Vorhand-
enheit) for a distinction between types of entity. He zealously 
reminds his readers that ready-to-hand entities are not those 
specific things that happen to be used as tools by humans, but 
rather that any extant entity may be taken as ready-to-hand 
or present-at-hand.22 This point is certainly misunderstood 
by a number of interpreters. However, even when combined 
with his reading of Heidegger’s use of the word “mere” (Bloß) 
to denigrate the status of presence (Anweisenheit),23 this does 
not show that Heidegger is championing a complementary 
notion of execution (Vollzug) as the real meaning of “Being” 
that the metaphysical tradition overlooked. On the contrary, 
it is possible to view this as a distinction between different 
modes of Being (Seinsarten/Seinsweisen) without reducing it 
to a distinction between mutually exclusive types of beings. 
This is precisely how Heidegger describes the distinction, 
and it will connect to the other exegetical points still to be 
made.24 Moreover, the fact that Harman develops this notion 
of execution into a new conception of substance (ousia), be-
moaning the inability of Heidegger commentators to see the 
connection between Zuhandenheit and ousia,25 indicates he has 
diverged from Heidegger somewhere earlier down the line.26
22 Cf. Harman, Tool-Being, 38.
23 Ibid., 48-49.
24 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 305; Martin Heidegger, 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 151-152.
25 Harman, Tool-Being, 270.
26 Heidegger’s criticism of presence is inexorably tied up with his critique 




Secondly, Harman claims that Heidegger’s insights cannot 
be truly ontological ones if they are taken to be understood in 
terms of the intelligibility of entities to Dasein. The argument 
for this essentially boils down to the idea that intelligibility 
to Dasein is seeming for Dasein, and Harman defines “Being” 
as opposed to seeming.27 For Harman, ontology is the study 
of beings as they are in themselves, as distinct from their ap-
pearances. This is almost the opposite move made by most 
orthodox Heidegger scholars, who define “Being” as the 
intelligibility of beings as distinct from any “metaphysical” 
conception of the underlying grounds of this intelligibility. 
For them, ontology is the study of appearances freed from the 
mistaken metaphysical search for substantial basis of these 
appearances. Both of these readings are seriously misguided 
insofar as Heidegger does not define “Being” in either way. 
However, each has an element of truth to it. In line with the 
orthodox interpretation, he tries to argue against the meta-
physical tradition that Being is to be understood in terms of 
intelligibility (unconcealing). In line with Harman’s inter-
pretation, he also thinks that something must be said about 
that which resists or escapes intelligibility (concealing). His 
later work in particular attempts to show that the revelation of 
each entity to our understanding is tempered by its situation 
within a broader field of meaning (world) which is always in 
tension with reality in itself (earth). Every entity thus appears 
as a local modification of this global struggle (strife/truth).
Thirdly, this brings us to Harman’s criticism that, in inter-
preting Heidegger’s use of “world” as a phenomenological 
horizon within which entities appear to each given Dasein, 
Heidegger scholars have stumbled into a disastrous regress 
towards ever deeper unitary grounds (e.g., Zeitlichkeit, Tem-
poralität, Ereignis, etc.). He even parodies this regress by way 
of a children’s sleepover game.28 However, again, as much as 
this is a legitimate lampooning of the stylistic and exegetical 
excesses of much Heidegger scholarship, this does not amount 
27 See fn. 15.
28 Harman, Tool-Being, 27.
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to a proof that there is no well defined regress of unitary 
grounds in Heidegger. Even if there is a certain overworn 
argumentative trope in Heidegger, this does not excuse us 
from examining the specificities of its instances. It is thus 
entirely possible (and desirable) to determine that there are 
only a specific number of steps in Heidegger’s analyses, and 
that they actually have an end point in some more or less 
well delimited unitary structure (e.g., Temporalität in the early 
work, or Ereignis in the later work). Harman’s alternative is 
to read “world” as a complete totality of entities rather than 
a phenomenological horizon in which they appear. This is 
a disastrous misreading, and is explicitly counselled against 
by Heidegger.29
Fourthly, this sets the stage for Harman’s attack on anthropo-
centric readings of Heidegger. Although Harman recognises 
that Heidegger himself grants Dasein ontological privilege, 
he takes this to be entirely unnecessary, insofar as every en-
tity can be interpreted as a for-the-sake-of-which  engaging 
with other things in terms of projective understanding.30 
Harman explicitly claims that although Heidegger uses the 
term “understanding” (Verstand) here, this can be interpreted 
non-anthropocentrically as covering all interactions between 
things. This is indicative of a really pernicious misunderstand-
ing of Heidegger’s project that underlies the other points 
addressed so far. To briefly summarise Heidegger’s account 
of understanding: he thinks that Dasein relates to the things 
it encounters in terms of the possibilities for action that they 
provide it, and that what characterises Dasein qua Dasein 
(Existenz) is that set of conditions (Existentiale) without which 
Dasein could not count as freely choosing, and thus acting 
in any real sense. Harman is fond of ridiculing Heidegger’s 
analysis of the mode of Being of animality as distinct from 
Dasein’s mode of existence, precisely because he fails to see 
that Heidegger is describing entities that have similar be-
29 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Bloomington 




havioural capacities to Dasein (drives) that nevertheless lack 
the specific conditions of organisation that enable choice (as 
opposed to mere disinhibition).31 
This ties back to the third point: Harman cannot see what 
it would be to be world-poor insofar as he does not see what 
it would be for something to have a world in Heidegger’s 
sense: an internally articulated space of possible action 
(i.e., the projection of what is possible), involving a grasp of 
both generality and particularity (e.g., the possibilities of 
pens as such, and the possibilities of this pen, respectively), 
in isolation and situation (e.g., the possibilities of this pen 
in relation to paper as such, and the possibilities of this pen 
in relation to that piece of paper, respectively), organised in 
terms of a hierarchy of ends (e.g., the end of writing a letter, 
itself a means to maintaining a friendship, itself a means to... 
etc.) united by the fundamental goal of becoming oneself 
(i.e., Dasein as its own for-the-sake-of-which). Entities appear 
in the world for Heidegger insofar as they modify this space 
of possibility: their actuality consists in the way they open 
up certain specific possibilities for action while closing down 
others. This in turn ties back to the second point: Harman 
cannot see that differences in modes of Being (e.g., Zuhanden-
heit, Vorhandenheit, Existenz, etc.) are not simple differences 
between types of beings, insofar as he does not see the differ-
ent ways they are supposed to be individuated as actualities 
within the world qua space of possibility. So, it is true that all 
spatio-temporally located particulars are both ready-to-hand 
and present-at-hand in some sense (even if the space and time 
in question are not straightforwardly identical), but this is 
a matter of the difference between our grasp of possibilities 
as tied to the everyday forms of activity we inherit from the 
culture we are thrown into (e.g., pens qua writing implements), 
and our grasp of possibilities as abstracted from these activi-
ties (e.g., pens qua ink-filled molded plastic), respectively.
Fifthly, then, this brings us to Harman’s persistent criticisms 
of pragmatist readings of Heidegger in general, and of the 
31 Cf. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, part 2, ch. 3-6.
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tool-analysis more specifically. These are inexorably bound 
up with the other criticisms already presented, but there 
is an important additional dimension here: his claim that 
Heidegger’s concern with the use of equipment has nothing 
to do with use as we normally understand it, but should be 
understood as a matter of reliance upon equipment.32 It is 
the fact that reliance is an essentially causal notion that un-
derpins his claim that all interactions between entities can 
be described as entities “understanding” one another “as” 
something, and the development of this into the claim that 
all such interactions are analogous to the encounter with the 
broken-tool. We’ll return to the independent methodological 
problems with this claim, but for now it serves to point out 
the sheer extent to which this misunderstands Heidegger’s 
account of the as-structure and its relation to the broken-tool 
encounter. The crucial point is that Heidegger distinguishes 
between the hermeneutic “as” and the apophantic “as,” and 
associates these with the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, 
respectively. The relationship between the former thereby 
circumscribes the relationship between the latter, and it is 
essentially a matter of the relation between implicitness and 
explicitness, respectively.
It is important to understand that the “as” is indicative of 
generality. We grasp something “as” something insofar as 
we grasp a particular as an instance of a general type. The 
idea behind the split in the as-structure is that the grasp of 
generality involved here can be articulated in two distinct 
ways, even if these forms of articulation are fundamentally 
inseparable and always combined in different degrees. We grasp 
the entities around us principally through the hermeneutic 
“as” insofar as the specific possibilities we are immediately 
presented with by them (e.g., writing a letter) are articulated 
by an implicit grasp of the general types of equipment they 
instantiate (e.g., pens and paper qua equipment for writing). 
This implicit grasp is the condition of interpretation, which 




ate possibilities, taking them apart and bringing forth the 
generalities that articulate them. However, this process of 
interpretation is not yet linguistic: it is the move to making 
assertions about entities that transforms the hermeneutic 
“as” into the apophantic “as.” These involve the use of special 
linguistic equipment to isolate and then re-articulate the 
general possibilities that constitute these types. This enables 
a process of progressive abstraction which extricates the 
causal capacities of entities from the normative functions 
through which our everyday understanding grasps them. The 
present-at-hand is nothing but the correlate of the limit-case 
of this process of abstraction. It is not constituted by pure 
presence, or actuality devoid of possibility, but rather by pure 
capacity, or possibility devoid of function. The exemplars 
of the present-at-hand are those entities posited by science 
independently of any role they could have in everyday prac-
tices (e.g., electrons, black holes, mitochondria, etc.). Science 
is thus hardly the domain of pure presence in this vacuous 
sense, but rather the forefront of our attempt to work out what 
is really possible, over and above the expectations implicit in 
our parochial forms of life.
The encounter with the broken-tool must be understood 
in terms of this complex interplay between causal capacity 
and normative function. The important thing to realise is 
that the tool cannot break unless it behaves in a way it is not 
supposed to: there is no malfunction without proper function. 
It is the fact that we grasp equipment (e.g., pen and paper) in 
terms of a set of normatively articulated everyday activities 
(e.g., letter writing, drawing, doodling, etc.) that enables it to 
surprise us by failing to behave as it should in the context of 
those activities (e.g., the pen leaking ink all over the paper). 
This means that we must already encounter the equipment 
as equipment: without a prior hermeneutic “as,” nothing 
can break. This prior “as” forms the basis of the response to 
the encounter, insofar as the surprise malfunction incites 
us to re-interpret our grasp of the tool’s possibilities. This 
interpretation can then either stay at the hermeneutic level, 
or be developed apophantically by using assertions to draw 
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out the causal capacities the tool possesses independently of 
its functional role; or rather, independently of its status as a 
tool. It is in this sense that the encounter with the broken-tool 
amounts to a transition between the tool as ready-to-hand and 
the tool as present-at-hand: it is an invitation to a different 
form of understanding.
What all this reveals is that Harman’s reading cannot be 
an interpretation of the substance of Heidegger’s ideas, even 
one that Heidegger himself would disagree with. It is pos-
sible to read thinkers against themselves, but this requires 
that there is some essential element present in their work 
that the work itself fails to live up to.33 The element that 
Harman tries to unearth in Heidegger’s tool-analysis simply 
isn’t there.34 The only reason he can propose to extend the 
intentional relation between Dasein and its tools to cover all 
interactions between entities is that he has stripped this rela-
tion of everything that makes it recognisably Heideggerian. 
He has excised the structure of projective understanding 
wholesale, and thereby completely abandoned the semantic 
and epistemological framework within which the encounter 
with the tool is described. This becomes clear once we ask the 
question: just what would it be for a screen door to encoun-
ter a knife as a knife?35 To say that this is for it to be affected 
by it in a way that is common to all knives is to say nothing 
that warrants using the word “encounter” in an intentional 
33 This is a hermeneutic strategy that Brandom calls de re interpretation, as 
opposed to de dicto interpretation: the attempt to be faithful to the subject 
matter, rather than the words used to express it (Tales of the Mighty Dead, ch. 1).
34 Another point to make here about Harman’s reading qua reading is that 
even if there were some evidence that Heidegger did see the tool-analysis in 
something resembling this way, then it would still be far fetched, given the 
extent of the other aspects of Heidegger’s work it invalidates: theory, mood, 
space, time, etc. (cf. Tool-Being, §4-7) Harman gives us a long list of features 
of his thought that Heidegger can say nothing specific about despite his 
sincere and extensive attempts to do so. The sheer amount of Heidegger’s 
work that Harman’s reading disqualifies thus constitutes a pretty good 
reductio ad absurdum of it as a reading of Heidegger, even if we ignore the 
misunderstandings just discussed.
35 This is Harman’s own example (Tool-Being, 30-32).
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sense. The screen door has nothing that could qualify it as 
having anything like an awareness of generality. There is 
no hermeneutic “as” circumscribing its engagements with 
things. This leaves us saying that what it is for a screen door 
to interact with a knife qua knife is for it to be affected in the 
way that knives affect screen doors. This is an empty tautol-
ogy unworthy of metaphysical scrutiny.36
ii) The Argument from Execution
The principal argument derived from the tool-analysis in 
Tool-Being is what I have called the argument from execution. 
This argument aims to establish that the reality of entities 
consists in their execution (or tool-being), and on this basis 
to demonstrate that they withdraw from all epistemic and 
causal contact. Harman takes the method of the argument to 
be a matter of phenomenological description, insofar as it is 
a purported reconstruction of Heidegger’s own phenomeno-
logical analysis.37 The point of this analysis is to reveal the 
absolute invisibility of objects qua execution, by presenting 
three interrelated characterisations of execution: as causal 
capacity (or “effect”), as pure action (or “impact”), and as 
functional role (or “reference”). However, as we’ve already 
noted, Harman provides no clarification regarding the nature 
of his phenomenological method, or how it can be expected 
to yield metaphysical results. This is complicated by the fact 
that many of Harman’s claims are patently more metaphysi-
cal than phenomenological. This raises the possibility that 
in some cases he has simply imported metaphysical assump-
tions instead of collecting phenomenological evidence. We 
will thus have to be very careful to keep all the elements of 
his analyses separate in reconstructing their logical form.
Harman’s take on Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis 
opens by specifying its object: our ubiquitous encounters 
36 For a further example of Harman’s attempt to universalise the as-structure 
in this way, see his discussion of tectonic plates towards the end of Tool-Being 
(221-222). 
37 Harman, Tool-Being, 18. 
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with the entities that we “use” in the course of living. His 
break with Heidegger’s analysis occurs already in this first 
paragraph:
Heidegger demonstrates that our primary interaction with beings comes 
through “using” them, through simply counting on them in an unthe-
matic way. For the most part, objects are implements taken for granted, 
a vast environmental backdrop supporting the thin and volatile layer 
of our explicit activities. All human action finds itself lodged amidst 
countless items of supporting equipment: the most nuanced debates 
in a laboratory stand at the mercy of a silent bedrock of floorboards, 
bolts, ventilators, gravity, and atmospheric oxygen.38
This break is subtle, and does not become completely apparent 
until a few pages later, when he explicitly substitutes the word 
“rely” for “use.”39 The examples that Harman focuses on are 
indicative of this shift. Gone is the emphasis upon equipment 
actively deployed toward a goal (e.g., hammers, cars, signals, etc.), 
to be replaced with a focus upon “equipment” necessary to 
passively sustain a given state (e.g., ventilators, gravity, oxygen, 
etc.). It is not that Heidegger is not concerned with some 
examples of this kind—sustaining a state is as eligible a goal 
as achieving one—but rather that Harman narrows the scope 
of the analysis by collapsing active use into passive reliance, 
while simultaneously expanding its scope to include cases 
of dependence that lack anything that could be construed 
as awareness of the thing depended upon. This move both 
enables execution to take on the role of persistence we saw 
earlier, and facilitates the universalisation of intentionality to 
encompass all objects and the flaying of Heidegger’s account 
of intentionality that accompanies it.
We can already see the pretence of phenomenology slip-
ping here. Harman has subtly shifted the focus of his analysis 
from our practical comportment toward things to our causal 





nomenological description is apt to describe my relation to 
my internal organs, the geological strata that I stand upon, 
or the delicate balance of environmental factors necessary 
for life on earth in a manner analogous to my relation to the 
various socially delineated props I passively engage in car-
rying out everyday tasks. Harman balances this shift upon 
a delicate ambiguity in the sense in which encounters with 
things can be “unconscious” or “unthematic.”40 It consists 
in misunderstanding what Heidegger calls circumspection 
(Umsicht). Heidegger’s concern with this sort of “unthematic” 
understanding was to provide a phenomenological analysis of 
comportments that lacked a specific kind of awareness, rather 
than lacking awareness as such. He would not consider my 
relation to my internal organs to be an intentional relation 
unless it consisted in some implicit grasp of general ways in 
which they are involved within practical activities, either as 
obstacles (e.g. an awareness of my fickle digestive system) 
or resources (e.g., the metabolic control some yogic masters 
have achieved), or some explicit grasp of their general modal 
features (e.g., the theoretical understanding of a biologist or 
surgeon). Harman essentially substitutes Heidegger’s con-
cern with the “unconscious” encounter as awareness without 
attention, for a concern with it as dependence without awareness.
Bearing all this in mind, we can turn to the first step in 
Harman’s analysis. This is his claim that what we encounter 
in relying upon equipment is its causal capacity to produce 
the specific effect that we rely upon. This is his first charac-
terisation of the execution that constitutes the reality of the 
tool, and he vehemently opposes it to the idea that the tool 
consists in the ways humans expect to use it: “Equipment is 
not effective ‘because people use it;’ on the contrary, it can 
only be used because it is capable of an effect, of inflicting some 
kind of blow on reality. In short, the tool isn’t ‘used’—it is.”41 
40 It is also helped by an ambiguity in the sense of “reliance,” which can be 
read either as an intentional relation involving an expectation regarding 
whatever is relied upon, or as a matter of brute causal dependence.
41 Harman, Tool-Being, 20.
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On the face of it, this is a perfectly good inference—success-
ful reliance upon a thing demands that it possess the causal 
capacity to produce the effect relied upon—but the way it is 
introduced and used by Harman is questionable precisely 
insofar as it is metaphysical rather than phenomenological. 
Harman is already straying into metaphysics in describing 
the thing as consisting in this capacity, rather than simply 
possessing it, and he will stray further when he fleshes out 
his characterisation of this capacity qua execution. He does 
not linger in this register though. He rapidly returns to phe-
nomenology when he insists upon the invisibility of this 
capacity.42 However, invisibility is apparent only insofar as 
we focus upon precisely those un-Heideggerian cases that 
Harman has smuggled in. This paradoxical revelation of 
invisibility essentially consists in our discovery that we really 
have no awareness of those things we depend upon without 
awareness—at least that is, until we turn our phenomenolog-
ical gaze upon them. This has no force whatsoever, because 
there is no correlation between dependence and awareness 
either way. Prima facie, it is entirely possible for me to be aware 
or not aware of the things I depend on, to varying degrees.43
Let us move deeper into the nature of execution and its 
purported invisibility then. The second characterisation of 
execution is its status as pure action, and it has two aspects. 
First, the equipment is never what it is simply because it is 
capable of an effect, but must also enact this effect at every 
moment: “Equipment is forever in action, constructing each 
moment the sustaining habitat where our explicit awareness 
is on the move.”44 Second, this perpetual action is unitary, 
insofar as its effect cannot be broken down into subsidiary 
actions that might be held in reserve. It must be “an agent 
42 Harman, Tool-Being, 21.
43 No doubt some will claim that although there may indeed be degrees of 
awareness, this never amounts to complete awareness, and that this is suf-
ficient to underwrite the putatively “absolute” character of invisibility. This 
is a entirely separate argument, which I will deal with in the next section as 




thoroughly deployed in reality, as an impact irreducible to any 
list of properties that might be tabulated by an observer.”45 
There are at least two distinct tensions inherent in this 
characterisation: a modal tension between possibility and 
actuality, and a temporal tension between dynamism and 
stasis. The former comes from the contrast between this and 
the first characterisation of execution in terms of capacity, 
insofar as it flattens whatever possible effects a thing might 
have into its current actual effects. The latter comes from 
the characterisation of the thing as always already in action, 
an act whose occurrence is such that we only encounter it 
in a state of silent repose, or diachronic transition so pure it is 
the very essence of synchronic persistence. These tensions are 
seemingly constitutive for the invisibility of equipment. Try 
as we might to understand any specific capacity, we never 
reach the unitary effect that silently whirs behind it:
Whatever is visible of the table in any given instant can never be its 
tool-being, never its readiness-to-hand. However deeply we meditate 
on the table’s act of supporting solid weights, however tenaciously we 
monitor its presence, any insight that is yielded will always be some-
thing quite distinct from this act itself.46
Try as we might to understand the way an occurrence unfolds, 
the things it involves are events already past yet ongoing: “A 
tool exists in the manner of enacting itself; only derivatively 
can it be discussed or otherwise mulled over. Try as hard as we 
might to capture the hidden execution of equipment, we will 
always lag behind.”47 Harman provokes us like a zen master 
wielding a koan: a pure act rests behind all superficial acts, 
a pure actuality grounds all potential actualities. One hand 
claps slowly.48




48 Before withdrawing into itself, and disappearing in a puff of metaphysics.
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should we make of these tensions within the account of 
execution from the perspective of the split between phe-
nomenology and metaphysics? At best, they constitute a 
brute phenomenological description of dubious plausibil-
ity. Despite the general paradox of the accessibility of inac-
cessibility, and the more specific paradoxes of modality and 
temporality it poses us with, we might simply have to throw 
up our arms and admit: “Well, things do seem this way, just 
like he says!” Even so, we would have to be receptive to any 
analysis that could dissolve these seeming paradoxes, as op-
posed to simply harnessing them. At worst, they constitute 
a series of strange and strained metaphysical assumptions 
extending the reification of capacity carried out by the first 
characterisation, assumptions we are given anything but good 
reason to endorse. Just what is really going on here? Harman 
seems to have transposed the phenomenological analysis of 
tools as deployed in actions—which he otherwise ignored in 
favour passive dependence—into a metaphysics of tools as ac-
tions. This has a peculiar effect that can best be described as 
performative phenomenology. The revelation of invisibility 
is an artefact of the way in which it is introduced. The general 
paradox is underwritten by the specific ones. We encounter 
the invisibility of equipment as the ineffability engendered 
by the impossible tensions in the ways in which it is described. 
The supposed demonstration of epistemic inaccessibility 
is actually an elaborate numbing of our epistemic faculties, 
performed by multiplying the incompatible aspects of the 
mysterious withdrawn tool. Single hands don’t clap after all.49
We now turn to the third and final characterisation of ex-
ecution: as functional role. This builds upon the previous two 
characterisations by articulating the effect which the capac-
ity produces in its pure action as a means to an end of some 
sort. This is how Harman cashes out Heidegger’s account of 
reference (Verweis): he takes every entity to refer to those things 
the persistence of which depends upon its own persistence. 
The reference of a thing’s execution is another thing whose 
49 It turns out to have been a puff of logic, after all.
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execution it sustains. Reference and dependence are thus uni-
fied into a single relation of functional dependence. This is 
responsible for Harman’s machinic descriptions of entities, 
insofar as it underwrites his discussion of dependence rela-
tions in mereological terms, not merely as between part and 
whole, but as between component and system. What happens 
here is that the causal capacities actualised in composition 
get transformed into normative functions through being nor-
matively underwritten by the whole they actually compose. 
The various girders, nuts, and bolts that compose a bridge are 
simultaneously depended upon by the bridge and captured 
in executing their functional role in sustaining the bridge 
as a systematic effect on which further things depend.50 It is 
this interpretation of reference relations that collapses Hei-
degger’s account of world into a simple totality, insofar as it 
takes them to hold exclusively between individuals, understood 
in terms of their actual states, rather than a complex horizon 
that involves relations between both types and instances, un-
derstood in terms of their possible states.
According to Harman, this characterisation implies the 
second fundamental aspect of Heidegger’s tool-analysis: 
what he calls the tool’s totality as opposed to its invisibility. 
To understand this, it’s important to see that Harman takes 
functional dependence to extend beyond intuitive forms of 
mereological dependence (e.g., dependence upon my internal 
organs), to include things like environmental dependence 
(e.g., my dependence upon external factors such as gravity 
and oxygen), and even goes so far as to incorporate negative 
dependence relations (e.g., my dependence on a meteorite 
not falling from space into me). Moreover, although both 
dependence and reference are asymmetric relations, they go 
in opposite directions: if x depends on y then y refers to x, 
and each relation is transitive, meaning that: if x depends on 
y and y depends on z, then x depends on z, and therefore also 
that z refers to x. Given all this, the world becomes a network 
of functional dependence relations, in which each specific 
50 Harman, Tool-Being, 22-25.
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entity is individuated through its location relative to eve-
rything else. The bridge is what it is in virtue of depending 
upon precisely what it actually depends upon, and supporting 
precisely what it actually supports; the same is true for every 
nut, bolt, girder, and environmental condition upon which it 
depends, which includes everything upon which they depend, 
ad infinitum, and for every passing traveller, supply chain, or 
local business it exists in aid of, and everything they in turn 
support, ad infinitum. This converts the world from a simple 
totality of disparate individuals into a unified individual 
in its own right: the plurality of local systems of execution 
become an integrated network of components in a single 
global system, or “world-machine.”51 The numerous ends at 
which execution aims are subsumed within a single system 
of ends, the ultimate purpose of which can only be to sustain 
the system itself. 
This produces a relational tension alongside the modal 
and temporal tensions we have already uncovered, but it is 
more complicated insofar as it arises from a conflict between 
the relational holism Harman attributes to Heidegger and 
the radical individualism that he aims to derive from the 
principles on which it is founded. The tension consists in 
Harman’s attempt to convert holism into individualism 
by transforming execution from something individuated 
through the functional dependence relations it is bound up 
in, to something prior to these relations which makes them 
possible. It becomes manifest in the way he connects totality 
and invisibility through the characterisation of execution as 
functional role. His attempt to derive invisibility from func-
tionality is far more reminiscent of Heidegger than the other 
arguments for invisibility we’ve discussed: “The function or 
reference of the tool is effective not as an explicit sign or sym-
bol, but as something that vanishes into the work to which it is 
assigned.”52 For Heidegger, our attention is inevitably drawn 
towards the immediate ends of our activity, rather than the 
51 Harman, Tool-Being, 33.
52 Ibid., 25, my emphasis.
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various subordinate tasks and the means they involve. We 
focus upon what we’re doing with the hammer—putting up 
shelves—rather than the mechanics of the hammer and our 
use of it. Nevertheless, this phenomenological insight is not 
meant to preclude the possibility of turning our attention to 
any of these easily overlooked details. Our awareness of the 
task as an articulated whole enables us to shift our attention 
back to any aspect of it. We shift focus to our grip upon the 
hammer, thereby adjusting it to optimise the force we can 
achieve at the odd angle the space allows us. Harman’s read-
ing warps this insight: the activity becomes the thing, and the 
focus of our attention upon the end of the activity becomes 
the vanishing of our awareness of the thing into whatever it 
sustains. This mutates further when exposed to his totalising 
logic of reference: all awareness vanishes into the world-
machine, as the unitary activity in which everything plays 
its sustaining role.53
So far then, Harman appears to have derived the invisibility 
of everything but the world as a whole from his functional 
account of individuation. Perhaps the strangest move is 
still to come though, because he converts this claim about 
invisibility back into a claim about individuation: “Every 
being is entirely absorbed into this world-system, assigned 
to further possibilities in such a way that there could never 
be any singular end-point within the contexture of reference. 
In the strict sense, the world has no parts.”54 It is not merely the 
visibility of the parts but their distinctness which collapses 
into the whole—vanishing becomes absorption. This is highly 
problematic, because it uses an account of the articulation of 
systems into distinct components to deny that there is any 
such articulation at all. It presupposes the fact that there are 
distinct entities with differentiated capacities that can be 
combined and configured in a variety of ways, only to inter-
pret this combination and configuration in such a way as to 
deny the distinctness that it is predicated upon. We would be 
53 Harman, Tool-Being, 32-33.
54 Ibid., 43.
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forgiven for insisting upon a reductio ad absurdum of some, if 
not most, of Harman’s premises at this point. He does indeed 
intend to perform a reductio of sorts, but it is not the one we 
might expect, and indeed, should insist upon.55 He ignores the 
inconsistency at the heart of his account of functionality in 
favour of the contradiction between his account of invisibility 
and the “existence of objects as a glaring experiential fact.”56 
He in turn allies this with a further apparent contradiction 
implied by the account: “If [it] were the case, physical causation 
could never occur, since there would be no individual objects, 
but only a single system, with no explanations for why this 
system should ever alter...”57 The issues of diachronic causal 
interaction (as opposed to synchronic causal dependence) and 
the appearance of a multiplicity of distinct objects (as opposed 
to the reality of unitary execution) are hereby intertwined. 
What is Harman’s reductio then? What is it that converts 
Heidegger’s purported holism into his radical individualism? 
The answer is the introduction of the break between the real 
and the sensual—which is to say, the core of the account of with-
drawal. This emerges in his interpretation of the as-structure 
and the way he identifies it with the broken-tool encounter.58 
The principal motivation for this theoretical supplement is 
its ability to diffuse the live contradictions hovering in the 
background. However, it will only be warranted if it can in-
tegrate the three facets of the account of execution into the 
individualist account of substance, at least in outline, and 
thereby dissolve the relational tension between this and its 
functional foundations. How this is supposed to work, and 
whether it can also dissolve the accompanying modal and 
temporal tensions is now our principal concern. I’ll tackle 
it one contradiction at a time.
On the one hand, Harman aims to resolve the contradic-







by re-conceiving the very notion of appearance itself. Har-
man’s concern with invisibility up until this point has turned 
upon an implicit conception of awareness, which, as we have 
seen, has not yet been made explicit through the provision 
of a phenomenological methodology. Nevertheless, the in-
visibility of things has been “shown” through purportedly 
phenomenological analyses of the scope of this awareness. 
What now changes is that the phenomenal aspect of this 
implicit conception is explicitly severed from the epistemic 
aspect: awareness is split in two, so that multiple individu-
als may phenomenally appear, even while the singular whole 
from which they appear epistemically withdraws. We can see 
the hammer, but we can never know the intricate system that 
harbours its hidden essence. This rift constitutes the differ-
ence between the hammer as presence and the hammer as 
execution, the hammer as hammer and the hammer in itself, 
and the malfunctioning hammer and the functioning hammer, 
respectively. It permits the conversion from invisible to vis-
ible in the encounter with the broken tool precisely because 
the underlying execution of the tool is not really made visible. 
The malfunction throws off an epistemically irrelevant husk 
that can at best hint at the silent reality of proper functioning.
On the other hand, Harman aims to resolve the contra-
diction between functional fixity and apparent change by 
uniting the question of causal interaction and the question 
of phenomenal presence. Although this is often hinted at, it 
only becomes completely explicit towards the end of Tool-
Being itself:
the time has come to admit to the reader that I have been guilty of a 
deliberate over-simplification...In fact, it is impermissible to replace 
the tool/broken tool distinction with the difference between causality 
and visibility. For it turns out that even brute causation already belongs 
to the realm of presence-at-hand.59
59 Harman, Tool-Being, 221.
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If we accept Harman’s identification of presence with 
malfunction, then this makes a certain amount of sense. If 
the world is taken to have a fixed order insofar as it is con-
stituted by a network of functional dependence relations, 
then any change to this order must amount to a break with 
these relations, and thus to a malfunction of some sort. This 
would make the question of interaction/presence a matter 
of explaining how components rebel against the systems in 
which they are seemingly subsumed, so as to generate the 
abundance of individuality in our phenomenal experience. 
This is not a question Harman takes the tool-analysis to answer. 
He simply takes it to have posed the problem in the correct 
terms. Nevertheless, he insists that the analysis implies that 
any solution must move beyond the appearance of individual-
ity to the reality of individuality, because entities can break 
with the functional order in which they are enmeshed only 
if they hold something in reserve that is not determined by 
this order.60 This is where the relational tension becomes 
most acute: just how is the account of execution that implies 
holism to be modified so as to permit the individualism it 
seemingly demands?
The tension is more serious than might be initially ap-
parent. This is because Harman extends the identification 
of presence with causality beyond diachronic interaction to 
include the cases of synchronic dependence upon which his 
initial characterisations of execution were built. This can be 
seen in his example of a bulky metal appliance sitting upon 
a frozen lake: “When the lake supports the appliance, this 
act of supporting unfolds entirely within the as-structure, 
not within the kingdom of tool-being.”61 It is this move that 
enables Harman to convert the distinction between execution 
and presence into the distinction between substance and rela-
tion, insofar as it enables him to treat all causal relations in 





the relations of functional (and thus causal) dependence that 
entities are bound up in withdraws from all current relations, 
as the substance that underlies them. However, as Harman 
continues: “This raises the following question: if the fact that 
the frozen lake supports an object is not its tool-being, then 
what is?”62 As he puts it slightly earlier: “In short, tool-being 
is not at all what we have thought it was up till now. It must 
lie at a still deeper level than that of force or relation. It is no 
longer an effect as opposed to an appearance, but rather an 
executant being that is neither of these.”63 We are once more 
told what execution is not, but we are still none the wiser 
about just what it is.
Here is where we stand then. The relational tension consists 
in the fact that Harman’s individualist conception of execu-
tion as substance is incompatible with the holistic conception 
of execution as functional role from which it is derived, but he 
does not make clear which aspects of the latter conception are 
abandoned, and thus precisely how the former differs from 
it, apart from its purported individualism. He does not stop 
characterising execution in terms of function.64 He continues 
to think of objects in terms of systematic unity.65 When he 
needs to talk about the substantial reserve that necessitates 
individuality, he simply turns to his earlier characterisations of 
execution: it stands independent of all relations as an actuality 
“richer than all possibility”66 and prior to all effects as a “real 
execution, silently resting in its vacuum-sealed actuality”67 Far 
from dissolving the modal and temporal tensions discussed 
above, he intensifies them, and he nowhere provides us an 
account of how the functional character of execution is to be 
curtailed, let alone how it is to be integrated with its status 
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tensions we have located (modal, temporal, and relational) 
are presented as paradoxical intuitions that open up room 
for further metaphysical speculation, but, at best, they are an 
argument left hanging.68 Harman has not yet succeeded in 
discharging the contradictions that arise from his assump-
tions. He has failed to provide us with a good reason to adopt 
his partial reconstruction of what he takes to be Heidegger’s 
inconsistent system, rather than simply rejecting its core 
presuppositions. 
How does this reflect upon the relation between phenom-
enology and metaphysics? Let’s take one last look. I think 
the core methodological issues emerge from the attempt to 
provide an account of modality. Here it is useful to contrast 
Harman’s approach with the brief summary of Heidegger 
we provided earlier. Heidegger provides us with is an intri-
cate modal epistemology. He builds a phenomenological 
framework within which he analyses both our understand-
ing of the entities we encounter in terms of the normative 
features they acquire through the practices we are socialised 
into, the unthematic understanding of the causal features of 
these entities that is implicit in this, and the various levels 
of thematic understanding that can be developed out of this. 
His analysis of the encounter with the broken-tool is a subtle 
demonstration of the interface between these levels of modal 
understanding. 
By contrast, Harman’s approach can only be described as 
modal mysterianism. It begins with phenomenological de-
scriptions of our experience of things, from which it derives 
a pseudo-Heideggerian functional vocabulary, but almost 
immediately converts this into a metaphysical inquiry into 
our causal relations with things, in the process hypostatising 
this functional vocabulary into a metaphysical teleology. 
It is important to emphasise how contentious this move is. 
There are deep and divisive arguments about the reality of 
functions running from Plato and Aristotle, through Leibniz 
68 Harman explicitly presents two unresolved paradoxes at the end of Tool-
Being (287-288), but they are not the tensions I have outlined here, which 
emerge more sporadically throughout the work.
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and Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, all the way to contemporary 
debates regarding the correct interpretation of Darwin. Har-
man makes this move not by providing a compelling reason 
for it, but by simply ignoring an important methodological 
distinction. As we have seen, the other claims he makes 
about the metaphysical basis of causal capacities are equally 
methodologically suspect. Where Heidegger does his best to 
delineate the modal relations between normative functions 
and causal capacities, showing both how they connect and 
pull apart, Harman systematically conflates them under 
the single heading of execution, which he then fails to suf-
ficiently integrate. His purported justification of epistemic 
inaccessibility on the basis of these modal features (excess) 
is thus stuck halfway between a questionable attempt to phe-
nomenologically delimit phenomenal access (the revelation 
of invisibility), and a dubious metaphysical reinterpretation 
of phenomenal access itself that simultaneously undercuts 
his phenomenological pretensions (the split in awareness) 
and fails to provide a coherent account of the inaccessible 
(the unresolved tensions). The philosophical framework he 
builds in Tool-Being leaves us with no grasp of what tool-
being is, and simply decreeing “that’s the point!” is to lapse 
into mysterianism.
iii) The Argument from Excess
The other argument that Harman associates with the tool-
analysis, which I have called the argument from excess, can 
be found intermingled with elements of the argument from 
execution at several points in Tool-Being and elsewhere,69 but 
it becomes the dominant strain of the analysis by the time 
of his presentation of the tool-analysis in his book on Meil-
lassoux.70 It is fairly brief, and its conclusion is more often 
69 Cf. Tool-Being, 96, 98, 223; “A Fresh Look at Zuhandenheit,” in Towards 
Speculative Realism, 54-55; “The Revival of Metaphysics in Continental Phi-
losophy,” in Towards Speculative Realism, 116-117.
70 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 135-136.
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simply asserted than properly derived from its premises, but 
it is possible to reconstruct a reasonably concise version of it 
on the basis of these examples. I will first quote the relevant 
sections from the Meillassoux book, to provide a basis for 
reconstruction:
In Heideggerian terms it is true that phenomena in consciousness 
fail to do justice to the full depths of things, to their inscrutable being 
withdrawn from all presence. Yet it is also the case that the practical 
handling of entities fails to do them justice as well...human theory and 
human praxis are both translations or distortions of the subterranean 
reality of [tool-being], which is no more exhausted by sentient action 
than by sentient thought.71
He thus opens with an outright assertion of the thesis of 
withdrawal, but he frames it in two important ways. He ar-
ticulates it as a matter of the inexhaustibility of tool-being, 
and he identifies theoretical understanding and practical 
use in terms of their inability to exhaust it. The framing 
of withdrawal in terms of inexhaustibility will form the 
centrepiece of the argument, whereas the identification of 
theory and praxis paves the way for the more controversial 
identification of knowledge and causation. This is followed 
by a sort of retroactive argument for withdrawal that works 
from within this frame:
All of these activities could possibly be linked under the term “inten-
tionality,” but whereas the intentionality of Brentano and Husserl 
is a matter of immanent objectivity, we are now concerned with a 
transcendent kind of object. It is true that the hammer takes on a specific 
configuration both for the construction worker and for the scientific 
specialist on hammers (assuming the latter person exists). But what 
is most relevant here is the transcendent hammer that startles us with 
surprises, shattering in our hands or rotting and rusting more quickly 
than expected. The present-at-hand hammer cannot explain these 
sudden surprises, and hence by subtraction we arrive at the notion of 
71 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 135.
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a withdrawn, subterranean tool that enters into relation with me and 
other animate and inanimate entities as well.72
What we have here is an argument that aims to proceed from 
the obvious fact that the causal capacities of an object can 
exceed our understanding of them (and thereby “surprise” 
us) to the contentious claim that we cannot encounter the real 
objects in which this excess consists, but only the distinct 
sensual objects that they withdraw behind. 
What follows is my best attempt to reconstruct the transi-
tion between the two. I’ll begin by splitting the obvious fact 
into two fairly uncontentious claims:
i) Our knowledge of things does not exhaust all their 
features. There is more to them than we actually know.
ii) Our causal interactions with things do not exhaust all 
their capacities. There is more to them than we actualise.
The example of something’s causal capacities exceeding 
our grasp of them is obviously taken from the analysis of 
the broken-tool, but its real import comes in straddling the 
divide between (i) and (ii). Although other presentations will 
emphasise one or the other, the justification of the thesis of 
withdrawal depends upon equivocating between these two 
claims in some fashion, be it by leaning upon aspects of the 
argument from execution (e.g., interpreting praxis as reliance) 
or simply treating the identity of intentional and causal rela-
tions as a given. This equivocation exemplifies the collapse of 
phenomenology and metaphysics into one another discussed 
earlier. What is important is that the combination of (i) and 
(ii) gets interpreted in a somewhat more contentious way 
than either of them:
iii) Our  knowledge/interactions can never exhaust all the 
features/capacities of things. There is more to them 
than we could possibly encounter.
72 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 136.
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This move converts a factual excess of features/capacities into 
an essential excess. The move is strictly illicit, but, although 
it leads to a stronger claim than either (i) or (ii), it is still not 
all that contentious. There are many who would agree with 
(iii) for independent reasons, or simply because it is reason-
ably intuitive. The really contentious claims are those that 
get inferred from (iii):
iv) Our knowledge/interactions can never exhaust all the 
features of a thing, because there is some feature of every 
thing qua thing that we can never encounter. 
This move aims to explain the necessity of excess by locating 
it in a feature common to all things, as opposed to something 
which varies from thing to thing. It holds that excess is es-
sential because there is an essential feature of entities that 
is excessive. This makes sense if one demands an intrinsic 
explanation of excess, which locates the reason for the ex-
cess in the encountered object, as opposed to an extrinsic one, 
which locates it in the encountering object. When the latter is 
understood as a knowing subject, the extrinsic explanation 
of excess has traditionally taken the name of finitude. This 
posits an internal limit upon the cognitive abilities of the 
subject that precludes it from knowing objects in full. This 
limit needn’t be interpreted in terms of some common quali-
tative excess, but could be seen as a disparate quantitative 
excess. It could simply be the case that the subject can only 
grasp a finite number of the infinity of features belonging 
to each thing, but that there is no particular feature that is 
in principle ungraspable. 
Harman insists upon an intrinsic explanation, as can be 
seen in the above quote, but it’s important to recognise that 
this is underwritten by the equivocation between knowledge 
and causation: “I am convinced that objects far exceed their 
interactions with other objects, and the question is both what 
this excess is, and where it is.”73 In other words, he takes the 
73 Harman, “The Revival of Metaphysics in Continental Philosophy,” in 
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issue of essential excess to be equivalent to the issue of sub-
stantial reserve discussed in the argument from execution.74 
The localisation of epistemic excess is thus predicated upon 
the localisation of causal excess. This sets the stage for the 
final (and most contentious) inference:
v) Our knowledge/interactions can never exhaust a thing, 
because we can never encounter the essence of the thing. 
We only encounter the (sensual) appearance of the thing, 
never its (real) being.
This move converts the essential excess into an excessive 
essence. Harman takes the common essential feature of all 
things that cannot be encountered to be what things are in 
themselves, or essence as such. This is supposed to warrant the 
absolute distinction between the real and the sensual, insofar 
as it implies that whatever epistemic/causal contact there 
is with a thing must be contact with something other than 
what it really is. It thereby moves from localisation to isolation. 
However, this exploits the same equivocation as (iv), albeit 
in reverse, insofar as it makes sense of causal isolation in 
terms of epistemic isolation. While it is easy to understand 
withdrawal as the impossibility of direct epistemic access, it 
is much less clear how we are to understand independence 
as the impossibility of direct causal contact. There is a clear 
quantitative line from some access to no access, because we 
can intuitively grasp what it would be to completely fail to 
know anything about a thing despite seeming to, but there is 
no such clear line from some contact to no contact, because we 
cannot intuitively grasp what it would be to completely fail 
to activate any of a thing’s capacities, despite seeming to. Of 
course, this is not how Harman conceives of independence. 
He bypasses quantitative considerations involved in (i) to 
(iv) by treating that which underlies causal interaction as 
a unitary execution as opposed to a multiplicity of distinct 
Towards Speculative Realism, 117.
74 This is precisely how the arguments intertwine in Tool-Being, 223.
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capacities.  The actualisation of capacities through causal 
contact is then treated as something qualitatively distinct 
from the independent substance which underlies them, much 
as the appearance of features through phenomenal access is 
treated as qualitatively distinct from the withdrawn essence 
which underlies them. This qualitative break is what divides 
execution and causation into distinct forms of actuality (modal 
tension) and activity (temporal tension). The equivocation 
between knowledge and causation thus disguises an illicit 
leap from quantitative to qualitative excess, along with the 
mysterian tensions it invokes.
The overall shape of this argument is thus another reduc-
tio ad absurdum of sorts. It begins by assuming that there is 
partial contact between objects only to try and demonstrate 
that its essentially partial character implies the impossibility 
of any contact at all. It slides easily from quantity to quality 
on the back of Harman’s characteristic universalisation of 
intentional relation, but as with the argument from execution, 
this conceals problems that warrant rejecting the terms in 
which it is framed. However, there is a further aspect of the 
move from quantity to quality worth considering:
But the following objection to this theory often arises: why exagger-
ate and say that things cannot touch at all? Does it not seem instead 
that things partly make contact with each other?…The problem is that 
objects cannot be touched “in part,” because there is a sense in which 
objects have no parts.75
Harman is very insistent withdrawal is complete. Our knowl-
edge of things is not merely limited, but entirely inadequate. 
Objects are foreclosed to us. But here he presents the mereo-
logical missing link in his reasoning from quantitative 
excess to qualitative excess. It seems that he takes the idea 
that a whole is more than its parts to imply that the whole is 
entirely distinct from its parts, such that to know the parts is 
not to know the whole, not even partially, as it were. This is 
75 Harman, The Quadruple Object (Zer0 Books, 2010), 73.
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somewhat questionable, but it is not the whole story, as it only 
works if we treat the features and/or capacities of objects as 
if they are parts. This provides a path between (iv) and (v), 
but it is highly dubious.
iv) The Argument from Identity
The final argument, which I call the argument from identity, 
will require even more reconstruction than the argument 
from excess. This is because, although it is frequently invoked, 
it is usually presented without a detailed analysis of how it 
is supposed to work. Though it does appear in the context of 
the tool-analysis,76 usually in conjunction with some form 
of the argument from excess, it also appears independently,77 
as the snappiest and most condensed statement of the case 
for withdrawal. The most explicit presentation it has so far 
received is in Harman’s criticism of James Ladyman and 
Don Ross’ Every Thing Must Go, which I will quote at length:
Let’s imagine that we were able to gain exhaustive knowledge of all 
properties of a tree (which I hold to be impossible, but never mind that 
for the moment). It should go without saying that even such knowledge 
would not itself be a tree. Our knowledge would not grow roots or bear 
fruit or shed leaves, at least not in a literal sense. Even in the case of 
God, the exhaustive knowledge of a tree and creation of a tree would 
have to be two separate acts. Now, it has sometimes been objected to 
this point that it is a straw man. After all, who confuses knowledge of 
a tree with an actual tree? The answer, of course, is that no one does, 
since no one could openly identify a thing with knowledge of it and 
still keep a straight face. Yet the point is not that people defend this 
view openly, which they do not. Rather, the point is that many people 
uphold a model of the real that entails that knowledge of a tree and a 
real tree would be one and the same, and hence their views are refuted 
76 Cf. Harman, Tool-Being, 224; Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in 
the Making, 136.
77 Cf. Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 83, 103; Harman, Prince of Networks, 132; 
Harman, The Quadruple Object, 28, 73.
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by reductio ad absurdum. Namely, if someone holds that there is an 
isomorphic relationship between knowledge and reality, such that 
reality can be fully mathematized, then it also follows that a perfect 
mathematical model of a thing should be able to step into the world 
and do the labor of that thing. But this is absurd.78
The essence of this argument is the attempt to derive the 
impossibility of complete knowledge of a thing from the 
ontological distinction between a thing and our knowledge 
of it. Although it sometimes appears that this invocation of 
non-identity is an argument for withdrawal proper, it is re-
ally an argument for the epistemic component of premise 
(iii) of the argument from excess. The rejection of complete 
knowledge must then be leveraged into a rejection of partial 
knowledge, as is clear from the article just quoted, which fin-
ishes the above section with a short appeal to the mereological 
component of the argument from excess discussed above.79 
The inference from ontological distinction to the impos-
sibility of complete knowledge once more takes the form of 
a reductio ad absurdum. The principle that underlies it is the 
claim that complete knowledge of a thing would somehow 
have to be identical to the thing, thereby contradicting onto-
logical distinction. It is this principle which is nowhere given 
a detailed analysis, and which we must therefore reconstruct. 
The major problem we face here is that Harman’s use of the 
term “knowledge” is never really backed up by an episte-
mology that could answer questions about the distinction 
between completeness and incompleteness, how this relates to the 
distinction between correctness and incorrectness, and whether 
knowledge of an object is composed of distinct representations. 
I have thus endeavoured to reconstruct the argument on the 
basis of reasonable assumptions about what Harman means 
by knowledge, the most important of which is that although 
Harman tends to simply talk about knowledge of an object 
78 Harman, “I am also of the opinion that materialism must be destroyed,” 




as a unitary phenomenon (e.g., knowing a tree), the notion 
of completeness/incompleteness implies that this must be 
composed out of correct representations of distinct features 
of the object (e.g., its species, size, shape, colouration, loca-
tion, etc.). I’ll thus begin with some premises that codify this 
implicit epistemology:
i) For any representation of an object to be correct, the ob-
ject must in some sense be the same as it is represented 
as being: I know the tree is an elm only if I represent 
it as being an elm and the tree is actually an elm, or if 
the tree-for-me and the tree-in-itself are the same in the 
relevant respect.
ii) For a composite representation of an object to be correct, 
every distinct piece of it must be correct: my represen-
tation of the tree will not amount to knowing the tree 
if I misrepresent its structure, despite correctly repre-
senting its species, or if there is a difference between the 
tree-for-me and the tree-in-itself.
iii) For a composite representation of an object to be com-
plete, it must be both correct and exhaustive: I know the 
tree completely only if there is no feature of the tree 
that is not accurately represented by some component 
of my representation of it as a whole.
From these premises it is then possible to infer the follow-
ing claim:
iv) For any knowledge of an object to be complete, the 
object-for-us and the object-in-itself must be the same in 
every respect.
We now only require Leibniz’s principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles to reach the principle from which our con-
tradiction is derived:
v) For any knowledge of an object to be complete, the 
object-for-us and the object-in-itself must be identical.
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This means that as long as we have good reason to think that 
the object-for-us and the object-in-itself must be ontologically 
distinct, the reductio will work. Harman’s argument depends 
upon the obviousness of this fact.
However, if we dig into this obviousness, we’ll find that 
all is not as straightforward as it might initially seem. I take 
the intuitive basis for ontological distinction to be the con-
junction of two ideas: what I’ll call the possibility of error 
and the necessity of identity. The former is the idea that for 
any representation to be a representation there must be the 
possibility that it could be incorrect, because correctness 
makes no sense without the possibility of incorrectness. The 
latter is the generally accepted principle that if two things are 
identical it is not possible that they could have been distinct. 
If we add these to (v) we can derive ontological distinction 
by reductio ad absurdum. This is because, if the object-for-us 
and the object-in-itself were identical, then our knowledge 
of the object would be necessarily complete, and therefore 
its component representations would have to be infallible, 
thereby violating the possibility of error. However, the fact 
that this demonstration includes (v) should give us pause 
for thought. It indicates that there is something fishy about 
the connection between (v) and ontological distinction that 
should be pursued further. What it indicates is that (v) already 
has some ontological content. Some potentially questionable 
metaphysical assumptions have been snuck in via the back 
door.80
80 It should be noted that to reject these questionable assumptions and the 
hasty proof of ontological distinction given above is not necessarily to reject 
the brute fact of ontological distinction. Another way of looking at the issue 
is to say that our knowledge (or its representational content) and its object are 
distinct by default, insofar as, pace Harman, the question of their identity 
simply cannot arise. To give a parallel example, Julius Caesar is distinct 
from the number 9, because, although we have procedures for determin-
ing whether numbers are identical, and whether people are identical, we 
have no procedures that cross the number/person divide. We have similar 
ways of determining whether representational contents are identical (e.g., 
whether you and I are saying the same thing in speaking the same sentence), 




However, there is an illicit assumption concealed in (i) that 
only becomes explicit with the invocation of the identity of 
indiscernibles in inferring (v) from (iv). It all comes down 
to how the notion of sameness is interpreted. In order for 
the inference from (iv) to (v) to work, the uncontroversial 
idea that a correct representation must somehow represent 
the object as being the same as it actually is needs to be con-
verted into the much more controversial idea that a correct 
representation must somehow be the same as the object is. 
This means that correctly representing  some feature of an 
object is interpreted as standing in some relation to another 
object that also possesses that feature. Knowing that the tree-
in-itself is an elm involves standing in some curious relation 
to a tree-for-me that is an elm in precisely the same sense as the 
tree-in-itself. For the principle of the identity of indiscernibles 
to work, the object-for-us and the object-in-itself must not 
only be able to have the same features, they must also possess 
these features in the same sense. What this shows is that the 
argument from identity can only contribute to the proof of 
withdrawal if Harman is allowed to base his epistemology 
upon a metaphysical distinction (object-for-us/object-in-itself) 
closely resembling the distinction between the sensual object 
and the real object it is intended to demonstrate. The fact of 
a distinction between types of object is already given, even if 
its character is not.81 To call this epistemology idiosyncratic 
would be an understatement.
b) Heidegger, Husserl, and Kripke
Harman’s fourfold obviously emerges from the combination 
of the real/sensual distinction provided by the arguments 
81 This is an interesting contrast to the way the distinction between types 
of object emerges in Tool-Being, which sees it as a consequence of his recon-
struction of the tool-analysis, rather than something already implicit in 
the analysis (258-259). However, the argument of this particular section is 
suspect (essence must itself have essence, ad infinitum) and does not seem 
to be repeated in any of the subsequent work. 
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for withdrawal with the object/quality distinction. There are 
a number of different ways in which Harman introduces 
the latter distinction and thereby facilitates this emergence. 
However, the fourfold lacks an obvious counterpart of with-
drawal’s tool-analysis: there is no single argument which 
stands out above all others. Rather, there is a mix of the three 
forms of exposition, which although it can be broken down 
into two core arguments: the argument from eidos (taken 
from Husserl) and the argument from essence (taken from 
Leibniz, Zubiri, and Kripke), is principally organised by Har-
man’s interpretation of Heidegger’s famous fourfold (das 
Geviert) of earth (Erde), sky (Himmel), gods (Göttlichen) and 
mortals (Sterblingen). As such, we must once more preface 
our examination of Harman’s own arguments with a brief 
analysis of his reading of Heidegger.
i) Harman’s Heidegger Revisited
Harman’s reading of the fourfold is to be praised for refusing 
to either sideline it as an unimportant feature of Heidegger’s 
work, or deny the numerical specificity of the categories 
constituting it. Moreover, it is to be commended for inter-
preting these categories as the result of the intersection of 
two distinctions that it basically gets right: cleared/concealed, 
and multiple/unitary. It is in the interpretation of these 
distinctions that everything goes wrong. The most serious 
problem is that he identifies the more famous fourfold dis-
cussed above with another fourfold schema found earlier 
in Heidegger’s works—in his course during the Freiburg 
Emergency War Semester of 1919. This is the intersection of 
a distinction between the pre-theoretical (vortheoretische) 
and the theoretical (theoretische) and a distinction between 
the generic and the specific, producing these four catego-
ries: the pre-worldly something (Das vorweltliche Etwas), the 
world-laden something (Welthaftes Etwas), the formal-logical 
objective something (Formallogische gegenständliche Etwas), 
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and the object-type something (Objektartiges Etwas).82 This 
is complicated by the fact that Harman also misreads the 
1919 schema, reading its concern with the “something” as a 
matter of singularity as opposed to universality, or a matter 
of beings as opposed to Being.
It is understandable that Harman takes the pre-theoretical/
theoretical distinction to correspond to his own real/sensual 
distinction, but, as we’ve already shown, this is a misreading 
of Heidegger’s concern with the difference between the 
ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. It is not a distinction 
between that which is understood (the sensual) and that which 
exceeds understanding (the real), but a distinction between 
theoretical (apophantic) and pre-theoretical (hermeneutic) 
modes of understanding. The more serious error is that he 
confuses the distinction between beings considered generi-
cally (beings qua beings) and beings considered specifically 
(e.g., this pen, that piece of paper, etc.) with the distinction 
between the unitary bearer of qualities (e.g., this pen, qua this) 
and the multiplicity of its qualities (e.g., this pen qua pen, qua 
plastic, qua blue, etc.). Although in considering something 
as a generic something we are indeed abstracting away from 
its specific determinations, we are not thereby moving from 
multiplicity to unity: the object-type something is already 
unitary, it is simply a unit of a specific type (e.g., a pen) with 
many other specific features (e.g., it is made of plastic, it is 
blue, etc.). The point is not to investigate the singularity of 
each being as distinct from the plurality of its qualities, but 
to investigate the universality of its Being as distinct from 
the particularity of its type and its other features. In essence, 
the 1919 schema is an early articulation of the connection 
between projective understanding and the question of Be-
ing: it circumscribes the relationship between the general 
structure of our theoretical understanding of beings (for-
mal-logical objective something) and the primordial source 
82 Theodore Kiesel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (University of 
California Press, 1992), 21-25.
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of our understanding (pre-worldly something). This is just 
what Heidegger will later characterise as the relationship 
between Being and time.83
The later fourfold most famously appears in an essay en-
titled “The Thing” in Heidegger’s analysis of the conditions 
under which a humble jug appears to us, but the themes that 
compose it are hinted at at least as early as his masterful “On 
the Origin of the Work of Art” and run rampant across the 
jumble of musings that compose Contributions to Philosophy. 
Harman overlooks these for the most part, in favour of his 
attempt to read a continuity with the 1919 schema. It is 
ironic then that his interpretation of the twin distinctions 
that constitute the fourfold gains more traction here. This 
is because it is essentially a modification and extension of 
the account of the strife between earth and world briefly 
discussed earlier. The important differences are that: a) 
world qua projected space of possibility is renamed sky; b) 
Dasein’s role in the projection of this space is made explicit 
in the form of mortals; and c) the enigmatic gods are added as 
a counterpart to mortals. This leaves us with a split between 
a unitary horizon of appearance (sky), multiple agents who 
clear this horizon (mortals), a unitary locus of resistance to 
this clearing (earth), and multiple foci where this resistance 
is hinted at within the horizon itself (gods). The mirror play 
between these four is then nothing but an extended account 
of strife: the process through which we attempt to negotiate 
a coherent and comprehensive grasp of reality by wrestling 
with that reality itself.
Harman underplays Heidegger’s version of the cleared/
concealed and multiple/unitary axes in order to draw a 
83 Of course, Heidegger never provided a complete account of his analysis 
of Being in terms of time. The third division of part one of Being and Time 
which was supposed to contain this analysis was never published, although 
we have fragments of the ideas that would have made it up in the form of 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, which provides the most extensive version 
of the analysis, along with the best account the projection of Being upon the 
primordial source of temporal understanding (Temporalität).
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continuity with his own fourfold.84 The crucial difference 
between them is that Heidegger interprets the multiple/
unitary axis as a distinction between beings as such (the plu-
rality of beings) and beings as a whole (the totality of beings), 
whereas Harman interprets it as the distinction between the 
multiplicity of a being’s qualities and its singularity as bearer 
of these qualities. This reflects their differing interpretation 
of the other axis, insofar as the later Heidegger understands 
concealing principally in terms of the whole (earth), of which 
particular concealings (gods) are derivative, whereas Harman 
takes particular concealing to not only be primary, but to be 
the only real form of concealing (withdrawal). Harman does 
not think the whole conceals itself as much as that it doesn’t 
exist. It is nothing but the mutual withdrawal of every being 
from every other.85 This raises the issue of the relation be-
tween the multiple/unitary distinction and the part/whole 
distinction. Harman’s rejection of the whole turns on inter-
preting it not merely as the totality of beings, but as a single 
being composed out of all other beings. As we have seen, this 
is precisely how he interprets Heidegger’s account of totality. 
This makes Heidegger’s position into a variant of what he 
would call onto-theology, insofar as it comprehends Being 
in terms of a single privileged being. This misinterpretation 
reveals a deeper issue though, insofar as Harman seems to 
blend these two distinctions in explaining his own schema. 
Specifically, the multiplicity of a thing’s real qualities and 
its unity as bearer of these qualities is often exchanged for 
the distinction between the thing’s real parts and its unity as 
the whole these parts compose.86 This conflation sometimes 
84 I say “underplay” here because there are points at which he seems to 
recognise that Heidegger’s later schema simply does not fit his own. This is 
somewhat implicit in Tool-Being (266), but it is explicit by the time of The 
Quadruple Object (87-88).
85 Harman, Tool-Being, 294-296.
86 This is most explicit in the section of Tool-Being where he explains the 
distinction between real objects and real qualities by way of Zubiri’s account 
of essence: “The object lives with a dual tension in its breast. On the one 
hand it fluctuates between the vacuum of its tool-being and the power of 
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comes out into the open, only to disappear once more.87 We 
must be careful not to let it pass without notice.
ii) The Argument from Eidos
It is clear that any argument Harman presents for his four-
fold schema and the categorical structures he derives from 
it will inevitably depend upon the arguments for withdrawal 
we have already presented. Beyond this, Harman does not 
really need to argue for the distinction between objects and 
qualities, at least insofar as it is a correlate of the intuitive 
distinction between subjects and predicates. Rather, what 
must be argued for is his interpretation of the way this dis-
tinction intersects with the distinction between the real and 
the sensual to create a divide between two kinds of quality. 
The first such argument we will consider, from The Quadru-
ple Object, attempts to reverse engineer this distinction by 
independently deriving one of the categories that emerges 
out of it. It aims to demonstrate the divide between kinds of 
quality from within experience itself by appropriating Hus-
serl’s phenomenological analysis of eidos. Harman is fond 
of remarking that despite the avowedly idealist character of 
Husserlian phenomenology, it nevertheless has a distinctly 
realist flavour.88 He finds this flavour concentrated in the 
analysis of eidos, where he attempts to separate it out from 
the bitter overtones of Husserl’s idealism.
Harman begins by introducing Husserl’s theory of ad-
its impact on neighbouring beings. On the other hand it is itself a systematic 
empire swarming with interior parts.” (266, my emphasis).
87 The sheer extent of this is dramatised across Guerilla Metaphysics, in 
which the distinction between parts and qualities finally becomes evident, 
as if suddenly discovered, only to metamorphose through a number of dif-
ferent forms (cf. §7B, §10, §11) before finally settling upon a rejection of the 
plurality of qualities in favour of the plurality of parts (228-229). A detailed 
commentary upon these convoluted transitions is beyond the scope even of 
this extensive essay, but the need for one is ameliorated by the subsequent 
fading of this bold position in the formulation of the object/quality distinc-
tion presented in The Quadruple Object (cf. 88).
88 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 20.
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umbration (Abschattung).89 The basic idea underlying this 
phenomenological concept is that in ordinary perception we 
encounter things from different perspectives, and that the 
way the thing is presented may vary between them, highlight-
ing some features and concealing others, despite the object 
remaining the same. We can stand outside a house and view 
it from various angles, and even walk within it, touching its 
walls and smelling its scents, but we are always encountering 
the same house, even if the encounters themselves are distinct. 
From this, Harman draws the phenomenological insight 
that the object is distinct from the qualities that it presents 
in these adumbrations, not because it is more than them, but 
because there is some sense in which it is less than them. 
This is because it is possible to subtract them from the object 
without it ceasing to be the same object. However, there is a 
limit upon subtraction, because if we could subtract all of a 
sensual object’s qualities there would be nothing to distinguish 
it from other such objects.90 There are some essential features 
without which the sensual object cannot be what it is, and it 
is possible to compare different adumbrations of the same 
object and strip away the inessential features they present, in 
order to leave these behind. Husserl calls this process eidetic 
variation and its result eidos.
Harman then claims that, according to Husserl, eidetic 
qualities are never revealed in perceptual adumbrations in the 
way that accidental ones are, but only through the process of 
eidetic variation, or the categorial intuition that arises from 
it. Harman then criticises Husserl, and amends his account 
in the following way:
Husserl is wrong to distinguish between the sensual and the intellectual 
here; both sensual and categorial intuition are forms of intuition, and 
to intuit something is not the same as to be it. Hence the eidetic features 
of any object can never be made present even through the intellect, but 
89 Harman, The Quadruple Object §1b.
90 Ibid., §1c.
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can only be approached indirectly by way of allusion, whether in the 
arts or in the sciences.91
The argument from identity thus makes a reappearance here 
to invoke the split between the real and the sensual. However, 
what is more important is the way this is configured in relation 
to the analysis of eidetic variation. Harman draws a distinction 
between sensual and intellectual modes of engagement with 
a thing’s eidetic features only to collapse it, and thereby insist 
that these features must lie beyond both. He thus converts 
the distinction between accidental and eidetic features into 
his distinction between sensual and real qualities: “For the 
qualities of its eidos are also withdrawn from all access, and 
‘real’ is the only possible name for such a feature.”92 Here we 
once again encounter the strange interface between meta-
physics and phenomenology in his work. Just what is eidetic 
variation if the features it was supposed to reveal can never 
actually be revealed?
The truth of the matter is that Harman has parted ways 
with Husserl long before this move is made. Husserl’s concept 
of eidos is an account of general essence, as opposed to the 
account of individual essence that Harman is attempting 
to develop. Husserl principally talks about eidetic hierar-
chies of genus and species (e.g., the eidetic features of trees 
as opposed to those of elms) which eidetic variation and its 
corresponding modes of intuition allow us to traverse on 
the basis of our intuitions of individuals.93 He insists that 
all eidetic features “belonging to the essence of the individuum 
another individuum can have too,”94 in contrast to the idea that 
eidos could be unique to a given sensual object. However, this 
claim is not just in conflict with Harman’s take on essence, 
but with his take on the qualities that compose it: “qualities 
91 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 28, my emphasis.
92 Ibid., 28.




as described in this book are always individualised by the 
object to which they belong.”95 Harman not only thinks that 
the process of eidetic variation aims at what makes a sensual 
object the unique individual that it is, but he thinks that it 
does so by considering qualities that are unique to it qua 
individual. This dearth of generality means that there is no 
basis for the process of comparison, insofar as there are no 
qualities that could possibly be shared.96 This makes the basis 
of the process of subtraction entirely mysterious, as there are 
no criteria for sorting accidents from eidos.97
In essence, what Harman does here is capitalise upon this 
mystery, in a manner similar to that we’ve seen in the argu-
ments from execution and excess. He converts the absence of 
criteria for differentiating between essential and inessential 
qualities in any given case into an absolute difference between 
essential and inessential qualities in all cases. That there are 
no conceivable features that could be the end point of the 
process of determining eidos so described is used as a rea-
son to treat eidetic features as inconceivable. Ultimately, the 
paucity of Harman’s account of eidetic variation is actually 
best indicated by the way he appeals to allusion to fill it in. 
Not only does this bear no resemblance to the Husserlian 
phenomenological method on which the argument is sup-
posedly founded, but it raises difficult questions about the 
categorical schema derived from the fourfold, insofar as it 
95 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 30.
96 We have already seen this dearth of generality in Harman’s interpretation 
of Heidegger’s phenomenology (cf. Tool-Being, 84-85), but it is equally present 
in his reading of Husserl’s. For instance, the example of the phenomeno-
logical reduction he presents in Guerilla Metaphysics (§10b) never moves 
beyond the level of the individual, but simply decomposes sensual wholes 
into sensual parts and explores the relations between them.
97 Going further than this, in “On Vicarious Causation” Harman claims that 
Husserl’s method is superficial, because it cannot analyse eidetic qualities 
without turning them into “something like accidents” (214). He even goes 
so far as to claim that, not only are qualities individualised, but there is 
really only one quality—the singular eidos. He thus sees eidetic variation 
as a sort of frantic scrabbling to unwrap a present in which we never reach 
the gift itself, only ever more layers of wrapping paper.
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seemingly conflates allure (space-fusion) with theory (time-
fission).
iii) The Argument from Essence
The second argument for the distinction between sensual 
qualities and real qualities is less localised. It must be re-
constructed out of two components that are liberally spread 
throughout Harman’s work, one associated with Kripke’s work 
on rigid designators,98 and one associated with Leibniz and 
Zubiri’s work on individuation and essence.99 When taken 
together, these components allow for a reverse engineering 
of the distinction similar to that of the argument from eidos, 
by deriving the corresponding category of essence. Also like 
the argument from eidos, it depends upon the distinction 
between sensual and real established by the arguments for 
withdrawal. This is because it needs to conceive the relation 
between the sensual object and the real object in terms of 
reference. This does not mean that it must be described in 
terms of Heideggerian functional relations between things 
and things (Verweis), but rather that it must be described in 
terms amenable to the debates regarding how words relate 
to things inaugurated by Frege’s theory of sense (Sinn) and 
reference (Bedeutung). This is facilitated by the fact that the 
Husserlian terms in which Harman couches his theory of 
sensual objects were developed in dialogue with Frege. It 
is this concern with the intentional basis of reference that 
connects his work with the issues that Kripke raises for the 
theory of names.100
To explain further, Harman draws on Husserl’s concept of 
nominal acts to explain the relationship between the sensual 
98 Cf. Harman, Tool-Being, 124, 213-215; Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 28-29, 
108-110, 197-198; Harman, Prince of Networks, 175; Harman, The Quadruple 
Object, 67.
99 Cf. Harman, Tool-Being, §23-24; Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 82-83, 147, 
162, 192; Harman, The Quadruple Object, 48-49.
100 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).
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object and its real counterpart.101 He interprets Husserl’s claim 
that all other intentional acts are founded upon nominal acts 
as saying that in any intentional relation we are acquainted 
with an immediate “this” (sensual object) that in turn refers 
to a shadowy “this” (real object). Names are attached to the 
former as if they are the senses that determine their referenc-
es. This means that distinct sensual objects can refer to the 
same real object insofar as one thing can have many names. 
The crucial point is that, although Harman thinks that we 
can become acquainted with a sensual object by means of a 
description of the object that would draw our attention to it, 
and thus that we can learn how to use names through using 
descriptions (e.g., “‘Pete’ refers to the person who wrote the 
paper you’re currently reading”), he does not think that this 
is necessary for acquaintance. As he explains in his reading 
of Ortega y Gasset, our acquaintance with the sensual object is 
a sort of feeling, and the object a sort of feeling-thing, which 
any particular description can never completely capture.102 
However, this inability of descriptions to capture the feel of 
sensual objects is not yet the inability to capture the meaning 
of names that Kripke reveals. Harman takes the latter inability 
to consist in the relation between the name and its reference 
rather than the name and its sense: “For Kripke, names are 
‘rigid designators’ that point to (or stipulate) realities beyond 
all possible descriptions of them.”103 Whereas the immediate 
“this” is something more than the particular descriptions that 
give us purchase upon it, the shadowy “this” is something 
other than every possible description. It’s helpful to quote Har-
man at some length on this point:
Kripke’s “rigid designator” is meant to serve as a proper name pointing 
to something that remains identical even when all known features of 
the thing are altered, so that the moon remains the moon even if we 
turn out at some future point to have been catastrophically wrong about 
all its properties...However, the question for us is whether the invio-
101 Harmen, Guerilla Metaphysics, 28-29.
102 Ibid., 108-110.
103 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 67.
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late “this” beneath all apparent properties is something lying within 
perception, or is instead a real object lying somewhere beneath it.104
Harman obviously answers this question in the affirmative, 
but it is important to see that he does so for epistemological 
reasons. He thinks that because we can use names to talk about 
the same thing  regardless of any possible disagreements about 
how we should describe it, every name must therefore refer to 
a mysterious “inaccessible ‘x’ lying behind any descriptions 
that might be given of it.”105 What this means is that because 
Kripke shows that the reference of names is somehow inde-
pendent of our beliefs about their qualities, the individuation 
of the objects they refer to cannot have anything to do with 
these beliefs. This is the first component of the argument.
The second component is much simpler. It amounts to a 
rather straightforward claim about the nature of individua-
tion, which enables us to draw consequences regarding how 
the individuation of real objects does work from the above 
claim about how it doesn’t. Harman discusses this in relation 
to Zubiri’s work, but his simplest statements of it are always 
his remarks on Leibniz: “[Leibniz] observes that even though 
each monad must be one monad, each also needs a multitude 
of qualities to be what it is, to differ from other monads rather 
than being interchangeable with them.”106
For real objects to be distinct from one another they must 
possess some qualities that distinguish them. There can be 
no individuation without qualities. This claim interacts with 
the Kripkean component in the following way:
The basic point is that we can no longer simply distinguish between a 
sensual world of properties and a deeper hidden core of the essential 
“this”...The “this” may be separable from all sorts of specific and falsi-
fiable features, but it is never separable from a specific essence, and is 
therefore no “bare particular.”107
104 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 197-198.
105 Harman, Tool-Being, 213.
106 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 49.
107 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 197-198.
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Real objects must have individual essences that distinguish 
them from all other things, even if these cannot be adequately 
described in terms of any sensual qualities whatsoever. There-
fore, if sensual qualities are unable to compose these essences, 
there must be an entirely distinct type of quality capable of 
doing so. The need for essence thus demonstrates the need 
for a distinction between real qualities and sensual qualities.
The issue with this argument is that, much as we saw with 
Husserl in the argument from eidos, Harman’s attempt to 
integrate Kripke’s insights into his metaphysical framework 
ends up seriously warping them. We could focus on the 
fact that Kripke would not endorse the account of indirect 
reference that Harman’s division between sensual and real 
objects implies, but this is a tortuous point, given the intri-
cacies of neo-Fregean attempts to account for names as rigid 
designators.108 A more salient point is that although Kripke 
also develops a conception of individual  essence out of 
his account of rigid designation, it is remarkably different 
from Harman’s. Kripke does not take his account of rigid 
designation to imply that the essential properties of things 
must be of a completely different kind to their inessential 
ones.109 For him, it is entirely possible for one thing to possess 
a property essentially (e.g., a living cell’s salinity, which must 
remain within a narrow range for it to function) and another 
to possess the same property accidentally (e.g., a cooked piece 
of pasta’s salinity, which can vary well outside of this range 
without dissolution). Of course, he might simply have failed 
to recognise the implications of his own theory, but it should 
give us pause for thought. As such, we should take a look at 
his argument against descriptivism.
Kripke claims that the meaning of a name such as “Aristotle” 
cannot be composed out of descriptions such as “the most 
108 I have in mind the work of Gareth Evans, John McDowell and Robert 
Brandom. I personally endorse Brandom’s own anaphoric approach to 
integrating the Fregean sense/reference distinction and rigid designation, 
which he calls “tactile Fregeanism,” cf. Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit 
(Harvard University Press, 1994), ch. 7-8.
109 Cf. Naming and Necessity, 39-53, 110-115.
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famous student of Plato,” “the tutor of Alexander the great,” 
or “a Greek philosopher with an impressive beard,” even if 
these descriptions uniquely pick out the relevant object, ei-
ther individually or in conjunction. Put in its simplest form, 
the argument for this claim is that we would otherwise be 
unable to make sense of statements such as “Aristotle might 
not have been the greatest student of Plato,” “Aristotle could 
have died before Alexander was born,” or “It was possible 
for Aristotle to shave off his beard and abandon philosophy.” 
For any descriptive feature that is supposed to belong to the 
meaning of a name, we can construct a seemingly reasonable 
counterfactual statement involving that name in which the 
object lacks it, thereby producing a contradiction. The im-
portant contrast to draw with Harman’s presentation of the 
argument is that this is straightforwardly modal rather than 
epistemic: it involves differences between the way the world 
actually is and ways it could have been, rather than differ-
ences between the way the world really is and ways we take it 
to be. What Kripke means when he says that names are rigid 
designators is simply that they pick out the same thing in all 
counterfactual scenarios. Moreover, he does not think that 
the name successfully refers to an object in every proposed 
scenario. He holds that some counterfactual statements (e.g., 
“Aristotle could have been a pig”) are false precisely because 
there are some essential features (e.g., humanity) that could 
not be absent from a scenario without the object being absent. 
He thus does not think that grasping the essence of a thing is 
impossible, but simply that it is distinct from grasping the 
meaning of a name that refers to it. There may be independent 
reasons not to endorse Kripke’s essentialism, but they are not 
necessarily reasons to endorse Harman’s alternative.
Harman’s account of rigid designation has thus mutated 
into stubborn designation, insofar as names not only refer 
to the same thing throughout counterfactual variations, but 
across all possible appearances. For Kripke and those who 
attempt to incorporate his insights, there is still at least 
some role for descriptions of the features and history of the 
objects our names refer to in determining whether two dif-
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ferent names refer to the same thing. There can be entirely 
separate causal histories (or anaphoric chains) determining 
the reference of different names (e.g., “morning star” and 
“evening star”) and yet facts about these can help determine 
whether they have been referring to the same thing all along 
(e.g., “the morning star is the evening star,” as both are names 
for Venus). For Harman, we can at best use descriptions to 
determine whether the sensual objects our names are attached 
to are the same, but never whether distinct sensual objects 
might refer to the same real object. This makes the bound-
aries between real objects as mysterious as their qualities.110 
The sensual chair I am sitting on and the sensual tree I am 
staring at are sensually distinct, but they might not be really 
distinct. The sun, the sea, and the strudel I had for breakfast 
may really have been the same thing all along. The messy 
business of working out just what it is we’re talking about 
can only be given over to allure in the same fashion that the 
theorisation of eidos seems to have been. It therefore seems 
as if the whole issue of reference from which the argument 
begins has gone out the window. 
Even more worryingly perhaps, we are left wondering why 
me must affirm the reality of discreteness at all, rather than 
some singular Apeiron underlying a plurality of discrete ap-
pearances. Harman’s own analysis of appearance cannot but 
dissolve the “glaringly obvious fact” of discreteness that he 
himself held up against Heidegger’s purported holism. His 
radical dissociation of the individuation of sensual objects 
from the individuation of real objects precludes appealing to 
apparent discreteness to prove real discreteness, and thereby 
undermines his seemingly radical individualism. If we can-
not know anything about the criteria of individuation of real 
objects, then we are left with the real possibility that there 
might just be one.
110 I owe this point to Daniel Sacilotto.
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c) Occasionalism, Independence, and Supplementation
In considering the arguments for the final aspect of Harman’s 
system, we are put in a similar position to our examination 
of the arguments for the fourfold, only more so. Though 
Harman devotes a considerable amount of space to elabo-
rating his account of allure,111 and presents some additional 
reasons why we should want such an account of causation, 
the principal motivation for the account is provided by the 
arguments we have already considered and rejected. Harman 
issues the following challenge to those who would assess his 
account of causation in Guerilla Metaphysics:
Once it was conceded that the world is made up of withdrawn objects, 
utterly sealed in private vacuums but also unleashing forces upon one 
another, all the other problems follow in quick succession. Let anyone 
who does not agree with the strategies of guerilla metaphysics specify 
clearly which of its initial steps is invalid.112
This is precisely what I have done. None of these initial steps 
has proved valid, let alone all of them. This seems to rule out 
vicarious causation by default. Still, there are some more 
probative reasons that Harman presents for his account of 
causation. He provides a further historical narrative regard-
ing the tradition of occasionalism about causation, which 
is meant to suggest that the problem his theory responds to 
emerges from a broader range of concerns than his own. He 
also suggests that the scientific account of causation demands 
supplementation by a metaphysical theory of causation 
of precisely the kind he provides. I will now address both 
of these, but will divide them with a final statement of the 
core of Harman’s argument for vicarity, on the basis of the 
independence of objects from one another. This provides a 
proper contrast with the motivations of the occasionalists 
as well as contextualising the demand for supplementation.
111 Cf. Harman Guerilla Metaphysics §8-12; Harman “On Vicarious Causation.”
112 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, p. 97.
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i) Harman’s Occasionalist Tradition
According to Harman, the problem of how distinct things can 
causally interact has a long lineage.113 On the one hand, he 
sees it being raised within explicitly metaphysical terms in 
the Islamic occasionalism of the Ash’arite school, the modern 
occasionalism of Descartes, Malebranch, and Leibniz, and 
in the more contemporary occasionalism of Whitehead. All 
of these thinkers invoke God as a mediator capable of over-
coming what they see as the causal gap between entities, be 
it as the source of all causal power (the Ash’arites), the source 
of the connection between different kinds of substance 
(Descartes), or the medium through which entities are able 
to encounter one another (Malebranch, Leibniz, and White-
head). On the other, he has sees it being raised implicitly in 
the epistemological skepticism/critique of Hume and Kant. 
He reads these thinkers as invoking the mind as a mediator 
which provides the causal connections between appearances, 
be it through mere habit (Hume), or through transcendental 
necessity (Kant). Harman criticises both of these trends for 
advocating a global occasionalism, insofar as they require all 
causal relations to be mediated by the same thing, be it God 
in the former or the mind in the latter, and proposes, along 
with Latour, a local occasionalism, in which causal relations 
between entities are mediated by further entities.
Now, although this strikes me as presenting a somewhat 
perverse reading of Kant and Hume, insofar as it reads 
their epistemological concerns in metaphysical terms they 
would abjure, there are definite continuities here. There are 
overlapping themes that seem to motivate similar accounts 
of causation, insofar as they all demand some form of causal 
mediation. However, this demand does not arise from a single 
problem held in common between the various sub-traditions 
that make up this narrative. For instance, Islamic occasional-
ism did not only provide a theological solution, but was moti-
vated by a theological problem about the power of God. This is 
113 Cf. Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 188, 202, 218-219; Harman, Prince 
of Networks, §5c.
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remarkably different from Descartes’ problem concerning 
the split between thought and extension, Leibniz’s problem 
concerning compossibility, and lightyears from the concerns 
with the nature of explanation that motivate Latour’s occa-
sionalism. If we do not share any of these diverse concerns, 
then this problem has no hold on us. Harman hardly takes 
the theological concerns of the Ash’arites to be pressing, so 
he cannot lean upon them to motivate his own theory of 
causation. In short, we still need some good reasons to accept 
the problematic status of unmediated causal relations above 
and beyond this narrative. 
ii) The Argument from Independence
Harman’s own reasons for taking unmediated causal relations 
to be impossible all stem from his claims about the indepen-
dence of objects from their relations to one another. These 
turn up at various different points in the three arguments for 
withdrawal we’ve considered, but they are never motivated 
independently of claims about the excess of objects over our 
grasp of them, be there an explicit connection between them 
or an implicit conflation of them. This should be unsurprising 
given the dominance of phenomenological themes through-
out these arguments, even when they are illicitly intertwined 
with metaphysical ones. My aim is now to make this tangle 
of claims about epistemic access and causal interaction a 
bit clearer, not by reconstructing a further argument, but by 
unearthing a non sequitur underlying the other arguments. 
This amounts to a final attempt at cutting the Gordian knot 
of methodological issues underlying Harman’s project be-
fore we consider his ideas about the relationship between 
philosophy and science.
I think the key here is Harman’s offhand remark that 
“despite its various degrees of efficacy, [physical causation] 
must ultimately either work or fail to work.”114 This is made 
in the context of displaying the parallels between causation 
and allure, which he similarly takes to either succeed or fail 
114 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 176.
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in this binary fashion. This adds an extra layer of depth the 
to the picture of vicarious causation presented above, insofar 
as not only is sincerity insufficient for causal interaction, but 
that allure is sometimes insufficient too. Successful causation 
requires successful allure. However, what is really interesting 
is the claim that causal interaction should be understood in 
terms of success at all. If the problem of how one object can 
affect another is actually the problem of how one object can 
successfully affect another, then this tells us something more 
about the implicit motivations of the problem. This is because 
knowledge can be understood in terms of representational 
success. If one conflates representation and causation by 
treating causation in intentional terms, then one can seem-
ingly infer the impossibility of successful causation (causal 
independence) from the impossibility of knowledge (epistemic 
excess). This conflation can only be held together by the sort 
of functional language that Harman refuses to abandon at 
the end of the argument from execution, as it lets us treat 
things as striving for ends. We can say that things try to affect 
one another, even if they always fail.
 Of course, there still must be some way in which causation 
can succeed. The absolute ban upon causal contact is thus 
qualified using the notion of directness: all direct access fails, 
therefore all direct causation fails. The hope of an indirect form 
of access (if no longer strictly epistemic in character) thus 
holds open the hope of an indirect from of causation. This 
hope is answered in both cases by allure. It provides a sup-
posedly non-representational way for us to access the real, and 
in doing so provides a way for the real to affect us. However, 
the fact that these relations proceed in opposite directions 
should give us pause for thought. The object that tries to af-
fect is the object hiding behind the sensual object, whereas 
the object that tries to access is the object encountering this 
facade. What’s going on here then?
The crucial question is this: in precisely what way can allure 
be said to succeed where representation fails? It is the equivo-
cation between the standards of representational success and 
causal success that allows us to convert epistemic excess into 
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causal independence. If there is no sense in which allure is 
held to the former standard, or to some deeper standard that 
it shares with representation, then there is no good sense in 
which it can overcome causal independence. The problem is 
that the only concrete standards of success that Harman ever 
deploys in his discussions of allure concern how the allure 
affects the one who experiences it.115 Does the joke make me 
laugh? Does my mistake embarrass me? Does the metaphor 
make me think? The fact that these are the questions that 
determine the success of allure indicates why successful al-
lure is a model for successful causation. These allusions can 
only succeed or fail insofar as there is some effect they are 
supposed to produce upon us. They are thus more like access 
to narcotics than access to information. It doesn’t seem to matter 
that there is no substantive comparison with representational 
success, only because it is already understood in causal terms. 
The non sequitur is hidden by blatant circularity. Harman’s 
aesthetics is an introspective theory of emotional affection.
iii) The Argument from Supplementation
Finally, we come to Harman’s defence of the importance of 
his theory of vicarious causation by way of his thoughts on 
the relationship between philosophy and science. Let’s jump 
straight in at the deep end:
For several centuries, philosophy has been on the defensive against the 
natural sciences, and now occupies a point of lower social prestige and, 
surprisingly, narrower subject matter. A brief glance at history shows 
that this was not always the case. To resume the offensive, we need only 
reverse the long-standing trends of renouncing all speculation on 
objects and volunteering for curfew in an ever-tinier ghetto of solely 
human realities: language, texts, political power. Vicarious causation 
frees us from such imprisonment by returning us to the heart of the 
inanimate world, whether natural or artificial. The uniqueness of 
philosophy is secured, not by walling off a zone of precious human 
115 Cf. Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, §8-9, 211-213.
Speculations III
364
reality that science cannot touch, but by dealing with the same world 
as the various sciences but in a different manner.116
He thus sees his metaphysical system as an attempt to return 
philosophy to its rightful subject matter. He defends philoso-
phy’s right to tackle the same topics as the sciences by claiming 
that it  can approach them through other means. Given the 
difficulties we’ve had in determining Harman’s methodol-
ogy up till now, we are entitled to some curiosity regarding 
just what these means are, and how they are supposed to 
differ from those of the sciences. This is where the theory 
of vicarious causation is supposed to shine, by providing us 
with an exemplar of the divergence between the scientific 
and philosophical approaches:
From the naturalistic standpoint, ignoring for now whatever complica-
tions one might wish to infer from the quantum theory, causation is 
essentially a physical problem of two material masses slamming into 
each other or mutually affected through fields. One object becomes 
directly present to the other, whether through physical contact or 
some other form of intimacy. But there is also a metaphysical problem 
of causation.117
The initial problem with this is that all of the contrasts Har-
man makes between the supposed  scientific understanding 
of causality and his own metaphysical one present an incred-
ibly crude version of the sciences.118 Although he pays lip 
service to the implications quantum mechanics, he entirely 
ignores the advanced mathematical techniques (e.g., phase 
space modelling, statistical analysis, information theory, 
etc.) that the sciences have developed to model phenomena 
since Hume talked about billiard ball dynamics, along with 
the intricate theoretical questions regarding the nature of 
causation that these have spawned, both in the sciences and 
116 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 190.
117 Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 18.
118 Cf. Harman, Tool-Being, 19, 209 ; Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 79.
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the philosophy of science (e.g., emergent capacities, statisti-
cal causality, information transmission, etc.).119 However, on 
second thought, the real problem is that Harman’s approach 
precludes him from paying any attention to these things 
anyway. As far as he is concerned, the sciences don’t tell us 
anything about reality. They only talk about it as it seems, 
whereas philosophy can talk about it as it is. This isn’t to say 
science is useless, but simply that the truth is entirely inac-
cessible to it. Maybe this truth will be relevant to the sciences, 
maybe it won’t, but there’s no real debate to be had here, even 
if there might be mutual inspiration.
There is a tremendous irony in this, insofar as the strange 
methodological hybrid of phenomenological description 
and metaphysical argument that Harman adopts amounts 
to the practice of introspective metaphysics. It is important 
to understand that this is different from what is often called 
“armchair metaphysics” insofar as it has nothing to do with 
the a priori as traditionally understood. It is not a matter of 
retreating from observation to contemplate and reason about 
the fundamental concepts that underpin observation, but a 
matter of seeking out a special kind of intuition unknown to 
the sciences. Harman claims to get at the reality that the sci-
ences can never describe by closely describing the structure 
of seeming. Far from challenging the retreat of philosophers 
from the world into the bastion of consciousness, he has 
simply extended the domain of consciousness into the world. 
On this basis, he provides us with an introspective theory of 
causation modelled upon emotional intensity. This theory is 
independent of the sciences insofar as it is based on a form 
of evidence entirely alien to the sciences, but it strikes me 
as equally alien to the proper practice of philosophy. The 
phenomenological trappings in which Harman’s metaphysi-
cal introspection is clothed are at best a bad disguise, like 
a tasteless rubber Nixon mask, only formed into a bizarre 
119 This is evident in the way he approaches the work of Ladyman and Ross 
in “I am also of the opinion that materialism must be destroyed,” where he 
all but explicitly refuses to consider the scientific issues that motivate many 
of their crucial metaphysical choices.
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caricature of Husserl’s face instead. What they hide is a series 
of questionable assumptions and sometimes outright mis-
understandings regarding important epistemological and 
metaphysical issues. Our next task must be to peal back this 
mask and bring these assumptions into the open, in order 
to better understand why one might be tempted to endorse 
OOP despite the convoluted and deeply flawed arguments 
presented for it.120 
120 This argument will be continued in a second part which will be published 
in a forthcoming issue of Speculations.
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Of Realist Turns
A conversation with Stathis Psillos
Fabio Gironi
Stathis Psillos is Professor of Philosophy of Science and Meta-physics in the Department of Phi-
losophy and History of Science in the University of Athens, 
former president of the European Philosophy of Science 
Association and editor of the review journal Metascience. 
Psillos is one of the most prominent defenders of scientific 
realism in contemporary philosophy of science, and he for-
mulated his arguments in defense of realism in two impor-
tant monographs: Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth 
(1999) and Knowing the Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism 
and Explanation (2009). Psillos’ investigation begins with 
the identification of three core theses of scientific realism:1
• The Metaphysical Thesis: the world has a definite and mind-
independent natural-kind structure;
1 See Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999), xvii and Stathis Psillos, Knowing the Structure of 




• The Semantic Thesis: scientific theories should be taken at 
face-value, being truth-conditioned descriptions of their 
intended domain, both observable and unobservable;
• The Epistemic Thesis: mature and predictively successful 
scientific theories are to be considered well-confirmed and 
approximately true descriptions of the world.
He proceeds by offering an articulation of the so called 
“no-miracles argument” for scientific realism as the crucial 
argument supporting this realist worldview, taking it as an 
instance of inference to the best explanation and defus-
ing the attacks of vicious circularity moved against it. He 
has also defended scientific realism from a range of other 
anti-realist arguments, including Larry Laudan’s pessimistic 
meta-induction, the argument from underdetermination of 
theory by evidence (the so-called Quine-Duhem thesis), and 
the constructive empiricism of Bas Van Fraassen. Psillos’s sci-
entific realism conjoins a positive epistemic attitude towards 
a fully knowable natural-kind structure of the universe with 
a robust, non-epistemic conception of truth, constructing 
a realist stance which is (as famously phrased by Crispin 
Wright)2 both metaphysically modest (there is an external 
world which is in every way independent from us) and 
epistemically presumptuous (this world can be known, to a 
good approximation of truth-likeness by our best epistemic 
practice, i.e., science).
There is thus no better dialogue partner than Prof. Psillos 
to discuss realism, especially for those interested in “bridging 
the gap” between the continental and the analytic philosophi-
cal traditions. I take it to be an integral part of the mandate 
of Speculations to promote this cross-contamination: those 
interested in the resurgence of realist concerns from within 
the continental tradition ignore the vast analytic philo-
2 See Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1992), 1-2.
Stathis Psillos – Of Realist Turns
369
sophical production on this topic at their peril. An informed 
understanding of how the realist stance has evolved in the 
last few decades of philosophical research in philosophy of 
science in dialectical engagement with a variety of anti-realist 
positions and how it has worked towards the clarification of 
concepts like causation, explanation, truth, and reference to 
unobservable entities, will offer precious conceptual resources 
for realists of all stripes and backgrounds.3
As readers of Speculations will know, in the last few years 
we have witnessed a return of realist concerns within the 
continental tradition: this has taken shape in both readings 
of figures from the history of continental philosophy on 
the background to the problem of realism and antirealism 
(often in relationship with their understanding of the natu-
ral sciences)4 and of formulations of new, original realist 
positions. Many of these new theoretical orientations have 
been grouped under the term “speculative realism,” a rather 
loose category which can be characterized, for brevity’s sake 
(and indeed in the attempt to find a minimum common de-
3 Some thinkers within the continental realist movement are aware of this 
necessity, and it is not uncommon, in their work, to find reference to a range 
of analytic figures including Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, Robert Brandom, 
Nancy Cartwright and Paul and Patricia Churchland.
4 See, for example, Lee Braver’s historical narration of antirealism in conti-
nental philosophy (Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental 
Anti-Realism [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007]), Iain Ham-
ilton Grant’s defense of a materialist/vitalist Schelling (Iain Hamilton Grant, 
Philosophies of Nature After Schelling [London and New York: Continuum, 2006]), 
Trish Glazebrook’s account of the evolution of Heidegger’s opinions about 
science throughout his philosophical career (Trish Glazebrook, Heidegger’s 
Philosophy of Science, [New York: Fordham University Press, 2000]), Manuel 
DeLanda reconstruction of Gilles Deleuze’s realism through his engage-
ment with complexity theory and differential geometry (Manuel DeLanda, 
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy [London and New York: Continuum, 
2002]), Martin Hägglund’s and Michael Marder’s materialist/realist reading 
of Jacques Derrida’s philosophy (Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Der-
rida and the Time of Life [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008] and 
Michael Marder, The Event of the Thing: Derrida’s Post-Deconstructive Realism 
[Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press. 2009]). It is worth 
noting that many of these texts have the programmatic intent of presenting 
the work of continental figures in terms appreciable by an analytic audience.
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nominator in a range of often widely different approaches), 
by a reaction against and rejection of all those boundaries 
(Kantian-transcendental, phenomenological, cultural relativist, 
postmodern) posed between the human subject and “things-
in-themselves” independent from human epistemic access. 
The criticized stance can be reduced to what Quentin Meil-
lassoux has christened “correlationism,” the thesis defending 
the viciously circular impossibility of thinking an entity x as 
independent of thought, a stance which always reinscribes 
(correlates) the independent dimension of an entity within 
the limited horizon of a language, of consciousness, or of 
any other transcendental condition. These new forms of 
realism share the belief in the possibility of constructing a 
philosophy which can reclaim the right to deal with things 
in themselves, but to do so in a “speculative” manner. One 
should be cautious in defining what “speculative” means 
here. Roughly, new continental realisms are “speculative” 
insofar as they either 1) reject the mandatory grounding of 
a realist metaphysics on purely empirical foundations and 
thus promote the reactivation of the possibility of a ratio-
nalism of a pre-Kantian kind (reclaiming the possibility of 
“first philosophy” and, to a certain extent, carrying forward 
the continental ambition of doing fundamental ontology) 
or 2) even when embracing the natural sciences’ results 
as a starting point (without caricaturizing or simplifying 
them), intervene precisely where the sciences themselves 
are unable to find an internal explanation of their results 
by revising their metaphysical conceputal apparatus. As a 
general point one can say that it is precisely the negotiation 
of a new relationship between (continental) philosophy and 
science which is at stake in speculative realism, and thus 
that different orientations along this realist “spectrum” are 
to be distinguished on the basis of their degree of allegiance 
to the natural sciences or—if we consider the comparative 
dimension that we will pursue in this interview—the degree 
to which they reject the strict naturalism which dominates 
the analytic field. 
•
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Fabio Gironi: I would like to begin by asking you how you developed 
your philosophical interests. You started your academic education 
in Greece with a degree in Physics. What pushed you to philosophy 
and specifically to the philosophy of science?
Stathis Psillos: Part of the reason why I was drawn to the 
study of the natural sciences and of physics in particular was 
disillusionment with the way philosophy was conceived of, 
and practiced, in Greece back in the 1980s (and until not too 
long ago—perhaps even today in certain traditional circles). 
Philosophy was taken to be an essentially philological disci-
pline constitutively engaged with the interpretation of the 
texts of the great dead philosophers (especially the ancient 
Greeks) and with an attempt at a grand historical narrative of 
philosophical ideas; as if philosophical ideas were developed 
in an epistemic vacuum independently of what was going 
on in science and in general culture. Actually, philosophy 
was taken to be a discipline which has evolved in opposi-
tion to science. Studying philosophy this way was extremely 
unattractive to me (even though, unbeknownst to me back 
then, there were pockets in a couple of philosophy depart-
ments in Greek universities that resisted this conception of 
philosophy). I was therefore led to physics, but it was quite 
clear to me from quite early in my studies that I was looking 
for a window of opportunity to engage with philosophy in 
a systematic manner. My turn to philosophy of science was 
a natural outcome of my engagement with physics and my 
tendency to look for philosophical problems that arise within 
physics as well as from what physics tells us about the world. 
I wrote my first degree dissertation on issues in the philoso-
phy of quantum mechanics (trying—in vain, I am afraid—to 
understand the rich Aristotelian notion of potentiality and 
its possible relevance to the stochastic conception of the 
world, as this is depicted in the standard interpretation of 
quantum mechanics). Back then (in the late 1980s) it was 
quite hard to find any serious literature in Greece and I was 
lucky to be given by a teacher of mine the typescript of the 
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yet unpublished book of Michael Redhead’s Incompleteness, 
Non-Locality and Realism, which excited my interest in realism. 
My commitment to realism (admittedly in a naïve and 
perhaps vague way, and mainly conceived of as materialism) 
was already there because of my theoretical engagement 
with Marx. In fact, this engagement kept my philosophical 
awareness alive throughout my University studies and led 
me to try to understand both the idealist and the empiricist 
opposition to realism (perhaps, unwittingly, conflating them 
back then). Reflection on Marx’s second thesis on Feuerbach 
(“The question whether objective truth can be attributed to 
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practi-
cal question. Man must prove the truth—i.e. the reality and 
power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The 
dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is 
isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.”) was 
leading me towards a conception of realism that was meant to 
enable the task of transforming the world. I was feeling quite 
satisfied by the fact that this task was meant to be the proper 
mission of philosophers, as Marx, I thought, was claiming 
in the famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “The philoso-
phers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it.” But I soon realised that I was fooling 
myself. Contrary to Marx’s eleventh thesis, the point was still 
to interpret the world—if we are to know what we are doing 
when we try to change it. In this endeavour to interpret the 
world, science, I thought, was the bastion of rationality and 
progress; the terra firma upon which one could base all hopes 
for a better world. I believed back then—and still believe 
now—that science is the best way we humans have invented 
to push back the frontiers of ignorance and error, to achieve 
a deep understanding of the world and of our place in it, and 
to make the world a better place to live. What I now add is 
that science is not a faultless, value-neutral and interest-free 
way to understand and change the world. 
But science and its claim to truth and knowledge are not 
immune to criticism; hence, they need justification and de-
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fence. To me, looking into the scientific realism debate was 
no longer optional. It amounted to taking a standpoint: the 
scientific realist standpoint. When I went to King’s College 
London for graduate studies in philosophy of science (hav-
ing gratefully received a state’s scholarship, without which I 
would have been unable to pursue my philosophical studies 
in the UK), I came into the scientific realism debate with no 
neutrality. I wanted to defend scientific realism, along with 
the objectivity and rationality of science and its method. 
This was both an intellectual and, I thought, a political goal. 
Back in the 1990s, there was a pervasive thought, especially 
among left-wing American and continental European intel-
lectuals, that undermining the alleged epistemic authority of 
science, challenging its claims to objectivity and knowledge, 
was an act of emancipation from the strangling authority of 
Reason. I was never persuaded by this rhetoric. It conflated 
intellectual authority with authoritarianism and, at least to 
all of us who learned our basic philosophy and politics in the 
European south, intellectual authority (and objectivity and 
criticism and the search for truth) were the arch enemies of 
any kind of authoritarianism. 
FG: Indeed. Considering the paradigm of “charismatic” populist 
authoritarianism that has been steering politics in my own country 
in the last decades, I couldn’t agree more. I’d like now to introduce 
readers not acquainted with them to discussions taking place in the 
analytic philosophy of science (since enthusiasts of the continental 
“realist turn” often tend to overlook the fact that a similar turn has 
occurred in the analytic tradition roughly between the 1960s and 
the 1970s, and has developed vigorously ever since) and, second, 
to expose you to some recent realist developments in continental 
philosophy. As for the first point, can you clarify how the “scientific” 
qualifier differentiates “scientific realism” from the more general 
“realism” part of philosophical vocabulary since medieval scho-
lasticism? And can you offer a brief historical narrative guiding 
us from the realist turn which lifted the embargo on the reference 
to unobservable, theoretical entities—originating in the work of 
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philosophers such as Wilfrid Sellars, J.C.C. Smart and Richard 
Boyd—to the present state of the scientific realism debate?5
SP: Historically, realism has been taken to be a doctrine about 
the independent and distinct reality of universals (qua attributes 
or species). It was opposed to nominalism, viz., the view that 
only particulars exist. Nominalists argued that general terms 
and predicates are merely names for classifying particulars 
in terms of their similarities and differences. Realists—who, 
historically, came first—claimed that universals are real entities 
referred to by abstract terms, general names and predicates, 
and argued that they are necessary for knowledge and for 
grounding the similarities and differences among particulars. 
There have been transcendent realists (those who think that 
universals—qua Platonic forms—are apart from, and prior to, 
the particulars) and immanent realists (those, like Aristotle, 
who think that though a universal is the one over the many 
and “imperishable,” it is not apart from the many). 
It’s an interesting question when and under what circum-
stances the term “realism” started to acquire philosophical 
currency. I have not looked into the matter with any seriousness. 
The term appears in Kant’s first critique (quite late in the text) 
joined with the qualifiers “transcendental” and “empirical.” 
Kant contrasts realism to idealism; in particular to his own 
transcendental idealism. Kant claims that transcendental 
realism takes the phenomena (outer appearances/objects of 
the senses) as real and as existing independently of us and 
our sensibility, thereby taking them as things-in-themselves. 
It is transcendental realism that he famously denies and to 
which he opposes his transcendental idealism, viz., the view 
5 “The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate” is the title of the first 
chapter in Psillos’ Knowing the Structure of Nature. Readers seeking a fully 
detailed account of this debate should turn to it or, for an even broader per-
spective, to Psillos’ exhaustive historical survey of the entirety of twentieth-
century philosophy of science in chapter fourteen of Dermot Moran, The 
Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
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that the objects of knowledge are not the things-in-themselves, 
but the phenomena as they are constituted by their epistemic 
conditions for their knowledge (the categories and the forms 
of pure intuition). But transcendental idealism, he insists, 
makes room for empirical realism, meaning that the objects 
of the senses are material things that are to be found in space, 
even though space (and time) are a priori forms of sensible 
intuition. The fact is that Kant’s way to cure the “scandal of 
philosophy” (recall: “it must still remain a scandal to philoso-
phy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, 
as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to 
ourselves…and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof 
to anyone who may call it in question”6), created another 
scandal: the inherent unknowability of things as they are in 
themselves (by beings like us anyway, who are bounded by 
sensible intuition). 
The Kantian dichotomy between the noumena and the 
phenomena (an epistemic dichotomy, to be sure) made any 
robust realist position having to face an uphill struggle: to 
save the independence of the world from the human mind 
while avoiding scepticism or agnosticism. Denying the very 
distinction between the noumena and the phenomena, the 
Hegelian idealist tradition compromised the independence 
of reality from thought, thereby securing its knowability. It’s 
not clear to me there were any strong realist voices in the 
nineteenth century. Perhaps the strongest was Gottlob Frege’s 
who took it that the truths of arithmetic are fully objective, 
mind-independent and about numbers qua abstract objects. 
Bertrand Russell, in the early twentieth century, developed 
what came to be known as (a version of) structural realism in 
an attempt to argue that, given various quite plausible causal 
assumptions, the structure of the things-in-themselves (that 
is of the world as-it-is-in-itself) is inferable from, and hence 
knowable on the basis of, the structure of the phenomena. 
Rudolf Carnap famously argued that the issue of the reality 
(and mind-independence) of the world is a pseudo problem, 
6 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, b xxxix.
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but following Moritz Schlick he made room for empirical 
(as opposed to metaphysical) realism. The spectre of meta-
physical realism, as Schlick put it, was the phantom of a world 
“somehow standing behind the empirical world, where the 
word ‘behind’ indicates that it cannot be known in the same 
sense as the empirical world, that it lies behind a boundary 
which separates the accessible from the inaccessible.”7 It was 
the specter of the Kantian noumena, perhaps under the illu-
sion that there is a special non-empirical method of knowing 
them. Rejecting metaphysical realism, Schlick and co. were 
striving for a position which would leave metaphysics behind, 
without however abandoning the rich conception of the 
world, as this is described by the sciences—a world popu-
lated by atoms and fields and whatever else our best science 
tells there is. Science advances by revealing the constituents 
of things that we encounter in perception and the fact that 
these are (typically) invisible is no reason to suppose they 
are not real. Hence, Schlick and co. were aiming to articulate 
an empiricism-friendly philosophical stance towards science 
which is distinct from instrumentalism but not committed 
to a metaphysically-loaded sense of reality. 
By the 1920s, the classical Newtonian conception of the world 
was giving way to a new theoretical framework dominated 
by Einstein’s theories of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. 
What is more, the atomic conception of matter was gaining 
wide acceptance—it had become the new paradigm. With it, 
this conception brought the issue of the ontic status of the 
various invisible entities posited by theories to explain the 
various observable phenomena. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, there was a rather heated debate concerning the 
status of explanatory hypotheses in science—those that pos-
ited the existence of unobservable entities. The resistance to 
explanation-by-postulation was motivated by philosophical 
arguments, mostly driven by what was taken to be commit-
ment to empiricist theses. One line of resistance had to do 
7 Moritz Schlick, “Positivismus und Realismus,” Erkenntnis, 3, 1-31, 1932. 
Translated as “Positivism and Realism” in Logical Positivism, Alfred J. Ayer, 
ed. (Glencoe, NY: Free Press, 1960).
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with semantics: how can we render language to refer suc-
cessfully to things that are not given in experience? Another 
line of resistance had to do with epistemology: how can we 
possibly come to know anything about the unobservable, if 
the basis of this knowledge is not rooted in experience? A 
third line had to do with metaphysics: what exactly is it to be 
committed to the reality of unobservable entities? Perhaps, 
a final line was methodological: in trying to understand 
science as a practice that involves theory and observation, 
do we need (and do we have) to read theories as if they aim 
to tell a true story about the unobservable world behind or 
beyond the phenomena? In practice, these four lines of re-
sistance were mixed and conflated. But the fact is that very 
many eminent scientists who had philosophical motivation 
and acumen (from Ernst Mach, to Pierre Duhem, to Henri 
Poincaré, to Wilhelm Ostwald) took it that there is something 
deeply problematic with explanation-by-postulation and 
its promise to take our epistemic grasp beyond the limits of 
(immediate/sensory) experience. It turns out that the key to 
shifting scientific opinion in favour of the reality of atoms 
was Jean Perrin’s theoretical and experimental work (roughly 
around 1910) on the causes of the Brownian motion, which 
drove home the message that explanatory hypotheses can 
be highly confirmed by empirical evidence (provided they 
acquire characteristics that make them definite and test-
able). It was in this period that the first versions of a major 
argument for scientific realism were drafted, by the likes 
of Poincaré, Duhem and Ludwig Boltzmann—viz., that the 
predictive success of scientific theories cannot be a feat of 
chance, but that it is best explained by (and hence gives us 
reason to accept) facts involving unobservable entities which, 
according to the theories, are causally responsible for the 
generation of the relevant empirical phenomena. It was also 
in this period, however, that an important argument against 
scientific realism started to take shape: the argument from 
theory-change in science. This is based on the historical fact 
that there are radical revisions in the scientific image of the 
world; that past theories were abandoned and replaced by 
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substantially different ones. This fact caught the public eye 
in France, in the beginning of the twentieth century, under 
the rubric “the bankruptcy of science.” If current theories 
will have the fate of the past ones (if they too become part of 
the future history of science books), what is the reason to take 
them seriously as revealing to us the way the world is? Faced 
with the problem of radical discontinuity in theory-change, 
Poincaré and Duhem argued that there is, nonetheless, some 
substantial continuity at the level of the mathematical equa-
tions that represent empirical as well as theoretical relations. 
From this, they concluded that these retained mathematical 
equations—together with the retained empirical content—
fully capture the objective content of scientific theories. By 
and large, they thought, the theoretical content of scientific 
theories is structural: if successful, a theory represents cor-
rectly the structure of the world. It is noteworthy that at least 
in Poincaré’s case, his structuralism had a Kantian origin. He 
took it that science could never offer knowledge of things as 
they were in themselves. But he did add to this that their rela-
tions could nonetheless be revealed by structurally-convergent 
scientific theories.
These two major arguments (one from the success of scien-
tific theories and the other from the existence of revolutions 
in science) were destined to define most of the logical space 
within which the scientific realism debate would take place 
later on in the century. Neither of these arguments were at 
the forefront during the heyday of logical positivism. It was 
Herbert Feigl’s liberating critique of the main tenets of logi-
cal positivism that set the agenda for the realist turn of the 
1950s. He argued that the empiricist programme had been a 
hostage to verificationism for too long. Verificationism runs 
together two separate issues: the evidential basis for the truth 
of the assertion and the semantic relation of designation (i.e., 
reference). It thereby conflates the issue of what constitutes 
evidence for the truth of an assertion with the issue of what 
make this assertion true. If theoretical statements cannot be 
given truth-conditions in an ontology that dispenses with 
theoretical entities, then a full and just explication of scien-
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tific theories simply requires commitment to the irreducible 
reality of unobservable entities, no less than it requires com-
mitment to observable entities.
Perhaps the first full-blown defence of scientific realism 
was Jack Smart’s Philosophy and Scientific Realism—published 
in 1963, though his key papers on the reality of theoretical 
entities were published in the middle of 1950s. Smart rebut-
ted various views that treated theoretical entities as fictions 
or phenomenal constructs or mere concepts. Smart put the 
defence of scientific realism in proper perspective by argu-
ing that it rests on an abductive argument, aka inference to 
the best explanation. Smart argued against instrumentalists 
that they must believe in cosmic coincidence. Scientific re-
alism, on the other hand, leaves no space for a cosmic-scale 
coincidence: it is because theories are true and because the 
unobservable entities they posit exist that the phenomena 
are, and are related to one another, the way they are. It is fair 
to say that the realist turn in the philosophy of science was 
greatly facilitated by Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on the myth of 
the levels. This myth rested on the following image. There 
is the bottom level of observable entities. Then, there is the 
intermediate level of the observational framework, which 
consists of empirical generalisations about observable entities. 
And finally, there is yet another (higher) level: the theoretical 
framework of scientific theories, which posits unobservable 
entities and laws about them. It is part of this image that while 
the observational framework is explanatory of observable 
entities, the theoretical framework explains the inductively 
established generalisations of the observational framework. 
But then, Sellars says, the empiricist will rightly protest 
that the higher level is dispensable. For all the explanatory 
work vis-à-vis the bottom level is done by the observational 
framework and its inductive generalisations. Why then posit 
a higher level in the first place? Sellars’s reply was that the 
unobservables posited by a theory explain directly why (the 
individual) observable entities behave the way they do and 
obey the empirical laws they do (to the extent that they do 
obey such laws). He, therefore, offered an indispensability 
Speculations III
380
argument for the existence of unobservable entities: they are 
indispensable elements of scientific explanation of singular 
observable phenomena. 
In his brief review of Smart’s book in 1964, Quine exclaimed: 
“With science dominating our lives and progressing ever 
faster on even more frontiers, it is strange that such a view 
[the realistic view of fundamental particles of physics] needs 
urging. Strange but true.” But by then, the tide had started to 
move the scientific realists’ way. Putnam expressed this by his 
famous slogan, which has become known as the “no miracles 
argument”: “The positive argument for realism is that it is the 
only philosophy that does not make the success of science 
a miracle.” In his widely circulated and discussed, but still 
unpublished, manuscript Realism and Scientific Epistemology, 
Richard Boyd tied the defence of scientific realism with the best 
explanation of the fact that scientific methodology has suc-
ceeded in producing predictively reliable theories. Boyd viewed 
scientific realism as an historical thesis about the “operation 
of scientific methodology and the relation between scientific 
theories and the world.” As such, realism is not a thesis only 
about current science; it is also a thesis about the historical 
record of science: it claims that there has been convergence 
to a truer image of the world, even though past theories have 
been known to have been mistaken in some respects. This 
historical dimension is necessary if the truth (or partial truth, 
or significant truth) of scientific theories is to be admitted as 
the best explanation of the predictive reliability of methodol-
ogy. For, as noted already, unless continuity-in-theory-change 
and convergence are established, past failures of scientific 
theories will act as defeaters of the view that current science 
is currently on the right track. If, however, realism aims to 
explain an historical truth—viz., that scientific theories have 
been remarkably successful in the prediction and control of 
natural phenomena—the defence of scientific realism can 
only be a posteriori and broadly empirical.
Couldn’t scientific realism be lightweight? Would it not be 
enough for someone to accept the reality of unobservable 
entities without also rendering them mind-independent? 
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And wouldn’t this move bring scientific realism in contact 
with empirical realism and in freedom from metaphysical 
realism and/or transcendental realism? Well, a lot depends 
on how exactly the claim of mind-independence should 
best be understood. I take it that the sense in which realists 
claim that the world is independent of theories, beliefs, war-
rants, epistemic practices, etc. is best captured by admitting 
the possibility of divergence between what there is in the 
world and what is issued as existing by an epistemically right 
theory, which is licensed by the (best or even ideal) evidence 
or other epistemic criteria. It is precisely for this reason that 
realists need to rely on a non-epistemic conception of truth 
(the most popular, and controversial, of which is that truth 
is correspondence with the facts), which does allow for the 
foregoing possibility. When truth is attributed to the theory, 
this is a substantive attribution which is meant to imply that 
the theory is made true by the world, which, in its turn, is 
taken to imply that it is logically possible that an accepted 
and well-confirmed theory might be false simply because 
the world might not conform to it. A realist non-epistemic 
conception of truth, and in particular the possibility of 
divergence, does justice to the hard-won fact of empirical 
success and convergence of scientific theories. Given that 
there is no guarantee that science converges to the truth, or 
that whatever scientists come to accept in the ideal limit of 
inquiry or under suitably ideal epistemic conditions will 
(have to) be true, the claim that science does get to the truth 
(based mostly on explanatory considerations of the sort we 
have already seen) is quite substantive and highly non-trivial. 
If, on the other hand, the possibility of divergence is denied, 
the explanation of the success of science becomes almost 
trivial: success is guaranteed by a suitably chosen epistemic 
notion of truth, since—ultimately—science will reach a point 
in which it will make no sense to even raise the question of 
whether there is possible gap between the way the world is 
described by scientific theories and the way the world is. 
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FG: Thanks, that was an excellent survey indeed! Now, for the 
second point. To start with, as a philosopher of science with an 
analytic background what is your relationship, if any, to the con-
tinental tradition? You authored a Philosophy of Science A-Z 
text,8 which includes entries on notable philosophers of science: 
the closest one of these gets to being considered “continental” is 
perhaps Pierre Duhem, hardly a central figure in the continental 
canon. I take your choices not as prejudiced or idiosyncratic, but 
dictated by the necessity of faithfully representing the discipline 
as it is practiced, with its themes and central figures. Are students 
trained in the analytic tradition of philosophy of science exposed 
to any non-analytic material?
SP: A lot depends on how we should understand the so-called 
continental tradition. As you have seen from my previous an-
swer, I have been influenced by many continental thinkers, 
though they are not in the canon of what is called continental 
philosophy. But what exactly is continental philosophy? Are 
we thinking in terms of the Franco-German tradition in 
contradistinction to the Anglo-American one? But let us not 
forget that analytic philosophy, let alone analytic philosophy 
of science, would be nowhere if it were not for certain strands 
within the Franco-German tradition: from Frege, to the neo-
Kantians, to Wittgenstein, to the French conventionalists, to 
the Logical Positivists. When I try to picture the so-called 
continental tradition, I see some schools of philosophy, like 
phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, hermeneutics 
and post-modernism. Is there anything that unifies them into 
a single tradition? Perhaps it is that they are subject-centered; 
perhaps it is that they are based on narratives rather than 
rigorous arguments and conceptual analysis; perhaps it is 
that they are anti-science (in the sense that they bracket—to 
say the least—the scientific image of the world and are in-
different to the possible relevance of scientific findings to 
8 Stathis Psillos, Philosophy of Science A-Z (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007).
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philosophy and its methods); perhaps it is they take the key 
task of philosophy to be to unravel how the subject is related 
to the world of experience and what categories constitute this 
relation; perhaps it is the thought that there are no external 
(non-subjective, non-textual, non-what-have-you) standards 
of correctness of philosophical theory; perhaps it is all (or 
some) of the above in various blends. I do not think this kind 
of search (for the blueprint of continental philosophy) is ei-
ther profitable or interesting. I prefer to look into individual 
thinkers and schools (with some order of preference—I would 
never bother much with Heidegger!), and to try to find out 
whether what they say, or argue for, can help us better to un-
derstand some philosophical problem. I am deeply impressed, 
for instance, by Hegel’s critique of mechanism and I have 
argued that the key problem he raised, viz., that mechanisms 
are individuated functionally and hence that their bound-
aries and composition are relative to the function they are 
taken to perform, is significant for the current debate about 
mechanisms in the philosophy of science. Or take Husserl’s 
The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenom-
enology. This is a really significant piece. Husserl was very 
critical of the “bottomless theorising” that characterised the 
exact sciences. His criticism of the modern (post-Galilean) 
science and of the mathematisation of nature on which it was 
basing its search for objectivity is that in this process, science 
lost contact with the world of subjective experience. He took 
as the task of his own philosophy to rehabilitate subjectivity. 
He then urged that scientific objectivism be bracketed and 
that philosophy (that is, his own phenomenology) focuses 
on the life-world; the “actually intuited, actually experienced 
and experienceable world.”9 I happen to disagree with the 
way Husserl prioritises the life-world. But the problem he 
raises—the relation between the world as it is described by 
science and the world as we experience it—is profound and 
you can find variations of it both Carnap’s The Logical Structure 
9 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenom-
enology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 50.
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of the World and in Sellars’s famous discussion of the relation 
between the scientific image and the manifest image—where 
the category of “person” is ineliminable. Here we are talking 
about three different perspectives on the same philosophi-
cal issue and the classification of these perspectives in the 
categories “continental” and “analytic” would simply distort 
their significance. Or take Althusserian Marxism and its in-
sistence on the structure over the subject as well as the need 
for science to break free from ideology (though, as Althusser 
himself admitted, his early distinction was too theoretical). 
This is not the place to go into details, but my view is that 
modern structuralist tendencies in the philosophy of science 
have a lot to learn from the French structuralist tradition 
(especially when it comes to the social world and the social 
sciences).
It is true, however, that there is little communication between 
analytic philosophers and continental philosophers and that 
this is partly due to the fact that philosophical training has 
been identified with the immersion within a tradition and 
its own ways to raise and to articulate philosophical problems 
and to determine what counts as the right approach or answer 
to them. I would not surprise anyone if I said that I simply 
cannot get a grip on what some “continental” philosophers 
say, though I can more easily associate with them when what 
they argue is translated (perhaps by someone conversant 
in both traditions) into the language of the philosophical 
conceptual framework I relate with. 
In recent years, there have been systematic attempts by 
various “analytic” philosophers to immerse themselves into 
the views of the continental thinkers—and this is quite heart-
ening, if only because, if you think of it, the split between the 
so-called analytic and the so-called continental philosophy is 
a historical event that took place within a single philosophical 
framework. It is related (to some extent at least) to the split 
of Kantianism into two neo-Kantian schools who disagreed 
as to how best they were supposed to develop the key Kan-
tian points after the collapse of the neat way in which Kant’s 
described how knowledge is possible. Those in Marburg 
Stathis Psillos – Of Realist Turns
385
took mathematics and the natural sciences as the models of 
objectivity and knowledge and aimed to remove all intuition 
from knowledge, while those in Baden focused on values and 
their role in knowledge, turning their attention to history and 
the human sciences and aiming to unveil their peculiarities 
vis-à-vis the natural sciences. Whichever way to look at it, 
both the analytic and the continental traditions are heirs to 
the network of problems, concepts, methods and theories 
that constitute the lore of philosophy from Plato to old Kant. 
When it comes to philosophy of science in particular, it is 
significant that analytic philosophers of science have started 
to take notice of the tradition of historical epistemology—
what is simply called “epistemology” in many continental 
countries—which is a genuinely historical and contextual 
approach to conceptual and philosophical problems in the 
sciences. This encounter should ideally lead to a new synthe-
sis between historical approaches to science and philosophy 
of science. 
FG: Right, let’s pursue this further. I feel that it’s still reasonable 
to say that this “neat” disciplinary division in the philosophy of 
science can perhaps be traced along two lines. First, as you just 
mentioned, the importance (or lack thereof) attributed to historical 
concerns. This might be a sweeping statement if we consider the 
analytic tradition as a whole, but it seems to be fair if we consider 
the philosophy of science (moreover, I think that there is some truth 
in the claim that historical interests in analytic philosophy, while 
not absent, tend to be located on the meta-philosophical level 
rather than organic parts of the construction of an argument). 
This is arguably a consequence of the logical empiricist collapsing 
of the traditional disciplinary distinction between Naturwissen-
schaften and Geisteswissenschaften (essentially in favour of the 
former), one which took shape in the Carnapian “unity of science” 
program and which strictly confined “cultural objects” outside of 
the mandate of science. Little more than a decade later Edmund 
Husserl laments precisely this positivistic reduction of philosophy 
(and science itself, both somewhat subsumed in the German term 
Wissenschaft) to a narrow concern with a factual objectivity ex-
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punged of the concern for “human questions” and, in a memorable 
line, claims that “Positivism, in a manner of speaking, decapitates 
philosophy.”10 He goes on to denounce the “naïvete through which 
objectivist science takes what it calls the objective world for the 
universe of all that is, without noticing that no objective sci-
ence can do justice to the [very] subjectivity which accomplishes 
science.”11 Scientific objectivity, an ethical imperative to be reached 
for the Husserl of the Crisis, is ultimately grounded in a lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt) of intersubjectively, historically constituted cultural 
formations. Even outside the Husserlian phenomenological legacy, 
continental philosophy of science, in particular the French epis-
temological tradition running (roughly) from Emile Meyerson to 
Michel Foucault through Leon Brunscvicg, Gaston Bachelard and 
Georges Canguilhem, was composed by thinkers with a scientific 
background who put a premium on a philosophico-historical 
analysis that would emphasize the discontinuities of science. These 
would be often caused by those psychological, (inter-)subjective 
preconceptions (“epistemological obstacles” as Bachelard named 
them) which are to be accounted for if we are to offer an account 
of science as actually practiced by human subjects. A far cry from 
Carnap’s antipsychologism guiding, in the Aufbau, his “rational 
reconstruction [rationale Nachkonstruktion] of the concepts 
of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the 
immediately given.”12 Canguilhem well synthesizes the spirit of 
French épistémologie in one paragraph: 
The history of sciences is not the progress of sciences in reverse, i.e. the put-
ting into perspective of outmoded stages whose truth is today on the point 
of disappearing. It is an effort to enquire into and give an understanding of 
the extent to which outmoded notions or attitudes or methods were, in their 
time, successful; and consequently of the respect in which the outmoded past 
remains the past of an activity for which it is necessary to retain the term 
10 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phe-
nomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 9.
11 Ibid., 294-295.
12 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in 
Philosophy (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2003), v.
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“scientific.” To understand what gave instruction in its time is as important 
as exposing the reasons for its destruction by what followed.13 
Of course, Thomas Kuhn acknowledged Meyerson among his key 
influences, but the Kuhn-inspired historical turn seems to have 
de-legitimized itself (in the eyes of most philosophers of science) 
with what were perceived as post-Kuhnian relativist excesses (from 
Paul Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism to David Bloor and 
Barry Barnes’ “strong programme” in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge) with the result that today mainstream philosophy 
of science remains well insulated from those projects of “science 
studies” that aim at placing science in its historical (but also 
gendered and social) context. I personally think this is for the 
worse, and I see much value in the recent, more regulated, return 
to a merging of history and philosophy of science (HPS) in the so 
called “Integrated HPS” (or &HPS) projects,14 (in which I think 
you are personally involved, being among the organizers of the 
4th international Integrated HPS Conference, which was held in 
Athens last March). HPS can help re-conceptualize episodes and 
concepts from the history of science from being the province of 
antiquarian interest to the living field of original philosophical 
work. As Hasok Chang recently put it “history-writing can be a 
very effective method of philosophical discovery.”15 What is your 
position regarding this split along historicist lines? Does the HPS 
trend hold the promise to effectively integrate analytic philosophy 
of science with historical research, and could this be an occasion 
for rapprochement between the two traditions?
SP: It’s obvious from what I said above that we agree on quite 
a bit. But I disagree with Husserl’s judgement on Positivism. 
13 Georges Canguilhem in Gary Gutting, Continental Philosophy of Science 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 201.
14 For an overview of this project, see Seymour Mauskopf and Tad Schmaltz, 
Integrating History and Philosophy of Science. Problems and Prospects (Dordrecht, 
Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 2011) and the issue of Isis (199:1, 
2008) with a focus on “Changing Directions in History and Philosophy of 
Science.”
15 Hasok Chang in Integrating History and Philosophy of Science, 111.
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Recall that his claim was against positivism as the dominant 
ideology for doing science: science is only concerned with 
experience and with getting the facts right. I am not sure any 
serious philosopher (not even Comte himself) held this view. 
Clearly this was not the view of the Logical Positivists and 
Husserl was aware of this. So if we take the “in a manner of 
speaking” seriously in his dictum, he might well be making 
a good point! But he too felt that the Logical Positivists’ ap-
proach was a weapon against irrationalism. Their criticism 
of traditional speculative metaphysics was meant to reshape 
philosophy in such a way that it is brought (again) in contact 
with science and rigorous conceptual tools and methods 
(broadly borrowed from logic and mathematics). So I’d say that 
positivism, in a manner of speaking, liberated philosophy. It’s 
true though that the Logical Positivists had had little time for 
history (though not for subjectivity and its place in the theory 
of knowledge). This is somewhat ironic since, at least until 
they were forced, by the rise of the Nazi’s in power, to leave 
the Continent (Schlick, as is well known, was assassinated in 
the staircase of the University of Vienna), they were the true 
heirs of the philosophies of science of Poincaré, Duhem and 
Mach; philosophies of science which were deeply immersed 
in history. But the insensitivity to history was, in a sense, 
necessary for what the logical positivists took as their imme-
diate task, which is this: how to reconcile the emerging new 
scientific image of the world with the collapse of the Kantian 
theory of knowledge, without at the same time jettisoning the 
Kantian idea of the spontaneity of understanding. Fulfilling 
this task requires an orchestrated philosophical act, one key 
element of which is clarifying the conceptual foundations 
of the new scientific theories (so that what they say of the 
world—their factual content—becomes as clear as possible), 
the other key element being the need to reformulate and 
reshape the standard philosophical categories by means of 
which the analysis and criticism of knowledge is effected. 
In this process, the very idea of intuition and of synthetic a 
priori knowledge of the world had to go; better: synthetic a 
priori principles were reconceived as analytic and yet revisable 
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framework-dependent principles. It was in this context that 
Schlick attacked Husserl’s Wesenschau (intuition of essences). 
He thought that empiricism could accommodate subjectivity 
without having recourse to sense-intuition or to substantive 
synthetic a priori principles. No special intuition of essences 
was necessary for knowing the structure of experience. The 
so-called “phenomenological propositions,” far from being 
part of the structure of the life-world, were analytic principles 
having to do with the structure of language. However, the very 
idea that the remnant of the Kantian spontaneity of under-
standing was to be found in framework-dependent and hence 
revisable general principles had a deep (if implicit) historical 
motivation, viz. the presence of revolutions in science. The 
synchronic logical analysis of the language and concepts of 
science that the positivists pursued was predicated on the 
thought that the form of the scientific method (aka induc-
tive logic) is diachronic (and hence, essentially historically 
invariant), while its content is historically variable.
Philosophy abhors vacuum, so the historical method that 
Duhem and Poincaré (as well as Mach) had followed in their 
philosophies of science was picked up by the French epis-
temologists of the school of Gaston Bachelard. But I take it 
that there was a lot of uncertainty as to how exactly history 
should be an integral part to philosophy of science. Back in 
1906, Duhem was quite clear about the importance of the 
historical method:
The legitimate, sure, and fruitful method of preparing a student to 
receive a physical hypothesis is the historical method. To retrace the 
transformations through which the empirical matter accrued while the 
theoretical form was first sketched; to describe the long collaboration 
by means of which common sense and deductive logic analysed this 
matter and modelled that form until one was exactly adapted to the 
other; that is the best way, surely even the only way, to give to those 
studying physics a correct and clear view of the very complex and 
living organization of this science.16
16 Duhem, Pierre, The aim and structure of physical theory, trans. P. Wiener 
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The historical method—the historical investigation of the 
conceptual processes that led to an adaptation between matter 
(empirical laws) and form (mathematics)—was taken to be an 
essential way to do philosophy of science. This is because the 
historical point-of-view unravels the constitutive interplay 
between empirical-factual investigations and mathematical-
formal frameworks in the development of scientific theories. 
Admittedly, Duhem tied his historical turn to a certain his-
toriography of science, viz. one that stressed the elements 
of continuity and rejected the view of theory-change as the 
way Athena emerging fully armed from Zeus’s head. Hence, 
he was using history as a guide to the future: as a way to show 
how there can be revolutions without incommensurability; 
how the physics of each epoch “is nourished” by past physics 
and “is pregnant with the physics of the future.” 
The view of the role of history shaped by the French epis-
temologists seems to me to be far more radical than Duhem’s. 
I think its forebear is Emile Boutroux, who argued for the 
presence of “genuine irreducible contingency” in the world 
and took it that according to this doctrine “it is erroneous 
and chimerical to attempt to reduce history to a simple de-
duction.” Furthermore, he argued that “it is not…the nature 
of things that should be the final object of our scientific in-
vestigations, it is their history,”17 which, incidentally, he took 
it to be the locus of objectivity. The French epistemologists 
extended these ideas to the very nature of science, arguing 
that science is essentially historical (no core themes, methods, 
etc.), the object of science (and concomitantly) the object of 
philosophy of science being historically variable. This way to 
view science leads to particularism, and particularism (when 
fully developed) is self-defeating. Unless all these activities 
that are classified under science have some general and 
shareable characteristics, it is hard to see what makes them 
science; what unites them under a common rubric? 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1906), 268-269. It is clear from the 
context that Duhem meant it as a general method for the study of science.
17 Emile Boutroux, The Contingency of the Laws of Nature. (Chicago and London: 
Open Court, 1920), 166,167.
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When Thomas Kuhn pleaded for “a role of history” in the 
introductory chapter of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
he was fully aware that history did already have a role—espe-
cially among the French epistemologists. So, his plea was for 
a new role for history, and in particular one that was based 
on the rejection of the cumulative-developmental model 
of science. There is, certainly, a way in which history was 
assigned a new role within general philosophy of science 
and this was related to the structure and the testing of the 
macro-models of scientific growth that became popular in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Models of scientific growth, such as 
Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s, presented the unit of scientific appraisal 
(the scientific paradigm, the scientific research programme) 
as an evolving dynamic structure that follows a rather tight 
historical pattern. Kuhn emphasised both the element of 
historical tradition that characterises normal science (seen 
primarily as a rule-governed—or exemplar governed—ac-
tivity) as well as the element of change that characterises 
revolutionary episodes (seen primarily as an abrupt change 
not-fully-accounted-for in terms of reason and evidence). 
Lakatos stressed the element of continuity and looked for 
clear-cut criteria of progressiveness in the transition from 
one research programme to another, which could underpin 
a notion of developmental rationality of science. But both 
took issue with a conception of science in general which had 
taken it to be subject to rules by means of which theories are 
appraised (e.g., a formal system of inductive logic and degrees 
of confirmation). And both took it that their macro-models 
of science reflected—and hence were licensed by—the actual 
historical development and succession of scientific theories. 
The genie of history was out of the bottle but I feel there 
still a lot of uncertainty—among philosophers of science—as 
to what wishes to make. If we were to think of the matter a bit 
abstractly, we could distinguish the following ways in which 
history of science and philosophy of science can be related. 
(1) Philosophy of science is an essentially ahistorical disci-
pline dealing with the logical analysis of the structure and 
concepts of science. If there is any role for history of science, 
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it is merely its role as the past of science: it is either a narrative 
as to how concepts evolve or a source of examples. (2) Phi-
losophy of science is the theory of historically individuated 
macro-models of theory development. History of science is 
then conceived of as the domain of application (and testing) 
of these models. (3) Philosophy of science involves a histori-
cal dimension in searching (in an a posteriori fashion) for 
the forms and justification of general rules and methods of 
science—what came to be known as methodological natural-
ism. (4) Philosophy of science is the rational reconstruction 
of the history of science and as such it relies on the history 
of science for warranted descriptions of how past scientists 
have actually practised science. I am not claiming that this 
list is exhaustive. Nor it is the case that these four points of 
view are totally independent from each other (especially the 
approaches 2 to 4). But what they all have in common is that 
they promote a kind of philosophy-infested history of sci-
ence; that is, a reading of the history of science in which that 
criteria of relevance are fixed by philosophical considerations. 
It’s time for a renegotiation and re-appraisal of the rela-
tions between the history of science and the philosophy of 
science. It’s not the case that there should be just one cor-
rect way in which history of science should be related to 
philosophy of science and a lot of insight will be gained by 
exploring the various ways in which philosophy of science 
and history of science could interact. I have tried to clear 
some of the ground for a renegotiation of the relation be-
tween philosophy of science and history of science in a very 
recent piece of mine called “What is General Philosophy of 
Science?,” which appeared in a special issue of the Journal for 
General Philosophy of Science. I would recommend a New Deal. 
The model I would promote is based, roughly, on the dipole 
idealisation/de-idealisation. Much of philosophy of science 
involves idealisations—what Alexander Koyré aptly called 
“structural schemata.” This is inevitable if a general view about 
science, its structure, methods and concepts is to be had. It 
is inevitable if we move beyond particularism and have a 
view of science-in-general. This is the proper subject matter 
Stathis Psillos – Of Realist Turns
393
of philosophy of science. But this drive towards idealization 
and abstraction, towards an idealized view of science, is es-
sentially incomplete; it leaves out of the picture a lot of the 
fine structure of science. An important way to reveal this fine 
structure, I think, is to use history of science as a de-idealiser, 
thereby getting a more accurate representation of the cluster 
of activities (and the various determinants) that constitute 
science. To put it bluntly, idealized (philosophical) models 
explain but do not represent; while de-idealised (historical) 
models represent but do not explain. Ideally, we need a new 
balanced relation. When you do philosophy of science, it is 
inevitable that the reading of history will be based, ultimately, 
on philosophical criteria of relevance. But this does not entail 
that a proper understanding of the history of science—one 
licensed by historical methods—will leave our philosophical 
conception of science intact. Integrated HPS is certainly on 
the right track. I feel, however, that it has not yet managed to 
mobilise historians of science to the extent that it is necessary 
for a partnership of equals to get off the ground.
FG: I guess that from a more properly philosophical standpoint 
the question is: to what extent, if at all, does historical awareness 
in philosophy of science undermine our faith in the correctness of 
our theories, the reliability of our methods or even in our theories’ 
ability to refer to an external, theory-independent world? Does 
such an historical reconstruction inevitably lead into a Laudan-
like pessimistic meta-induction and ultimately to some form of 
anti-realism?
SP: This is a good guess! Note, though, that things were not 
like that in the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
what should be properly called historical philosophy of science 
was formed. I have spoken already about the “bankruptcy of 
science” debate and how Poincaré and Duhem were trying 
to restore some warranted belief in scientific rationality and 
progress. The point is that the study of the history of science 
does not necessarily undermine the philosophical view that 
as science advances there is convergence to a stable network 
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of principles and theories about the deep structure of the 
world; to truer theories, as I would put it. In fact, a proper ap-
preciation of the history of science delivers a mixed message: 
there is change and continuity; rupture and stability. This is 
no news, of course. Already in 1900, Boltzmann addressed 
the “historical principle” employed by the phenomenolo-
gists, viz., that hypotheses are essentially insecure because 
they tend to be abandoned and replaced by other, “totally 
different” ones. Against this “historical principle,” he argued 
that despite the presence of “revolutions” in science, there is 
enough continuity in theory change to warrant the claim that 
some “achievements may possibly remain the possession of 
science for all time.”18 To be sure, we realists need to do a bit 
more work here. Two moves are really important. The first 
is to make the claim of convergence plausible, viz., to show 
that there is continuity in theory-change and that this is not 
merely empirical continuity; substantive theoretical claims 
that featured in past theories and played a key role in their 
successes (especially novel predictions) have been incorporated 
in subsequent theories and continue to play an important 
role in making them empirically successful. But making this 
first move does not establish that the convergence is to the 
truth. For this claim to be made plausible a second move is 
needed, viz., that the emergence of this stable network of 
theoretical assertions is best explained by the assumption 
that it is, by and large, approximately true. This is, roughly 
put, the role of the no-miracles argument. In doing all this, 
current theories constitute the vantage point from which we 
examine old ones—could there be any other vantage point? 
Yet, the identification of the sources of success of past theories 
need not be performed from this vantage point. 
Note that those who think that the history of science will 
necessarily lead to a pessimistic conclusion, viz., that current 
theories too are likely to be false and abandoned, rely on vari-
ous illicit philosophical assumptions that can be unearthed 
18 Ludwig Boltzmann “The Recent Development of Method in Theoretical 
Physics,” The Monist 11 (1900): 253.
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and challenged. One of them is an uncompromising holism 
regarding the confirmation of theories; another is a theory 
of meaning and reference that leaves no room for semantic 
bridges between distinct theories. The point that I am trying 
to make is that in this debate there is no neutral use of the 
history of science—the history of science does not speak with 
the voice of an angel. I take seriously Canguilhem’s dictum 
that “Without epistemology, it would thus be impossible to 
distinguish two kinds of history of science, that of superseded 
knowledge and that of sanctioned, that is, still actual because 
acting, knowledge.”
FG: Back to the division between the two traditions. I think that 
a second split line can be traced back to the notorious Carnap-
Heidegger controversy about the role that modern logic should 
play in the development of future philosophy, about the legitimate 
employment of language (and arguably, about the political nature 
of the social reform that both perceived as necessary) but mostly 
about what the overcoming/abandonment of metaphysics really 
should amount to.19 Even after the abandonment of the logical 
empiricist program, and the consequent rehabilitation of a range 
of metaphysical concerns, analytic philosophy still presents an 
hostility (or indifference) to that tradition of fundamental ontology, 
that kind of Aristotelian “first philosophy” concerned with being 
qua being, that came back to the fore in the wake of Heidegger’s 
project of answering “the question of the meaning of Being.” Today’s 
analytic metaphysics is organized around the problems of modality, 
of defining space and time, of causation, personal identity and free 
will, and hardly address the issue of “Being” (indeed, I think that a 
rough but efficient rule of thumb to distinguish a piece of analytic 
philosophy from a continental one is to count the occurrences of 
19 The classic reference for this debate remains Michael Friedman, A Part-
ing of Ways: Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open 
Court, 1990), but Abraham Stone recently proposed a slightly different 
take on the disagreement between the two philosophers, downplaying their 
disagreement over issues of logical consistency and emphasizing those 
regarding the allowed uses of language in his “Heidegger and Carnap on 




“Being” as a noun). In Heidegger’s eyes, what contemporary phi-
losophy of science refers to as “metaphysical commitments” would 
amount to a mere ontic project of identifying existent entities, 
rather than a properly ontological inquiry of Being itself. On the 
other hand, post-Heideggerian continental philosophy has kept 
referring to “Being” in its ontological (but post-metaphysical) 
projects, especially in the work of “realist” thinkers such as Gilles 
Deleuze and Alain Badiou, the former reactivating a tradition 
of “univocity of Being” which runs back to Duns Scotus, the latter 
reformulating the question of being in mathematical terms. This 
disagreement regarding the possibility of ontology can be seen as 
rooted in a different relationship with the natural sciences. From 
your standpoint, does it make any sense, today, to pursue the ques-
tion of what “Being” is or means over and above what current best 
science tells us about the fundamental constituents of the universe, 
or is such a question a vestigial problem, a relic of medieval scho-
lasticism or a “Heideggerian hangover?”20 
SP: I would not trust Heidegger too much! And I doubt he 
should be given too much credit anyway. If one were to an-
swer the question “what is metaphysics?” by trying to read 
Heidegger’s homonymous lecture, one would get a very 
distorted and perplexing idea of what it is all about. I’d say: 
if you want to do metaphysics (and to see metaphysics at its 
best) start straight from its source: Aristotle. The question 
of being is central to his Metaphysics. But more importantly, 
Aristotle suggests that there are two questions to be asked. 
One is what kinds of things there are (what kinds of being 
are), while the other is what it is for something to be: what 
is being. It might well turn out that these two questions are 
interconnected. But their conceptual separation makes meta-
physics possible as a distinct and distinctive enterprise. For 
the second question can be asked only within metaphysics; it 
arises from a genuine metaphysical aporia. It transcends the 
20 I borrow this expression from Adrian Johnston, “Hume’s Revenge: À Diex 
Meillassoux?” in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism 
edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (Melbourne: 
Re.Press, 2010), 110.
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bounds of the individual sciences, since the latter investigate 
the being-under-a-description, and hence some part of it, say 
the physical or the biological world (1003a22-26). Metaphys-
ics is the science of essence; of being qua being. But Aristotle 
wanted to put metaphysics in the service of science—what 
he called episteme. The fundamental structure of reality 
(ultimately comprising primary substances, essences (or es-
sential properties qua universals) and accidental properties 
(symvevikota) grounded the possibility of episteme and made 
episteme a distinctive kind of knowing (qua general, explana-
tory and necessary). His account of scientific knowledge (in 
Posterior Analytics) goes hand in hand with his account of 
the fundamental structure or being (in Metaphysics). If we 
take Aristotle seriously, adding the adjective “analytic” to 
metaphysics is a pleonasm. 
I take it that the immediate rival to “analytic” metaphysi-
cians (would it not be better to be called “metaphysicists?”) 
is the metaphysics-free tradition within analytic philosophy 
that was associated with Humean empiricism and later on 
with logical positivism. Could it then be that the addition of 
“analytic” is meant to make (pre-Kantian) metaphysics more 
palatable? Metaphysics is inevitable—the only question is: 
how much of it is necessary? Now, one may ask: necessary 
for what? To put it poetically, metaphysics fills the cracks of 
the scientific image of the world (in its totality and inter-
connectedness). To put it more theoretically, metaphysics 
secures the coherence of the scientific image of the world. 
I very much doubt that it makes sense to do metaphysics 
in complete isolation from what science tells us about the 
world, but I also think that science does not dictate a unique 
conception of the metaphysical structure of the world; of 
the kinds of beings there are; of the kinds of connections 
there are among them; of the basic characteristics that they 
have to have in order for the world to have unity and coher-
ence. Science goes a long way, but not all the way (ultimately, 
it cannot settle the question of being qua being). Think of 
the question of what, and how many distinct, categories of 
being need to be presupposed by a coherent conception of 
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reality—this is the problem of nominalism versus realism 
about universals. Or think of the question of whether there 
is sui generis power in the world which grounds and explains 
the regularity there is in it, or whether it is regularities all 
the way down, as I am fond of saying—this is the problem of 
the nature of causation. Or think of the question of whether 
some kinds of properties are constitutive of the kind of being 
something that there is is or whether all properties are on a 
par—this is the question of essentialism. These are typically 
metaphysical questions whose answer should certainly be 
constrained by what we know of the world via science; but 
they are clearly underdetermined by what science tells us 
about the world. 
If you think of it, this situation is not terribly odd or unfa-
miliar. Scientific theories themselves are underdetermined by 
the empirical evidence and yet there are plausible criteria to 
break ties of empirical equivalence: empirical equivalence does 
not entail epistemic equivalence. The situation is essentially 
the same with metaphysics: the name of the game is “infer-
ence to the best explanation.” Metaphysical hypotheses about 
the structure of the world might not explain in precisely the 
same way in which scientific hypotheses about unobservables 
explain, but they do play an important explanatory role by 
enhancing the unity and coherence of the scientific image of 
the world. When the logical positivists attacked metaphysics, 
they were not in the business of taking explanatory criteria 
as decisive. A.J. Ayer famously took it that what’s wrong with 
metaphysics is that it promises knowledge of reality which 
transcended the world of experience. He was right that there 
is no special non-empirical method of acquiring knowledge 
of the world. But he was wrong to restrict the empirical 
methods of science to those allowed by verificationism. Be 
that as it may, verificationism was a natural (if exaggerated) 
reaction to the speculative metaphysics of German idealism 
and its successors. Heidegger, for instance, thought that the 
inquiry about what he called the nothing (the non-being) 
is a central preoccupation of metaphysics, which sets it apart 
from science (of which Heidegger said that it “wishes to know 
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nothing about the nothing”). Carnap was fully justified to 
take on this conception of metaphysics and to argue that it 
fails to express genuine propositions. Here again, Carnap 
was taking metaphysics to be an endeavor to “discover and 
formulate a kind of knowledge which is not accessible to 
empirical science,” perhaps by means of special inferences 
that may begin from experience but transcending experience. 
This is something that Heidegger and co. may well have been 
fond of. But explanatory methods (which are legitimately 
employed in science) might well take us beyond experience 
without transcending it (at least in the technical philosophi-
cal sense of “transcendence”). In 1957, when Carnap added 
some remarks to the English translation of “The Elimination 
of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language” 
he noted that his early reactions to metaphysics did not ap-
ply to attempts “towards a synthesis and generalization of 
the results of the various sciences.” When philosophers like 
Quine (and Sellars) made room for explanation, metaphysics 
(properly understood as not relying on sui generis methods 
and inferences) started to become legitimate again. Quine was 
sharply critical of Carnap’s point that ontological questions 
could be asked in two distinct ways: as external questions 
and as internal ones. Carnap, famously, excluded external 
theoretical questions: questions about the reality of a general 
type (or category) of entity which are supposed to be settled 
by looking for (empirical) evidence for the reality of this type 
or by insight into the metaphysical structure of the world. 
Questions concerning the reality of a type of entity, Carnap 
argued, are legitimate and have content, but only if they are 
taken to be either external practical questions concerning the 
benefits of adopting a certain framework which includes 
this type of entity in its basis ontic inventory or as internal 
theoretical questions concerning the evidence there is for 
(or other reasons for accepting the reality of) certain tokens 
of this type, but only after a framework has been adopted. 
Despite his trenchant criticism of Carnap’s dichotomy, Quine 
did agree with Carnap on a fundamental point, viz., that there 
is no theory-free standpoint from which what there is can be 
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viewed. But he took this denial of a theory-free vantage point 
to imply that there is no sharp line between theoretical is-
sues (or questions) and practical ones. Ontological questions 
(questions about what there is) are theoretical questions as 
well as practical ones: they are answered by our best theory 
and there is no extra-theoretical court of appeal. Already in 
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine had argued for the “blurring 
of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics 
and natural science.”
If explanation-based metaphysics is allowed, where does 
one stop? Should, for example, a scientific realist adopt neo-
Aristotelianism simply on the basis that it is the best explana-
tion of, say, the neo-Humean account of the world? My own 
view on this matter comes to this. We should certainly take 
ibe seriously, but it can be contested that neo-Aristotelianism 
does indeed meet the best explanation test. One particularly 
acute problem is that all the denizens of the neo-Aristotelian 
world (powers, metaphysical necessities, dispositional es-
sences and the like) are themselves unexplained explainers. 
Though everyone should accept some unexplained explain-
ers, in this particular case, they are more poorly understood 
than the Humean facts that they are supposed to explain. 
Another problem, noted above, is that it is not clear at all 
how all these heavy metaphysical commitments are related 
to current scientific theories. The fact is that this kind of 
neo-Aristotelianism—and its commitment to heavy-duty 
metaphysics—has become a major force in current analytic 
metaphysics. And it also true that it is being developed (to a 
large extent at least) in close connection with science. Un-
fortunately, not all current analytic metaphysics is in contact 
with current science. This raises a serious issue: what are the 
criteria of success in metaphysical theorising? It cannot be 
merely internal consistency; the metaphysical theory must 
also be plausible. Since there is no a priori insight into plau-
sibility, I think the plausibility ranking must be based on the 
ordinary defeasible criteria that are used in science to rank 
and evaluate competing theories. If all this sounds too shaky 
a ground for metaphysics, so be it!
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FG: I largely agree with you here, even though I think that some 
forms of rationalism or a priori forms of reasoning can be salvaged 
if articulated within a Darwinian framework, defending a kind of 
naturalized rationalism which in my opinion is the most interesting 
path of inquiry taken by up by some “continental naturalizers.” How-
ever, going back to your indictment of neo-Aristotelian metaphysical 
options like powers or dispositional essences (and in general your 
scepticism towards any sort of “crowded” metaphysics) I would like 
to probe your opinions a little deeper with a “limit case.” How do 
you react to the recent renaissance of panpsychism (seen both as 
an approach to the “hard problem” of consciousness21 but also as a 
respectable general metaphysical option22 for a description of reality 
as a whole)? On the one hand, what I find interesting is that it seems 
to be an option which cuts transversally across the “two traditions” 
drawing in metaphysicians of both purely analytic breed and those 
inspired by German idealism or phenomenology. On the other, it 
seems to me to be a hopelessly wrongheaded stance, one that fails 
your test of plausibility as being the best explanation, and that 
makes a rather odd use of otherwise correct anti-anthropocentric 
guidelines—it’s alleged to be a sign of human-centered narcissism 
to assume that humans are the only entities in the universe en-
dowed with “mind” or some form of intentionality. The most famous 
argument here is the Galen Strawson thesis that “real physicalism” 
(as opposed to a reductionist, dogmatically scientistic “physicSal-
ism”) actually implies panpsychism.23 Your “scientific realism with 
a Humean face” is open-minded enough to not be a dogmatically, 
“old-fashioned” physicalist one (or indeed invested in any other 
strong metaphysical commitment) because it is defensible indepen-
dently from naturalism, but isn’t panpsychism a prime example of 
21 See Michael Blamauer, The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on 
Panpsychism (Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2011) and David Chalmers, The 
Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 297-299.
22 See Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium edited by David 
Skrbina (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Com-
pany, 2009).
23 See Galen Strawson “Realistic Monism: why Physicalism entails Panpsy-
chism,” in Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium.
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an explanans which is far less clear than the explanandum? Is 
this not a clear case where “empirical equivalence does not entail 
epistemic equivalence?” Personally, I am particularly interested 
in the metaphysical clashes behind the science vs. religion debates, 
and to take as an example another path-breaking panpsychism-
friendly philosopher—Thomas Nagel—I think a clear point can 
be made regarding all this. The argumentum ad ignorantiam 
that proceeds from our sketchy understanding of consciousness to 
the plausibility of some form of conscious activity in non-human 
entities, essentially defended in his 1979 essay,24 seems to me to 
lead directly to the theses he puts forward in a later essay called 
“Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.” Here, he seeks 
a “secular alternative” to reductive naturalism and identifies it in 
a kind of natural teleological process wherein “each of us…is a part 
of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up”25 How 
far does your Humean/empiricist outlook allow you to go in the 
refutation of a thesis like this, which seems to fly in the face of some 
central, historically hard-won, steps towards the goal of a full(er) 
scientific knowledge of nature (here, the rejection of Aristotelian 
teleology and the physics it produced)?
SP: There are endless possibilities in philosophy, given time 
and world enough. I have not followed the literature on 
panpsychism (at least the recent one, since a form of it is 
supposed to be present in Spinoza), but I feel there are two 
readings of it, one weaker (and relatively plausible) and an-
other stronger (and I think implausible). The weaker reading, 
I take it, is an attempt to dethrone the human mind from the 
centre of the universe, opposing the Protagorean idea that 
the human being is the measure of everything. In this sense, 
panpsychism would say that the mind and the mental life 
is not the prerogative of the human animals. But note well: 
this conception does not entail a special view about the soul 
24 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), Chapter 13.
25 Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 16,17.
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or the mind, or the spirit. In the history of philosophy, these 
have been the various candidates (typically, but not invari-
ably, taken to be the same “thing”) for the uniqueness of the 
humans among the “created” beings. This individuating factor 
has been taken to be imperishable, in constant motion, the 
locus of thought and mental activity, the subject of salvation 
and others. Weak panpsychism need not be committed to all 
this and is consistent with the scientific image of the world 
(if we take it to imply that the mental life is not uniquely 
human). The stronger version of panpsychism, in my view, 
would be committed to the implausible hypostatisation of 
the soul, albeit extending it to other animals (or even to non-
animals). Why is this view implausible? Precisely because it 
does not sit well with what we know about the mind and its 
functions. It feels good to believe that there is an immortal 
soul; that the mind is a substance; that there is a set of non-
natural properties that constitute the mental economy. It 
gives reassurance. But does it do good? I see no intellectual 
benefit in accepting this view. I still endorse non-reductive 
physicalism (though it is not entailed by scientific realism) 
which is essentially the same as naturalism. Sober—that is 
non-eliminative—naturalism puts a pressure on everything 
that is (supposed to be) non-natural to show that it has what 
it takes to be included in the natural world. So, all prima facie 
sui generis entities (or states, or attitudes) that are needed to 
explain Moorean facts (which include facts about colours 
and epistemic norms and evaluative attitudes and beliefs and 
pains) need to earn their right to be included in the natural 
world. They don’t earn this right automatically (by featuring, 
say, in potential explanations—cf. animistic or vitalistic expla-
nations). Nor do they enter the natural world autonomously. 
And to earn this right is, a naturalist would say, to be suitably 
dependent on the natural. There are notorious problems with 
this notion of dependence. But the central characterisation, 
I think, should be in terms of physical constitution. Natural-
ism need not be imperialistic, but is has to be elitist. Even so, 
it’s not arrogant elitism that characterises it. Anything that is 
prima facie sui generis can earn the right for inclusion in the 
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elite club, but they have to do some work to achieve that. It 
is a contingent fact about the world that all spatio-temporal 
entities are physically constituted. This does not, on its own, 
exclude the possibility of a property-dualism (or, better, 
property-pluralism.) But perhaps all that is needed to be added 
is that given the physical constitution of all spatio-temporal 
objects, whatever properties they have—and whatever causal 
powers they endow these objects with—are controlled from 
within “and are not imposed upon then from without” (cf. 
Dewey, Hook & Nagel 1945, 109).26
Naturalism excludes supernaturalism. Perhaps, Dewey, 
Hook and Nagel (1945, 116) can help here too. The horror su-
pernaturae is indeed the horror of naturalists. But this horror 
is the expression of a methodological policy: it is the firm 
refusal to accept that for which there is no evidence (or, in 
some cases, that for which there is overwhelming evidence 
against). In a certain sense, the naturalists’ horror supernaturae 
is the outcome of the following principle: if something is 
not acceptable, then it should be avoided, which is the con-
trapositive of the sound principle: What cannot be avoided, 
is to be accepted.
There is an issue I want to touch upon and this is the role 
of a priori within naturalism. Philosophical tradition has 
wavered between two conceptions of the a priori: the absolute 
conception and the absolute rejection. The absolute conception 
is exemplified in Kant. According to the Kantian conception, 
the possibility of human knowledge requires placing a priori 
restrictions on the admissible models of the experienced 
world—only those models are admissible that conform to a 
set of synthetic a priori principles. This captures a sense of 
constitutive a priori: some principles are necessary presup-
positions for knowledge (and for doing science)—necessary 
in the sense of being sine qua non for understanding the 
world. Since those principles that are necessary for experi-
26 John Dewey, Sidney Hook & Ernst Nagel “Are Naturalists Materialists?,” 
Journal of Philosophy, 42 (1945), 515-30, reprinted in American Philosophical 
Naturalism in the Twentieth Century, edited by J. Ryder (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1994).
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ence precede experience, they cannot be defeated by it; they 
are permanent and unrevisable; they are necessarily true. Kant 
thought that these two senses of being necessary—necessary 
presuppositions for doing science and necessary as perma-
nent and unrevisable—ought to coincide if some principles 
properly were taken to be independent of experience. This 
coincidence is the kernel of the absolute conception. Accord-
ing to the Millian-Quinean absolute rejection of the a priori, 
there cannot be any justification independently of experience. 
Mill’s chief point was that all justification, even justification 
of the laws of arithmetic, is inductive. Quine’s chief point was 
that everything can be revised or abandoned in light of experi-
ence. Since, according to the absolute conception, statements 
that are supposed to be a priori are unrevisable, Quine drew 
the conclusion that there are simply no a priori principles. 
The logical empiricists (capitalizing on an empiricist tradi-
tion that arguably goes back to Locke and Hume) thought 
that there is a middle way: some truths (notably the truths of 
logic and maths) were meaning-constitutive analytic truths; 
hence they tried to secure the a priori by tying it to analyticity 
(and to necessity, by implication, since all and only analytic 
truths were supposed to be necessary). Quine’s arguments 
against analyticity have conclusively shown that there is no 
non-circular way to characterise analyticity. This, of course, 
does not show that there are no analytic truths—but it does 
question that we have a coherent idea of what we attribute 
to them when we call them analytic.
There is another way to defend a middle position between 
the absolute conception and the absolute rejection, without 
being committed to analyticity. This is to drive a wedge 
between the elements of a priori knowledge: constitutivity 
and necessity. The locus classicus of driving this wedge is 
found in Hans Reichenbach’s The Theory of Relativity and A 
Priori Knowledge (1921). He drew a distinction between two 
elements in the Kantian conception: a priori principles are 
meant to be necessarily true; and they are meant to be consti-
tutive of the object of knowledge. Reichenbach accepted the 
second dimension but denied that a priori principles were 
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necessarily true and unrevisable—rather, being framework-
dependent, they are abandoned when the framework they 
are constitutive of is abandoned. I have tried to develop this 
middle ground in joint work with my ex-student and current 
colleague Demtera Christopoulou.27 The point I want to make 
now is that this relativised conception of the a priori seems 
compatible with a broader naturalistic perspective in the 
sense that naturalism does not obliterate the spontaneity of 
the understanding; nor is it committed to the rejection of 
the view that some principles are constitutive of the object 
of knowledge. In a rather marvelous passage, Poincaré drew 
a fine distinction between contradiction and condemnation. 
He was quite firm in that no experiments can ever contradict 
a constitutive principle (what he called “conventions”). For 
no experiment can conclusively refute such a principle. Yet, 
experiments can condemn a constitutive principle, or even a 
whole framework, in that persistent failure to account for new 
facts renders a particular principle or a whole framework no 
longer convenient. What a realist naturalist should retain at 
all costs is obviously the possibility of friction between our 
conceptual schemes and the world, which friction (making 
itself present in persistent and recurring anomalies) is (to a 
large extent) responsible for the replacement of conceptual 
frameworks by others.
FG: The analytic/continental divide is active on several dimen-
sions: professional, stylistic, methodological and thematic. I take 
the first to have little of philosophical merit, boiling down to a 
matter of safeguarding one’s own academic turf. Are the other 
dimensions crystallized enough to impede hopes of reconcilia-
tion, and is reconciliation a desirable outcome to start with? I 
think there can be three possible approaches: 1) bridging the gap, 
possibly through an interpretative work aimed at demonstrating 
how behind different methods and styles there can be identified 
27 Stathis Psillos and Demetra Christopoulou “The A Priori: Between con-
ventions and implicit definitions.” In N. Kompa, C. Nimtz, and C. Suhm 
(eds.), The a priori and Its Role in Philosophy (Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 2009).
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common concerns;28 2) preserving the gap, in the name of either 
the preservation of “essential traits” (analytic virtues of problem-
solving and clarity vs. continental “breadth of vision” and “exis-
tential relevance”) whose disappearance is deemed dangerous29 
or in view of an inherent value of a fragmentation of viewpoints 
and approaches, or 3) ignoring it. What would this latter option 
amount to? I take it to be a real possibility that the divide will 
gradually vanish with generational change: as the “old guard” 
dies out, a new generation of philosophers will achieve intellec-
tual maturity having ignored institutional divisions and having 
simply read–and thought through–the work of philosophers from 
both camps. Here I agree with part of Richard Rorty’s diagnosis, 
identifying the institutional origin of the split at the “graduate 
student level.” Rorty argued that
graduate students trying to shape themselves into plausible job candidates 
for teaching positions in philosophy only have time to read so much. They can 
please only so many potential employers….No matter how much intellectual 
curiosity a student has…there just is not enough time. So if she develops am-
28 One can think of the work of Christopher Norris and (more recently) of 
Samuel Wheeler to present Derridean deconstruction (and, in Norris’ case, 
Alain Badiou’s philosophy) in terms understandable to analytic philosophers, 
or of Lee Braver’s and Jeff Malpas’s comparison of the work of Davidson with 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s (see Christopher Norris, Language, Logic and Epis-
temology: A Modal-Realist Approach [Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004]; Christopher 
Norris, “Tractatus Mathematicus-Politicus: on Alain Badiou’s Being and Event” 
in Speculations II (2011), 7-48; Samuel Wheeler, Deconstruction as Analytic 
Philosophy [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000]; Braver, A Thing of This 
World, and Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, Understanding, edited 
by Jeff Malpas[Cambdidge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2011]. Also several 
chapters of A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy 
edited by G.C. Prado, (Amherst, NY, Humanity Books, 2003) seem to adopt 
this “contrast and compare” strategy over selected philosophical themes.
29 An example from the analytic camp is Timothy Williamson, who in the 
appendix of his The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 289, 
recommended that contemporary analytic philosophy as a whole should 
“do better,” guilty, in his eyes, of forsaking its mandate of argumentative 
clarity, rigor and precision and indulging in “ugly, convoluted, ramshackle 
definitions of concepts and theses.”
Speculations III
408
bidexterity [Rorty’s term for proficiency in both traditions], it will usually 
be in later life—usually after she gets tenure. Then she can afford to start 
following her nose rather than pleasing interviewers or senior colleagues.30
However, I think that we are witnessing today the emergence of a 
significant minority of graduate students reckless enough to take 
the risk and attempt to develop “ambidexterity.” Do you see some 
form of reconciliation as necessary, and would you encourage 
students to ignore traditional boundaries? And would you say 
that a realist philosophy of science can be at the forefront of such 
reconciliation, the two traditions having, so to speak, to be judged 
equally by the standards of an external reality independent of the 
philosophical style one uses to examine it?
SP: Hume used to say that philosophy arises out of intellec-
tual curiosity and that the philosophical problems will keep 
cropping up and boggle the investigative mind even if we try 
to lay them to rest by an appeal to common sense. There are 
different ways to address the very same philosophical prob-
lems; there are different prioritizations of their urgency; and, 
ultimately, there are different problems for which philoso-
phers are curious about. This, schematically put, explains the 
dichotomy between the two traditions, but also highlights that 
they are traditions within the very same intellectual enterprise. 
As I noted in my reply to an earlier question, what we call 
“the two traditions” have emerged from the very same womb 
and they share a common ancestry. In practice, things are 
more complicated of course, and no-one should be oblivious 
to this. There is a certain philosophical ideology associated 
with each tradition and until fairly recently there have been 
important linguistic, stylistic and methodological hurdles 
that had to be jumped if one were to immerse oneself in both 
traditions. Even nowadays, it’s hard to understand a thinker 
from the “opposite tradition” unless you read stuff that ex-
30 Rorty in Prado A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Phi-
losophy, 18.
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plains what they were supposed to be doing in the language 
of the tradition you are duly immersed. Immersion is part of 
the philosophical training and it depends, at least partly, on 
contingent factors. Given this, I doubt that the matter has to 
do with an “old guard” and its resistance to rapprochement. 
In the European continent, where the “continental tradi-
tion” was dominant for decades, there is a younger and very 
dynamic generation of philosophers which conscientiously 
inscribe themselves within the analytic tradition and pursue 
analytic themes vigorously and with flair. There are vibrant 
societies for analytic philosophy and plenty of congresses and 
workshops. This might be ironic since it happens in an age 
in which the original divide tends to fade away in the Anglo-
american philosophical community. This might well have to 
do with the fact that the history of philosophy has become 
a hot topic in the analytic tradition in the English-speaking 
world. But on the European continent, analytic philosophy still 
plays the role of an identity-maker among young academic 
philosophers. To promote analytic philosophy is to make 
a statement about what philosophy is; what philosophical 
problems are important; what methods pertain to philosophy; 
how philosophy is connected with science, etc. I am part of 
this tradition in my own country, even though I understand 
its limitations. Reconciliation will take time. Developing a 
rapport is much more manageable and welcome. The form 
that this will take is hard to tell. I would encourage philosophy 
students to engage with the writings of the major thinkers 
of the twentieth century and to try to identify the problems 
they were grappling with and how these problems re-appear 
and are re-shaped in the work of various past and present 
philosophers of various schools and traditions. 
Can realism facilitate this rapport? The very issue of real-
ism and its rivals is constitutive of philosophy and present 
in both traditions, perhaps in different forms. In this sense, 
it could provide a platform for thinking that philosophy is 
ultimately one and its fundamental problems the same for 
all. I was very glad to see (in the material you sent me and 
in the claims made in your questions) that there is a “realist 
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turn” happening presently in the continental tradition. It 
was even more heartening to learn that this turn is a self-
conscious attempt to reclaim the realist ground and to recoil 
from the dominant neo-idealist and anti-realist tendencies 
within this tradition. I feel that what you call “correlation-
ism” (the view that the only thing that can be accessed is the 
relation between thought and being and not the relata in 
isolation of this relation) has had a strong grip on the tradi-
tion that obscured the fact that a) the relata can be posited 
(and get their identity) independently of their relation; and 
b) if the (cognitive) access to reality were independent of 
thought, language, concepts, etc. we would not need thought, 
language, concepts, etc. to access reality. It is precisely because 
the cognitive access to the independent reality is mediated by 
epistemic categories, that the very question of the conditions 
and credentials of this access becomes philosophically excit-
ing and pressing. If there is a problem that “correlationism” 
points to, (the problem of how thought is related to reality), 
it is not solved by collapsing the two relata to one. It cannot 
be solved by making thought spinning in the void. There are 
various issues that can provide a fertile ground for the growth 
of the discussion between the various realist tendencies in 
both traditions; to name but a few: the relation between real-
ism and materialism, the issue of reductionism, the role and 
function of mathematics and the question of truth.
FG: Let us pursue the theme of the continental “realist turn” then. 
As I’ve tried to sketch in the opening remarks, a common trait 
of these new continental approaches to realism is the insistence 
on considering reality in-itself as not reducible to our cognitive 
capacities and to our metaphysical categories. Their return to 
realism associates a rejection of Kantian dichotomies between the 
humanly knowable and the unknowable (or even of the postmod-
ern, relativist, or linguistic denial of any noumenal reality) with 
informed allegiance to contemporary science. These philosophers 
are especially interested in the counter-intuitiveness and irre-
ducible character of the reality presented to us in the Sellarsian 
“scientific image.” Consequently, metaphysics is not seen as limited 
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to Strawsonian “descriptive” tasks but allowed to be thoroughly 
“speculative,” i.e. legitimately operating on a purely philosophical 
ground to offer an account of those consequences and presupposi-
tions which science cannot account for intrascientifically. Adrian 
Johnston (a critic of some “speculative realist” positions, but part 
of the broader resurgence of continental realism nonetheless) sum-
marizes this spirit when he argues, referring back to Hegel, that 
“the sciences produce out of themselves, on their own grounds, an 
internal delimitation of their explanatory jurisdictions”31 while 
a physicist like Gabriel Catren proposes a “speculative physics” 
aimed at deducing the rational necessity of scientific theories.32 As 
I noted above, an economical way to say this is that these kinds 
of “speculative” realisms offer only a conditional submission to 
naturalism: the natural sciences are the most reliable epistemic 
enterprise which humans have managed to come up with, but there 
are real features of the world which a method regulated by strict 
empiricist scruples cannot fully account for. Herein lies the subtle 
but crucial divergence between the continental and the analytic 
realist stance. You are strongly against what you call “principled 
epistemic divisions” between what can be known and what can-
not, and indeed claim that it is possible to know the structure of 
nature (that is what current best science offers us), but in your 
Humean-flavoured realism you have a naturalist skepticism of 
those inflationary neo-Aristotelian metaphysics which postulate 
natural kinds, powers, metaphysically necessary laws and so on, 
since they rely too much on a priori postulation of what the world 
must be like. How do you feel about attempts to reintroduce 
some forms of rational speculation in the context of our scientific 
worldview, a philosophy that, starting from the natural sciences, 
attempts to employ their results as speculative opportunities for 
a reconceptualization of our metaphysical categories, included 
those which were employed by science in the first place? To focus 
this further, you wrote that “only science can tell us what the world 
31 Adrian Johnston, “Materialism, Subjectivity and the Outcome of French 
Philosophy,” interview by Michael Burns and Brian Smith in Cosmos and 
History, 7:1 (2011), 177.
32 Gabriel Catren “A Throw of the Quantum Dice Will Never Abolish the 
Copernican Revolution,” Collapse V (2009), 459.
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is like. Philosophy can only raise some principled challenges to the 
ability of science to tell us what the world is like.”33 How far, in your 
view, can these challenges go? Are there reasons to place some 
boundaries on the epistemic audacity of science, and its ability to 
answer, without philosophical aid, meta-scientific questions about 
science’s own foundational assumptions or are these questions to 
be considered (in positivist fashion) meaningless?
SP: Science is far from sacrosanct! But it is also by far the best 
way we humans have invented to know the world. This does 
not mean that philosophy is the handmaiden of science; nor 
does it imply that the scientific image of the world is free 
from deep and controversial philosophical assumptions. In 
my most recent book, Knowing the Structure of Nature, I indeed 
argued against the view that there is a principled epistemic 
division between what can be known of nature and what 
cannot; hence that there is a principled limit to the scientific 
knowledge of the world. This limit is different in the assorted 
positions that I argued against, but it is supposed always to 
be principled, definite and drawn by philosophical reflection 
and argument. I am not claiming that science will discover 
everything there is to know. Science might, in the end, not 
reveal us what the world is like. It might be able to disclose 
only part of the structure and furniture of the world. But this 
is as it should be. It would be a totally different matter if there 
were good reasons—mostly drawn by philosophical reflec-
tion on science, its methods and its limits—to believe that we 
qua cognitive beings, or science qua an epistemic enterprise, 
are cognitively closed to some aspects of the unobservable 
world. What I do claim is that though there might be parts of 
nature that science might never be able to map out, these do 
not fall nicely within a conceptual category which captures 
one side of a sharp epistemic dichotomy (the unknown x: the 
things in themselves; the unobservable; the non-structure; 
the intrinsic properties, or what have you). 
33 Psillos in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science, edited by 
Steven French and Juha Saatsi, (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), 88.
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Naturally, there are significant philosophical motivations 
for raising these epistemic barriers that science is supposed 
to be unable to cross. It might be ironic but one important 
recent motivation is that (a form of) realism is best defended 
if it lowers its epistemic optimism. Hence, there are weaker 
versions of realism on the market such as structural real-
ism or semirealism. The challenges to realism come from 
various sources, but perhaps the most significant (as we have 
already seen) comes from the history of science, and has the 
form of the pessimistic induction. Another challenge (with 
some empiricist credentials) comes from the claim that 
the explanation by reference to unobservable entities and 
mechanisms (what I call explanation-by-postulation) leads 
to inflationary metaphysics. There is a sense in which this 
is obviously true: realism takes science to proceed by posit-
ing further entities that are meant to explain the life-world 
and its (typically non-strict) laws. But in another sense, the 
inflation is metaphysically harmless. For, if you think of it, 
science proceeds by positing micro-constituents of macro-
objects, whose main difference from them is that they are, 
typically, unobservable. That a putative entity is unobserv-
able is, if anything, a relational property of this entity and 
has to do with the presence of observers with certain sensory 
modalities (of the kind we have) and not others. No interest-
ing metaphysical conclusions follow from this fact; nor any 
seriously controversial ontological inflation.
As I have noted already above, the attempt to marry real-
ism with a neo-Aristotelian conception of the metaphysical 
structure of the world is a different matter. There I side with 
neo-Humeanism, which I take to involve the following three 
negative theses:
a There are no necessary connections between distinct 
existences (No necessity enforcers). 
b There are no universals as distinct from classes of 
resembling particulars (No resemblance enforcers).
c There are no powers as distinct from their manifesta-
tions (No regularity enforcers).
Speculations III
414
It might be thought that neo-Humeanism is anti-metaphysics 
altogether, but this is wrong. As I said already, metaphys-
ics—that is, a view about the deep structure of reality and 
its fundamental constituents—is not optional. The only 
serious issue, I believe, is how deeply this view should be dig-
ging; how rich the conception of the fundamental structure 
of reality ought to be. Neo-Humeanism promotes a rather 
thin—or sparse—view of the fundamental structure of re-
ality, according to which there are irreducible regularities 
in nature (regularities all the way down, so to speak) which 
involve patterns of dependence among members of natural 
classes (natural properties) and which underpin the causal 
and generally modal relations there are between them. But 
buying into the idea that the world is characterised by regular 
patterns of co-existence and succession of property-instances 
is metaphysics enough! 
Does science need the help of philosophy? Clearly yes! There 
are certain issues that can be raised only within a proper 
philosophical perspective on science. These include the status 
of first principles in science; the relation of science to reality; 
the epistemic credentials of scientific theories; the fabric of 
the deep structure of the world as it is described by science; 
and the very possibility of a unified (but not necessarily re-
ductive) account of it. Actually, these are issues that cannot 
be successfully dealt with at the level of individual sciences. 
We have to look at science as such. The individual sciences, as 
well as their philosophies, lack the conceptual resources and 
the power of abstraction that are required for a more global 
perspective on reality—for seeing the whole picture. They 
are limited by the fact that they focus on aspects or layers 
of reality. Putting together the scientific image of the world, 
looking at the various interconnections among the “partial” 
images generated by the individual sciences, and clearing 
up tensions and conflicts is precisely the kind of job that 
philosophy of science is meant to do. To put it in Sellarsian 
terms, philosophy of science offers the space in which the 
various images of the world provided by the individual sci-
ences are fused together into a stereoscopic view of reality. 
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FG: A similar question but put in terms of truth rather than 
ontology. A stance defended by some recent figures of continental 
realist philosophy, inspired by the work of Alain Badiou, is that we 
need to reconceive the concept of truth as that which by definition 
breaks the boundaries of our current-best knowledge and that 
which introduces radical novelty in our worldview. A wedge must 
be firmly put between knowledge and truth, since the latter will 
have the power to completely rearrange the structure of the former. 
You think that a verification-transcendent conception of truth is 
a cardinal pillar of the realist position, and that true assertions 
have truth-makers which are independent of our current opinion 
(or lack thereof) about them and that we shouldn’t be shackled 
by the epistemic criteria of warranted assertability or trapped 
in our linguistic horizon. Yet I suspect you would be cautious of 
claiming that new truths can be discovered through purely ratio-
nal, logico-deductive means rather than by ampliative inference 
grounded on empirical observations. Do you consider it possible 
for our truth-tracking enterprises to go, to use Graham Priest’s 
formula, “beyond the limits of thought,”34 to those boundaries 
that cannot be crossed, and yet are crossed? And do you consider 
the total set of truth-makers in the universe (the known and the 
unknown existents) to be a closed totality that doesn”t allow for 
novelty? Or is this, once again, a meta-scientific question that the 
empirically-minded realist can refuse to answer? 
SP: As I noted above, I take a non-epistemic conception of truth 
to be an essential realist commitment because this is the best 
way to capture the standard realist assertion that the world is 
mind-independent. Traditionally, the opponents of realism 
(idealism and phenomenalism) expressed their antagonism 
to realism by claiming that there is only mental stuff in the 
world. So the realist declaration of independence might be 
seen as a commitment to the view that there is material stuff 
in the world and, in particular, that the entities posited by sci-
entific theories are non-mental (material). I do not think this 




is a useful way to think of the realism issue any more. There 
is an anti-realist tradition which argues for something more 
complicated and interesting. It centres on the conditions that 
must be in place for legitimate commitment to the existence 
of whatever entities are said to make up the world. According 
to this long anti-realist philosophical tradition, it makes no 
sense to be committed to the existence (or reality) of some 
entities unless this commitment is understood as implying 
(and being predicated on) the fulfilment of certain epistemic/
conceptual conditions, the most popular of which is Michael 
Dummett’s warranted assertibility. Very much like realism, this 
tradition opposes idealism and phenomenalism. But it does 
render the world (or a set of entities) mind-dependent, albeit 
in a subtler sense: it forges a logical-conceptual link between 
what there is in the world and what is licensed as existing on 
the basis of the satisfaction of suitable epistemic conditions; 
hence, this kind of anti-realism renders what there is (what-
ever kind of stuff it may consist in) exhaustible by what can 
be known in principle (verified, warrantedly asserted and the 
like) to exist. Opposing this kind of mind-dependence, the 
realist claim of mind-independence should be understood 
as logical or conceptual independence: what the world is like 
does not logically or conceptually depend on the epistemic 
means and conceptualisations used to get to know it. 
As I stressed above, this commits realism to the possibility 
of a divergence between what there is in the world and what 
is licensed as existing by a suitable set of conceptualisations 
and epistemic conditions. Modern anti-realism (let’s call 
it verificationist anti-realism) precludes (a priori) this pos-
sibility of divergence by adopting an epistemic conception 
of truth. What, ultimately, is at stake in the scientific realism 
debate is a robust sense of objectivity, according to which the 
world as it is independently of our changing and evolving 
conceptualisations of it is the final arbiter of their correct-
ness. Verificationist anti-realism cannot, however, dissociate 
objectivity completely from the obtaining of some or other 
(however idealised and inter-subjective) epistemic condition. 
The result is that the final arbiter of the correctness of our 
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conceptualisations is not the world but the fact, if it is a fact, 
that some but not other conceptualisations satisfy certain 
epistemic conditions and therefore are licensed by them. 
Some care is needed here, however. The claim that truth is 
evidence-transcendent is a claim about the nature of truth; 
a claim about what makes a truth true. It is not an epistemic 
claim about the knowledge of truth; it does not lead to scep-
ticism (though it does leave its possibility open). Attaining 
truth very much depends on our truth-tracking methods and 
their reliability. These are ampliative and hence defeasible. 
Their success requires epistemic luck, but it is not due to luck; 
it requires (and gives us evidence for) a co-operative world. 
I would certainly not contrast truth to knowledge. Truth 
is required for knowledge, but there may well be unknown 
truths. Whatever else it is, truth is something that has no 
expiry date. Unlike dairy products, truth cannot go off. If a 
belief is true now, it is true atemporally: it has been true in the 
past and will stay true in the future. In this sense, truth can-
not be equated with acceptance or kindred epistemic notions. 
Nor can it be equated with what communities or individuals 
agree on, or with what the present evidence licences. If we 
made these equations, truth would not be a stable property 
of beliefs. It could come and go all too easily. Besides, if we 
made these equations, we would end up with a thoroughly 
relativised conception of truth. But relativism about truth, 
viz., the claim that truth ascriptions are always relative to a 
person or a community, is ugly and self-refuting, anyway. Even 
those who think that truth is, ultimately, an evaluative concept, 
have to think of the norms that govern its use as objective (or 
ideal). Similarly for knowledge. Knowledge is not something 
than can be lost in the sense that something can be known 
now but not known tomorrow. Sometimes we use the term 
“knowledge” colloquially, equating it with whatever we have 
evidence to accept or whatever we believe today. Then we say 
that our knowledge of the world has changed; or that what it 
was known in the past is considered false today. This is loose 
(and incorrect) talk. Once possessed, knowledge is not lost. 
Speculations III
418
(Clearly, knowledge can be “lost” in the unproblematic sense 
that some kind of truth that was known in the past has not 
survived in what is known today.) So truth and knowledge 
are intimately connected. There is simply no guarantee that 
all truths are knowable; and in any case, realism allows for 
the possibility that there are unknowable truths. Suppose that, 
as a matter of fact, all truths are knowable and that there is 
a coincidence between whatever is licensed by an epistemi-
cally right theory of the world (that is, a theory that satisfies 
certain epistemic conditions) and what really exists in the 
world. This need not compromise the realist commitment 
to the mind-independence of the world. Nor, of course, does 
it commit realism to an epistemic account of truth. All the 
realist needs to claim is that there is a certain direction of 
fit or order of dependence. This can be made plain by being 
put in terms of a Socratic Euthyphro-type contrast. Suppose 
there is a coincidence between what there is in the world and 
what is licensed as existing by an epistemically right theory 
(that is, a theory that meets certain epistemic conditions). 
Is the world what it is because it is described as thus-and-so 
by an epistemically right theory or is a theory epistemically 
right because the world is the way it is? Scientific realists can 
and should go for the second disjunct, while verificationist 
anti-realism goes, ultimately, for the first. 
I am not quite sure how to understand your request for 
novelty. The world is the totality of what there is; part of 
what there is is known and part of it is (and may remain) 
unknown. If the request for novelty were the request for a 
kind of openness, I would agree. The world is transformed by 
human action (for better or for worse) and not just by human 
action, so new things are brought into existence and other 
cease to exist. Truth-makers come and go. There has been a 
traditional worry about the independence of the world: how 
can it be interfered with (known, manipulated etc.) if it is 
independent of the subject? To this worry I juxtapose another 
one: what worth would the interference have if the world was 
not independent of us?
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FG: But can there be novelty independently from human interfer-
ence? I suppose I’m asking if in your view it makes any sense to 
claim that there is some incompleteness at the ontological, mind-
independent level. This is probably what you would call speculative 
metaphysics, but is there any necessary principle regulating the 
actual totality of all that is the case (the known and the unknown) 
to remain the same, or modally constraining the possible to a lim-
ited set of configurations? I am hinting here towards worldviews 
that admit (or require) some form of ontological contingency. You 
mentioned Émile Boutroux, who, in his The Contingency of the 
Laws of Nature,35 defended the thesis that modern science, in its 
reliance on fixed laws of nature, offers only a partial understanding 
of the universe, that limited part where stability reigns, since the 
latter is really governed by a “principle of creation” and “perme-
ated by contingency.”36 Similar arguments were offered by other 
philosophers and scientists after him, including at least C.S. Pierce, 
A.N. Whitehead, and J.A. Wheeler. These theses are often (certainly 
in Boutroux’s case) motivated by theological/spiritualist leanings, 
and yet today it is not uncommon, in “continental” circles, to see 
“contingency” defended as a secular notion, indeed a radicaliza-
tion of “Hume’s problem” which rejects any metaphysical necessity, 
ontological unity and universal laws (but I suppose we could at 
least tangentially include someone like Nancy Cartwright’s work 
in this trend).37 Is this idea of contingency and ontological novelty 
something that, from your own Humean perspective, cannot be 
excluded or does it undermine the reliability of scientific knowledge 
in a way that forces us to discard it? To phrase it differently, how 
far is your Humean “regularities all the way down” from Bas Van 
Fraassen’s claims that “[t]here are no necessary connections in na-
ture, no laws of nature, no real natural bounds on possibility” and 
35 Émile Boutroux, The Contingency of the Laws of Nature (Chicago and Lon-
don: Open Court, 1920)
36 Ibid., 160.
37 See Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 




that “[r]eally, nothing is necessary, and everything is possible”?38 
Can one be a realist rejecting any natural necessity?
SP: I agree that contingency should be defended as a secular 
notion and part of the reason for my adherence to it is that 
I believe there is no external (super-natural) law-maker and 
law-giver. But this does not mean there are no laws! I defend the 
view that laws are a species of regularity and I deny the claim 
that there are regularity-enforcers of a distinct metaphysical 
kind. I have commented on this issue in a previous answer, 
so what I want to add here is that denying the existence of 
enforcers (metaphysical entailment; universals; powers) does 
not imply that anything goes! It does not imply that there are 
no non-trivial actual relations between the regularities there 
are in the world; that there are no actual objective relations of 
similarity and difference in the objects in the world. Denying 
the existence of enforcers implies that these relations are not 
metaphysically necessary; they do not have a grounding in 
metaphyisically distinct layers of facts. Those philosophers 
who think that laws are contingent necessitating relations 
among universals (David Armstrong, Michael Tooley and Fred 
Dretske) are right in claiming contingency, but I think we do 
not have a clue as to what exactly this necessitating relation is; 
hence it is an extra burden in our attempt to understand the 
presence of regularity in nature. But the price of metaphysi-
cal necessity is even heavier, especially if it’s taken together 
with the currently very popular dispositional essentialism 
(and power realism). On this view, it is not clear any more 
whether there are laws! They are either summaries of the 
potencies of related powers or nothing at all. Worst, there 
can be all the power in the world and nothing happening 
in it. I have recently tried to do some work on the notion of 
pattern, in order to explain the presence of regularity and 
to differentiate laws from accidentally true generalisations. 
38 Bas Van Fraassen in Jan Hilgevoord, Physics and Our View of the World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 124.
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My views have not matured yet (I must say it is really hard 
to do any serious philosophical thinking under the present 
situation in Greece). But in broad outline the idea is that a 
pattern is a repeatable and recurring network of differences 
and similarities among entities and that those regularities 
are laws that are characterised by the unity of a (natural) pat-
tern. Patterns seem to have the following advantages: a) they 
can be characterised in terms of their naturalness; b) they 
may occur within other patterns; hence they may form net-
works and c) there need not be a pattern-enforcer (of distinct 
metaphysical type). I do hope that when this work matures it 
will show how there are non-trivial actual relations between 
the regularities there are in the world and hence that the 
contingency of the laws of nature is far from being a threat 
to the objectivity of scientific knowledge. This commitment 
to necessity in nature is, to paraphrase Elizabeth Anscombe, 
the dogmatic slumbers of the day. 
FG: Whatever the details and the arguments employed to defend 
one’s position, what is at stake in being a realist? Both positivists 
and postmodernists coated their (differently motivated) rejection 
of realism with ethical concerns. As we’ve seen, Bas Van Fraassen—
arguably the most prominent critic of scientific realism today—still 
argues along these lines when he claims that metaphysical realists 
are deluding themselves, guided by a naïve metaphysical reassurance 
given by “deep” explanations going beyond the phenomenal surface, 
and presents his own “empirical stance” as the only intellectually 
responsible, truly “disenchanted” one to assume.39 On the other 
hand, a number of philosophers have defended realism precisely 
against the moral dangers of a reduction of reality to opinion (be 
it individual or collective, be it about scientific entities or political 
events)—Richard Boyd, for example was equally engaged in the 
defence of both scientific and moral realism, while Christopher 
Norris has attacked the postmodern suspension of belief in reality 
in the wake of very real events like the first Gulf War. Today, think-
39 See Ibid., and Bas Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2002).
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ers within the continental tradition are mobilizing continental 
sources (from Hegel to Lacan, from Deleuze to Derrida) to build 
more or less direct bridges between a renewed materialism and 
leftist emancipatory politics (Slavoj Žižek probably being the most 
prominent figure). Are there ethico-political grounds on which you 
embrace and defend your realist stance?
SP: This takes us back to the first question. Of course there 
are ethico-political grounds for realism (at least the kind of 
realism I want to defend). To be a realist, in my book, is to 
occupy a certain standpoint according to which there are 
objective criteria of rightness and wrongness and external 
facts-of-matter as to what is right to believe and what not. This, 
to be sure, is an external constraint on our belief systems 
and in very many typical cases, we might not be able to say 
or warrantedly assert that we know these external facts-of-
the-matter or the grounds of objectivity in judgement. This 
predicament—the human predicament—does not invalidate 
the role (sometimes, the regulative role) of this standpoint. 
The realist standpoint and its commitment to objectivity need 
not (and should not) be confused with a claim that there is 
a royal road to truth and that some already possess it. Well, 
science is the best road we have invented so far and we should 
be quite confident that it tends to lead to truths (though not 
to the whole truth and nothing but the truth)! But even there, 
truth emerges from theoretical pluralism, failed theories and 
defeasible methods. In my mind, the realist standpoint makes 
possible the battle against relativism. Relativism should not 
be confused with pluralism and open-mindedness. It is as 
ugly as its opposite: authoritarianism. It’s hard to see how 
relativism can be avoided without having external standards 
of objectivity and rightness. It’s even harder to think how one 
can oppose oppression and war and injustice without taking 
an anti-relativist stance. I cannot go into this now, but a robust 
realist stance in ethics and society (one that takes it that an 
underlying social reality grounds social appearances and 
that ethical conduct has an objective—though not necessarily 
abstract and ideal—ground) can help human emancipation. 
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The realist standpoint need not be associated with the 
impossible view from nowhere. Representation is always 
perspectival, but the represented is not. In fact, it can emerge 
as the invariant element in various representations. Nor 
should we confuse the lack of certainty in knowledge with the 
lack of objectivity of our knowledge of the world. Objectivity 
without certainty is possible! 
FG: That’s a slogan to keep in mind! So, to conclude, I would like 
to ask you about the repercussions on academia of the current eco-
nomic situation in Greece. Are you encountering problems when it 
comes to funding for students or for the organization of academic 
events? Is the country losing a generation of scholars, emigrating 
elsewhere in the hope of finding more promising prospects for 
an employment? Have you or your colleagues considered moving 
abroad after the radical cuts to the salary of academic staff?
SP: Greece is in a terrible mess currently and will be like 
this for quite a while. The causes of the crisis is a matter 
of dispute (there is, broadly, a right-wing and a left-wing 
account of them), but the working people of Greece—who 
have heavily suffered from the unprecedented wave of aus-
terity—are not among the causes. We are living through the 
dismantling of welfare state in Greece—a state that was built 
slowly but steadily (and not without deep structural problems 
and deficiencies) after the collapse of the military junta in 
1974 and especially in the early 1980s. Deep and persistent 
recession; rising unemployment (dangerously high among 
the youth); more than 30% reduction of the annual income 
of civil servants and most other employees (including the 
University teachers); slashing of all pensions and benefits; 
high prices and mounting inflation; one capital tax piling 
upon another; disappearance of state investments; slashing 
of the budgets of hospitals, schools, universities, the police… 
This is Greece nowadays. And on top of it, there is a growing 
recognition of the obvious: that the recipe prescribed by the 
imf (taken from its outdated rulebook) for getting Greece 
back on track was simply disastrous; a non-starter. After two 
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years of ruthless policies that were supposed to take Greece 
out of the zone of bankruptcy (predicated on the thought 
that the welfare state is too costly to maintain and that an 
internal devaluation of “human capital” would make Greece 
competitive), Greece is still on the brink of default—things 
have gone worse; almost out of control. But the fiscal deficit 
(and the crazy policy of diminishing it whilst economy is 
in massive contraction) is the tip of the iceberg; the social 
deficit that the relentless austerity has created is far more 
serious and dangerous. There is an increasing number of 
dispossessed and disaffected especially in the big cities; there 
are families with no parent in employment; there is a rise in 
crime and violence; even in the number of suicides. Poverty 
and desolation are visible in the streets and the neighbour-
hoods of Athens. A whole generation will be lost. There is a 
democratic deficit too, which puts the role of the democratic 
institutions at stake; but this is a different (and ugly) story. 
And as if all this was not enough, the previous government 
decided to reform the universities, passing a bill which will 
render them less democratic and more authoritarian insti-
tutions. The new ideology of “excellence” is implemented 
from above and in an environment in which austerity and 
cutbacks have almost brought the universities to their knees. 
Disintegrating infrastructure is left to its own devices. Re-
search funds have become scarce. Research grants that have 
been awarded after a national competition (one of them to 
my group; the only one in philosophy, I must say) have been 
frozen and are drowning in a wave of delays and redtape. More 
than 800 junior members of staff that have been elected in 
university positions were on the waiting list to be officially 
appointed; 300 of them were appointed recently after an 
almost three-year wait, but the prospects for the remaining 
500 are not good. An increasing number of students have to 
look for some kind of part-time job to support themselves. 
The really sad thing is that the Greek universities are on the 
brink of stagnation—Greece’s intellectual capital will be 
wasted. It’s not uncommon that academics or PhDs look for 
employment abroad; the prospects of intellectual flourishing 
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in Greece are dim. 
My colleagues and I took pride in that, in precisely this 
atmosphere, we successfully organized in October 2011 in 
Athens the third conference of the European Philosophy of 
Science Association. It was an act of intellectual defiance and 
we were deeply moved by the determination of philosophers 
of science to come to Athens for the conference, despite the 
fact that a strike of the air-traffic controllers hit Greece on 
the first day of the conference. My feeling—call me a pes-
simist—is that Greece won’t make it in the end; really dark 
days lie ahead of us. The Greek academics (and philosophers 
in particular) who have contributed to the advancement and 
the rising international standing of the Greek universities 
have an intellectual obligation to resist all this; to make 
values prominent and to show that human beings and their 
prosperity are above profits.
FG: Thanks a lot for your time, I believe that we covered quite a lot 
of material and readers of the journal will surely enjoy our conver-
sation. As a parting gift, could you just whet our appetite with a 
quick description of the book you are working on at the moment? 
I believe you are preparing something on empiricism, trying to 
rediscover a certain line of realism-friendly thinkers from within 
the Logical Positivist movement—is that correct?
SP: Yes, I want to reclaim a tradition within empiricism which 
took it that the critique of metaphysics should leave intact 
the world as this is described by science; a world populated 
by atoms, and fields and dna molecules, but also by natural 
kinds and social classes. If time and energy permit, I want to 
write a book about the history of the philosophy of science 
in the twentieth century focusing on the transition from 
views that allowed a priori principles to play a role in the 
constitution of the object of scientific knowledge to more 
naturalistic views. 
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the democracy of objects is Levi Bryant’s first full-blown mono-graph since enlisting in the 
ranks of the recent philosophical movement known as Object 
Oriented Philosophy (oop). It offers an outline of what is a 
broadly novel metaphysical system which, following the work 
of Graham Harman, describes a reality composed of objects 
all throughout, and nothing besides. Seeking to displace the 
primacy of the relation between the human and the world, 
oop follows the basic intuitions of Quentin Meillassoux’s 
work in proposing an alternative to idealist and correlationist 
philosophies, in the arduous process of stepping out of the 
post-Kantian shadow of critique, wherein Continental theory 
and thought is said to have circularly roamed, imprisoned, 
for the past few centuries.1 However, unlike some of its fel-
low Continental realists, oop’s approach for overcoming the 
putative force of the “circle of correlation” is to adopt a de-
flationary strategy, in which the question about how humans 
access the world is construed as being just one more relation 
1 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Con-
tinuum, 2006). 
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between objects in a metaphysical account. In that regard oop 
is not entirely new, in that it remains continuous with the 
trivialization of epistemology sought by many Continental 
thinkers during the 20th Century, promoting rather the 
restitution of the primacy of ontological questioning, i.e. the 
kind of radicalization of the critique of metaphysics of which 
Heidegger, Deleuze, and more recently Badiou, are perhaps 
the tradition’s most emblematic figures. However, rather 
than exacerbating the epistemological question of access to 
the point where strict epistemology becomes displaced in 
favor of an examination of its linguistic, historical, or socio-
cultural conditions, oop proposes to dislodge philosophy 
from its human cohort altogether, the better to rehabilitate 
an exploration of “the great outdoors” philosophy had sown 
shut in favor of critique, making the world relative to our 
own faculties in some form or other. 
In what follows, I concentrate on evaluating Bryant’s proposal 
for a new metaphysics from two perspectives. First, I present 
and evaluate Bryant’s case for the methodological primacy of 
ontology over epistemology, which is chiefly indebted to 
the work of Roy Bhaskar, and which is the focus of the first 
chapter of the book. In doing so I seek to isolate the core 
motivations for the prospect of a metaphysics of objects that 
is supposed to be propadeutic to any kind of epistemological 
enquiry. In that regard, it is important to notice that however 
“exhausted” the problematic of access is taken to be for Oop, 
this shouldn’t dissuade us from questioning whether the 
displacement of epistemology is in fact tenable, and whether 
such exhaustion has in fact taken place. For even if critical 
philosophy succeeded in tightening the correlationist leash 
and casting an unforeseen anthropocentric myopia, one might 
insist that such a predicament follows from the philosophi-
cal difficulties that the injunction to proscribe any principled 
harmony between thought and reality bestow upon thought: 
thought is not guaranteed access to being, just as being can-
not be straightforwardly described without first clarifying on 
what grounds one is entitled to provide such a description. If 
thought is potentially refractory to being, and if the former’s 
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access to the latter is not to be construed in epistemological 
terms, but rather in metaphysical ones, then we will surely 
still need a story about how to resolve the critical quandary 
of the relation between thought and reality, in the process of 
legitimating the purchase that our theories might bear on the 
world they are allegedly in a position to tell us about. The first 
section will thus allow us to see the main thrust behind Bry-
ant’s oop and his case for a new metaphysics. I shall suggest 
that the case against the primacy of epistemology, inspired 
principally by Bhaskar, is insufficient to motivate the kind 
of metaphysics that Bryant admirably defends, in failing 
to dissolve the primacy of representation in favor of practice.
Second, I propose to examine the internal conceptual coher-
ency of Bryant’s metaphysical system, and his multifaceted 
account of objects. This is of course the core of his project, 
and constitutes a remarkable attempt to draw insights from 
various disciplines, not restricted to philosophy: Bruno La-
tour’s theory of collectives and actants, a Deleuzean-inspired 
metaphysics of the virtual, Niklas Luhmann’s autopoietic 
systems theory, Lacanian psychoanalysis, just to name a few. 
We shall briefly consider how this varied assortment of 
theoretical frameworks comes to bear within Bryant’s sys-
tem, by evaluating their articulation. For reasons of space, 
our analysis shall be restricted to assessing what I take to be 
the main theses in Bryant’s ontology of objects: the twofold 
structure of substance as virtual and actual, the complex ac-
count of withdrawal which affects all objects, the account of 
relation inspired by autopoietic-systems theory, and the de-
fense of a “flat” ontology which purports to make all objects 
as being finally in the same metaphysical footing, without 
compromising their difference. 
Given that Bryant’s account is rich and filled to the brim with 
content, I set myself the task to open up a space for discussing 
the more salient features of his overall system, rather than 
to seek an exhaustive delineation of the virtues and flaws in 
his philosophy, or to evaluate in rigorous fashion the justice 
he does to the theories that inspire his account. Thus, I shall 
obviate, at present, many intriguing attempts throughout the 
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book to apply his major ontological insights in the form of 
varied examinations of psychoanalytic, political, and social 
situations. These are all valuable facets of Bryant’s project, and 
merit consideration in themselves, which I reserve perhaps 
for a future occasion. In the end, this precautionary paucity 
is strategic, since the plausibility of oop as proposed by Bry-
ant cannot but supervene on how the methodological and 
metaphysical theses hang together; and so without further 
ado I propose to focus on these.
I - Methodological Quandaries
Epistemology or Ontology, Representation or Practice?
At the outset of the book, Bryant sets the itinerary for an auda-
cious challenge to the ubiquity of post-Kantian “philosophies of 
access,” which purport to examine the relation between mind 
and world, as opposed to the structure of world as such.2 This 
tradition, we are told, has somewhat uniformly maintained 
that the category of the object ought to be thought of as being 
correlative to that of the subject, and so that a philosophical 
examination of former must be in principle understood as 
pertaining to something which is in relation to the latter. In 
short, they constitute what Bryant calls epistemological realisms 
(er).3 The core feature that Bryant seeks to isolate from every 
iteration of er is the latter’s characterization of the relation 
between subject and object as being one of representational 
nature, i.e. the subject stands to the object as representing agency 
stands to represented content. This representational link is 
to be understood in the sense in which the intentionality of 
thoughts, mental states, signifiers or propositions are sup-
posed to “mirror” states of affairs wherein objects are poten-
tially known, making thus all object-related content relative 
2 For an account of the expression “philosophies of access,” see Graham 
Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2005).




to the faculties and powers of the subject.4 We should note 
that the reference to “mirroring,” which obviously brings to 
mind Rorty’s famous moniker for certain brands of analytic 
epistemology, strongly suggests that Bryant understands er 
as involving a correspondence theory of truth and meaning, 
where objects take place as arguments in the representation 
of semantically determinate facts. The result is that for er “...
the question of the object becomes a question about whether 
or not we adequately represent the object.”5 
In contrast, Bryant proposes an ontological realism (or), where 
the task becomes to describe the being of objects themselves, 
as opposed to their being in relation to us. Whereas er can-
not but subordinate the being of the object to its relation 
to the human knowing subject, quickly paving the way for 
the anti-realist evisceration of all exteriority, or purports to 
access the structural features of objects and their relations, 
which include, albeit not exclusively nor especially, the hu-
man. Bryant wittily calls his system an onticology, obviously 
playing on the Heideggerean ontological difference between 
beings and being.6 The term indexes the key maneuver in 
oop through which philosophy is to be delivered back to 
the task of providing an inventory of the items and features 
that populate a multifaceted reality and their objectual, 
general structure, thereby folding the ontological back into 
the ontic. In that regard, oop is a “revisionary Aristotelian” 
position, insofar as it thinks of the explanatory primacy of 
metaphysics, within the scope of an account of substances 
qua objects, as first philosophy. Indeed, the “return to Aris-
totle” is one of the motifs that Harman himself has set for 
oop in general in its reactivation of the category of substance 
understood as autonomous, discretely individuated entities, 
that exist independently of the relations they might have to 
other substances. 
4 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 14-15
5 Ibid., 14. 
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (San Francisco: Harper, 1962).
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We should underline that Bryant does not mean to say that 
the relationship between humans and the world has no bear-
ing for oop, but merely that subject-object relations are to be 
construed as a species of object-object relations. Having said 
this, let us note that although er is characterized by Bryant 
as being a kind of realism, the more subtle point is that it 
paves the way for an anti-realism about objects, where the 
ontological determinacy and constitution of the latter are 
rendered dependent on the subject’s faculties/operations, 
however broadly understood. Thus, while er is still a realism, 
it is one only in the sense that it acknowledges the reality of 
relations between subject and object in some form or other, 
since it already shuns from the philosophical imaginary the 
possibility of thinking of objects independently of anthropo-
centric determinants. In that regard, Bryant’s oop is in perfect 
continuity with both the deflationary position endorsed by 
Harman, insofar as they both seek to supplant the centrality 
of the human in order to “flatten” the latter into the category 
of object and with Meillassoux’s own diagnosis against the 
correlationist reification of relation as displacing the (clas-
sical) realist avowal of the in-itself.
At this juncture, several questions appear urgent: are there 
no further alternatives besides er, anti-realisms, and or? Is 
the construal of er as tethered to a correspondence-theory 
a fair characterization of those who insist on the priority 
of epistemology and the primacy of representation? Why 
should we choose in favor of or and the displacement of 
epistemology, and particularly the version that Bryant’s oop 
advances, over its alternatives? In what follows I assess some 
of Bryant’s arguments in response to the questions suggested 
above, and argue that the cogency of these answers conditions 
the feasibility of his onticological program. 
The first crucial issue concerns the motivations for the 
choice in favor of or over er. To make his case, Bryant fol-
lows George Spencer-Brown in order to qualify the difference 
between metaphysical and epistemological realisms, through 
the difference between distinction and indication.7 The latter 
7 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 20.
Speculations III
432
is said to presuppose the former, i.e. in order to be able to 
indicate anything whatsoever, we must begin by making a 
prior distinction which separates that which can be located 
and differentiated within a given domain from that which 
the distinction leaves out altogether. Once we make use of 
a distinction, we can only indicate that which is within its 
demarcating space, while the primary distinction itself is 
rendered invisible to those who use it. Yet, since every indica-
tion presupposes that a distinction has already been made, the 
interesting question becomes the one about which distinctions 
ought to be made, and on which basis. The main point that Bry-
ant seeks to draw from this is that er and anti-realisms begin 
by distinguishing within their internal domain that which is 
determined by subjective or cultural operations, with the 
result that the “great outdoors” wherein non-human objects 
abound is excluded from taking part as the domain’s proper 
content. Thus, every posterior indication performed within 
the space of er or anti-realism will enforce seclusion within 
the cohorts of the human or the cultural, and their manifold 
contents: ideas, representations, signifiers, sensations, etc. 
These denominations are supposed to be broad enough to 
cover the emphasis on epistemology and propositional analy-
sis motivated by the linguistic turn in the analytic tradition, 
as well as the exacerbation of the critical turn carried out by 
the Continental tradition which, despite its manifold claims 
against epistemology, ends up reinforcing the priority of the 
human. The alternative that Bryant proposes is to begin rather 
by marking objects as the distinguished domain within which 
every posterior indication will take place, thereby rendering 
human and non-human factors univocally accounted for as 
possible contents for indication. 
Subjects are objects among objects, rather than constant 
points of reference related to all other objects. As a consequence, 
we get the beginnings of what a proper anti-humanism and 
post-humanism ought to be, insofar as these theoretical orien-
tations are no longer the thesis that the world is constructed 
through annonymous and impersonal social forces rather 
than through an individual subject. Rather, we get a variety 
of nonhuman actants unleashed in the world as autonomous 
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agencies in their own right, freed from any constant reference 
to the human where they are reduced to our representations.8
Bryant argues that whereas er is forced into the enclosure 
of the subjective, since it concerns itself with how propositions 
relate to facts in the enterprise acquiring knowledge, oop 
factors in non-human entities by thinking of the production 
of knowledge. By the same token, anti-realisms cannot but 
concern themselves with exclusively human factors and 
properties, such as signifiers or ideal contents, since they 
have proscribed the possibility of thinking robustly of any 
externality, rendering material production and knowledge 
entirely subservient to the straightjacket of the human. The 
suggestion then seems to be that if we want to account for 
our relation to non-human factors in the production of 
knowledge, as well as for the relation between non-human 
objects themselves, we cannot endorse er or anti-realism. 
Now, it is a truism to say that in order to be realists and so 
to endorse the mind-independence of a world we cannot be 
anti-realists; that can hardly be an argument for a realism of 
any kind. Rather, the motivation for realism would have to 
come from considering what allegedly anti-realism leaves out. 
And the idea is that anti-realism prevents us from thinking 
about how entities that are ontologically independent from 
each other interact and play a part in the production of new 
beings, forms and events, and not just exclusively for the 
acquisition of human knowledge which er emphasizes. In 
that regard, Bryant is surely correct in suggesting that inso-
far as anti-realisms cannot but subordinate the ontological 
valence of non-human factors to the human, their capacity 
to explain interactions as involving entities that are wholly 
autonomous to the human is necessarily shut. 
The more difficult question comes however with regard 
to er. For it is far from clear that representational accounts 
that try to explain how we understand the world in terms of 
propositional content are in principle incapable of accounting 
for such things as non-human factors, the relations between 
8 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 22-23. 
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humans and other non-human factors, the relations between 
non-human factors themselves, or the experimental conditions 
under which knowledge is produced and not just acquired. For 
although accounts which favor some kind of correspondence 
theory, if successful, ought to describe how the properties and 
existence of beings in the world is within our cognitive and 
linguistic grasp, this does not seem in principle to rule out the 
possibility of giving an ontology for the world thus accessed. 
Indeed, many proponents of the analytic philosophical tradi-
tion, which could be characterized as endorsing a form of er 
by Bryant’s own lights, actively defend various metaphysical 
accounts. It is therefore unlikely that a methodological primacy 
or autonomy reserved for epistemology should in principle 
destine thought towards the “death of ontology,” as Bryant 
calls it.9 Notwithstanding the fact that much epistemology 
in recent decades has thoroughly rejected representational 
models tethered to correspondence-theories, it is not even 
clear that approaches that defend the latter must result in the 
anthropocentrism that Bryant deems inescapable.
The implicit worry seems to be that if we concentrate on the 
semantic properties of propositions we are bound to remain 
caught in talk about language. As Bryant claims: 
Were the world the totality of true propositions or constructed by lan-
guage, this activity would be most peculiar indeed as there would be 
no unknown generative mechanisms to uncover in the experimental 
setting. In other words, the intelligibility of experimental practice is 
premised on the ontological supposition of generative mechanisms or 
objects independent of that activity.10
However, we must note, that this is to confuse sentences and 
propositions: the former are linguistic items and are fun-
damental in explaining how human communication and 
sapient thought takes place, while the latter provide a logical 
grammar for the formal structure of thoughts and the states of 
9 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 34.
10 Ibid., 50.
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affairs represented thereby. The link between the two is to be 
construed in terms of how propositions relate the declarative 
force of sentences.
Yet the propositional content or “descriptive content” as-
sociated with a sentence or a linguistic item need not be 
constrained to human entities in principle, or indeed to 
the properties of linguistic items or mental states; certainly 
not any more than Bryant’s own roster of theoretical claims 
must be about linguistic items simply because they take the 
form of expressions in English.11 To say that propositional or 
descriptive content is taken to be “correlative” to whatever 
can be asserted through the use of declarative sentences (clas-
sically, those expressions which complete that-clauses) is just 
to say that sentences are usually taken to express some state-
of-affairs in the world which can be formalized by a proposi-
tion, and not that sentences are about propositions, or that 
propositions are about sentences.12 And it is certainly not to 
say that the subjects and predicates, entities and properties, 
as expressed in propositional or sentential form, must be 
ontologically indistinguishable from their expressions. To 
claim otherwise would be to incur in an instance of Stove’s 
Gem: the fallacy that seeks to derive from a) the tautological 
epistemic dependence of any knowledge to our capacities to 
know, b) the ontological dependence of that which knowledge 
is supposed to be about such capacities/faculties. In other 
words, the metaphysical status of propositional content is 
quite controversial, and cannot be straightforwardly identi-
fied with mental or linguistic entities.
11 The term “descriptive content” is Sellars’ own coinage to isolate the non-
conceptual element of experience, in which the knower becomes tethered 
to causal processes, in relation to its surrounding environment. See Wilfrid 
Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1997).
12 It is important to notice that although Bryant wants to emphasize the 
importance of knowing-how over knowing-that, or practice over theorizing, 
it still becomes necessary to account for the former within any framework 
that presumes to disambiguate between the claims one makes and the things 
the claims are supposed to be about. This concern is hardly palliated by ap-
peals to the priority of human practice.
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In short, propositional analysis is not linguistics or psychol-
ogy, and propositions with mental content are not in principle 
proscribed from relating to a mind-independent world. Even 
inferentialist approaches to philosophical semantics which 
do away with ontology, constraining meaning to inferential-
role and truth to that which is preserved by inference, are not 
for this reason incapable of pursuing realism in an analysis 
of objectual evaluability, i.e. semantic holism does not entail 
idealism.13 In general, to insist in that propositional contents 
are representational in any case is simply to say that such con-
tent is to be understood as formally expressing states of affairs 
which compose the world, i.e. we must understand questions 
about the nature of intentional content and the precise ways 
in which features of the world are cognized by isolating the 
formal structure of such features. But what kinds of relations 
and items we offer as candidates for representational contents 
and how semantic value is determined is highly disputed 
within epistemological schools, and here usually questions 
proper to ontology come to bear as well.14 Since Bryant surely 
thinks that our thoughts of things are not themselves the things 
that are thought, and that we can think about things which 
are not for this reason ontologically dependent on thought, the 
idea that the contents of propositions must be restricted to 
human-relative items or else make everything ontologically 
dependent on the human strikes me as rather odd. If all it 
takes for an account to become representational is the belief 
that one’s claims stand in some sort of relation or other to 
13 For an excellent debate on whether inferentialism can support robust 
representationalism in terms of objectual evaluability see the exchange be-
tween Robert Brandom and Michael Kramer in Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy 
Wanderer, Reading Brandom: On Making it Explicit (New York: Routledge, 2010)
14 In particular, contemporary naturalisms have yielded light into the 
difficulties involving the task of understanding representation: computa-
tionalism, eliminativism, ontic structural realism, and instrumentalism all 
being examples of this sort. It would therefore be extremely misleading and 
oversimplifying to say that contemporary epistemology seeks to transform 
questions of ontology into its own terms or to dissolve ontology altogether; 
the porous frontier between epistemology and ontology, our understanding 
of the structure of thought and reason and the structure of the world, is one 
of perpetual negotiation and which must be understood carefully. 
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the things they purport to describe, whether these be mind-
dependent or not, then even Bryant’s account would have to 
be deemed implicitly representational in claiming to provide 
a suitable account of the metaphysical structure of reality. 
But the more worrying gesture seems to be the implicit ban 
on explanatory necessity: what Bryant finds reproachable about 
er is not that its proponents hold that thought and claims 
can potentially stand in some relation or other to the world, 
but the demand that one ought to explain what this relation 
consists in order to legitimate one’s metaphysical claims. For 
Bryant’s argument to have the strength it presumes to have 
he would need to show not only that er concerns itself with 
questions of access to the world in virtue of dealing with 
propositions, but that in doing so it elides the possibility of 
a realist metaphysics. Needless to say, such a bold accusation 
would require much further argument to be persuasive for 
anyone looking to see whether the displacement of er is ten-
able. This is, however, precisely the kind of confrontation with 
the tradition that Bryant declares he is able to avoid, arguing 
instead that philosophical progress is not made through the 
successful resolution of arguments following deliberation, 
but rather that what matters in the end is how fashionable 
positions gather sufficient supporters across generations, 
leaving those unresolved dilemmas to whither on the vine:
New innovations in philosophy do not so much refute their opponents 
as simply cease being preoccupied by certain questions and problems. 
In many respects, object-oriented ontology, following the advice of 
Richard Rorty, simply tries to step out of the debate altogether. Object-
oriented ontologists have grown weary of a debate that has gone on 
for over two centuries, believe that the possible variations of these 
positions have exhausted themselves, and want to move on to talking 
about other things. If this is not good enough for the epistemology 
police, we are more than happy to confess our guilt and embrace our 
alleged lack of rigor and continue in harboring our illusions that we 
can speak of a reality independent of humans.15
15 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 29.
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The suggestion made above threatens to compromise the 
rational grounds on which philosophical issues are decided. For 
if “growing weary” of a particular problem, however fastidious, 
is sufficient to obviate it rather than to motivate its urgency, 
then nothing prevents the philosopher to ignore arguments 
presented to them, as opposed to having the rational obliga-
tion to respond to them. Of course, one cannot exhaustively 
“fight off” every possible objection and interlocutor; indeed, 
no philosopher, however worthy of the name, has ever done 
such a thing. But it seems quite tendentious to claim that the 
questions that drive philosophers and research programs 
all around the world are “exhausted” to the point of vacuity 
without further ado. This is particularly grave, considering 
that the characterization Bryant gives of er is meant to be a 
diagnosis of the global state of the discipline, rather than nar-
rowing down a particular school. But epistemological realism 
is unfortunately not precise enough a denomination to cover 
the depth of the field it presumably disqualifies, failing even 
in establishing that one could not achieve the kinds of things 
Bryant expects from a metaphysics unless such a disqualifi-
cation were to take place. Without curbing one’s affirmative 
enthusiasm by policing the extent to which we are deemed 
capable of describing a mind-independent world, one risks 
blurring the line between fiction and philosophy, between 
imaginative freedom and rational obligation. 
However, the more important question is whether the posi-
tive arguments for the primacy of ontology over epistemology 
in fact work, and for this Bryant devotes the entirety of the 
first chapter of the book. This is a particularly important issue, 
because the difference between distinction and indication 
that Bryant draws upon to suggest the prerogative of ontology 
is later in Chapter four characterized by Luhmann as being a 
contingent matter, so that every identity ascribed to beings in 
ontological terms will be grounded in a decision: “Luhmann 
effectively shows how this distinction is contingent such that 
identity is no longer the ground of being, but an effect of a 
distinction that enables observation.”16 Thus, we must ask if 
16 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 139.
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the distinction which decides in favor of objects isn’t finally 
tacitly subordinated to a subjective whim, in which case we 
are either back with anti-realism, or else we must explain why 
such a distinction is in fact not contingent upon voluntarist 
caprice, but suggested on rational grounds. In other words: 
what sets constraints on our capacity to make distinctions 
so that onticology can be something besides an arbitrary 
thought experiment, and without making ontology impos-
sible, like Luhmann claims? 
For these purposes, Bryant takes on the work of Roy Bhaskar’s 
transcendental realism, which is set to provide the “sufficient 
reason” to think of the methodological primacy of ontology.17 
In particular, he suggests that we should extrapolate the onto-
logical aspect from the transcendental argument that Bhaskar 
offers for scientific realism. At core, the argument proceeds 
as follows: rather than imagining what the mind must be like 
for knowledge of the world to be possible, Bhaskar inverts the 
question and asks what the world must be like in order for 
the experimental activity of science to be possible.18 Second, 
given that through experimental activity we learn that objects 
may have qualities or powers which they do not exhibit at 
a given time, we must stipulate that there are such things as 
intransitive objects, i.e. an object is intransitive if and only if 
objects are real structures whose powers may be “out-of-phase” 
with the actual patterns or events that they manifest at a given 
time.19 For Bryant, this constitutes a crucial rejoinder to the 
traditional empiricist argument which relativizes any knowl-
edge of the object to our sensory impressions that obtain in 
actual manifestations. This “empiricist” view quickly leads 
to the Humean consideration that causality is not real, but a 
mere projection illegitimately drawn to support an imaginary 
necessity from what are mere associations between percep-
tual events. The idea is thus that scientific experimentation 
must acknowledge that objects can be intransitive, since if it 





didn’t it would have no reason to suppose that objects have 
causal powers hidden from what they evince at a given time. 
Furthermore, considering that conjunctions of events are 
exceptions rather than rules, experimental practice is tenable 
precisely insofar as it teases the capacities that an object has 
but might not exhibit regularly, through repetition in con-
trolled settings. This will turn out to be a crucial element for 
Bryant’s thesis of withdrawal, i.e. objects always have structural 
features that are not manifested at a given time, but which 
upon repeated testing might become evinced, illuminating 
the object’s nature:
We thus have an ontological distinction between objects or generative 
mechanisms on the one hand, and events, on the other. If experimen-
tal activity is necessary, then this is because generative mechanisms 
can be dormant, inactive, or veiled by the agency of other objects or 
generative mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is generative mechanisms or 
objects that are responsible for the production of events.20
As we shall see below, the distinction between generative 
mechanisms and events is reproduced in an assortment of 
other distinctions from different theoretical sources: virtual 
proper being and actual manifestation (Deleuze), substance 
and qualities (Aristotle), system and information (Maturana, 
Varela, Luhmann), being the main ones as far as I can gauge. 
For the moment, let us note that Bhaskar’s transcendental 
argument is meant to reinforce the necessity of a mind-
independent world not just for scientific practice to be possible, 
but more generally for ontology to get off the ground. In that 
regard, the argument for the existence of physical objects 
is generalized to infer the existence of intransitive objects, 
which for Bryant are not taken to be necessarily of physical 
nature. This is important, since Bhaskar’s argument suggests 
that intransitive objects exist in order for scientific practice 
to be understood; but, accordingly, these objects are meant to 
conform to our understanding of physical phenomena, and 
not just an unqualified domain of objects-in-general. It is 
20 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 48.
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therefore not clear just how far Bryant’s commitment to ma-
terialism can make use of the scientific grounds in Bhaskar’s 
argument to support his more general claims about objects. 
This is not trivial, seeing that Bryant intends to extend the 
distinction between objects and events to argue for the ex-
istence of all kinds of objects, and not only for the physical 
beings whose existence is supported by the transcendental 
argument. Although the latter is meant to give warrant to the 
claim that all existing objects can be out-of-phase with regard 
to their powers, and even assuming that the argument works in 
determining the autonomy of physical phenomena, it surely 
wouldn’t follow from the latter that there are objects outside 
the concern of scientific experimentation that either exist 
or exhibit these same features. We will later see how Bryant 
develops the thesis of withdrawal as being a general feature 
of objects, which are not taken to be by necessity physical. 
The more interesting question is whether Bhaskar’s tran-
scendental argument effectively works to ground a realism 
of any given sort, and here a few provisory observations are 
pertinent. First, it is not clear that pointing to the empiricist 
conflation between causal powers and sensible manifestations 
suffices to establish the existence of causally autonomous 
objects. Rather, what it seems to show is that if objective 
properties are reduced to sense-data, and if causal laws are 
taken to be ontologically relative to such data, then causality is 
either epiphenomenal or epistemically foreclosed. Therefore, 
it suggests that if causal powers exist then these cannot be 
reduced to salient features in sense-data, and so that traditional 
empiricism won’t work to motivate realism. However, the 
argument does not show that other accounts that think of an 
epistemological relation between mind and world reserving 
a role for perception to yeild objective knowledge couldn’t 
successfully avoid the perils of traditional empiricism.
Indeed, revisionist approaches to naturalism have challenged 
sense-datum theories, and not just or exclusively against 
traditional empiricism, by insisting that perception should be 
understood as a thoroughly conceptual achievement proper 
to rational behavior, while sensibility can be given a perfectly 
Speculations III
442
intelligible account as a causal, non-conceptual process nev-
ertheless.21 For these roughly post-Sellarsian accounts, one 
must reject the reification of sense-data or phenomenologi-
cal givenness in their attempt to play the part of ‘presenta-
tionalist’ anchors for representation on experience, i.e. the 
claim that sensibilia present themselves to us immediately, 
and so that we have privileged access. They thus reject that 
representation must be anchored on anything like ‘immedi-
ate experience’, or that acquaintance with sensation by itself 
yields knowledge, and in that regard they follow the Hegelian 
trivialization of givenness or sensible intuition. These, they 
argue, must be deflated in favor of integrating perception a 
formal analysis of the inferential structure of representation 
in its conceptual envelopment. Thus, perceptual judgments are 
to be understood in terms of the distinctive inferential role 
that they play within a conceptual economy (distinctively as 
language-entry transitions) and must be subject to defeasibil-
ity conditions relative to the causal onsets that trigger them, 
in order for them to play the epistemic role they do.22 Blunt 
experience is epistemically mute; conceptual rationality is 
the mark of sapience.
Other externalist approaches, such as Tyler Burge’s (2010), 
suggest that while perception is the most primitive form of 
representation, anchoring the organism’s relation to its envi-
ronment, it does so through (fallible) subpersonal mechanisms 
for objective individuation, which exhibit strict conditions 
for veridicality, i.e. conditions for the success of failure of a 
perceptual faculty in representing its environment.23 Fur-
thermore, “nativist” approaches argue against the exclusive 
21 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. 
22 This is not to claim that all knowledge is necessarily causally acquired by 
means of an inference, or that there cannot be non-inferential knowledge. 
It is simply to say that all knowledge, in order to count as knowledge, must 
be justifiable independently by another proposition(s) on the basis of the 
goodness of the inference from the latter to the former, even if the belief 
thus justified wasn’t formed or acquired through a process of inference.
23 Tyler Burge, The Origins of Objectivity, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010).
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primitiveness of perception and sensation, claiming that 
there are also modular representational states which conform 
to conceptual core-cognitive acquisitions or “triggerings,” 
and which condition the central development of full-blown 
conceptual projection through which learning properly takes 
place.24 Such contemporary models for perception need not 
assume that those representations which enter into modular 
perceptual computations be consciously accessible; they are 
computed through subpersonal mechanisms that require the 
appropriate, causally instantiated environmental triggers.25
Crucially, following Piaget and Quine, nativist approaches 
explicitly challenge traditional empiricism in emphasizing 
that the primitive representation of persisting objects cannot 
be circumscribed to perceptual contents, since the former 
are multimodal while the latter are modally-specific to the 
organism’s sensory-analyzer capacities to register data.26 
Multi-modality is therefore taken as an epistemological 
route to anchor realism, on the basis of what a persistent, 
perception-independent object must be like in order for their 
representations to obtain. All of this to say that the conceptual 
onsets required for the representation of objects are taken to 
be fundamentally distinct from the computations of actual 
sensory outputs, and that only the former require conceptual 
envelopment to some degree. Thus, the instantiation of these 
conceptual capacities must be described causally by relating 
the organism to its environmental stimuli, and indepen-
dently of any appeals to the putative conscious transparency 
of sensible “ideas” that traditional empiricists used in order 
to fold causation inwardly into the “contents” of perception. 
24 For an example of these approaches and an explanation of the modular/
central distinction for representational-state acquisition see Susan Carey, 
The Origins of Concepts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); also Jerry 
Fodor, The Language of Thought (USA: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1975). 
For a more recent account see Jerry Fodor, LOT 2: The Language of Thought 
Revisited, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
25 Carey, The Origins of Concepts, 31. 
26 Indeed, nativist accounts argue that the ontological commitments which 
anchor our capacity to represent objective reality are innate, and triggered 
by brute causal processes as opposed to “learnt.”
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In dispute with these variegated approaches, Burge insists 
that although perceptual representation is pre-conceptual, it 
nevertheless suffices for objectual representation, insisting 
that the latter need not be tethered to multimodality, but that 
anticipatory mechanisms that come with the organism as 
base cognitive functions suffice to do the trick (and indeed, 
such abilities are taken to be present in non-sapient organ-
isms such as insects).27 
In any case, the point here is not to argue whether any of 
these alternatives is better suited for realism, but to point out 
that the suggestion that we’re forced either into an or of the 
sort supported by Bhaskar’s transcendental argument, or else 
faced with the quandaries of traditional empiricism wed to 
the putative “givenness” of sense-data, is a false one. Clearly, 
much work in recent epistemology goes far beyond classical 
empiricism, and it is far from clear how Bhaskar’s arguments 
motivate the ontological prerogative against these alternatives.
The most salient worry is, however, is that the transcenden-
tal argument begs the question about why non-manifestness 
should entail mind-independence. Certainly, one could claim 
that phenomenally individuated particulars bear properties 
that are not, at a given time, manifested or transparently 
available to consciousness. One of Harman’s own frequent 
examples is that of Husserl’s inflection of the phenomenal/
noumenal distinction to phenomenal: the intentional object 
of consciousness retains a unified being irrespective of its 
contingent adumbrations.28 Similarly, for Heidegger, epis-
temic opaqueness is the norm rather than the exception; 
for the most part we deal with the world practically, without 
explicitly construing its contents as having propositionally 
determinate, explicitly salient properties.29 Yet this is not to 
say that such properties are taken to be independent of their 
27 Additionally, Burge construes conceptuality in narrower terms than Carey, 
by taking it to be a distinctive feature of sapient organisms equipped with the 
capacity for linguistic representation. See Tyler Burge, The Origins of Objectivity. 
28 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. 
Fred Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982). 
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 103. 
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mode of apprehension, given that for Heidegger the realm of 
present-at-hand particulars and their properties is taken to 
be a function of the breakdown of ready-to-hand equipment 
in practice, while the latter remains tethered to Dasein’s com-
portments within a correlationally constituted world.30 The 
inference from out-of-phasing to mind-independence seems 
less persuasive once we realize that science can be explained 
on instrumentalist grounds, while accepting out-of-phasing as 
a constitutive feature of the objects proper to empirical study. 
Indeed, the status of causality within contemporary debates 
in the philosophy of science and metaphysics is also highly 
disputed. Proponents of instrumentalist approaches, insist 
in that ontic determinacy is ultimately a matter of pragmatic 
convention, while accepting that experimentation runs on 
the background of non-manifest, non-theorized states, i.e. the 
specificity of the latter can be accounted for without biting 
the realist bullet. These considerations lead me to suggest that 
Bryant’s reading of Bhaskar runs on a very narrow conception 
on what the contents of perceptually triggered mental states 
can be like. More specifically, it seems like Bryant thinks that 
the causal autonomy of objects must follow from the follow-
ing two requirements for perceptual content:
(Luminosity): For any perceptually triggered mental 
state x, I can know that I’m in x. If P(x) 
is true at t1, then I can know that P(x) 
is true at t1.
30 A similar confusion is repeated towards the end of the third chapter where 
Bryant claims that “it is difficult to see how language could ever have the 
power to divide or parcel in the way suggested by the linguistic idealists 
were it not for the fact that the world is itself structured and differenti-
ated. Absent a world that is structured and differentiated, the surface of the 
world, as a sort of formless flux, would be too slippery, too smooth, for the 
signifier to structure at all.” See Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 132. 
Again, it is not clear that differentiation need be mind-independent in 
order to occur, since one can easily hold that it is the realm of appearance 
which is differentiated and split, and which the signifier works upon to 
make its secondary differentiations. The point is not that this would not 
still be correlationism or idealism, for it would clearly be one of the two, 
but that the transcendental argument from Bhaskar does not help assuage 
the possibility of this scenario.
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(Actualism):  For any perceptually triggered mental 
state x at a time t1, there is no property 
P(x) manifest at t1 that is not manifest 
at a later time t2. 
These two theses taken together underlie Bryant’s idea that 
so long as we don’t postulate a mind-independent roster of 
objects we will not be able to explain why an object can fail 
to manifest all of its qualities, i.e. why objects must be intran-
sitive if open-systems obtain. As I suggested above, there is 
no independent argument to support either luminosity or 
actualism about perceptual states, and so the inference from 
epistemic opacity to mind-independence is in my estimation 
not a good one. With this in mind, I conclude that appeals to 
Bhaskar’s transcendental argument to motivate the preroga-
tive of or against er are not adequate. 
Before moving on to assess the composition of Bryant’s 
ontological system, we should make a few cursory remarks on 
his general contentions against correlationism, idealism, and 
the epistemological inflections of contemporary philosophy 
that are offered towards the end of the first chapter. Following 
a brief excursus through the history of correlationism, Bry-
ant goes on to reassert what he takes to be a fatal complicity 
between epistemologically oriented accounts and experiential 
givenness:
Wherever claims about the being of beings are transposed into questions 
about our access to beings, we end up with givenness legislating what 
exists and what doesn’t exist based on what is given or accessible, and 
we thereby find ourselves trapped in a self-defeating self-referential 
paradox where we simultaneously concede the existence of objects 
while denying their existence.
As a consequence, claims about the being of entities are arrived at 
in an entirely different manner than the epistemological question of 
access. We do not begin with our access to beings, but instead ask what 
the world must be like for certain practices to be possible. The object-
oriented ontologist is not claiming that we have access to beings, that 
they are given, or that our perception is identical to the way the world 
is, but that the existence of substance is a necessary premise for a whole 
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slew of our practices to be intelligible. In other words, the onticological 
thesis is that the world must be a particular way for certain practices 
and activities like perception, experimentation, discourse, and so on, to 
be possible and that the world would be this way regardless of whether 
we perceived, experimented, or discoursed about it.”31 
As I have been suggesting above, the complicity between 
perceptual data and givenness is vastly challenged by epis-
temologists everywhere, and cannot be taken seriously as an 
Achilles heel bound to force one into pragmatic contradic-
tions, or to anthropocentric claustrophobia. The claim that 
questions about access are bound to be transformed into 
questions of givenness is therefore a strawman against the 
arguments proposed by those who insist on the methodologi-
cal priority of epistemology, and the viability of grounding 
realism through the latter. 
Granted, to transform questions proper to ontology into 
questions of epistemology would be to fold the contents of the 
world into the human. But this is clearly not what is at stake 
for epistemologists: the question is not whether we ought to 
construe the world as a function of human knowledge, but 
rather to specify how the fallible and revisable structure of the 
latter makes possibly intelligible the existence and structure 
of the former. When Bryant suggests that we ought to shift 
the starting point from epistemology to ontology to ground 
realism, he is thus in fact obviating rather than addressing the 
pertinence of the critical filter against dogmatic metaphysics, 
a precaution emblematic of modernity which is advanced in 
order to rule out appeals to any given pre-established harmony 
between thinking and being, concepts and objects. Given that 
the support for realism that Bryant draws from Bhaskar does 
not settle the case in favor of ontology, one may be forgiven 
for being skeptical about the thesis that epistemology must 
have exhausted its speculative resources to the point of war-
ranting its destitution.
So to answer Bryant’s question: “Why not begin with amoeba?,” 
31 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 64-65.
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we can simply answer “Because the problem of access remains, 
and unless we enact a regression to dogmatic metaphysics, 
we better have a story to tell about how the structure of the 
world is within our cognitive grasp!” Indeed, anything less 
would surely compromise the “democratic” pretences of oop, 
subjecting its metaphysical account to prescriptions based on 
authority rather than argument. And if such grounds ensue 
as feasible criteria for entitlement to one’s own philosophical 
position, then we inadvertently restitute the prerogative of 
our pragmatic interests and contingent proclivities over the 
force of reasons. It is precisely such a displacement of our 
critical standards that surrenders philosophy to the whims 
of the human, to the enclosure of the subjective, and which 
should be taken to be in complicity with correlationism and 
anti-realism, and not the work of those who insist on the 
importance of clarifying the gulf that persists between mind 
and world.32 Realism in any relevant sense is not something 
32 It should be remarked that it is actually those philosophers devoted to 
exploring the gulf that persists between mind and world that have been most 
attentive to the “vast outdoors” of non-human actants and factors, rather 
than our veritable stock of Continental theorists which dismiss the prob-
lematic, “materialists” or not. It is usually those who work on the kinds of 
issues epistemologists concern themselves with that indeed contribute to 
the numerous empirical explorations carried forth by the empirical sciences, 
and not those who routinely patronize the necessity to leave one’s armchair 
in the name of a more fundamental understanding, ontological or otherwise.
This is not to indulge in some facile “scientism,” to claim that philosophy 
is the “handmaiden” of the sciences, or to disavow the philosophical valence 
of other domains of investigation and practice besides science. It is just 
to recall that philosophers who ally themselves to the post-Heideggerean 
suspicion against “epistemology” for being a kind of metaphysics are for 
the same reasons usually dismissive of scientific insight, the better to staple 
themselves to their cozy armchairs.  To Bryant’s credit, his concern with 
developmental biology, however brief or cursory, is already rather excep-
tional among Continental theorists, and in this he certainly does justice 
to some of his intellectual heroes, like Deleuze and DeLanda, who are also 
exceptional in that regard.
The patronizing dismissal of the scientific exploration of the world, which 
is proudly regurgitated and reenacted to this day by many leading theorists, 
has resulted in an incalculably pernicious aloofness and mystification for 
generations of philosophers, severing the discipline from the very world it 
was allegedly committed to think about.  With this in mind it should prove 
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we ought to innocently assume for philosophy to be possible, 
but is rather something that may be a result following from 
philosophical questioning. If Bryant’s earnest wish to decen-
tralize the focus on the human is to be carried out without 
facile obviations, then one must perhaps realize that in asking 
about the limits of knowledge one begins by modestly ac-
cepting that intelligibility comes at a price, that we are quite 
fallible in bringing the real before us, and that we need to 
understand how we may have the capacity to know this real 
before unabashedly proclaiming that we do. 
Having said this, Bryant’s enterprise is nevertheless laud-
able insofar as it raises the fundamental question about 
whether philosophy ought to assign methodological prior-
ity to ontology, or to epistemology. And if epistemological 
realisms which opt for the latter option can be endorsed, 
then the challenge will be to show that such an enterprise is 
possible without running along presupposed metaphysical 
precepts, readily awaiting the deconstructive scavengers to 
ruin the day. The suggestion that Bryant advances closing on 
the first chapter is that epistemology-driven accounts must 
at the very least presuppose the metaphysical reification of 
the knower that thinks, and must therefore invariably run 
on a tacit ontological footing:
Those who advise us to observe the observer somehow seem to miss 
the point that the very act of observing the observer or observing how 
other observers observe presupposes the existence of an observer that is 
doing the observing of other observers. Far from undermining the thesis 
that substances or objects exist, in other words, this move presupposes 
surprising to see oop perform a similarly facile dismissal of the epistemological 
tradition which has occupied philosophers of mind during the last century, 
by no means restricted in scope to an exploration of the human, but rather 
devoted to thinking along the intricacies of scientific experimentation and 
practice to this day. Specialization at the price of synthetic capaciousness 
surely renders philosophy dull and myopic; but synthetic ambition without 
curiosity and discipline for learning delivers philosophy to quixotic banality 
and shallowness, however disguised in appeasing rhetoric.
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the existence of at least one substance or object. And as a consequence, 
this move is incapable of consistently maintaining the thesis that the 
world is a product of how observers perceive other objects.33
We should note that even if one restricts the scope of the 
correlationist obsession with access to only imply the being 
of the one who thinks and does the observing (and not other 
observers), the question about whether ontology can be de-
ferred or suspended lingers on. Bryant is correct in detecting 
that an epistemological destitution of ontology in principle 
would just beg the question, and become directly complicit 
with anti-realism, or else forced to endorse a reification of 
the knowing subject as a minimal ontological commitment, 
enacting a kind of Cartesianism run amok. Yet this would 
surely jeopardize the claim that epistemology could get off the 
ground without any prior ontological decision or reflection. 
However, to claim that it would be on any account impos-
sible to begin with anything but ontology, since one must run 
with some metaphysical commitment or other, strikes me 
as eliding the possibility of distinguishing between a method-
ological dualism which defines the semantics of rationality 
functionally, and a metaphysical dualism which begins by rei-
fying rationality metaphysically. It rejects the possibility that 
we may avoid the ontological circle by way of methodologi-
cally suspending the metaphysical status of thought in the 
process of engaging in an epistemological investigation of 
reason. The charge against such a possibility obviously calls 
into question the viability of all post-Sellarsian approaches 
that claim for a methodological separation of the normative 
from the natural, and which do not reify this difference in a 
metaphysical dualism of mind and world.34 This is not some 
arcane conceit that occupies stale epistemologists, but forms 
part of the Kantian legacy which Bryant wages against. By 
attempting to secure the distinctiveness of rationality for 
33 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 66.
34 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. 
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the normative purchase that allows for subjects to engage 
in commitments and hold endorsements for which they are 
responsible, the “inferentialist” program seeks precisely to 
extirpate any residual metaphysical baggage that came with 
primitive characterizations of judgment as predication, in 
the way of explaining what constitutes the intentionality of 
the mental. This is what Brandom, following Sellars, crucially 
takes to be already at work in the Kantian “jurisprudential” 
account of representation and the construal of reason as a 
“tribunal”: “Kant’s most basic idea is that minded creatures 
are to be distinguished from unminded ones not by a matter-
of-fact ontological distinction (the presence of mind-stuff), 
but by a normative deontological one. This is his normative 
characterization of the mental.”35 In continuity with this ac-
count, what transcendental idealism continued to reify from 
aesthetic experience in the ideal structures of space-time, is 
deflated by revisionary approaches which, while retaining 
the prerogative of giving a formal account of the inferential 
structure of representation, deny the valence of intellectual 
intuition and experiential givenness. Bryant’s excursus there-
fore implicitly suggests that these accounts cannot but run 
on metaphysical endorsements of the sort that vitiate the 
purported ontological neutrality of the normative. 
However, even if we had to accept (and it is not clear that 
we do) that we are forced into an ontological decision prior 
to any pretence to epistemological questioning, this still 
wouldn’t by itself suffice to legitimize ontological realism 
about objects, or about any other particular ontological op-
tion for hypothesizing a mind-independent reality. And it 
certainly won’t suffice to elide the prerogative of the ques-
tion of knowledge or representation to deny the claim that 
rational agency must be recognized. For we might think, in 
continuity with the modern legacy castigated by Bryant and 
his Continental predecessors, that the minimal commitment 
to which thought is forced into acknowledging is that of itself 
35 Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, (USA: Belknap 
Press of University of Harvard Press, 2009), 32-33.
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as that being who is gripped by the force of reasons, and that 
such a commitment immediately solicits an investigation 
into reason’s structure, whether this be called transcendental, 
deontological, or ontologically “regional.” Such an explana-
tory exigency haunts those who inhabit the logical space 
of reasons in any case; it holds irrespective of whether we 
must assign to the latter’s inferentially governed structure a 
metaphysical status or not. For even if we must endow ratio-
nality a minimal metaphysical character, then we still have 
to acknowledge that our being as knowers delivers us into a 
reflection about the structure of the reason through which 
the knowing takes place. 
This is the idea that has motivated philosophical modernity, 
from Descartes to contemporary epistemology; a possibility 
that ceases to appear as the antiquated and exhausted option 
oop deems as long as one remembers that its critical exigency 
came about in order to defuse dogmatic claims to metaphysi-
cal knowledge. In looking past the importance of critique 
in the name of theoretical vanguardism, oop risks enacting 
a profound philosophical regression, throwing away, along 
with the prudential discipline of the post-Kantian legacy, both 
the rationalist baby along the anti-realist bathwater. Worse 
still, if or fails in its methodological motivations, then it is 
not clear that oop can even abjure the anti-realist side of 
critique, as it proclaims. But on any account, Bryant’s open-
ing chapter evinces the difficulty facing anyone’s claims to 
realism: how to reconcile the critical necessity to adjudicate 
our purchase on a world which is by itself not designed to 
be intelligible, while explaining how the purposeful thought 
that rationally enjoins itself as the will to know arises out 
from such a purposeless world.
II - Mereological Quandaries 
Withdrawal, Structure, Relation
Although both Harman and Bryant seem crucially indebted 
to the work of Bruno Latour, whereas the former’s account 
develops closer to the phenomenological tradition, the lat-
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ter looks in the direction of Deleuze, Luhmann, and Lacan, 
among others. On both accounts, the basic task is to think 
of an ontology of self-subsistent objects, while nevertheless 
providing an adequate account of relation and change that 
doesn’t relapse into a pre-Darwinian avowal of fixed essences 
or ideal forms, as in classical realist accounts and traditional 
Aristotelian/Platonist position. Although Harman becomes 
explicitly a dualist in his distinction between real and sensu-
ous objects, Bryant follows Deleuze in proposing ontological 
univocity and a “flat” ontology, claiming instead that objects 
have two distinct dimensions as part of the same ontological 
domain: the virtual and the actual. As we shall see, however, 
this distinction remains continuous with Harman’s account 
insofar as both accept that one must separate between what 
an entity is and how an entity appears within a given situa-
tion or to another being in relation. 
These propadeutic insights allow us to observe two major 
aspects of what Bryant calls the thesis of withdrawal: objects 
are ontologically independent from their relations by pos-
sessing an internal structure of their own, and objects have 
non-manifest potentialities proper to their structure which in 
every case are irreducible to what their actual states reveal.36 
The second and third chapters of the book propose thus to lay 
the foundations for a new account of substance, distinguishing 
for every object an internal structure (its “endo-relations”), 
and the qualities or events that they manifest in actuality as 
a result of entering in relation with other objects, which Bry-
ant calls the “exo-relations” of substance.37 This distinction is 
analogous to the one developed in the third chapter between 
the virtual proper being of the object and its local manifesta-
tions, between the powers that the object has qua generative 
mechanism, and the events or qualities that it manifests at 
a given time.38 In other words, qualities are to be understood 
as events that happen to objects and aspects manifested by 
objects, rather than as features in objects. 





With this in mind, Bryant goes on to introduce the two 
major aspects of what he calls the thesis of withdrawal in the 
following passage:
Within the framework of onticology, the claim that objects are with-
drawn from other objects is the claim that 1) substances are indepen-
dent of or are not constituted by their relations to other objects, and 
2) that objects are not identical to any qualities they happen to locally 
manifest. The substantiality of objects is never to be equated with the 
qualities they produce.39 
The two aspects of the thesis are obviously linked together: 
objects are ontologically independent from their qualities 
precisely insofar as they are always capable of doing things 
that exceed that which they actually do. The capacity of the 
object to produce effects relative to its virtual structure is thus 
the obverse of the claim that every manifestation is neces-
sarily the manifestation of a power proper to the object; or 
else it wouldn’t make sense to say that powers are in excess 
to their manifestations. With this in mind, I propose the 
following formulation for the excess condition that Bryant 
gives as follows:
(Excess): For any substance x, if xRy makes x 
manifest a local quality a at t, then 
there is a power b of x such that xRy 
does not manifest b at t.
Bryant goes on to tie in his account of withdrawal with his 
distinction between object and parts. As one might expect, he 
claims that an object is ontologically irreducible to its parts. 
This is yet another dimension of the withdrawal thesis: objects 
are not only independent from the qualities they manifest, but 
also from the parts that compose them. The latter are taken to 
be objects in their own right. We should note that with regards 
to the relation between objects and parts, excess would have 
to mean something quite different than we surmised above; 
39 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 70. 
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namely, it should entail that objects always have powers which 
their parts themselves don’t possess. Or stated differently, it 
ought to be possible to predicate of objects features that are 
not equivalent to those of their parts, or else the former would 
be the sum of what is predicated of the latter:
Were objects identical to their parts, then this would entail that objects 
are predicates of their parts. This, in turn, would undermine the au-
tonomy or independence of objects. Consequently, while substances 
certainly cannot exist without their parts, substantiality must be some-
thing other than the parts of which an object is composed.40
At this juncture, however, the Aristotelian and Deleuzean 
sides of Bryant’s account are, if not in conflict, at least unclear 
in their articulation. For if every object has a virtual structure 
which can subsist without having any qualities (objects can be 
“dormant”), then it must be equally true that objects cannot 
exist without their parts, which plainly suggests parts are not 
qualities. However, it is equally unlikely that the parts of an 
object must belong to what Bryant calls the object’s virtual 
structure, or its potentialities, since the latter are taken to be 
essential to its being, while parts are said to be accidental. It 
is difficult to understand how parts are articulated within 
the dual structure of the object, since the intrication between 
parts and virtual structures is not rendered transparent in 
Bryant’s account, albeit it is clear that whatever parts are 
they must have a virtual structure of their own, being ob-
jects themselves. Indeed, Bryant claims that “...substantiality 
must be something other than the parts of which an object 
is composed,” thereby suggesting that parts are not parts of 
the proper being of the object.41 But then in what sense can 
parts be of objects, if not “properly”? To what extent can an 
object depend on its parts without indexing the latter to its 
internal structure, but without splitting the object into two? 
It seems therefore as if we must distinguish not just between 




the endo-relations of the object’s virtual proper being and the 
exo-relations which it has with other objects in producing 
qualitative states, but also between the virtual proper being 
of an object defining its autonomous and necessary structure, 
and its contingent parts. In this regard, parts are like quali-
ties in that they are contingent or accidental features apart 
from the proper being of the object, while they are like the 
virtual proper being in that they condition the possibility of 
the existence of the object.
However, it remains unclear just why we should call such 
accidental components “parts” of an object as opposed to 
merely autonomous objects with which that object enters 
in exo-relations, as argued above. And the intuitive answer is 
that although parts are independent insofar as they are objects 
themselves, the object of which they are parts of couldn’t exist 
without them. There is thus a crucial disjunction tacitly at 
work in Bryant’s account between an object’s ontological inde-
pendence and its existential independence: the former requires 
that one’s virtual structure be defined in terms of powers that 
are autonomous to the relations into which the object enters, 
while the latter implies that the virtual structure of the object 
couldn’t continue to subsist as such without support from its 
parts. It is the account of existential independence, however, 
which remains opaque in Bryant’s account, since it is just not 
clear how the virtual proper being of an object must relate 
to the parts which compose it so as to render the former 
existentially dependent on the latter. With this in mind, the 
intrication between the three aspects of the object (virtual 
proper being, qualities, and parts) as articulated through the 
withdrawal thesis, is unclear.
In any case, the manifold sides of withdrawal are closely 
knit to Bryant’s account of relation, and of how entities 
manage to perturb one another. Before we go on to provide 
a brief assessment of these however, we should provide a 
few remarks about how Bryant develops the dyad between 
an object’s virtual proper being and its local manifestations, 
mainly through Deleuze and the work of Manuel DeLanda. 
The virtual/actual distinction maps two thoroughly dissimilar 
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aspects of the object: a topological aspect which defines its po-
tentialities across a vector field, and a geometrical aspect which 
defines its actual states and the qualitative transformations it 
undergoes in phase space.42 The most important qualification 
that Bryant proposes as a corrective to Deleuze’s account is to 
treat the virtual as what defines discrete objects, as opposed to 
a pre-individuated continuum composed of singularities which 
fall short of being individuals. This corrective is necessary 
since, in Bryant’s estimation, Deleuze lacks an account of 
non-qualitative individuation that would be adequate to his 
antipathy to substances and objects:
By treating the domain of the virtual as the pre-individual and the 
domain of the actual as an effect of the virtual, Deleuze is left with-
out an account of why the virtual actualizes itself at all (despite his 
impressive efforts to the contrary), and is led to treat the actual as a 
mere product, an excrescence, that itself has no efficacy within being. 
What is required, by contrast, is an account of the virtual that treats it 
as a dimension of primary substances or discrete individuals, where 
substance precedes the virtual (transcendentally, not temporally) not 
the reverse, and where actual entities are capable of interacting with 
one another.43
Yet Bryant seems to oscillate between the claim that Deleuze 
has no account of individuation, and the claim that such an 
account is given but is unsuccessful. This turns out to be an 
important issue, because the ontological decision in favor of 
an ontology of objects is supposed to come out of the insuf-
ficiency of thinking of the virtual as being pre-objectual or 
pre-individual. It seems clear that Deleuze, at the very least, did 
provide a theory of morphogenesis as intensive individuation 
through his account of larval subjectivity, and the syntheses 
of space and time, which culminate in his account of psychic 




individuation.44 It is far less obvious, however, what exactly 
Bryant finds to be lacking in Deleuze’s account, besides the 
fact that it is said to fail when accounting for objectual dis-
creteness. 
In that regard, it is not clear how the suggestion that an 
account which explains individuation starting from pre-
individual singularities is necessarily incapable of accounting 
for individual differences in being. Considering that Deleuze’s 
entire project constitutes allegedly an effort to think of virtual 
singularities as the unequal-in-itself, or difference-in-itself, 
how exactly the multiplicity of virtual singularities and their 
actualizations relapses into an undifferentiated continuum is 
left unexplained.45 Without such an explanation, it is far less 
clear either that we ought to choose in favor of the restitution 
of substances, or that the Deleuzean account is incapable 
of accounting for individuation, as the argument proposes. 
Second, performing a similar maneuver to his extrapola-
tion of Bhaskar’s transcendental argument, Bryant dislodges 
DeLanda’s allotment of the virtual to the spatial domain of 
the topological, to argue instead that the division between the 
virtual and the actual is of an ontological dimension which 
might hold for all objects in general. In order to cash out 
the more intuitive appeal of Deleuze’s notion of the virtual 
as involving “singularities,” he proposes to follow DeLanda 
thus in treating the latter as attractors, i.e. singularities are 
to be understood as the potentialities which define variable 
tendencies in a system/object, and which preside any specific 
44 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press: 1995), Chapter II, pp. 78-85. 
45 One possible way of understanding Bryant’s argument is that he follows 
Badiou’s reading of Deleuze that claims that Deleuze’s notion of multiplic-
ity is subordinated to the notion of the “One,” in the sense in which fails 
to rise to a purely extensional domain of the pure multiple. This kind of 
argument is, however, foreclosed to Bryant, since he himself has a notion 
of self-constituted objects which are entirely defined by internal relations, 
and which would constitute prime examples of the kind of “Oneness” ex-
tensional approaches proscribe in principle. 
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actual state which the latter might manifest at any given time. 
Thus, Bryant wants to thinks of potentialities as that which 
persists and underlies every actualization for an object, i.e. 
it becomes part of how to understand the withdrawal thesis:
 
Yet, above all, the distinction between virtual proper being and local 
manifestation teaches us that objects are plastic. As a function of the 
exo-relations objects enter into with other objects, the attractors de-
fining the virtual space of a substance can be activated in a variety of 
different ways, actualizing objects in a variety of different ways at the 
level of local manifestations. It is for this reason that the confusion of 
objects with their actualization in local manifestations always spells 
theoretical disaster, for in doing so we foreclose the volcanic potentials 
harbored in the depths of objects.46 
But Bryant illegitimately detaches a theoretical model 
from its proper domain of application: whereas vector spaces 
wherein attractors are defined serve to model the topologi-
cal properties of spatial systems for DeLanda, Bryant wants 
to define every object’s virtual proper being as composed 
of singularities or attractors without thereby attributing to 
them spatial being. However, how things such as numbers, 
Popeye and parties are supposed to be formalized in terms 
of actualizations from vector fields to phase space is miss-
ing from the account. It is straightforward enough to claim 
virtual powers and actual manifestations differ; but from this 
it seems a long way to claim one that can successfully model 
a non-spatial account of objects on a procedure that maps 
specifically relational, homeomorphic-independent features 
such as continuity, neighborhood, disjunction, connection, 
etc. Specifically, attractors are supposed to define systemic 
tendencies in extended space without temporal variables, and 
so singularities are supposed to be understood as limit-points 
for changes within the system. Although Bryant seeks to draw 
ontological lessons from what is restricted in a scientific ex-
planatory framework to account for spatial events, it is anyone’s 
46 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 114. 
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guess just in what sense one could say that an object’s actual 
manifestations are trajectories in the process of approaching 
their own powers. The latter make sense within the scope of 
morphogenetic processes and topological thinking because 
trajectories can be mapped onto a spatial field wherein ho-
meomorphic transformations can take place, and thus through 
which spatial relations specifically are understood. But the 
claim that objectual powers are in excess to actual states and 
to all relations without qualification cannot be bluntly identi-
fied with the claim that there are trajectories in phase space 
developing in relation to attractors. Bryant claims:
The virtual proper being of objects consists not of qualities, but of 
powers and these powers are never exhausted by local manifestations. 
In this regard, there is never a complete mapping of any phase space, 
but rather only ever a limited mapping of a phase space dependent on 
the exo-relations into which the object has been placed.47
With these divergences kept in mind, the continuity between 
the Aristotelian and Deleuzian aspects of Bryant’s account in 
terms of the presumed isomorphy between substance/quali-
ties binary on the one hand, and between the virtual/actual 
one on the other, is not secure. The idea that substances are 
constituted by a virtual proper being which is in turn defined 
in terms of vector spaces seems to be at this point merely a 
metaphor to reinforce the notion of withdrawal outside the 
stillness of the classical theory of substance, and towards a 
dynamic account of individuation. But becoming untethered 
from the spatial, virtual powers qua attractors start to sound 
oddly abstract, to the point where one begins to wonder 
whether Bryant has compromised his alleged commitment to 
univocity in favor of a kind of dualism. Yet it is not even clear 
that by accepting dualism one can nest withdrawal, thinking 
of the virtual as parts of objects, for the reasons mentioned 
above. In that regard, the idea that qualities are somehow 
creatively instantiated differentiations which can be internal 
47 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 121. 
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to the system (endo-qualities) or external to it (exo-qualities), 
while nevertheless “not resembling” the powers they are 
instantiations of, is left also unclear within this framework. 
At that juncture, it seems that Bryant’s excess condition in-
explicably shifts from an argument from quantitative differ-
ence to qualitative difference, from the numerical excess of 
powers over manifestations, to constitutive ontological gulf 
separating them beyond repair.
Having said this, and in order to continue to assess how 
the notion of withdrawal is supposed to work, I now focus on 
the intricate account Bryant provides of objectual constitu-
tion and relations, which takes up the core of chapters four 
and five. It is here that Bryant specifically deploys resources 
from autopoietic systems theory, and more specifically from 
the work of Maturana, Varela, and Luhmann. The point I will 
focus on is his account of how different objects relate to each 
other by translating that which is received from other entities 
in the form of perturbations, by transforming the latter into 
information which selects system states, and which result in 
an object manifesting a quality/having a local manifestation. 
The interplay between these three interrelated concepts is 
difficult to disentangle from the text. Bryant states from the 
start that what he finds most attractive from autopoietic sys-
tems theory is the notion of operational closure which define 
the autonomy of a given system or object.48 
The two major aspects of such systems are: 1) self-referenti-
ality—the outputs of every system are a product of their own 
internal structure; 2) operational closure—every system must 
relate to its exteriority by virtue of translating whatever per-
turbations it receives from other objects into information, in 
order to select a system state/actualize itself.49 Taken together, 
both claims are strongly resonant with Bryant’s withdrawal 
theses: an object’s contingent manifestations are the result 
of its endogenous structure, and the manifestations that an 
object obtains by entering in relation with other objects are 




relative to the structural powers that it has. Having said this, 
we can approximate that for Bryant a perturbation is that 
which for any object (may) trigger a given manifestation when 
relating to other objects. The term translation is thus meant 
to capture that every object reacts to relational encounters in 
accordance with the parameters set by their internal struc-
ture, i.e. information is not transmitted between objects, but 
is rather what an object produces from the perturbations it 
receives from other objects. 
It is important to notice that information is not yet equiva-
lent with a local manifestation or a system state, but rather 
that it is that which allows an object to select a system state 
within its range of potential variations. In this regard, insofar 
as an object can only be susceptible to be affected by certain 
perturbations it can translate into information, given param-
eters defined by its own internal structure, there is a sense 
in which the environment of an object is constituted by how 
the latter selects system states from translated information: 
An environment is thus an environment only for the interior of an 
object or substance. Two consequences follow from this: First, the 
environment is not a container of substances or systems that precedes 
the existence of substances or systems. There is no environment “as 
such” existing out there in the world. Put otherwise, there is no pre-
established or pre-given environment to which a system must “adapt.”50
This becomes also the focus in the fifth chapter of the book 
for an account of why objects, despite being autonomous 
and generative of their environments, are not for this reason 
unlimited in their creative power. This is plainly because an 
object’s capacities to interact with other objects, which Bryant 
calls the object’s regime of attraction, run against the higher 
complexity of the environment it unifies in relation, which 
can perhaps be taken to be yet another dimension of the 
withdrawal thesis, i.e. an object’s capacity to be perturbed by 
other objects and to perturb other objects is limited not just 
by its own internal structure, but by the structure of those 
50 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 146. 
Daniel Sacilotto – Review of Democracy of Objects
463
objects with which it enters in relations and which must be 
invariably more complex than it. So, Bryant claims:
Just as other substances in a substance’s environment can only perturb the 
substance without determining what information events will be pro-
duced on the basis of these perturbations, the most the substance can 
do is attempt to perturb other substances without being able to control 
what sort of information-events are produced in the other substances. 
And these attempted perturbations can always, of course, fail.51
Having laid our rough account of the basic features Bryant 
borrows from systems theory, some questions are in order. First, 
what is the precise ontological status of a perturbation? Are 
they objects, local manifestations in objects, parts of objects, 
or something to be understood quite differently from these 
distinctions? This might seem like a fastidious question, but 
it seems relevant for Bryant’s account of relation without 
transmission, and of operational closure as constraining the 
translation into information by a virtual structure, leading to 
the choice of system states. Although it is clear that it is objects 
that perturb other objects, we must remember that given the 
withdrawal thesis it must follow that any object that perturbs 
another must do so in virtue of being in an actual state. How-
ever, given operational closure, it follows that one couldn’t 
say that the perturbed object receives a local manifestation or 
a quality, since no transmission ever occurs between entities. 
The question then becomes one about ourselves as objects, in 
the process of providing a description of the world which we 
know of in practice as much as theory, if we are invariably 
translating our world into terms that are relative to us. That 
is, how are we supposed to characterize the features in other 
objects as being proper to the object’s themselves, if there is 
a good sense in which every characterization is rendered 
relative in its determinate specificity to our own internal 
structure? That is, how do we know that the features we at-
tribute to objects are in the objects themselves if we must accept 
51 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 205. 
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that information is relative to our own structure? How do 
objects can ever come to know of other objects, and not just 
produce knowledge through relations? The following few 
passages provoke this concern:
However, here we must proceed with caution, for information is 
not something that exists out there in the environment waiting to 
be received or detected. Moreover, information is not something 
that is exchanged between systems. Often we think of information as 
something that is transmitted from a sender to a receiver. The ques-
tion here becomes that of how it is possible for the receiver to decode 
the information received as identical to the information transmitted. 
However, insofar as substances are closed in the sense discussed in 
the last section, it follows that there can be no question of informa-
tion as exchange. Rather, information is purely system-specific, exists 
only within a particular system or substance, and exists only for that 
system or substance. In short, there is no pre-existent information.52
...
Perturbations are never identical to information precisely because 
information is object-specific, whereas the same perturbation can 
affect a variety of different objects while producing very different 
information for each object perturbed. Finally...events of information 
link difference to difference through a linkage of different withdrawn 
objects to one another. No object directly encounters another object 
precisely because all objects are operationally closed. As a consequence, 
no object is capable of representing another object or of functioning as 
a pure carrier of the perturbations issued from another object. This is 
because objects always transform or translate perturbations. Nonetheless, 
information links the different to the different in a substance-specific 
manner wherever substances relate to one another.53 
Here we find a potentially unwarranted corollary of the 
withdrawal thesis: if one only is capable of relating to the 
world by translating unspecific perturbations into informa-
tion, then there is a sense in which not only the object’s virtual 
52 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 153. 
53 Ibid, 156. 
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proper being withdraws from relation, but even their local 
manifestations are in themselves intractable. In other words, 
it seems as if every feature we could attribute to other objects 
would be a function of how we translate an otherwise unspeci-
fied perturbation, and so that the actual states whereby we 
characterize object could at best be construed as a case of what 
the object is for-us. But this is to reintroduce the skeptical 
quandaries associated with epistemic foreclosure proper to 
correlationism, and which Bryant surely wants to avoid. By 
the same token, if Bryant wants to say that however relative 
the information translated by each system is endogenously 
specified, this does not rule out that such information allows 
us to infer that objects exist outside of such delimitations. 
Bryant in fact suggests that this much may be accomplished 
through experimental activity:
Knowledge of an object does not reside in a list of qualities possessed 
by objects, but rather in a diagram of the powers hidden within objects. 
However, in order to form a diagram of an object we have to vary the 
exo-relations of an object to determine that of which it is capable. And 
here, of course, the point is that knowledge is gained not by represent-
ing, but...by doing.54
In the previous section I suggested that the appeals to ex-
perimentation inspired by Bhaskar did not suffice to ground 
ontological realism, and now we are in a position to see why the 
problem is configured more acutely within Bryant’s ontologi-
cal system. Within the onticological framework, knowledge 
as a practice ought to be understood in relation to an object’s 
regime of attraction, i.e. in order to know an object one must 
vary the exo-relations into which it enters so as to tease out 
its potentialities which might otherwise not be manifest. But 
the problem is that knowledge of objects must be capable 
of construing the latter qua virtual structures in their own 
right and not just as translated into our own terms. In other 
words, although knowledge will necessarily be produced on 
54 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 170. 
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the basis of how the perturbing object becomes translated 
by the perturbed object’s virtual proper being, the resulting 
state must yield knowledge of the object as it is in itself and 
not just as it is for us through our manifest knowledge-states. 
If one cannot do this, then all talk about mind-independent 
objects becomes suspect, and the distinction between direct 
knowledge (which is impossible) and indirect knowledge 
(which is possible) becomes unintelligible at a loss for epis-
temic criteria for distinguishing what we are relating to, and 
how it is that we relate to this same entity so that we know of it. 
However, in order to make such a distinction, Bryant must be 
able to show that our knowledge is related not just to a mind 
independent reality, but to objects specifically, and more still, to 
objects whose inherent potentials may be inferred as having 
the content we attribute to them from our translations. As 
we saw earlier, the possibility of a wholesale qualitative gap 
between the virtual and the actual, and not just a quantita-
tive one, makes it exceedingly difficult to understand how 
an actual manifestation could ever be of a corresponding 
power. But now this ontological gulf seems redoubled by 
an epistemological gulf, wherein even the manifestations 
of the object are only accessible via a process of translation 
which invariably renders them relative to our endogenous 
capacities. An account of how these translations could ever 
suffice to inform us of the extraneous objects that populate 
the much coveted “great outdoors” is well in order.
However, this means that Bryant requires an account of how 
an object’s operationally-closed translations and knowledge 
track the powers and qualities in other objects which emit 
perturbations, and how these can affect different objects in 
different ways. Thus, the information we translate must yield 
content through which one must be able to access a foreign 
object’s endogenous structure and powers, in order to make 
sense of the claim that these are capacities proper to autono-
mous objects, and not just relative to us or our faculties. Such 
an account couldn’t but be representational, by definition, and 
so this spells obvious problems for a theory which has abjured 
the valence of representational explanation altogether. Indeed, 
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in spite of the dismissive attitude against empiricist accounts 
which cling to presentational givenness, the onticological 
argument proceeds as if the manifest content which consti-
tutes an object’s privately constituted information serves as 
the basis for the ulterior inference that mind-independent 
objects populate the world, without clarifying how it is that 
such states map the structural features of this world. This 
threatens to reactivate appeals to the experiential transparency 
which Bryant castigated earlier as an empiricist corollary knit 
to correlationism. It would thus seem that although Bryant 
refuses to explain how representation works, it nonetheless 
remains implicitly presupposed in his account. But it then 
seems that it is not so much that we cannot or should not seek 
to explain our relation to the world in epistemological terms, 
but simply that Bryant does not provide such an explanation. 
And yet, failing in the task to provide an account of how 
thought tracks the world by saying that such an account is 
untenable in principle, onticology distorts a philosophical 
deficiency to a principled philosophical impossibility. As a 
result, Bryant incurs in an instance of Dennett’s so-called 
philosopher’s fallacy: to camouflage a failure of imagination 
or argument by claiming that one is dealing with an impos-
sibility for thought. 
With this in mind, the two possible scenarios facing Bry-
ant are equally at odds with the aims of his project. First, one 
insists in saying that nothing gets “transferred” between 
systems, that knowledge is system relative and that the in-
formation produced by a system is only intelligible within 
its own parameters, and so that knowledge is by definition 
knowledge of reality as it is for us. The same would hold for 
every object, presumed existent, which enters in relation to 
another. In this case we obtain either a version of idealism 
which makes system-independence utterly unthinkable, or a 
version of weak correlationism where knowledge of the real 
is unknowable, albeit thinkable. This scenario leaves it open 
that if an external world exists, then it may be the repudiated 
formless apeiron, the much coveted universe of objects, or 
any thinkable assortment of ontological options. Whether 
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any notion of a “flat” ontology is tenable or not seems, on 
this account, a question that becomes impossible to answer 
in principle. 
Alternatively, one admits that translated information 
may nevertheless index inferable features about a mind-
independent reality, while insisting in that this knowledge 
is acquired through our own epistemic parameters, in which 
case we rehabilitate representation and the question of how 
we know the world in accordance to our own faculties. The 
question of how our own virtual structures produce this 
information would necessarily be methodologically propa-
deutic to any account purporting to describe the structure 
of other objects, their own proper capacities for translating 
information, and their regimes of attraction. This option 
inadvertently reactivates the necessity and methodological 
priority of epistemological questioning for realism about 
the external world, the very exigency which was allegedly 
disavowed in favor of the priority of ontology from the start. 
To claim that one can have knowledge of external objects 
without a representational account, while insisting in that 
operational closure constrains intelligible information to 
the native structure of the host-object which translates an 
otherwise amorphous perturbation appears, on these grounds, 
to want to have one’s cake and eat it. 
Before closing up on our discussion, a few remarks cursory 
should be made about the developments that Bryant pursues 
in the last two chapters of the book. The fifth chapter seeks to 
emphasize the intrication between systems and environments, 
so as to explain how objects can be autonomous and creative 
of their own openness to other objects, while not “dominating” 
the latter, i.e. how it is that constraints limit the development 
that an object goes through, and so the relations it enters into 
and the powers it actualizes.55 This feeds right back into the 
problem we have been exploring, since by departing from 
Maturana and Varela’s strict theory, Bryant wants to resist 
the claim that objects create other objects, while admitting of 
55 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 204-205. 
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operational closure, and so that each object’s environment 
is relative to its own powers. As we emphasized above, this 
relative autonomy was accounted for in terms of the higher 
complexity of the environment in contrast to the organism 
which construes such an environment. Following Luhmann, 
Bryant emphasizes that an object’s openness to the environ-
ment it constitutes does not have control over what happens 
in this environment just because it is for the object that such 
an environment is constructed. To quote again from Bryant’s 
original account of substance:
Just as other substances in a substance’s environment can only perturb the 
substance without determining what information events will be pro-
duced on the basis of these perturbations, the most the substance can 
do is attempt to perturb other substances without being able to control 
what sort of information-events are produced in the other substances.56 
Crucially, this seems to suggest that environments are not 
just the perturbations that objects receive from other objects, 
or the collection of objects with which an object may interact 
at a time, but rather the “space” wherein different objects can 
perturb one another. For it is within an environment that an 
object is said to be capable of being affected or of affecting 
others. Now, this seems rather strange, since it suggests that 
environmental openness is metaphysically prior to the ac-
tual perturbations that take place between objects. Yet Bryant 
insists repeatedly that environments are to be understood 
in terms of how an entity’s regime of attraction determines 
its exo-relations, by sorting out what it “relevant” to it, i.e. by 
reacting in accordance to what its virtual powers allow it to 
do. The question is then simply about what it means to say 
that an object constructs its “openness” to the environment. 
In what sense can an object A, which is not relating to another 
object B, nevertheless be within object A’s “openness” to the 
environment, or vice versa? In other words, in what sense 
56 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 205. 
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can the “openness” that an object exhibits include within its 
scope other objects which it has not yet entered in relation 
to. Since there is no information prior to the translation of 
a perturbation from another object, and since the environ-
ment constructs the openness from which environments 
are woven through such reactions, in what sense can things 
be within the reach of an object, falling short of relation? If 
objects have only relations to that which they are selectively 
open to, and this is to count as an explanation of how objects 
do not ontologically determine that which they relate to, then 
the notion of openness to other objects must not be simply 
reiterative an object’s virtual proper being, in excess to ex-
ternal relations and its own manifestations:
Of course, this openness to the environment can shift with changing 
events within the system such that the system becomes open to events 
that it was previously closed to, but the point is that at any point in 
time the system only maintains selective relations to its environment.57
In other words, if one claims that an object is open to that 
which its internal powers allow it to relate, then it makes no 
difference to say that an object is capable of doing something, 
and it being open to something. And yet this is to elide the 
distinction between what an object can do at a given time, and 
what its virtual powers delimit it to do in general. However, 
how are we to construe selective openness? Bryant suggests 
that this should be understood in terms of the anticipatory 
capacity of the object, at least for autopoietic systems:
Because structures operate within the framework of system/environ-
ment distinctions, they are selectively open to their environment and 
can therefore evolve and develop as a result of that openness to their 
environment. Objects constrain the sort of events to which they’re 
open from their environment through their distinctions or organiza-
tion. In the case of autopoietic objects, this entails that structures are 
57 Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, 235.
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anticipatory of what the future will bring. When events issue from 
the environment, information-events are produced selecting system-
states within the system. This leads to the production of further events 
within the system, unfolding within a particular order and structured 
in a particular way.58
This claims that the selection process precedes the openness 
of the object, and that the latter is determined in part by the 
former. Nevertheless it remains exceedingly opaque what 
exactly openness is meant to entail, and how it constructs a 
field of potentialities which are neither those native to the 
object’s structure, nor actual relations to other objects. My 
contention is that without being able to clarify exactly how 
selective openness is irreducible to translated information 
or to virtual powers, then it won’t help to appeal to it in order 
to clarify how an object is potentially constrained by its en-
vironment. Since it is precisely the space for an interaction 
between autonomous entities which is in dispute and which 
must be accounted for, Bryant needs to tell us how it is that 
an object can have something like a non-relational apprehen-
sion or exclusion of other objects which does not require 
translation, and which therefore places the object within an 
environmental space which it does not dominate on its own 
without constituting it as internal information. As far as I can 
gauge, such an account is missing from the book and so it 
does not help resolve the major worry about how objects are 
capable of individuating features which map other objects 
through their translations, both powers and their qualities. 
In fact, it is not even clear how translated information can 
numerically map an object to a single perturbing object, given 
that every registered instance of information is necessarily 
already processed through the host-object’s internal structure. 
Perhaps this can be assuaged with an amplified story of how 






When all is said and done, Bryant’s first attempt to develop an 
ontological system remains a commendable one, bringing to 
the fore many crucial questions for anyone interested in the 
issues once associated with the brand name of “speculative 
realism.” Our critical overview of the core theses of the book 
should nevertheless point towards what is a problematic at-
tempt to resolve the correlationist quandaries that Quentin 
Meillassoux admirably set for Continental philosophy. Bryant’s 
work virtuously displays stylistic lucidity and clarity, and a 
sincere attempt to comprehensively tackle a field muddled 
by debates and terminology under a guiding idea: philoso-
phy is more than a narcissistic exercise with ourselves, and 
we must open for thought, once again, that “great outdoors” 
which has been, for long, exiled from our reach. These two 
guiding principles remain a part for any serious concern with 
realism, whether it be called Continental, epistemological, 
ontological, speculative, or whatever else. 
Only the sustained antipathy to anti-realism can survive the 
polarization that has somewhat dissolved whatever valence 
the term “speculative realism” was meant to unify. This dis-
integration must be, however, indicative not of philosophical 
sectarianism, but of the inevitable rupture that comes with 
rational dissonance between positions. And if this is the case, 
then it becomes increasingly evident that it is not so much 
the antipathy to correlationism that guides us uniformly as 
a principle, but the way in which this battle is pursued that 
ultimately matters. For if realism deserves to be taken as 
a philosophical quandary, rather than a pleonasm knit to 
thought, as Heidegger believed, then it all turns to what the 
term could mean and require from us today. Or, put some-
what differently, and not without an air of bombast, the task 
is perhaps not just to leave the cave and shadows behind, but 
rather to make sure that in our zealous desire to see we don’t 
rush against the force of the blinding sun, bouncing back, 
sightless into the dark.
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Christpher Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-theologi-
cal thought in Badiou, Nancy and Meillassoux
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011
281 pages
Assessing the French Atheistic Turn
Fabio Gironi
Cardiff University
In under a decade we have witnessed a proliferation of texts on “atheism,” so much so that the 
term “New Atheism”1 has become a widely employed label 
to describe the discourse of this intellectual current, and 
books propounding or opposing it compete on the shelves of 
bookstores. Mostly, unfortunately, the tone of this discourse 
ranges from the patronisingly sarcastic to the irresponsibly 
uninformed (in the case of atheism-friendly authors) and 
from the wisely condescending to the virulently obscurantist 
(in the case of religious apologists). Most commonly associ-
ated with this movement are the naturalising reductions of 
religion by Daniel Dennett, the militant, neo-positivist Dar-
winism of Richard Dawkins, the pedantically cultured work 
of Christopher Hitchens and the populist, mouth-foaming 
Islamophobia and self-righteous outbursts of Sam Harris 
(these four authors are often grouped together as the “Four 
Horsemen” of atheism) and—to quote at least one author 
1 One might legitimately wonder what exactly would be “new” about it. Many 
“new Atheists” bring less to the intellectual table (and with poorer style) than 
Celsus’ strident Logos Alethes did in the 2nd or 3rd century ce (see Celsus, On 
the True Doctrine: A Discourse Against the Christians, [Oxford: OUP, 1987]).
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from the other side of the intellectual barricade—the natural 
theology redux of Alister McGrath. With the exception of the 
best moments of Dennett’s work these publications usually 
suffer from a deficit of philosophically informed argumenta-
tion and (even in Dennett’s work) of actual engagement with 
the historico-theological heritage that is part and parcel of 
our conceptual toolbox. 
This is of course a rather lengthy introduction to the fact 
that Watkins’ book has nothing to do with this kind of lit-
erature: the object of Watkins’ study is a completely different 
tradition of atheist thought, and the title already suggests 
so. Watkins’ focus is the difficult atheism sought by three 
contemporary French philosophers (Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux), not the relatively easy 
(which does not necessarily mean facile) atheism matter-of-
factly presented by Dawkins and his associates. To do justice 
to these two different styles, it would be correct to claim that 
the basic methodological difference between them lies in the 
gap between a naturalising, science-first approach of the new 
atheists and the (eminently French) rationalist propensities 
of the protagonists of Watkins’ book. Indeed, Difficult Athe-
ism is best seen as part of a recent series of studies—whose 
unrelatedness demonstrates their timeliness—concentrating 
on the development of a certain constellation of approaches 
to atheism developed in twentieth- (and in Difficult Atheism’s 
case, twenty-first-) century French philosophy. The first (in 
order of publication) of these works is Martin Hägglund’s 
Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (2008), a powerful 
(re)reading of Jacques Derrida aimed at reclaiming (at times 
violently so) his philosophy from theological appropriations. 
Hägglund does so by interpreting Derrida’s structure of the 
trace in the atheist key of an inescapable complication of time 
and space of all beings, privileging the aporetic, inescapable 
radical finitude of survival over the soteriological notions of 
infinity, immortality or eternal self-subsistence. Hägglund’s 
work has significantly contributed towards the correction of the 
facile stereotype (largely diffused even in certain “speculative 
realist” circles) of a Derrida irremediably compromised by 
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narrow linguistic-ethical concerns and thus dispensable for 
philosophers interested in the (re)construction of metaphysics, 
and has shown how the logic of deconstruction is a precious 
methodological ally (if not something of a forerunner) of 
post-ontotheological materialists2 (note, however, that the 
radically atheist Derrida presented by Hägglund is at odds 
with the brief treatment Watkins gives of him). 
The second important publication in this area is Stephanos 
Geroulanos’ outstanding (yet somewhat underestimated),3 An 
Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought (2010). 
This text draws the genealogy of a non-humanist atheism 
parallel with the development of a negative philosophical 
anthropology and the political critique of humanism in French 
culture between the 1930s and the 1950s. It maps the under-
examined intellectual ground that allowed in subsequent 
2 Admittedly, this thesis is far from uncontroversial. John Caputo, in his 
detailed (if somewhat repetitive) 93-page (!) long review of Radical Athe-
ism (John Caputo “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to 
Radical Theology,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11:2 (2011): 32-125) 
responded to Hägglund’s direct attacks by defining the book as offering 
an “abridged edition of Derrida” (Ibid., 33) and “a torso of deconstruction” 
(Ibid., 34). In the space of this brief footnote I cannot do justice to the 
hermeneutical nuances underlying this debate over Derrida’s legacy, but 
it will suffice to say that what is at stake are two different understandings 
of deconstruction, neither of which is necessarily incorrect: Hägglund’s 
paradigmatic Derrida is the early one, the (post-structuralist) philosopher 
of aporetic origins and of the logic of the trace as that which comes before 
the founding question of Being, excluding the possibility of an answer in the 
language of presence; Caputo’s Derrida is the later one, the Kierkegaardian 
philosopher of the impossibility of fore-seeing the a-venir, of a messianism 
without a Messiah, of a poetics of difference casting everyone (and everything) 
into an inescapable, structural, “fear and trembling” in the face of the risky 
business of existence. If Caputo probably offers a more “complete” version 
of Derrida, it shouldn’t be forgotten that he was instrumental in forging a 
certain understanding of Derrida’s thought through a sustained personal 
interaction with Derrida himself. One could only speculate what Derrida’s 
reaction would have been to Hägglund’s book, but I suspect it would have 
been less hostile than Caputo’s is and that it might have pushed him to take 
a clearer stand on issues that, in the later years of his life, simply occupied 
less of his philosophical engagement.
3 Perhaps because it is too much a work of careful intellectual history for 
the contemporary, largely anti-historicist philosophical climate.
Speculations III
476
decades for the emergence of full-blown post-structuralist 
antihumanism and the announcement of the “death of Man.” 
Geroulanos’ book offers material of direct relevance for readers 
of this journal: his first chapter in particular delineates the 
conceptual traits of what he names “antifoundational real-
ism” through an analysis of thinkers like Gaston Bachelard, 
Alexandre Kojève, Jean Wahl and Alexandre Koyré. Such a 
position, derived from a unique encounter of post-1920s 
(post-“quantum revolution”) philosophy of science and the 
“imported” phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, rejects 
the neo-Kantian focus on the knowing subject as detached 
observer and replaces it with a human, finite subject. The 
subject is trapped in a world of immanence whose details are 
essentially foreclosed, a subject characterised by its lack of 
(classically interpreted) transcendence upon the world and by 
its failure to concur with a reality-in-itself that is always already 
a human reality. There is no better description of this (all-too 
often neglected) epoch of epistemological pessimism4 to put 
some historical flesh on the bones of Meillassoux’s (largely 
unhistorical) definition of “strong correlationism,” and the 
book as a whole offers an excellent “preface” to Watkin’s own 
treatment of later developments of French atheism.5 
4 Which was however, it’s worth underlining, not conceived as an antirealism. 
In this regard Geroulanos’ “antifoundational realism” could be analysed par-
allel to Lee Braver’s description of the ontological modesty which underpins 
what he names a “transgressive epistemology” (wherein our knowledge of 
reality is “passively” dependent onto a reality which always partially exceeds 
our comprehension) in the context of a forthcoming paper on “continental 
realism.” The figure that best links the two accounts is Emmanuel Levinas, 
the author of the expression that provides the title for Geroulanos’ book and 
a central figure in Lee Braver’s narration, responsible for the overturning 
of the focus of Husserlian phenomenology from the constitutive action of 
the I to the receptiveness of the subject to the object’s “call” (see Braver, “A 
Brief History of Continental Realism,” Continental Philosophy Review, 45(2) 
(2012): 261-289.
5 Watkin indeed credits Geroulanos’s book as “a fine analysis of the rela-
tion between humanism and atheism to which the present volume [Difficult 
Atheism] owes a debt” (16, n.3). Note however that the comparison with 
Geroulanos’ narration allows us to somewhat question Watkin’s association 
of Nancy with Badiou and Meillassoux: even when sharing a focus on im-
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Watkin presents his book as aimed at a survey of the contem-
porary move towards a thinking after God, a “post-theological 
thought”6 which cannot be merely reduced to “atheism” since 
historical consciousness forces it to go through theologi-
cal thought before disengaging it. This is no concession to 
Christianity though, since Watkin clarifies that the endgame 
of post-theological reflection is “to follow the death of God 
more rigorously than before.”7 In the introduction, Watkin 
presents a very useful taxonomy of two different “styles” of 
atheism which will be employed as a key hermeneutic device 
throughout the book: the first is imitative or parasitic athe-
ism (the latter formulation is the most commonly employed 
by Watkin), a thought that preserves a theological structure 
replacing divine content with celebratory humanism. This 
is the atheism of Enlightenment humanists, divinising (at 
times literally) human reason, hypostatising it as a faculty 
metaphysically separate from “mere nature” and celebrating 
the intrinsic dignity of man; an intellectual stance which 
runs from the Comtean religion de l’Humanité straight to the 
manence, what sets the latter two apart from Nancy is their strong, principled 
rejection of any commerce with the theme of finitude which characterised 
post-structuralist thought. In Badiou’s case, a further particularity of the 
dialectical relationship of his thought with post-structuralism resides in 
what Ed Pluth aptly described as “Badiou’s theoretical anti-humanism and 
practical humanism,” which amounts to the splitting of subjectivity into 
“finite” pre-evental individuals and “infinite” militant subjects (see Ed 
Pluth, Badiou [Cambridge: Polity, 2010], 12ff.) Watkin is of course well aware 
of this: I am merely suggesting that from a broader historical perspective 
the case can be made that Badiou’s and Meillassoux’s positions represent 
(if still in embryonic form) a different “stage” (not necessarily progres-
sive!) in French thought. Perhaps more cogently, it could be argued that the 
inclusion of the “atheist practice without doctrinal atheism” presented by 
Françoise Laruelle would have been a very important addition to Watkin’s 
survey of immanentist positions in the contemporary French scene, one 
arguably capable of offering a different avenue for the development of post-
theological thought which Watkin seeks to describe (see Françoise Laruelle, 
Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy. Trans. by Anthony Paul Smith [London and 
New York: Continuum, 2010]).




New Atheists polemicists.8 This does not amount to a mere 
borrowing of terms though, as Watkin explains that “an athe-
ism is parasitic upon theology only when it deploys concepts 
that cannot be accounted for in exclusively atheistic terms 
but require assumptions proper to theology, whether or not 
those concepts happen to carry theological labels.”9 Parasitic 
atheism thus fails to disengage itself fully from theology, but 
the second tendency scarcely fares better. This second atheism 
is residual or ascetic atheism (again, Watkin seems to favour 
the second term), which is the post-Nietzschean stance of a 
world void of any transcendent guarantee, where the same 
disease that killed God has withered away ideas like Truth, 
Reason and Humanity, an atheism that finds instantiation 
in Blanchot and Camus (Watkin’s examples) but also in the 
thinkers analysed by Geroulanos in his own book. Ascetic 
atheism is an atheism that is not humanist since “far from 
triumphantly acceding to God’s vacated throne, Man finds 
himself unable to survive the divine demise.”10 The death of 
God is but the omen of the death of Man. However, bring-
ing together the terminology of different authors,11 “ascetic 
atheism” can at best merely ground an “antifoundational 
realism” as it is too metaphysically anodyne to fend off the 
resurgence of “fideism.” In Watkin’s view Derrida’s empha-
sis on the inescapable finitude of our expectation of a-venir 
“presents us with a sophisticated version of ascetic atheism”12 
and indeed ascetic atheism’s capitulation is best represented 
by the theological turn in French phenomenology, and the 
8 See for example Dennett’s membership of the (somewhat infelicitously 
named) “international internet constituency” of the “Brights,” aimed at 
“[promoting] the civic understanding and acknowledgment of the natural-
istic worldview, which is free of supernatural and mystical elements” (see 
http://www.the-brights.net), as well as A.C.Grayling’s recent publishing of The 
Good Book: A Secular Bible (London: Bloomsbury, 2011. Published in the US 
with the somewhat more acceptable title of The Good Book: A Humanist Bible).
9 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 3.
10 Ibid., 6.
11 Watkin, Geroulanos and Meillassoux, respectively.
12 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 7.
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emergence of post-religious or post-secular faith in a God 
beyond being (from Levinas to Marion).13 Residual atheism 
thus “finds itself unable to refute the turn to religion; in 
fact it is the very seedbed in which the turn can take root 
and bloom [and] under the guise of heroically repelling the 
religious intruder it is in fact an abject accommodation to 
religion’s terms of engagement.”14 We can now understand 
the meaning of Watkin’s title: what is difficult is to reach a 
consistent post-theological stance which does not unwittingly 
slip into the (ultimately bankrupt) positions of parasitic or 
ascetic atheism. Watkin has therefore chosen three “case 
studies”—Badiou, Nancy and Meillassoux—as three prime 
examples of thinkers attempting a “post-theological integra-
tion” whose goal
is not to oppose theism but to occupy it, not to expel theism but to 
ingest it, taking terms and patterns of thought previously associated 
with theism and re-inscribing them in a way that is not to be confused 
either with parasitism or with asceticism.15
Notice however that Watkin almost immediately crushes our 
hopes: none of these thinkers manages to safely achieve a post-
theological position. According to Watkin “neither Badiou nor 
Nancy unproblematically secures a position that is ‘without 
God’” and “Meillassoux’s move beyond atheism does not suc-
ceed in freeing itself from the shadow of religion”16—although 
throughout the book we can detect a slight partisanship with 
Nancy’s positions.17 The failure of these thinkers to actually 
13 As Dominic Janicaud put it in his well-known report on “The Theologi-
cal Turn in French Phenomenology” (in Dominic Janicaud, Phenomenology 
and the Theological Turn: The French Debate [New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2001]) this turn essentially consisted in a “rupture with immanent 
phenomenality” and the consequent “opening to the invisible, to the Other, 
to a pure givenness, or to an ‘archi-revelation.’” (Ibid. 17.)
14 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 11.
15 Ibid., 14.
16 Ibid., 15.
17 Unsurprisingly so, considering that Watkin’s previous publication, his 
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elaborate a successful post-theological integration, however, 
should not diminish the importance of the “new determina-
tion to grapple with the legacy of the death of God in a deeper 
way than ever before, re-making philosophy from the ground 
up as a thinking ‘without God’”18 at work in their writings. 
In contemporary French thought that of post-theological 
integration (as opposed to an “atheism” which would fall prey 
of parasitism or asceticism) is more of a research program (a 
difficult atheism) than an accomplished result.
Throughout the book, Watkin displays in-depth familiarity 
of the whole corpus of published work by the three French 
philosophers he examines, and he is well up-to-date with 
(and often critical of) the most significant pieces of second-
ary literature. The book is neatly organised, and each chapter 
is divided into sections dedicated to each thinker and con-
tains a useful concluding paragraph summarising the main 
points which were examined.19 The first two chapters of the 
book deal with the theme of the “death of God” in Badiou 
and Nancy. Watkin borrows the Badiouian taxonomy (from 
his prologue of his Court Traite d’Ontologie Transitorie) of a 
variety of “deaths”: the death of the God of the philosophers 
Phenomenology or Deconstruction?: The Question of Ontology in Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2009) (an extension of his PhD thesis) already showed a (critical) 
propensity towards Nancean positions and indeed had as one of its aims 
to render justice to the nuances of Nancy’s thought ignored by a somewhat 
selective reception of his work in English-language literature (Ibid. 9, 137.)
18 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 240.
19 I have only one minor editorial qualm with Watkin’s decision of always 
quoting the original French and to insert the translation in the endnotes at 
the close of each chapter. My French is decent enough to manage to under-
stand at least the general meaning of the, at times lengthy, quotes that are 
often encountered in the book without the need to jump to the endnotes at 
each occurrence, but as a general rule I’m not sure that an English-language 
publication should adopt this practice. Given that most of the texts quoted 
by Watkin are available in English translation, it seems more reasonable to 
me to offer an English quote in the main text, followed by a double page 
reference (English and French editions, as Watkin already does) and include 
the original French passage (a very welcome inclusion indeed!) as an endnote 
(or—even better—as a footnote).
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(chapter one) and that of the God of the poets (chapter two), 
and introduces the reader to the conversation between the 
two (particularly through Nancy’s intervention on Badiou 
“Philosophy Without Conditions”20 and Badiou’s L’Offrande 
Reservee) to highlight some crucial differences between their 
approach to post-theological thought. Chapter one thus stages 
“a productive encounter between Nancean finitude and Ba-
diouian infinitude”21 by counterposing Badiou’s axiomatic, 
dichotomising “Platonism of the multiple” to Nancy’s “decon-
struction of Christianity”: whereas for Badiou a true dethe-
ologised thought can only be the one which originarily posits 
an infinite inconsistent multiplicity, axiomatically rejecting 
the infinite/One of God (and foreclosing any reintroduction 
of the One, including Nancy’s finitude), Nancy stresses the 
necessity of recognising the historicity of metaphysics and 
its impure genesis and thus indicates a latent parasitism in 
Badiou’s commitment to a singular break of mathematism 
from mytho-poetic thought. However, Watkin concludes, 
“neither of these positions can, in the final account,…banish 
the ghost of parasitism.”22
Chapter two proceeds by explicating the rejection of the 
“God of the poets” and romanticist aesthetics through Badiou’s 
and Nancy’s reading of the Hegelian difference between 
“bad” (interminable repetition of finite instances) and “good” 
(actual) infinity: agreeing in the rejection of the negative 
finitude characterising bad infinity, Badiou opts for a positive 
(mathematically detheologised) infinity, while Nancy for a 
positive finitude, a finitude that opens unto infinite without 
falling into theological thought. The contrast drawn here 
is once again that between an immanent, rational infinity 
without theological reminders and a work-in-progress, “yet-
without” infinity of the finite. 
20 In Peter Hallward, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy 
(London: Continuum, 2004).




Chapter three brings Badiou and Nancy together by ex-
amining the key methodological articulations of their post-
theological thought: Badiou’s deployment of axioms and 
Nancy’s movement of dis-enclosure and spacing. This is a 
crucial chapter of the book which resists a quick summary: 
most interestingly (in my view) Watkin here defends Badiou’s 
employment of mathematical (set-theoretical) axioms against 
a range of accusations highlighting the “arbitrary” character of 
this choice, by highlighting how in Badiou’s own understand-
ing the founding (existential) axioms of set theory respond 
to “a certain historical necessity,”23 an historical injunction 
to come to ontological terms with modernity’s (along with 
Koyré’s well-known thesis)24 rejection of a finite, enchanted 
cosmos and the adoption of a secularised infinity. Watkin is 
quite right here in observing that Badiou’s axioms are neither 
inevitable (responding to a strict, quasi-Hegelian necessary 
stage of philosophical development) nor arbitrary (a mere 
unjustifiable fetishism for matehmatisation), but are strictly 
undecidable, an undecidability necessarily collapsed by the 
very axiomatic decision which decides them. This leads to 
one of the most interesting problems raised by this book: 
what Watkin calls Badiou’s “axiology of the Good.”25 Badiou’s 
philosophical choice of axiomatic thought cannot be justified 
by either an eternal necessity or as belonging to a contingent, 
and transitory, historical moment: Watkin therefore argues that 
“Badiou’s axioms are worthy (axios) because they promote the 
implicit Good in Badiou’s philosophy.”26 Watkin argues that 
this normative commitment is at work since the founding 
gesture of Badiou’s thought, and that “the Good for Badiou 
can be construed as atheism itself.”27 As in Lucretius’ (and the 
23 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 103.
24 See Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed world to the Infinite Universe (Balti-
more: The John Hopkins Press, 1957).
25 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 107.
26 Ibid., 107.
27 Ibid., 109.
Fabio Gironi – Review of Difficult Atheism
483
Epicurus of the Letter to Herodotus) case, an ethico-existential 
concern precedes and orientates ontological commitments, 
and Badiou’s choice of an axiomatic method is meant “to 
be worthy of the secularised, generic, universal notion of 
being that propels his thought,”28 buttressing a materialist 
and immanentist worldview. Watkin calls this an ultimately 
“therapeutic moment in Badiou’s axiomatisation”29: the Good 
is to set oneself free from the tyranny of the One (in all its—
always “parasitic”—forms), through adherence to the purely 
rational, mathematical, edifice built on a founding decision 
which axiomatically rejects the existence of any such One 
in favour of the primacy of multiplicity. This, however, in-
troduces an element of circularity in Badiou’s atheism since 
“secularisation itself becomes the promise which decides the 
axioms of his mathematised universe in the first place”30 and 
thus demonstrates, for Watkin, that Badiou’s atheism “must 
inevitably fall either into parasitism or into asceticism, an 
atheism that, like all great philosophies, is inaccessible to itself, 
and in that admission finally becomes consistent, as it makes 
room for fidelity to ontological ataraxia.”31 Once again, the 
chapter—which also examines Nancy’s faith as a supplement 
for reason and his rejection of the theism/atheism dichotomy 
in his “atheology”—closes with the diagnosis that both think-
ers “come up short of a post-theological integration.”32
Chapter four discontinues the parallel analysis of Badiou 
and Nancy by introducing the thought of Quentin Meillassoux 
and his rejection of the dichotomy of theism and atheism in 
favour of “philosophy.” Difficult Atheism thus holds the record 
(if only by a few months) of being the first English-language 
publication which examines the entirety of Meillassoux’s 
published works to date. And not only the published ones: 
Watkin refers to (and quotes extensively from) Meilassoux’s 
unpublished doctoral thesis De L’Inexistence Divine. Watkin 







does an excellent job in unpacking for the reader the nuances 
of both Meillassoux’s argument for a rational belief in a non-
existent (or inexistent) God, and his defense of the “principle 
of factiality” offering critical commentary of central nodes 
of this thought (often employing a Nancean deconstructive 
line). Once again, I want to focus here on some of the most 
interesting (especially for readers of this journal) of these 
points of critique. Repeating the structure of his commen-
tary to Badiou, Watkin defends Meillassoux’s hyperchaos 
from accusations of crypto-theological miraculousness but 
the goes on to argue that “hyperchaos is the undoing of the 
principle of factiality, and the exposure of Meillassoux’s phi-
losophy as parasitic after all,”33 by offering arguments against 
factuality and Meillassoux’s defense of the absoluteness of 
the law of non-contradiction and uncovering other binary 
oppositions which undermine Meillassoux’s short-circuiting 
of atheism and theism. Watkin’s main strategy is to draw the 
consequences of hyperchaos itself, a notion whose radicality 
Meillassoux “underestimates.”34 In what he calls the “split 
rationality critique” he argues that Meillassoux’s
own thinking must be up for grabs in the contingency of logical laws. 
In other words, the processes by which he arrives at the notions of 
“necessity,” “contingency” and “factiality” must themselves be able to 
be replaced by other, currently unimaginable, ways of thinking.35
And that therefore
[t]he very decision as to what may or may not be “rationally legitimate” 
must not be unaccountably exempted from a possible future contingent 
rationality that in the present remains radically unforeseeable, on pain 
once more of fideism in the enduring necessity of rationality as it is 
currently understood and practised.36
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Once we recognize the utter unpredictability of the changes 
brought about by a hyperchaotic shift, nothing is safe from 
modification, including the very notion of hyperchaos. Further, 
Watkin deconstructs the crucial Meillassouxian binaries of 
necessity/contingency and thinkability/unthinkability, pos-
sibility/impossibility by arguing that a consistent application 
of hyperchaos would explode such binaries themselves: no 
conceptual distinctions can survive hyperchaotic change, 
and no absoluteness could be predicated in their absence. 
Therefore, this short-circuiting of logical distinctions makes 
it impossible to say anything meaningful about hyperchaos:
The concepts of possibility and impossibility do not begin to account 
for hyperchaos… The least we can say about hyperchaos (which is 
also all we can say, and in truth nothing at all) is that it will have been 
incommensurable with the concepts of possibility and impossibility...
and incommensurability.37
Watkin pushes his critique even further: not only the logical 
conceptual apparatus could be collapsed or modified beyond 
commensurability in the aftermath of hyperchaotic change, 
but our very ability of recognising or acknowledging this 
change would be undermined by it, unless our cognitive 
faculties would be somehow untouchable. His conclusion 
is that Meillassoux
has two options: if he affirms that our understanding and the laws of 
logic cannot have changed in this way, he is making an idol of one, or 
the other, or both; if he is more circumspectly reckoning that they will 
not have changed, then he is supplementing his principle of factiality 
with a faith that, like Nancy’s faith, irreducibly makes reason what it 
is. Meillassoux’s factiality is either an idol, or an article of faith. What 
it cannot be is neither.38
Watkins singles out the unjustifiable, pre-philosophical 




decision of rationalism at play in Meillassoux’s work and in 
particular in his insistence on the anhypothetical nature of 
facticity, a principle given exclusively through demonstrative 
discourse, a decision which corresponds to an unexplained 
and “unaccountable act of faith”: Meillassoux’s arguments 
repeatedly “[beg] the question of rationality”39 and this 
transpires clearly in his unsupported appeal to intellectual 
intuition. In other words, Meillassoux rejects the ontological 
validity of the principle of sufficient reason, but preserves its 
epistemic role: there must be a reason justifying the beliefs 
we do hold, and that is the immutable deductive power of 
rationality itself operating according to (immutable) laws 
of logic. Watkin thus concludes that even Meillassoux does 
not manage to go beyond a/theism since his own thought 
ends up either idolising reason (as being “untouchable” by 
hyperchaos) or postulating it as an article of “reasonable 
faith”40 (needing a Nancean supplement of faith to be what 
it is) hence being guilty, by his own lights, of the very fideism 
he so vehemently denounces.41
The concluding couple of chapters seek to draw ethico-
political implications (sketching the relation between the 
metaphysical and the normative register) of the three forms 
of post-theological thinking defended by Badiou, Nancy and 
Meillassoux: chapter five vis-à-vis the ethical and political 
projects as a whole and chapter six examining more spe-
cifically the question of Justice. In the former Watkin neatly 
summarizes Meillasssoux’s ethical pronouncements from 
39 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 161.
40 Ibid., 157.
41 This line of critique is very close to Alberto Toscano’s critique of Meillas-
soux’s reintroduction of idealism within his purportedly materialist philosophy. 
Like Watkin’s observation that Meilassoux inconsistently hedges an idolised 
reason from hyperchaos, Toscano writes that “[i]n trying to maintain the 
speculative sovereignty of philosophical reason, albeit advocating a principle 
of unreason and breaking correlationist self-sufficiency, Meillassoux can 
be seen to reintroduce idealism at the level of form at the same time as he 
valiantly seeks to defeat it at the level of content.” Toscano in Levi Bryant, 
Nick Srniceck and Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 91.
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L’Inexistence Divine, Nancy’s rejection of the (derivative) 
distinction between ontology and ethics in his concept of 
archi-originary ethos, and Badiou’s reconfiguration of eth-
ics outside the Kant vs. Levinas dichotomy of autonomy vs. 
heteronomy. In the latter, Watkin pursues head-on the ques-
tion of “whether post-theological integrations can secure 
a notion of universal justice”42 including a comparison of 
Badiou’s “Idea of communism” and Nancy’s “ontological 
communism.” Worthy of particular notice, in the context 
of Watkin’s description of Meillassoux’s advent of a “fourth 
World of Justice” and the “baroque”43 evocation of a prophet of 
contingency (the Child of Man), is his critique of Meillassoux’s 
narrow understanding of justice, restrictively presented in 
terms of future redemption of past wrongs via the rebirth of 
bodies. Watkin draws the rather unobjectionable conclusion 
that “Meillassoux’s philosophy has everything in common 
with religion in general (and, most often, with Christianity 
in particular) apart from belief in an actually existing God.”44 
More provocatively, and in line with his “radicalization of 
hyperchaos” strategy of critique in the fourth chapter, Watkin 
presents Meillassoux with an unresolved issue: “[o]n Meillas-
soux’s account, why not hope that the problem of evil will be 
solved by a change in my understanding of what is just, rather 
than by a rebirth of humanity?”45 I find it hard to disagree 
with Watkin’s skepticism regarding the persuasiveness of 
Meillassoux’s ethico-political speculations. Concluding the 
chapter, Watkin argues that “[t]he notion of universal justice 
for each of our three thinkers encounters the problem of a 
latent or unexplained conflation of goodness and equality, or 
goodness and justice”46 and this links to a central, if subter-
ranean theme which recurs throughout the book, approached 
by Watkin more explicitly in the conclusion: the “question 







of fundamental philosophical orientation.”47 Watkin argues 
that even in their common struggle towards a post-theological 
thought each of the three philosophers in question adopts a 
different strategy dependent upon a pre-systematic decision 
of one or another philosophical orientation, a deep meth-
odological conviction serving as fulcrum for their thought: 
Badiou’s preference for (axiomatic) decision, Nancy’s for 
(deconstructive) dis-enclosure and Meillassoux’s for (anhypo-
thetical) demonstration. The Badiouian here could perhaps 
reply: doesn’t this admission implicitly favour Badiou’s own 
explicit reliance on a primordial decision? Isn’t it the case 
that to call Badiou’s fundamental orientation a decision in 
favour of decision is a redundant restatement of his founding 
gesture? And isn’t the aporia of justifying the content of one’s 
conception of ethical good best resolved by an imperative (in 
the form of “let there be X”), yet not sovereign (without the 
mastery endowed by an eternal necessity, free of raison d’être, 
an-archic), axiomatic decision? 
Finally, Watkin diagnoses again the current situation in 
French thought, summarising his argument as holding that “a 
consensus has emerged around a desire to move beyond both 
parasitism and asceticism to a post-theological integration that 
cuts the theological root of parasitism without renouncing 
its fruit.”48 As we have already seen however, and as Watkin 
has repeated throughout the book, no such post-theological 
integration has been consistently achieved: every atheism 
seems to slide back into the traps of parasitism or asceticism. 
In a way, Difficult Atheism is the meticulous chronicle of such 
a failure (Watkin’s argument-counterargument structure in 
presenting the positions of the three French philosophers 
is thorough and unforgiving) and it might therefore leave 
the reader with the impression that no positive thesis of en-
during value was offered throughout the book. It might be 
however unfair to ask Watkin to singlehandedly provide the 
successful formula of post-theological thought in this context: 
47 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 241.
48 Ibid., 239.
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Difficult Atheism is explicitly an exegetical work and a piece 
of intellectual history of the present, not a theoretical work 
in its own right. The most resounding message of Watkin’s 
book is that “we can no longer use the term ‘atheism’” since 
[i]f we are to avoid a reductive approach to the current re-assessment of 
the West’s theological legacy we will henceforth need to circumscribe 
the term “atheism” itself much more tightly and see it as but one pos-
sible response to the legacy of the death of God.49
Watkin’s caution is well justified, and his warning against a 
reductive dismissal of the problem of genuinely post-theological 
thought is extremely opportune: the dangers of unwittingly 
sliding into the safety of crypto-theological metaphysics or 
of replacing God with any allegedly “secular” transcendental 
signified are to be always guarded from. However, it could 
be argued that at times he sets the bar for achieving a “real” 
post-theological thought too high, and that in his account it is 
all too easy to fall into an either parasitic or ascetic mode of 
thought. This could in turn be a weapon in the hands of the 
theologically-minded interpreter: the one between difficult 
atheism and impossible atheism risks being too thin a line. 
In today’s intellectual climate, there is a distinct urgency to 
defend a historicist, revisable, self-critical, plastic and yet 
resilient and substantial atheist stance against those various 
forms of irrationalism and antirationalism which have been 
sparring partners of rationalist intellectuals (at least) since 
what Isaiah Berlin famously termed the reactionary Counter-
Enlightenment.50 I can only tentatively gesture towards an 
alternative route here: agreeing with Watkin that we should 
avoid to settle our thought into either the parasitic or the 
ascetic permutations of atheism, I would propose that the 
solution is not to sail through an almost impossible strait 
between them, but on the contrary to dialectically embrace 
49 Watkin, Difficult Atheism, 241.
50 See Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, (New 
York: Viking Press, 1979)
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both at the same time. In more intelligible terms, I think this 
would entail a commitment to a form of rational natural-
ism (or naturalised rationalism) capable of defending the 
knowledge-producing power of human rationality while 
destroying the idol of a transcendent Reason with a natural-
ist hammer—thus combining (“parasitic”) Enlightenment 
values with a (“ascetic”) post-Darwinian and post-structuralist 
demotion of (hu)Man.
Having said that, I believe that Difficult Atheism will be a 
precious contribution to the contemporary discussion regard-
ing “atheism” (inverted commas are now of order) precisely 
by stimulating a more nuanced understanding of this term, 
and that many of its insightful critiques on particular aspects 
of the thought of the three French thinkers will need to be 
taken in consideration as serious challenges51 by all those 
interested in pursuing a secular thought impermeable to 
re-appropriation by post-modern or post-secular theologians. 
51 As I already noted above, I believe that Watkin’s objections to Meillassoux’s 
theses regarding our rational knowledge of hyperchaos and the possibility 
of justice are distinctly penetrating. Meillassoux’s daring—and still develop-
ing—philosophical approach has provoked the coalescing and development 
of a large philosophical community loosely bound by “realist” concerns, 
but as the feeling of novelty wanes, and the entry points for a critique of 
his theses multiply, it is time for him to offer sound defenses to some of 
these critiques, and Watkin’s should be seen among the most pressing ones.
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Andy Merrifield, Magical Marxism: Subversive 
Politics and the Imagination






“Together, we might be able to do dangerous subversive things, mischievous things.”1 Such is 
Andy Merrifield’s opening promise in his recent book Magi-
cal Marxism: Subversive Politics and the Imagination. Merrifield 
situates the work between two poles of people: those who are 
more or less orthodox Marxists and those who are Marxists 
but don’t know it. Thus, despite the fact that Merrifield toys 
with central Marxist tenets, he avoids any notion of third-
way rhetoric; Merrifield’s arguments are unapologetically 
Marxist, and his attempt to shake the tradition from within 
requires some working knowledge of Marx’s texts. This is not 
because Merrifield’s arguments are obscure. On the contrary, 
he is to be commended for how deftly he has condensed a 
wide range of difficult source material. Magical Marxism is 
a joy for the reader, and Merrifield’s broad attempt to inject 
some affirmation into the critical negativity of Marxism is 
reflected in his prose. 
The book requires a slight familiarity with the tradition 
1  Andy Merrifield, Magical Marxism: Subversive Politics and the Imagination 
(London: Pluto Press, 2011), xii.
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because Merrifield’s proposal of a “magical” Marxism is 
speculative. However, the point of the book is to help further 
social and political change, and thus Merrifield does not so 
much assume that all of his readers will be familiar with 
Marxism as that they will agree with it. As he puts it in the 
introduction, “Many young people have no difficulty grasping 
why workers get ripped off and how capital accumulates in 
the hands of the wealthy. They know capitalism rarely lives 
up to it promises, to its supposed potential.”2 To such people, 
Merrifield hopes to introduce a new politics with “a touch of 
the magical, that brews up some new radical moonshine, a 
new potion for stirring up our critical concepts, for making 
us practically intoxicated, that dreams the unimaginable, that 
goes beyond merely what is, beyond all accepted rules and 
logic, a politics that plays by its own rules, rules that have 
little to do with rationality or economic reason.”3 To unfold 
this politics, Merrifield relies on Gabriel García Márquez, and 
in particular, his novel One Hundred Years of Solitude. In the 
book, one of the characters says that he does not understand 
the point of a political contest in which both parties agree 
on the rules. For Merrifield, moderation or capitulation to 
the current rules of the game―political representation, for 
starters―means losing before the battle even gets going.
It is on the basis of this proclamation that Merrifield begins 
to articulate his new politics. The new rules are tinged with 
a poetic spirit, and although Merrifield writes that Magical 
Marxism is “about irrationality [and] not rationality,”4 he 
does not veer into irrationalism, although it’s plain to the 
reader that he enjoys dancing near the cliff. Instead, taking 
his point of departure from Debord’s society of the spec-
tacle and framing his discussion around Henri Lefebvre’s 
conception of the everyday, Merrifield argues that “Magical 
Marxism means creating another fantasy in light of the rul-
ing fantasy; its critical power doesn’t come from criticism 
2  Merrifield, Magical Marxism, 3.
3  Ibid., 9.
4 Ibid., 18.
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but from an ability to disrupt and reinvent, to create desire 
and inspire hope.”5
Following magical realists such as Marquez, Merrifield 
takes the existing world as the substance for the illusions that 
he attempts to conjure up. He compares the additional four 
decades of life in the society of the spectacle after its naming 
by Debord to the insomnia plague in Macondo, the village of 
One Hundred Years of Solitude. In the story, the expert insom-
niac is one who forgets the act of dreaming altogether. The 
point here is that the blurring of reality and illusion in the 
society of the spectacle sets a different agenda for Marxism. 
Merrifield notes that Márquez also incorporates the specific, 
historical reality of a massacre of banana company work-
ers in Cienaga, Columbia in 1928 into One Hundred Years of 
Solitude. According to Merrifield, no one knows exactly how 
many people were killed, and what the insomnia plague and 
Marquez’s version of the banana workers massacre demon-
strate is “how the reality of historical truth and the reality of 
(possible) subjective illusion become one and the same. There 
is no real way to tell either apart.”6 For this reason, Merrifield 
asks whether it’s necessary or desirable for Marxism to play 
the role of unmasking illusions to get at the real truth. With 
Debord, Merrifield finds that a Marxism that seeks to dispel 
illusions “moves in exactly the opposite direction to radical 
politics.”7 It is retrospective, and Merrifield argues that radi-
cal politics must be carried out along a different continuum, 
“imagining something in the present tense while struggling 
to realize it in the future, prospectively.”8 Much of the book 
is wrought with this tension between the theoretician who 
looks to the past with analysis and the Magical Marxist who 
looks forward to the dawn.
To this end, Merrifield introduces an extended discussion of 
automatist and communist activism in Chapter 2, “Subscribing 






to the Imaginary Party: Notes on a Politics of Neo-communism.” 
Merrifield discusses the events surrounding the publication 
of The Invisible Committee’s The Coming Insurrection, which 
in addition to Society of the Spectacle and One Hundred Years of 
Solitude, serves as a major touchstone for the remainder of the 
book. Merrifield’s central point in this chapter is that direct-
action anarchism is more than simply a fellow traveller with 
classical Marxism, but rather that an alliance is necessary in 
order to become Magical Marxists. This activism is “grounded 
in everyday life rather than the workplace,”9 and Merrifield 
invokes André Gorz’s Farewell to the Working Class in order to 
suggest that the old argument about the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is moot. “Consequently, anarchists and Marxists 
have no real reel beef with one another, seemingly concur-
ring with what Henri Lefebvre told us long ago: that there’s 
essentially no distinction between anarchism and Marxism, at 
least no significant difference that precludes one from practi-
cally identifying with the other.”10 As such, Merrifield boldly 
proposes that a unified non-class can still carry out a kind 
of class struggle, even in the absence of the proletariat. With 
the possibility of subversion beyond the workplace, society 
itself becomes the site of liberation, and Merrifield affirms a 
politics of friendship which he claims will add muscle to an 
affective politics that is causal for social formations. “Affinity 
becomes the cement that bonds people across frontiers and 
barriers. In desiring another reality, inventing it, dreaming it 
up, people find their kindred souls, perhaps nearby, perhaps 
faraway; and in finding one another they struggle together 
for the realization of their common hopes.”11 The relation-
ship between affect and politics is something that seems to 
be subterranean throughout the text, and I often wished for 
a more explicit treatment of this theme by Merrifield.
In the next chapter, Merrfield expands somewhat on these 
themes by introducing mística, a concept that comes from the 
9  Merrifield, Magical Marxism, 51.
10  Ibid., 62.
11  Ibid., 64.
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Landless Rural Workers’ Movement in Brazil. He compares 
this to the Spanish poet Frederico García Lorca’s notion of 
duende; both exhibit “a militant poetic and a poetics of mili-
tancy that makes things possible even when they’re impossible, 
even when you think that all is lost, that everybody is dead 
and buried.”12 These concepts are both important, rooted in 
particular struggles, and serve as concrete examples of the 
type of politics that Merrifield aims to gather under his ban-
ner of Magical Marxism. While this discussion could benefit 
from a more systematic account of affect, the remainder of 
this chapter nicely begins to tie the book together. Merrifield’s 
reliance on Lefebvre becomes strongest at this point, and his 
treatment of spontaneity is one of the highlights of the book. 
He argues that the spontaneous or unpredictable is essential 
for radical politics; without it, there is no movement. However, 
he also admits that not all eruptions of spontaneous political 
passion are progressive, pointing to several examples, includ-
ing Margaret Thatcher’s “bedside read,”13 Friedrich von Hayek. 
Merrifield takes a tempered approach, claiming that the drive 
to reject spontaneity outright is dogmatic, but to take it as 
an ontological principle or foundation is equally danger-
ous and capable of degenerating into violence for the sake 
of violence or “impulsive nihilism.”14 Merrifield advocates 
a hacker ethic approach to Marxism because “Marxism has 
the software as well as the hardware needed to engineer new 
forms of cooperation and solidarity, new forms of sponta-
neous activism and self-management spanning the world.”15 
This comparison with the Free Software movement may well 
serve as an apt metaphor for Merrifield’s entire approach in 
Magical Marxism, and the book continually sways between 
some conceptual development or explication of high theory 
and carrion calls for new forms of affirmative engagements 
between Marxism and various forms of activism. The ex-






amples that he gives often illustrate that these engagements 
are already or nearly underway, and with the recent uprisings 
around the world in 2011, I assume that an updated version of 
the book that takes these movements into account would be 
well worth reading. This is perhaps a strange way to praise a 
book published so recently, and also a moment to recognize 
that Merrifield would rather have his readers continue to 
form new alliances and networks of subversion with these 
movements than wait for his analysis of them.
In the remaining chapters, Merrifield continues to spin out 
various examples and urgings for a more positive Marxism. 
The fifth chapter, “Macondos of the Mind: Imagination Seizes 
Power,” opens with the suggestion that one of the characters 
in One Hundred Years of Solitude can be understood to have 
hedged his bets entirely on “speculative realism,”16 which 
he footnotes with some favorable comments. Merrifield is 
clearly familiar and enthusiastic with the debates surrounding 
speculative realism, and notes that “the ontological terrain...
is a lot more open, a lot more floating than has hitherto been 
credited,”17 even though he clearly favors a more mystical and 
humanist realism than many speculative realist authors. In 
this chapter, Merrifield also clarifies precisely what he means 
by imagination, taken from Sartre as “a consciousness for-
itself expressing itself in all its liberty.”18 With this, he also 
follows Sartre’s distinction and slippage between a real future 
and an imagined future. Merrifield then turns to an exten-
sive discussion of the Grundrisse, which helps bring together 
earlier mentions of figures such as Gorz. The imagination 
has a task of “the most damned seriousness.”19 Arguing that 
the subsumption of living labor to machines has reduced the 
time of necessary labor, Merrifield puts a positive spin on an 
otherwise dismal present wherein plundering of the commons 
has taken place through increased capital accumulation. The 
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fact that many are working less or part-time becomes a fact to 
be embraced, and time becomes perhaps the most precious 
asset for the Magical Marxist. Merrifield is not glib about the 
potential here, as he knows that the situation of precarious 
work and an ever-widening gap between the rich and poor of 
the world is not simply a fact to be celebrated and overcome 
by opting out of work. Instead, the most damn serious task of 
the imagination becomes a responsibility to align and fight; 
“this responsibility is and has to be a world away from bour-
geoius/neo-liberal ideas about personal responsibility, about 
being responsible for the exploitation somebody else inflicts 
upon us. Communist responsibility, by contrast, means being 
responsible for self-assertion not for self-condemnation.”20
With Magical Marxism then, Merrifield deliberately reaches 
in utopian directions in order to spur on a new politics. While 
he reminds us that to banish negativity altogether is to do away 
with Marxism itself,21 his overwhelming posture is affirmative, 
leaning more on figures such as Bloch or Hardt and Negri 
than Adorno or Marx himself. For all this positivity, however, 
Merrifield maintains a dialectical balancing act throughout 
the book, and thus even when he begins to criticize various 
figures or concepts within Marxism, he does so in order to 
push them in a direction that he hopes will be more politically 
subversive. For this reason, Magical Marxism is an important 
and helpful text as we move towards new stages of the Occupy 
movements, among other unknown spontaneous forms of 
passionate activism. Merrifield argues that “subversion is the 
condition of human beings in their quest for liberty,”22 and with 
this in mind, I offer only one critique of the book, hopefully 
in the spirit of a Magical Marxist tarrying with the positive. 
I have alluded to a desire for a more thorough framework 
to deal with issues of affect and politics, and this is because 
I think that a politics that reaches out to the utopian too 
strongly runs the risk of being co-opted. I agree that to banish 





the utopian, the magical, the absurd, and the affirmative from 
a radical politics will render it stale and able it to be easily 
swept under the rug where other people looking backwards 
with the right analysis are found, out of sight and unable to 
effectively bring about a decisive change to the status quo. If 
we are to make an analogy with affect and reason, then the 
point is that we can never escape the world of the affects. As 
Magical Marxists, we can never escape the hope for a better 
society. Even Adorno, a Marxist who is so negative that Mer-
rifield understandably doesn’t even mention him, writes at 
the end of Minima Moralia that “the only philosophy which 
can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the at-
tempt to contemplate all things as they would be from the 
standpoint of redemption.”23 Our collective utopian desire to 
live in an emancipated time is already underway, but in order 
to further it, we need more than a politics of hope: we need 
a politics of joyful and hopeful reasoning. Spinoza handles 
this relationship between affect and reason expertly in the 
Ethics, because he understood that to banish affects only serves 
hierarchical power and does nothing for the advancement of 
our happiness. For this reason, Spinoza brings together the 
joyful desire to affirm our own striving with reason as our 
most powerful tool, giving us the material for an affective 
reasoning to enact our collective emancipation, wherein we 
operate at the highest pitch of human freedom.24 
23 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, (Lon-
don: Verso Books 2005), 247.
24 Baruch Spinoza, Political Treatise trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 41.
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Graham Harman, Circus Philosophicus




After four vivid pages spent describing “the myth of the ferris wheel” Graham Harman sets 
into what some have called the most accessible introduction 
to Object Oriented Ontology to date. At around 25,000 words 
in length Circus Philosophicus reads nicely in one extended 
sitting, and very readily yields rewards to both the specialist 
and non-specialist reader. Situated within Harman’s expand-
ing oeuvre Circus Philosophicus is not readily comparable with 
any of his other work work, with the possible exception of 
the forthcoming Treatise on Objects (Open Humanities Press), 
which Harman describes as having a similar sort of prose. 
1The incomparable genre of Circus Philosophicus seems to 
have been the goal from the beginning, a fact made evident 
by the rear cover blurb which describes the goal to “restore 
myth to its central place in the discipline.” The following 
review will give a brief summary of the first half of Circus 
Philosophicus highlighting some pertinent details, while of-
fering some closing comments on the interesting placement 





of the work within both the genre and the discourse of Object 
Oriented Ontology.
From the first sentences of Chapter One, Harman quickly 
does away with the robotic or obscurantist tones that too often 
proliferate in contemporary philosophical writing. Instead 
he offers a narrative exposition of his philosophy in a genre 
somewhere between travel literature and the more accessible 
end of traditional philosophical prose. The work includes 
references to both real and fictional events, ranging from 
Harman’s 2008 trip to Chennai described in Chapter Three, 
to the imaginary myth of a haunted boat in Chapter Five.2 It 
is not surprising, given the latitude taken in both the stories 
and philosophical exposition that Harman calls it “the most 
satisfying piece of writing I’ve ever done.”3
As mentioned above, the work begins with the myth of the 
ferris wheel which provides the reader with a vivid image of 
the object relations that so define the system of Object Oriented 
Ontology. Harman also describes the mythic wheel in terms 
of “the dramatic interplay of object and network,”4 defined 
by events, contexts, and relations.5 He begins his argument 
by refuting the framework of the classical division between 
substance and aggregate, thereby opening the field for a 
wider definition of objects varying from “steel workers” to 
“celebration” in keeping with the curious example on page five. 
The refutation of the substance aggregate distinction is then 
pursued by dismissing the “familiar criterion of durability”6 
in discerning “what is real and what is accidental.” 7 Soon after, 
2 Graham Harman, “A relevant Circus Philosophicus excerpt,” Object Oriented 
Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/07/23/a-relevant-
circus-philosophicus-excerpt/ (accessed January 6, 2011)
3 Graham Harman, “Circus Philosophicus being printed,” Object Oriented 
Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/10/18/circus-phil-
osophicus-being-printed/ (accessed January 6, 2011)
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the ghost of Meillassoux’s “arche-fossil”8 can be seen looming 
in the background as human observers are removed from the 
myth of the ferris wheel in a sweeping illustrative gesture.9
After concluding the myth of the ferris wheel Harman transi-
tions from the third person to the first person and confesses 
that the myth is in fact an apologetic for the object-centric 
positions of Alfred North Whitehead and Bruno Latour.10 
This myth in defense of Whitehead and Latour’s model of 
object relations quickly turns to a description of its limita-
tions, including a nod to Latour in Harman’s claim that no 
object is “reducible to the events in which it participates.”11
The episodic narrative picks up again at the beginning of 
Chapter 2, entitled “The Bridge,” with a description of Har-
man’s years as a student in Annapolis. One can only speculate 
about the factual status of the narrator’s described engage-
ment to the character “Olympia, the multilingual heiress to 
an ancient pharmaceutical fortune.”12 The lengthy dialogue 
between the narrator and Olympia proceeds to invoke names 
from Heraclitus through Dante to Simondon, and the chapter 
sadly resolves with the termination of the engagement.
Harman then moves the small quasi-autobiography to a 
discussion on, of all things, calliopes. Powered by steam, or 
more recently compressed air, the calliope is a large musical 
instrument consisting of a multitude of whistles (making 
music which can reportedly be heard for miles). This is fol-
lowed by mention of Harman’s 2007-2008 sabbatical leave 
from the American University in Cairo, part of which was 
spent in Amsterdam, and another part in India. After voicing 
his rejection of Thomas Metzinger’s reductionist material-
ism outlined in Metzinger’s book Being No One, Harman 
offers his thoughts on Leibniz’s Monadology. In light of the 
8 See Chapter 1 of Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier 
(London & New York: Continuum, 2008).
9 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 6-7.





idea that “the monad (simple substance) is never separated 
from its body (composite substance)”13 Harman criticizes 
the unity and simplicity of Leibniz’s concept of the monad 
stating that there is a “false distinction between ultimate, 
simple substances and complex, derivative aggregates.”14 
The calliope is then implicated as an example of Edmund 
Husserl’s idea that we first encounter the object as a whole, 
rather than encountering the individual qualities and link-
ing “them together through the gullible myth of an underly-
ing thing.”15 After some further exposition on the calliopic 
nature of objects Harman connects this view of irreducible 
objects to the myth of the ferris wheel through the image of 
“a series of interlocking calliopes, each emitting music into 
the local sky above it, and thereby combining with others to 
yield larger machines.”16
So concludes the limited summary that this review will 
provide, for to give away much more would be unfair to future 
readers. What can be said safely is that the three chapters that 
constitute the second half of the work include a conversation 
with the science fiction novelist China Miéville on an off-
shore drilling rig (coincidentally the name of Chapter Four), 
Husserl’s ideas presented alongside an oriental myth in “The 
Haunted Boat” (Chapter Five), and a fascinating discussion 
between Harman and Latour over shisha and bad weather in 
Chapter Six. Let these be a temptation for the reader to buy the 
fairly priced book or to find it shelved alongside Heidegger’s 
work in your local library.17 
As is the custom with the discourse arising in the wake 
of Speculative Realism’s splintering, weblogs lit up with re-
sponses to Circus Philosophicus upon its release in late 2010. 




17 Graham Harman, “I don’t understand library cataloguing,” Object Ori-
ented Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/12/11/i-dont-
understand-library-cataloguing/ (accessed January 6, 2011).
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The first to occur was an exchange between Graham Har-
man and Levi Bryant concerning “vicarious causation,” and 
the second, an excellent response from Christopher Vitale 
of Networkologies.18 This review will conclude with a short 
examination of the nature of these exchanges, and a look at 
the unusual genre that Circus Philosophicus inhabits within 
an even more unusual discourse.
Levi Bryant (Difference and Givenness and The Democracy 
of Objects), who makes a short appearance near the end of 
Chapter Four, responds at Larval Subjects with an excellent 
post outlining and summarizing Harman’s concept of vicari-
ous causation.19 Developed in Guerrilla Metaphysics (2005), 
vicarious causation is described by Bryant as having three 
major characteristics: vicarious, asymmetrical, and buffered. 
In his response to Circus Philosophicus Bryant speaks to his 
difficulty in accepting vicarious causation in the past, and his 
present appreciation for its depiction in Circus Philosophicus. 
After outlining the three aforementioned aspects of vicarious 
causation, Bryant gives us a look into his The Democracy of 
Objects where he argues for an “autopoietic” system of objects 
which includes a corresponding idea to vicarious causation 
that differs in its emphasis on the translation-perturbation 
that occurs between objects-as-systems. Bryant’s autopoietic 
mode of causation is then addressed in Harman’s response in 
terms of a desired clarification regarding exactly how direct 
perturbed object interactions can be.20
This exchange between Harman and Bryant captures sev-
eral fascinating aspects of the discourse now called Object 
Oriented Ontology, as well as pointing to similar changes in 
18 Christopher Vitale, “Circus Philosophicus,” Networkologies, http://net-
workologies.wordpress.com/2010/12/31/circus-philosophicus/ (accessed 
January 6, 2011).
19 Levi Bryant, “Vicarious Causation,” Larval Subjects, http://larvalsubjects.
wordpress.com/2010/12/24/vicarious-causation-2/#more-4363 (accessed 
January 6, 2011).
20 Graham Harman, “Levi’s post on vicarious causation,” Object Oriented 
Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/12/24/levis-post-
on-vicarious-causation/ (accessed January 6, 2011).
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genre found in Circus Philosophicus. It first points to the speed 
at which responses occur to both newly published works 
and other blog posts, and second, the exchange itself occurs 
in the emerging medium of our time. Responses occur at a 
speed which far surpasses the lengthy publishing process 
that the academy has become so accustomed to, and as we 
can derive from McLuhan’s famous statement, the message 
will change as the medium changes. Even the companies that 
publish work on Object Oriented Ontology do so quickly—I 
am thinking here of Re.Press, Open Humanities Press, and 
Zero Books. Circus Philosophicus was published in the space of 
a year, and Harman remarks elsewhere that Re.Press offered 
the publication of his own Prince of Networks in a fraction of 
the time offered by a traditional publisher.21
The fact that most of Object Oriented Ontology is played 
out so quickly on blogs and through open access publishers 
may also be indicative of its networked nature. As a discourse 
Object Oriented Ontology uses the images of matrixial ob-
jects that are connected and complex. The accessibility of the 
discourse to anyone with an rss feed reader also points to 
the emphasis on the democracy between actors that springs 
from Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ant). Situated within 
these networks Circus Philosophicus is certainly a feature of 
the greater discourse in its accessibility, the speed of its pub-
lication, and its networked mediation of the objects called 
“prose” and “narrative.”
On the level of Circus Philosophicus itself, genre is bent, but 
perhaps not entirely reinvented. Robert Pirsig’s Zen and the 
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, although quite a bit longer, does 
preclude Circus Philosophicus in its combining of narrative 
and philosophical prose. To draw a comparison between the 
two would bow to the tendency to reduce the one to the other, 
so the two works should remain connected although, with 
vicarious causation in mind they best not make contact. The 
philosophical implications of myth and narrative do remain, 
21 Graham Harman, “Follow-up on open access,” Object Oriented Philosophy, 
http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2011/01/06/follow-up-on-open-access/ 
(accessed January 6, 2011).
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however, as the following quotation from Richard Kearney’s 
On Stories illuminates:
What works at the level of communal history works also at the level 
of individual history. When someone asks you who you are, you tell 
your story. That is, you recount your present condition in the light of 
past memories and future anticipations. You interpret where you are 
now in terms of where you have come from and where you are going 
to. And so doing you give a sense of yourself as a narrative identity that 
perdures and coheres over a lifetime. This is what the German philoso-
pher Dilthey called the coming-together-of-a-life (Zusammenhang des 
Lebens), meaning the act of coordinating an existence which would 
otherwise be scattered over time. In this way, storytelling may be said 
to humanise time by transforming it from an impersonal passing of 
fragmented moments into a pattern, a plot, a mythos.22
Kearney speaks to a concept of narrative identity being informed 
by myth in the humanization of time. Circus Philosophicus, in 
turn, provides the reader with both a philosophical primer 
on Object Oriented Ontology as well as some insights into 
the Zusammenhang des Lebens of the author himself. In this 
way, both the philosophical idea and the narrative life of the 
author are connected. The networked system of objects that 
constitutes both the content and form of Circus Philosophicus 
is bound up in both philosophical thought and narrative 
life, making it a picture of non-reductive object relations. 
Where other works may be strictly narrative prose or strictly 
philosophical prose, Circus Philosophicus asymmetrically 
mediates between two disparate objects without reducing 
one to the other.
As was stated at the beginning, Circus Philosophicus offers an 
accessible introduction to Object Oriented Ontology. Christo-
pher Vitale writes that “this is the most accessible presentation 
of OOO to date,”23 and Levi Bryant seconds claiming that it 
is “perhaps the most amusing and accessible introduction 




to Graham’s thought published yet.”24 The form and value of 
Circus Philosophicus extends beyond its content to the fact that 
it serves as a referent to the larger attributes of the discourse 
in its twisting of genre, and accessible presentation. The only 
confusion that stands out in the text is the odd nature of 
the afterword, also pointed out by Christopher Vitale in his 
response. It seems appropriate to close with the thought that 
one can only guess at the significance of a surrealist, monk 
and telepath in the concluding pages of the work.25 Perhaps 
the presence of these disparate objects is another feature of 
the flat ontology of actors that so define Object Oriented 
Ontology, or merely a reference to some narrative life-world 
yet unknown to the reader.
24 Bryant, “Vicarious Causation.”
25 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 77.
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Joseph Nechvatal’s nOise anusmOs installation
Galerie Richard, New York,  April 12-May 26, 2012
Yuting Zou
Independent Researcher
“The task of perception entails pulverizing the world,
but also one of spiritualizing its dust.”1
Black is the “color” of undivided nothingness and simplicity that has yet been penetrated by light. 
Black is immanent to itself. Entering the Galerie Richard, black 
was arguably my instant impression of Joseph Nechvatal’s 
nOise anusmOs installation, for most of this new series of 
paintings are unified by a black background. Against the 
black backdrop are complicated webs of alternating red and 
white, they suggest many ambiguous and provocative images 
of corporeal surfaces. Here, sfumato plays a role in slightly 
reducing the contrast of colors by adding a smoky and subtle 
layer to the otherwise pixelated images. The entire room is 
filled with immersive noise, from the visual noise (digital 
virus) inside the pictorial frame to its audial extension into 
the ambient space through the “viral symphony.” Bathed 
in a continuity of noise, it appeared to me that the overall 
composition of this body of work was more sparse and plural 
than before, and more speculative.  
On the black canvases, the potencies of color start to unfold. 
1 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
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Each painting is an autonomy of the inside, and it records 
the life of the tiny automata—artificial viruses. Those au-
tomata are equipped with sensory systems that allow them to 
perceive their local environment, detect enemies, and react 
accordingly. While, in most of the artist’s previous works, the 
macroscopic corporeality is decomposed by the microscopic 
into visible or invisible traces, the majority of this new series 
reverse the scheme, as the microscopic is used to generate 
the macroscopic, the cosmological. The artificial viruses are 
creative agents that resemble Leibnizian monads—simple 
substances that are living mirrors of the entire universe, 
projections of a phantasmagorical phenomenon, and each 
an indivisible autonomous enclosure of infinite minute 
perceptions. A cluster of viruses start from an indiscernibly 
close vicinity, with almost indistinguishable perceptions, 
then form infinitesimal differential relations, and unfold 
the color pixels underneath their paths. As time goes by, the 
integration of minuscule differentials gives a clear percep-
tion of chiaroscuro of varied degrees. By that increasingly 
sharp chiaroscuro, the two-fold image is made visible: the 
human anus (or retina) and the black hole (or wormhole). 
As such, through viruses’ own mild (confused) perceptions, 
their vibrating trajectories become a filter for a distinct per-
ception towards a threshold of consciousness. This process is 
captured into an actualized work of art. Looking upon them, 
vision sees vision.
Under dim lighting, the gallery room simulates a universal 
theater, where various media coexist to form a bel composto 
(beautiful assemblage) of many arts—the electronic “viral 
symphOny,” computer-robotic assisted acrylic on canvas, 
video animations, and a projection. Nonetheless, the mixed-
media unity is a mind-boggling one, a mixture of mystery 
and indecency, just like the “permanent happening” on the 
altar stage of the Cornaro chapel. That is, Bernini’s marble 
sculpture The Ecstasy of St. Teresa, where St. Teresa is portrayed 
as a young woman in tunic at the height of her spiritual trans-
port. As she recalled in her autobiography, she experienced 
both physically and spiritually an intense sweet pain that 
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caused her to moan, when all her entrails were penetrated 
and drawn out by a golden arrow during a gravity-free levita-
tion.2 Somehow reminiscent of that, the close-ups of human 
anus or retina are nomadically linked to the black holes or 
wormholes, through which an imaginative cosmological tele-
portation takes place. In that silent flight of noise, bodies are 
pulverized into weightless dusts, becoming a homogeneous 
whole with the boundless unknown and the inexperience-
able, reaching the ultimate ecstasy. Moreover, in the light of 
his own theory, the typical strategy of Nechvatal’s art works 
is to invoke “an infliction of a pleasant frustration that can 
lead to creative visualization,” which can also be observed 
from the audience’s reaction. Unlike his previous style that 
is characterized by overlapping two incompossible strata of 
the actual and the virtual, this time, the actual human retina, 
anus, or cosmological singularities, are progressively weaved 
into the fabric of the virtual noise, resulting in an emergent 
“viractual” (a term coined by the artist).3 It is a pleasure to see 
how these strands of virtual particles move on to unfold the 
magic tapestries that depict the moment of creation. However, 
they diverge quickly, lose their way in the labyrinth of the 
black chaosmos, and have only a brief existence from the 
undifferentiated black, back to black. Perhaps, all this echoes 
with what Francois Laurelle says, “(t)he World is the endless 
confusion of man and Universe.”4
Given the expansive, ecstatic, non-hierarchical impression 
2 Teresa, Life of St. Teresa of Jesus, of the Order of Our Lady of Carmel. Trans. 
David Lewis, ed. Benedict Zimmerman. 3rd ed. (London: T. Baker; New York: 
Benziger, 1904).
3 Joseph Nechvatal, Immersion Into Noise, (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press in conjunction with the University of Michigan Library’s Scholarly 
Publishing Office, 2011).
4 FrançoisLaruelle, Of Black Universe in the Human Foundations of Color. The 
original French essay, titled “Du noir univers: dans les fondations humaines 
de la couleur,” was published in La Décision philosophique 5 (April 1988): 
107-112. The English edition of this essay was first translated and published 
by Miguel Abreu as “Of Black Universe in the Human Foundations of Color” 
in the catalogue Hyun Soo Choi: Seven Large-Scale Paintings (New York: Thread 
Waxing Space, 1991), 2-4.
Speculations III
510
of the work, the unity of the microscopic and the macroscopic 
culminates in one’s mindscape as that of the infinitely small 
(infinitesimal) and the infinitely large, reflecting essentially 
the Leibnizian fractal view of the infinite:
I did not definitely assert that there are infinitely many degrees of 
infinities; I merely made certain conjectures, by virtue of which I 
deemed this to be possible, and indeed probable. My main reason was 
that there is no reason why God should have willed the existence only 
of this degree of infinity or order of magnitude, which constitutes our 
objects, proportioned to our intellects. I can easily conceive that, in the 
smallest particle of dust, there can exist a world, in which all things 
have the same relative proportions as in this large world; and, on the 
other hand, that our world might be nothing but a particle of dust in 
another, infinitely larger world. This way of conceiving things can be 
continued upwards and downwards indefinitely.5
5 G.W. Leibniz. Die mathematische schriften von Gottfried Wilheim Leibniz, vol. 
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